



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**A HISTORY OF
MODERN PHILOSOPHY**

BOOKS BY
HORATIO W. DRESSER

History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy
History of Modern Philosophy
Ethics in Theory and Application
Psychology in Theory and Application

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY
Publishers

A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

BY
HORATIO W. DRESSER, Ph.D.

Author of
"Psychology in Theory and Application," "Ethics in Theory and
Application," etc.

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PREFACE

This History introduces the student and general reader to leading tendencies and systems of modern thought, beginning at the point where studies in the philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance are brought to a conclusion, and continuing as far as current philosophy has become history. The logical prerequisite and natural introduction to the philosophy of the modern period is knowledge of ancient thought. But this History has been written with the realization that some will approach the study from the point of view of modern interests and problems, notably the results of the special sciences.

Philosophy is concerned with the universe as a whole: the first principles of the cosmos, the nature of mind, of the self, and of the moral order; as well as the nature of truth, the meaning of history, and the realm of ends or eternal values. Apparently, one system of thought displaces another to such slight advantage that there seems little prospect that this ideal will be realized. Yet the conflicts of systems are partly due to the fact that philosophers are intensively critical: they disparage a system if one objection can be raised against it. Time shows that from diverging systems have come a surprising number of conceptions essential to a world-view. Hence modern thought constantly reminds us of contributions made long ago by the ancient Greeks. We moderns have added the instruments, the laboratories, the precise methods, and the highly specialized research in co-ordinated fields by which we have verified ancient anticipations. This History endeavors to do justice to doctrines, sometimes neglected, which tend toward a comprehensive system.

Some of our modern tendencies might lead us to anticipate far less than this. Apparently, the theory of knowledge has been greatly over-emphasized, and we might be tempted to ignore it in studying the history of the past three centuries. Yet the discussion of this issue has in part given us the modern mind. We may have concluded that positivism is the only defensible doctrine, and so we might tend to exalt Bacon, the sceptics of the French Enlightenment, and Auguste Comte, by underestimating Descartes or Leibniz. But our history does not confirm this view. Again, the idealism of Berkeley may seem to have been so insistently refuted that Berkeley might well be ignored. Yet Berkeley has been given new recognition within the last two decades. More unfortunate would be the presupposition that pragmatism or instrumentalism is a philosophy, rather than a method of testing conceptions; and that anti-intellectualism has proved reason or intellect to be an essentially biological product, useful in our social environment, but of minor constructive value. Fidelity to reason has produced the modern types of philosophy, and the conviction that reason is competent is still the most defensible motive. The direct line of development is not from Bacon to Voltaire, and thence to the meagre results of thinkers who have given up the metaphysical enterprise: it is from Descartes and the other rationalists to the critical issues raised by Locke, the idealistic analysis of Berkeley, the sceptical analysis of Hume; and thence to Kant and the post-Kantians, with frequent reminders of Leibniz; and finally to the recent polemic of realists whose discussions can hardly be understood without grasping the idealisms wherewith they contend.

Modern philosophy is due to the conviction that First Philosophy or Metaphysics is extremely worth while, that philosophy seeks and can attain a world-view, can become a system by aid of the sciences. The early thinkers in the modern period acquired their conviction that reason is competent while science was emerging from centuries of neglect, while philosophy was overcoming its servitude to authority. To realize the force of the transition to the

freedom of thought which made possible the liberalism and criticism of Spinoza and Hume, is to take up the point of view of those who ardently believe the human mind can progressively eliminate what is merely transient and temperamental in the several systems. Appreciatively following the changes from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth, thus to our own century, we come to the greatly enriched conceptions of the philosophy of science. The possibility of agreement among philosophers is partly due to the developments of science which have rendered theories less necessary. The philosophy of science is in a way the central interest to which we are led by following the constructive thinking of the past three hundred years.

Here as elsewhere the philosopher gives himself to a consideration of what he finds rationally prevalent, he does not, as some critics have supposed, invent systems in a rarefied atmosphere. Thus he finds the mechanical conception of the universe, wrought in the age from Galileo to Newton, modified by the contributions of chemistry, embryology, geology, the doctrine of evolution, as the idea of the organism is brought to the fore. Again, he notes the transition from absolute space to relativity, masses to atoms, atoms to electrons and protons, solid matter in fixed positions in space to centres of radiant energy, mere "things" to *events* in space-time. Materialism meanwhile has waned. Remarkable indeed is the transition from the time when, for Hobbes, reality was Body in space, and thought mere "calculation" explicable by mechanical law. The former world-view has been refined away to a point where there is decreasing difference between an electrical and a spiritual universe.

Whatever the contributions of science, however, the essentially human problems remain, the relation of the philosopher to his system, of his general principles to ethics and religion, the philosophy of history, the theory of the State. Many interpretations of human nature may still be called for, varied ideals and values. For most of us the conservation of values remains the central interest. Philosophy in the greater sense has manifested a diversity of

interests in addition to the cosmological problem, notably in the interpretation of civilizations, the relation to the arts, to poetry, and literature; also the fostering of practical wisdom like that of the Stoics, the enrichment of values, and the assimilation of values in periods like that of Goethe and Schiller in Germany and Wordsworth in England. What we are concerned to do is to relate the values which withstand criticism to the cosmos of mathematical and physical conceptions which we call our modern world. The philosophy which became a "rediscovery of the inner life" also became an emergence into a world common to rationalists and empiricists, idealists and realists, amidst an enlarged conception of the human self.

The references at the close of sections include works in English especially available for introductory study. Readings in the briefer works of the philosophers in the earlier period, such as Descartes' *Discourse on Method* and Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*, may readily be supplemented by Rand's selections from the works of classical modern philosophers. For the period after Kant, works on special phases of idealism are particularly recommended, notably Royce's *Spirit of Modern Philosophy* and *Lectures on Modern Idealism*. The Philosophy Series of the Modern Student's Library includes small volumes of selections from the works of Descartes, Hume, Hegel, and other modern philosophers. The author's indebtedness, in addition to his debt to Royce and other historians of special periods, is indicated by footnotes.

HORATIO W. DRESSER.

South Hadley, Mass.,
Jan. 3, 1928.

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PART ONE
FROM BACON TO KANT

HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

§ 1. THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Ancient Philosophy.—With the beginning of the modern period philosophy resumes its ancient privileges. Originating as the endeavor to grasp and interpret the nature of things in their system, philosophy also began with the emancipation of thought from mythology and tradition. As a quest for the first principle of things, philosophy won the right to phrase that principle as love of truth might dictate. In the cosmological period, philosophy became identified with interest in such material elements as water, air, fire. Yet the “water,” “air,” or “fire” of these primitive cosmologies presently ceased to be a merely sensuous or tangible element and became a concept, when brought into polemical relation with other concepts, such as the “indefinite,” “number,” world-reason or justice, or some equivalent cosmic principle. Concepts of Being as immutable and immobile were brought into contrast with concepts of Becoming as the essential principle of the cosmos. The One and the Many were also contrasted. Thus began the age-long controversy which resolved itself into a comparative study of concepts, to be construed by rival theories of knowledge and competing ideas of ultimate reality.

The opposition between types of Being and Becoming also brought a change from mere cosmology to a profound discovery of the inner world. Accordingly, with the reflections of Socrates, philosophy became ethical insight. With Plato, philosophy departed in a measure from the

realm of sense-experience, and became a system of eternal Ideas, archetypes, ethical principles and values. Aristotle distinguished between First Philosophy (metaphysics, ontology, the science of Being or ultimate reality) and the various disciplines, logic, ethics, psychology. Thus philosophy was classed as either theoretical or practical. In the subsequent period, the study of first principles fell into relative neglect, amidst the practical interests of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.

Meanwhile, another contrast between concepts was involved in the rival systems. From the point of view of the atomists, the law and order of the universe were regarded as an achievement. Originally, only atoms and empty space existed. There was no cosmic energy or world-mover to arrange and develop the elements: the motions and collocations of the atoms themselves brought about our universe without design or purpose. But for Plato teleology or purpose was central to the universe. Atomism implied materialism, and in modern times it was enlisted in support of a purely mechanical conception. Teleology implied idealism: the universe was said to exist for the sake of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Platonism in various forms persuasively reappears in modern philosophy.

Medieval Philosophy.—With the waning century before the dawn of the Christian era, religious interests were steadily mingled with philosophy. Christianity offered a rival series of introductory convictions. Philosophers whose interests were partly ethical and partly religious reformulated Greek philosophy to meet the new demands. The conception of the physical nature of things was brought into relation with ideas of the supersensible world, with special reference to salvation and a future state. When dogmas intervened, the free comparison of concepts was no longer feasible. Greek rationalism gave place in large measure to the effort to justify faith. The forerunners of the period of medieval controversies systematized Christian doctrines by adopting Greek terminology and some of the principles of Greek logic. Indeed, the

theory of knowledge which became dominant in the Church was modeled after principles taken over from Plato and Aristotle. Instead of the opposition between a materialistic and an idealistic world-view, reason and revelation were brought into critical relation. The idea of God had become identified with the teleological conception of the world, and Plato's supersensible world of eternal Ideas with heaven or the City of God. Ecclesiastical authority became central, faith its ally, reason its servant. Nature as the field for scientific investigation was neglected. There ensued a definition of terms which was more fruitful for logic than for philosophy at large.

The Transition Period.—Permitted to justify faith but not to advocate principles which might undermine it, reason was also granted the right to make its classic formulations of theology by aid of Aristotelian terms. Meanwhile, Aristotle as regarded by the Church came into conflict with the Aristotle of scholars who had preserved some of the traditions of science. Some partisans of the life of reason were winning the right to reduce philosophy to assumptions required by known facts of experience according to the principle of parsimony. Natural science came gradually to the fore, and with the promulgation of a new world-view the realm of science was extended to the infinitude of the universe. Copernicus taught that the sun, not the earth, is the centre of our system. Galileo, Kepler, and other great men of science substituted precise observation and experiment, also exact concepts required by the facts, and the idea of laws implied by the relationships of these concepts; and *empiricism in general*, for the former appeal to the speculative authority of Aristotle. Thus the modern mechanical theory took shape, with the assumption that the phenomena of nature are *measurable*, that the laws of motion can be formulated as expressions of the systematic connection of things. Thus the idea of quantitative relations came into full recognition, atomism was revived, and inductions from the actual occurrences of nature took the place of speculations concerning the crystal spheres and assumptions involved in the idea of

the circle as the perfect form of motion. The relativity of place, motion, time; the infinity of the universe, the uniformity of nature, the reign of law, the idea of movement as the principle of all change; all these and many secondary conceptions followed in time from the great cosmic principles which were coming to the fore. With the great development of mathematics in the age from Galileo to Newton, the discoveries of various special observers in the field of the sciences, the idea of the periodicity of nature's phenomena, and the formulation of the law of gravitation and the type of cosmology which Newton's cosmology implied, natural science became independent.

While science thus played the major part in the process by which history repeated itself and philosophy once more overcame tradition in favor of the free development of reason, religious thought won a measure of independence with the Reformation. Hence the history of liberalism in modern times became an interest in itself which we need hardly touch upon, save in relation to religion as a factor in the Enlightenment during the eighteenth century. Thus philosophy was free to break with the remaining allegiances to scholasticism, and become the unhampered study of the nature of things by following out the implications of the new world-view. It was free also to revert to interests in the inner life fostered by Augustine, and to develop these interests without being diverted by presuppositions in favor of the fall of man and the need of regeneration.

Modern Methods.—Thus arose a new problem, that of the relationship between the given facts of self-consciousness and the world of nature as envisaged by the pioneers of the modern mechanical theory. This interest resolved itself especially into the question of the soul and body as two substances, each in its world, the one immaterial and unextended, the other characterized by matter (extension) and the properties which material substance in general implies. Thus the inner or subjective world came into marked antithesis with the outer or objective world regarded as a mechanical system in space and time. Medieval thought had been at times profoundly subjective. Modern

thought became objective with the right of philosophy to observe, describe, explain, and generalize its explanations without being subservient to the doctrines of the Church. Medieval thought had also become in a measure empirical, notably in the effort of thinkers who gave chief attention to psychology. Thanks to the venturesome investigations of Galileo and other scholars who dared to use the telescope or other instruments, to observe, to weigh, to test by repeated experiment, philosophy became freely empirical.

It is important to note the fact that empiricism and rationalism are in a sense differences of emphasis on the same principles. The one follows clues detected by observing experience, noting its implications, permitting experience to lead the way so far as possible, with the expectation that experience will generate its own explanations. The other puts emphasis on reason as the central principle in the universe and man, in quest of the complete system which all experience implies. Descartes the rationalist does not exclude experience, nor does Locke the empiricist neglect rationalism. The aim of all philosophy is to rationalize experience. That is what philosophy began to do in ancient Greece. That is what it was still doing when it became a comparative study of concepts in the contrast between materialism and idealism.

The rediscovery of the inner life in the modern period also meant persistent interest in the theory of knowledge. This problem held less interest for the philosophers of ancient times. During the Middle Ages it was often limited to the controversy over universals; the question whether the principles or concepts by which we think the universe are (1) real *apart from things*, (2) real *amidst* concrete particulars, or (3) real as *names* only. The mystics of the period claimed that there is an intuitive or higher type of knowledge, hence that knowledge has an inner source. Realism meant the rule of the highest universal, from which all other principles followed. Nominalism, or the assumption that universals are our own psychological terms for things, meant opportunity for free inquiry. But investigation became free only with the full right of private

judgment. The implication was that rationalism may be developed and followed wherever it may lead. This is the freedom of "natural reason," human thought in its own right, apart from all authority, even that of revelation; a freedom which the pioneers of the modern period had to exercise with certain discretion, in view of the fact that Galileo was compelled to recant and Bruno was burned at the stake.

Modern Rationalism.—Once free in this sense, rationalism took on another meaning, unhampered by the realistic theory of universals. As a difference of emphasis in approaching experience, rationalism was set over against empiricism in the narrower meaning of the term, namely, empiricism as the assumption that knowledge develops out of sense-impressions, disclosing its own principles or universals, describing and explaining itself. With the emancipation of First Philosophy from theology, it became permissible to set moral philosophy or ethics free from the assumption that moral ideas are innate. So psychology could start with the deliverances of the senses, and sense-presentations could become the basis for an empirical epistemology, namely, a theory of knowledge upspringing from experience. Rationalism, on the other hand, came to mean emphasis on the understanding, with its ability to formulate clear and distinct ideas as the test of truth.

Hence we find Descartes putting traditional conceptions through a process of doubt due to the conviction that human reason is autonomous, that its principles constitute a system. This did not signify utter neglect of the authority of the Church, but a division of interests. Hence philosophy as a discipline means that reason must demonstrate its own principles, whatever a thinker's allegiance to dogma in another connection. Galileo led the way in this transition from authority to empirical knowledge based on reasoned analysis, and looking forward to a complete system. Descartes cautiously enlarged rationalism to a world-view; while other rationalists, throwing caution to the winds, pursued their logic as far as it could lead them. Thus came into full vigor the assumption that *the consent*

of reason to its own principles is the criterion of truth, even when this involves a Kantian criticism of all knowledge. Spinoza became so free from tradition that he questioned even design or purpose in nature, doubted human freedom, and regarded his God or first principle (Substance) as the necessary ground of all thought and extension.

Empiricism.—Ferrier's dictum that the history of philosophy is philosophy itself taking its time is verified also by the competitive philosophy of the period, empiricism. With Locke, empiricism began to be a study of human nature and human experience as an enterprise worth pursuing in its own field. To Newton and others who were to develop physics, chemistry, physiology, embryology, and the other special sciences, was left the task of developing empiricism as a method of investigating the given fields of research in the external universe. Thus, beginning with Locke, empiricism entered the lists with rationalism in favor of an alternative theory of knowledge. Assuming less than its rival, empiricism sought to derive knowledge from experience, and thereupon to interpret experience under the guise of sense-perception. Thus in the ethical field a moral-sense doctrine was brought into interesting contrast with the doctrine that moral principles, like axioms in mathematics, are eternal, immutable, implied in the existence of conscience as innate. Presently, Berkeley's idealism and Hume's sceptical analysis of sense-impressions became profoundly influential tendencies. By empiricism, "experience" was taken to be its own interpreter, as man in the primitive world had proceeded by a trial-and-error method, as "common sense" yielded its patterns of thought, and practical behavior its types. For rationalism, the ultimate system of the universe was eventually to be known by principles pointing to a super-sensuous reality, namely, the self or spirit which by acute analysis we take ourselves to be: the first principle is God as the Self of Selves, the Supreme Spirit of the universe. Thus idealism came to the fore as the basis of a study of knowledge, in contrast with materialism, which assumes

that sense-perception is produced in us by the motion of material particles.

The relation between these terms and types of thought is implied in the history which we are here summarizing. Greek thought was open, free, objective in its quest for the nature of things; it was little perplexed by the scruples which beset the student of the inner life. Christian thought became intensely subjective, concerned with the problems of salvation, discounting human thought, exalting revealed thought. The pioneers of the modern world-view became so courageously objective that they ventured to use physical instruments and precise methods of measurement, in their study of the nature of things. No one would think of mathematics as subjective. A mechanical principle never depends upon the feelings or other inner states which may perchance be connected with our processes of knowing it. Granted the complete system of principles or laws of the universe, the system may be said to coincide with the universe. The process of knowing it is negligible. Reason claims the right to develop this system, by the persistent reduction of particulars to the unity which they imply. Our knowledge is still incomplete, to be sure; but were it complete, the universe would prove to be through and through *rational*. Rationalism, thus understood, is as objective as the universe itself. Our own thought implies the capacity of correlating the particulars in their system, so that no process of our own shall in the last analysis intervene to mar the whole. But philosophers differ in their approach to this the goal of all truth-seeking. The typical rationalist begins with his criteria of truth, his method; he pays less heed to experience as such. The typical empiricist seeks the progressive clues of experience itself, more cautious in his claims concerning thought which may be deemed "universal." But empiricism and rationalism may so nearly converge that, in the case of an empirical idealist, the analysis of sense-presentations may be the starting-point. The problem of knowledge arises in intensive form when we ask whether this series of concepts which we are developing (by analyzing sense-experience

as given) actually coincides with ultimate truth and reality. To adopt an idealistic theory of knowledge might be to attribute too much significance to the facts of perception. But to start with atoms or bodies in motion might be to find no way to describe and account for the remarkable fact that we *know* the things by which we are surrounded, that we possess *consciousness*.

Where Modern Philosophy Begins.—It is a mooted point just where the history of modern philosophy begins in this process of marking off rationalism and empiricism, materialism and idealism, with the implied theories of knowledge. Sometimes it is said to start with the Renaissance, with the emancipation of the individual, the new ideas of the State, and freedom in cultural and religious matters. Again, it is said to begin with the new philosophy of nature in Italy, especially with the modern mechanical theory. But it may also start with Bruno, with Bacon, or Descartes. To begin with Francis Bacon is to remember Roger Bacon, his forerunner. It may be said that modern philosophy means empiricism, and the advocate of empiricism may insist that Descartes—by emphasizing consciousness as the starting-point—gave philosophy an unfortunate turn in favor of the theory of knowledge. The impartial student will be concerned to follow both empiricism and rationalism wherever these doctrines and methods may lead, while remembering that the philosophy of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and of the dawning period of the mechanical philosophy brings the medieval period to a close by also beginning modern philosophy. Hence he will look back from Bruno to the forerunners who made possible Bruno's theory of infinity and relativity, while also looking forward to Spinoza. Modern philosophy may be said to date from Bruno's death, in 1600; to begin with Bacon, as critic of scholasticism; but it is usually said to begin in full seriousness with Descartes, as the thinker who introduced the method of doubt, the appeal to self-consciousness, and the criterion of "clear and distinct ideas." We shall begin with Descartes, after a brief study of the teachings of Bacon and Hobbes,

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§ 2. FRANCIS BACON. EMPIRICISM

Two considerations are brought prominently to mind, when we endeavor to put the right estimate on Bacon's pioneer work in modern philosophy. Aristotle, responding to the interests of his special type, excelled in defining and classifying the sciences, in formulating modes of reasoning with respect to his own system of terms, which were not those of mathematics, not the quantitative principles by which Democritus defined atomism. The influence of Aristotle persisted through the scholastic period, with its proneness toward deduction (from general principles to particulars) in accordance with the realism of the Church. This influence aroused Bacon in vigorous protest in favor of induction (from particulars to general principles, by observations based on experience). The other consideration is the fact that men of science were already using induction, for example, Kepler's discovery of the laws of planetary motion, and mathematical relations were being proved fundamental. Thus Galileo created mechanics as the mathematical theory of motion by studying the facts, types, modes, implications of motion, and proceeding to the general law; he employed the method of analysis, putting emphasis on counting or measurement, that is, on quantitative principles which were neglected when Pythagoras and Democritus were no longer influential in ancient times. Thus the development of scientific, mathematical methods was resumed; and eventually this development led to the more recent logic of the forms, categories, and types of order, in contrast with the proneness toward classification which was due to the influence of Aristotle. The scientific activities which were to lead to the Newtonian cosmology, including the formulation of the law of gravitation, were well under way when Bacon began to protest against the Aristotle of the Middle Ages. These activities do not find recognition in Bacon's philosophy, the importance of which is therefore to be seen in the light of

its protests rather than from the standpoint of constructive principles.

Life of Bacon.—The younger of two sons of Sir Nicholas Bacon, lord keeper of the great seal, Francis Bacon was born in London, in 1561. At the age of twelve he was sent to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he remained until 1575, and where his dislike of Aristotle seems to have begun. After three years spent in the suite of Sir Amyas Paulet, ambassador to France, Bacon returned to England. Called to the bar in 1582, he entered parliament in 1584, was made privy councillor in 1616, lord keeper in 1617, and lord chancellor in 1618. In 1603 he was knighted, in 1618 was created Baron Verulam, and in 1621 he became Viscount of St. Albans. Charges of bribery having been brought against him, he was convicted on his own confession, deprived of all his offices, fined £40,000, and sentenced to the tower, where he remained a few days until set free, his fine having been transferred. He devoted his remaining years, until his death, in 1626, to literary and philosophical pursuits. Bacon had carried on his investigations and had written several works during his public career. His activities as a philosopher were somewhat impeded by his connections with public life. In his own eyes Bacon was a herald of a new era which he foresaw without participating in it himself. In doubt concerning existing knowledge, and convinced that even the great thinkers were misled by their methods, he felt a strong desire to begin philosophy anew. The newness of his approach is indicated by the titles of some of his books, and those in which he offered a sketch of the sciences and showed what gaps needed to be filled.¹

Method.—Bacon's *Essays* are famous for their worldly wisdom, compact style, and keen insights into life, to the effect that "knowledge is power," science is for the man of affairs, and power the test of the sanity of our knowledge. This point of view signalized a departure from theology as the source of truth, waning interest in speculation, and stress on natural knowledge gained by observa-

¹ For example, *The New Organon*, *The New Atlantis*.

tion. Indeed, Bacon predicts that the new era is to be almost exclusively that of positive science. At his death, Bacon was still at work on his program; he left his *Sylva Sylvarum*, a description of natural phenomena, unfinished; also sketches and detached portions of his scheme for aiding the sciences.

Although this plan for renewing the sciences has never been formulated by others precisely as he outlined it, Bacon is regarded as one of the founders of modern philosophy, and has been highly praised as the prophet of positivism, as the forerunner of those who during the Enlightenment in France projected the *Encyclopedie*. He was the first to express the empirical ideal or practical type of thought for which England has stood for three centuries. But here too he is critic and forerunner rather than constructive thinker. It has been remarked that he did not even see the promised land, already conquered by the founders of the mechanical philosophy. Yet he voiced thoughts and hopes current when the new science was coming into being; his insight into the trend of thought in its re-shaping of conceptions was keener than that of other thinkers in the period of transition. No new discovery has been attributed to him, despite his great interest in the sciences. He was somewhat interested in Galileo's telescope, but seems to have been unaware of the work of Kepler and Tycho Brahe, ignorant of Napier's invention, and of Harvey's discovery; and his opinion of Copernicus was unfavorable.² His limited interest in the scientific principles which were coming into vogue indicates the shortcomings of his method. When honored in later times as the originator of the experimental method, the reference has been to his general method, not to its details or precepts. His method of enumerating facts is different from that of the laboratory. Yet it has been said that he accomplished more than any one else in freeing the human mind from preconceptions and directing attention to the unbiased study of facts.

² The invention of logarithms was announced by Napier (1550-1617) in 1614; in 1616 the discovery of the circulation of the blood was made known by Harvey (1578-1657).

Believing that he was born for the service of mankind, Bacon undertook the work for which he seemed fitted, the study of truth, as having a mind "nimble and versatile enough" to catch the resemblances of things, also "steady enough to fix and distinguish their differences." The great Renewal of the Sciences was to be in six parts, with all knowledge as the field of his inquiry.

The Idols.—Bacon begins as critic by reviewing existing knowledge, indicating defects and remedies. He finds scholasticism formal, often a meagre dispute about words. He puts speculation aside, separates faith and theology from philosophy, and shows that philosophy is concerned with formal and efficient causes. Hence philosophy should be a study of things in their connection, not of words. Current modes of thought were still subjective, to the neglect of things as objects of experience in the world about us. To know nature, real in space and time, we must first eliminate all subjective hindrances; must know the true instruments of knowledge, have a method of unbiased investigation. Hence the mind should be reduced to a blank tablet, with a view to acquiring new knowledge and restoring man's rule over nature.

All men are more or less hampered by various tendencies to err, illusions both native and acquired. These preconceptions Bacon calls idols of the mind.³ These deepest fallacies of the human mind fall into four classes. The idols of the tribe are deceptive tendencies originating in human nature, they are common to the race. Because of these preconceptions we tend to view things by human analogy, to the neglect of their relation to the order of the universe. Thus we assume a simplicity and order which the facts do not justify. Since our actions imply plans and purposes, we attribute purpose to nature. So we become prejudiced in favor of certain explanations in preference to others. The idols of the cave are individual peculiarities by which we interpret; and which lead us to note either differences or resemblances, to analyze and

³ *Advancement of Learning*, Bk. V, Chap. IV; *Novum Organum*, Bk. I, Sec. XXXIX, foll.

look for elements or to unify and seek wholes. The idols of the market-place are prepossessions due to the influence of language, in our use of proverbial sayings, when, for example, we quote familiar words with the implication that to use these terms is to explain the phenomenon or thing in question. The idols of the theatre are prejudices due to the influence of authority, tradition, theories long in vogue, false philosophies and alleged demonstrations, including perverted rules of demonstration, notably in case of views held in the Middle Ages when Aristotle was the supreme authority.

Bacon's Contribution.—When the mind has overcome these idols, the next step is careful observation to ascertain the facts, which are to be gathered before we generalize, in order that by a “just and methodical process” we may arrive at truth by interpretation of nature. We should avoid the leap from facts to general propositions, since there is need of many middle terms. Our aim should be to explain rather than to anticipate nature, the idols being incorrect anticipations. The use of induction, or the advance toward general principles from particular facts, has been limited to positive cases; it should include results in instances where the phenomena under consideration are absent.⁴ The modifications of phenomena under varying conditions ought also to be investigated. When adequate data have been gathered, a tentative hypothesis may be formulated. Then the analysis of instances which apparently contradict the theory should follow. Actual headway having been made, we may proceed to formulate laws, and ascend through inductive reasoning to a unity of the science in question, thence to a synthesis of sciences.

Bacon here stands between ancient and modern thought. He indicates the method of studying negative instances, and by describing the inductive method in detail he makes a real advance. But he rejects the authoritative Aristotle of the Middle Ages without understanding how thorough was the method of the real Aristotle, who used both induction and deduction. Although Bacon adopts Aristotle's

⁴ Bacon analyzes typical instances, *Novum Organum*, Bk. II.

classification of causes, as material, formal, efficient, and final, he uses the term "form" as the condition or ground of the "natures" of things, and takes exception to the quest for final causes. Thus in a way he prepares for the modern conception of a "law" of nature. The "form" of heat, for example, is motion. Yet Bacon neglects quantitative considerations and depreciates the mathematical methods then coming into vogue. He also neglects scientific imagination and insight. He expects too much from an exhaustive collection of instances, and by underestimating deduction refuses to admit evidences which might have led him to an appreciation of the new world-view. For him reality is primarily individual, that is, individual bodies existing in nature and made known by sense-perception, which he is careful to distinguish from "sense" (sometimes but a "dull thing"). Hence, for Bacon, science in contrast with religion is founded on perception, on general ideas derived from sense-impressions; while first philosophy is concerned with axioms common to the various sciences. Bacon concedes to metaphysics the right to discover the ultimate forms of bodies, but he holds that final causes have no place in the scientific scheme of nature or in the practical life of man. Philosophy may occupy an ideal place as the apex of knowledge, although Bacon does not attempt to develop such a system. Meanwhile, theologies, natural and inspired, have supplementary value in the total scheme. Bacon would have needed intimate knowledge of what Galileo was yet to accomplish and Newton to achieve in order to see the full significance of mathematical principles, and to realize that scientific induction implies a more elaborate method than he foresaw. His contributions have however won for him a notable place in history, through his wise caution, and the attention he gives to naturalism, to the empirical approach to every branch of philosophy.

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§ 3. THOMAS HOBBS. MATERIALISM

Life.—Thomas Hobbes was born at Westport, near Malmesbury, England, in 1588. His father was vicar of the parish; his mother is known for her fear of the Spanish Armada, and the effect of this fear on her son, who called himself a twin brother of fear. His life was harassed by fears, although he lived a leisurely and secluded life, beginning with ample educational opportunities. The prime result of his studies at Oxford, which he entered at fifteen, was reaction against scholastic discipline, dislike for philosophy and religion. He was, however, an excellent scholar, notably in logic. After leaving college he became companion to the eldest son of Lord Cavendish, a connection which enabled him to travel, to meet scholars and statesmen; and have ample leisure for work, including the study of the classics and the translation of Thucydides. Unlike Bacon, with whom he frequently conversed, in type of thought and character, Hobbes adopted the mathematical and mechanical conceptions of his day, and developed these into a system of philosophy, gradually matured amidst widespread observations and opportunities for knowing his age at first hand.

While travelling in Italy Hobbes made the acquaintance of Galileo, with whom he discoursed in Florence. He found great interest in mathematics in France, and was greatly impressed by the precision of mathematical principles, especially with Euclid, whose method impressed him as one which could be followed with certainty; hence Hobbes began to consider the ultimate basis of mathematics in relation to the facts of sensation. In France

he also became a friend of Gassendi, who with Galileo taught that impetus (energy) is not dissipated by actual motion. Hobbes adopted this view that motion is the fundamental conception for explaining the physical world and applied the same principle to human society. He also spent much time with Mersenne, an ardent follower of Descartes, whose philosophy was then in vogue. His first book, *De Cive*, published in Paris in 1642, was devoted to the political troubles of his day. Because of the unpopularity of his views, with the possibility of prosecution, Hobbes remained in France for eleven years, including the period of preparation for his chief work, the *Leviathan*, issued in 1651, the year of his return to England. He spent his remaining years in England, occupied with the completion of his system. His *De Corpore* was published in 1655, *De Homine* in 1658. The tract, *Of Liberty and Necessity*, 1654, was connected with a dispute with Bramhall on free-will; Hobbes defended his position in *The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance*, published in 1656. Controversies also arose over the *Leviathan*, and Hobbes for some time withheld other works from publication. He wrote his *Historia Ecclesiastica* in elegaic verse when about eighty years of age, and his autobiography, in Latin, at eighty-four. He continued his literary labors to the last, and died at ninety-one, in 1679.

Characteristics.—The life of Hobbes was marked by a succession of controversies, and his last twenty years were torn and embittered. His *Leviathan* was meant to be a vindication of the royal prerogative, but it was not accepted by the king; for Hobbes did not ground divine right in inheritance but in the nature of man, in the ruler who embodied the will of the people. His extreme opposition to free-will aroused theologians, he was opposed in the universities, attacked by mathematicians and physicists, and assailed for subordinating the Church to the State. In his later years he once more turned to the classics and translated Homer. He was prosaic, methodical; but possessed a remarkable literary style, and was one of the great prose writers of his century. His energetic, pic-

turesque style is suggested by his well-known characterization of man's primitive state as "solitary, poor, brutish, nasty, short."¹ While his thought discloses remoteness from common life, he had a passion for human well-being and social betterment, his philosophy is meant for practice; he was unselfish, a great lover of peace and order. His system is a remarkable instance of logical thoroughness, of persistent quest for the unity of all knowledge.

First Philosophy.—Hobbes begins with the facts of physical existence, and proceeds to mind, morals, and a theory of the State. His universal principle is motion, fundamental to body and mind.² All things being modes or congeries of motions, motion is the cause of all changes; it is not abstract, but is the movement of masses or particles and of minds. As sensation is primarily motion, without motion in the universe there would be no sensation, without external change no mental life. It is not necessary to try to penetrate beyond a universe of separate particles, whose motion can be mathematically and mechanically described. Since matter as extended and as known by us involves the doctrine that motions of mind have physical causes, the actuality of motion as the salient fact is verifiable by any one who "takes the pains to observe those motions within himself." Self-examination will show that the appetites and passions, unless restrained by some power, will always be making war upon one another. The appeal to experience is a step in establishing fundamental principles of investigation, by proceeding from an analysis of the given. First principles are adopted arbitrarily. The analysis which yields the universal method is not a demonstration; for deduction is the only method of demonstration, and no deduction of first principles is possible. Yet if we could rid our minds of all prejudice against the proposition that all changes consist of motions, no proof would be required. What is imperative is to avoid giving two contradictory names to the same thing, the choice of explanatory principles being

¹ Eng. works, Vol. III, p. 113.

² See *De Corpore*, Part II.

essentially an act of naming. In addition to motion, Hobbes assumes the law of causality, the principle of inertia, the fact that motion alone can result, and the principle that matter persists. Starting with the proposition that nothing exists save body in general and motions of bodies in space, all else follows; and the universe as the aggregate of bodies is describable by the geometrical and physical laws of motion.³ Extension and figure are directly attributable to bodies; motion, color, hardness, are describable by reference to the modes in which bodies are conceived. All phenomena being motions, everything can be explained mechanically on the assumption of the existence of energy (*conatus*, *impetus*): an incorporeal thing would be a pure fancy. Since science is limited to the investigation of finite things in motion, it is impossible to know nature in its entirety. Questions concerning the universe as a whole belong to faith, not to knowledge. Science cannot penetrate either origins or destinies.

Psychology.—Sensation is “nothing more than a motion among the particles of the sensing body.”⁴ Consciousness is solely a motion in certain parts of an organic body, is the form under which motion becomes apparent: thought is a motion in the head, thinking is calculation, the feeling of pleasure a motion of the heart. Hobbes qualifies only when admitting the remarkable fact that things can be presented to our minds, that motion is sensed or known by the observer. In a sense we know only our own minds, the qualities of things as experienced in ourselves. But in another sense our internal motions are due to moving objects outside, extension and figure being primary qualities; while color, hardness, as modes, are in ourselves. Hobbes emphasized subjective conditions as means only to the apprehension of objects externally constituted, as producing “apparitions” by which motion comes to be known, although it might be inferred that the idea of motion cannot itself be motion. As all modes of mental activity are forms of motion, sensation, memory,

³ *De Corpore*.

⁴ See the *Leviathan*, introductory chapters.

and comparison are intimately related: when the sensory stimulus stops, sensation ceases, and all that remains is a vague impression. Sensations as described presuppose distinctions and comparisons of these impressions. Appearing in a certain order, sensations are reproduced in the order of experience unless disarranged by feelings and impulses: this is memory, and the laws of association are mechanical. Our purposes bring order into our thoughts. Individual feelings and volitional experiences are due to the impulse of self-preservation. Pleasure and pain arise in so far as organic processes are fostered or suppressed. Appetite, involving pleasure, is an endeavor toward its object; aversion, involving pain, is an endeavor from the object. Motions and ideas expressing the purposes toward which our movements strive are conserved if these are favorable to the advancement of life. Life is a game in which we rejoice if we surpass others, by which we are humbled when we fail. There is no primary harmony between impulses making for self-preservation to guarantee that some impulses shall win. The strife between our impulses is like that in the world. Sensation itself is reaction or endeavor towards external objects. Hobbes might have developed sensationalism as it began to find expression in Locke's philosophy, had he emphasized motions within the organism, and put stress on his conclusion that light and sound are sensations. But he held resolutely to the materialism of his mathematical and physical conceptions.

Ethics and Politics.—Man esteems as good that which pleases, regards as evil what displeases, good and evil being relative to the individual. Will is due to sensation, memory, understanding; inclination and deliberation combine to produce conduct as a necessary result. Hence alleged free-will is caused by preceding processes, as are our appetites and aversions: it is as surely a product as the fact that knowledge is due to combinations of sensations. The state of nature, or human life as it would be without social compacts, is a war of all against all. The only restraining force is due to the individual, who, re-

sponding to impulses, to fear, the warfare of passion, has calmer moments in which he is willing to co-operate. But while each has a passion for perpetuating his own life, and although there is no right or wrong by nature, each is environed by other individuals actuated by this will-to-live. Clashes follow, food is limited, and although we are natively like wolves we yield for the sake of peace. Thus enters the moral motive; hence follow the special duties and virtues: fidelity, gratitude, complaisance, forbearance, justice, self-control. The State is the compact or institution resulting from this co-operation: war, fear, poverty, filth, isolation, barbarism, ignorance, savagery give place to reason, peace, security, riches, ornament, sociability, elegance, science, good-will. Forbearance yields the principle that one must not do to others what one would be unwilling to suffer from them. To be just towards others and to give them aid is a sign of strength. Political organizations are necessary to maintain and enforce regulations. Our freedom as unrestrained individuals is yielded in a renunciation of rights such that the State becomes absolutely sovereign over the individual. The ruler, embodying all the social rights, settles all questions pertaining to religion and morality. The power thus conferred is such that the State, ruled by its head, is an enormous individual, the commonwealth or "Leviathan." Monarchy is the best form of government; in the king public and private interests are conjoined. As the representative of the entire State, the king can do no wrong. Any division of power would mean a tendency to revert to the state of nature. Thus Hobbes carries to the extreme the doctrine of social compact and state absolutism. He derives his ethics and politics from his first principles and his psychology.

Historical Position.—Hobbes is admired for the originality and vividness of his account of the "state of nature"; for his effort to see life and see it whole, by admitting the power of circumstance to the full, emphasizing what nature makes of man, and what man by himself tends to be. A convinced determinist and absolutist,

his viewpoint is decisively objective, namely, in his insistence on motion as the real cause of all changes, including the half-spent motions called thoughts. For him the brain is a storehouse of impressions mechanically combined: thus he wins for psychology recognition of the law of association. Because of his rigid insistence on self-seeking as man's original motive, he roused a far-reaching protest and thereby exerted a profound influence on English ethics. He was also challenged for assuming that consciousness is due to the agitations of the brain. The most unshrinking and consistent thinker in English philosophy for generations, he is "extraordinarily instructive," challenging any one to prove that man was originally altruistic, that consciousness is as real as "body," or that our social organizations are other than mere political compacts to disguise our private interests and our self-love.

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§ 4. THE RATIONALISTIC SYSTEMS. DESCARTES

With Bacon began the protest against scholastic conceptions and methods, against the speculative and authoritative systems which had impeded philosophy. After his protests, the development of empiricism in accord with the new science of nature would naturally be expected. But this did not immediately follow. Hobbes acknowledged the scientific point of view in a measure, but Hobbes developed the mechanical conception of nature in the direction of materialism, with a minimum degree of reference

to the viewpoint of experience and the standpoint of consciousness and the inner life. In Descartes the revolt against conventional ideas and methods was united with the clear-cut thinking of the mathematician who also keenly appreciated the primacy of self-consciousness. It was the Cartesian doctrine of "thinking substance" co-ordinated with the idea of "extended substance," and appealing to clear and distinct ideas as the criterion of truth, which marked out the course modern philosophy was at first to follow. After Descartes came another pronounced rationalist, Spinoza, who was also an ardent believer in mathematical method; then Leibniz, whose rationalism assumed a form which proved to be profoundly influential through the whole modern discussion of the infinite and the finite, the relation of minds and things, the nature of force and the system which cosmic forces may be said to imply. Empiricism had to wait for John Locke and the beginnings of the critical philosophy, in the long controversy between empirical and rationalistic conceptions of knowledge. Meanwhile, Descartes was empirical in another meaning of the term, namely, the appeal to the facts of self-consciousness or inner experience as in some respects the surest data with which philosophy can begin.

Life of Descartes.—The chief incidents in the life of René Descartes are intimately related to his method and philosophy. Born in 1596, at La Haye, the son of a French nobleman, he had abundant funds for education, travel, and a leisurely life of thought. At the Jesuit college of La Flèche he had the best teachers then available, every opportunity to test his abilities, amidst disappointments over the training he received. He found philosophy and science still subject to the authority of the Church, with the narrowest field for independent thinking. However, Descartes made excellent use of the formal discipline he received, and was chiefly impressed by the method of mathematics. Finishing his education at seventeen, he travelled for a time, lived quietly in Paris, then sought more direct contact with the realities of life by joining the army dur-

ing the Thirty Years War. His philosophical awakening came while in camp at Neuberg, on the Danube, in the winter of 1619, with the discovery of his method: the possibility of beginning with the simplest and clearest ideas, and advancing to more complex problems. Postponing the development of his system, however, he adopted rules for adjustment to the world as he found it, devoted a few years more to study and travel, then settled in Holland where the climate was favorable and the intellectual conditions more free than in France. But he did not avoid controversies by this seclusion, since Protestants as well as Romanists were suspicious of his philosophy. When about to publish *Le Monde*, the work in which he maintained the motion of the earth, the news of Galileo's conviction reached him, in 1633; the Copernican theory had also been condemned even as an hypothesis, and Descartes withheld his book. Critics have severely censured Descartes for this action, while friends have pleaded that he remained loyal to the Church. The Queen of Sweden invited him to reside at the court; but he survived the cold climate of Sweden only a year, and died in 1650.

Descartes' Method.—Granted a mind as profound and original as that of Descartes, vigorously independent and free in his thinking, with mathematical ability of the first order, it was natural that he should part company with his predecessors in philosophy. The sciences, law, medicine, philosophy were disappointing; scholars were at variance, and his own mind was beset by doubts and difficulties. The resource was to sweep away all existing doctrines, push doubt to the limit, seek the clearest and most certain knowledge of himself and his ideas, and begin anew with the hope of finding principles which could be defended with mathematical certainty.¹

But first there was need of practical rules of life, which resolved themselves into these: To accept and obey the laws and customs which then obtained; to adhere to the faith in which he was educated; and to maintain moderate views, persistent and resolute in the course which he had

¹ *Discourse on Method*, I, tr. by Veitch, Open Court ed., p. 4.

adopted. This meant acceptance of the world-order as found; contentment, self-reformation, the exercise of his own judgment; and quest for a firm ground of assurance.² With respect to the enterprise before him, Descartes' rules were these: to accept as true only that which is clearly known to be such on the basis of evidence; to analyze the evidence into as many parts as possible; to arrange or order the evidence in ascending series; and to enumerate all significant cases. Thus by evidence, analysis, synthesis, and induction, he hoped to advance in the development of clearly and distinctly conceived ideas. By these rules Descartes established reason as the judge of what is true and false.

While in the sciences and philosophy disputes still existed concerning first principles, in geometry the basic principles were beyond question. Hence there was need of first principles involving the analytic method, that the mind might proceed from the given by the aid of the clearest presuppositions and simplest intuitions. The mind advances by clear-cut conceptions in the development of mathematical principles: why may it not proceed with equal certainty in developing conceptions implied in the nature of things? The first need is for an intuitively certain principle to serve as the basis of philosophy. Descartes finds this in propositions concerning existence and thought: *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am); because the mind thinks (is active) I exist, my thought presupposes my existence.³ He might have singled out other mental facts, such as volition or feeling. His *ergo* does not signify "therefore" in the sense of logical proof. His statement is an intuition, the reasons for which become evident on analysis. One might, for instance, doubt all ideas and all objects of knowledge. All perceptions might be illusory, all postulates deceptive. But doubt has limits. The most radical doubt presupposes thought, hence a doubter. To assume all conclusions to be false is still to find thought in process, the term "thought" being used

² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

in a wide sense. To say then, *Je pense, donc je suis*, is to utter the fact that consciousness *is*, that as existence it needs no proof, implies a thinker: "I am, I exist: this is certain; but how often? As often as I think."⁴ This intuition is clear and distinct. Hence it meets the test. Therefore Descartes adopts as a general rule the principle that "all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true."⁵

Descartes was greatly interested in the mechanical order of the world as described by Galileo and others. Hence his concern, having made the surest beginning in the mental world, was to emerge in full measure into the world of nature. Accordingly, with the next step in comparing ideas he advances to a principle which holds true objectively and establishes the validity of knowledge. It is certain that everything has a cause and that the effect cannot be greater than the cause. These are highly important considerations, as we presently discover. Causality is axiomatic: nothing can come out of nothing.⁶ But causes differ in type, some are internal, others external; some are due to ourselves, others not. The productive clue is found in the idea of God, an idea essential to explanation of things existing beyond my mere self.

The Idea of God.—On reflection I find myself to be finite, imperfect; the fact that I doubt shows this to be so. But, plainly, I have the idea of a perfect Being. As finite I could not have produced this idea: it must then have its origin in an infinite Being; otherwise there would be no explanation of the fact that my intellect in its maturity has arrived at the idea. It is not necessary to assume that this conception is innate, as if consciously present from the first: only a tendency to form the idea when the mind reaches maturity is necessary. The argument for the existence of God turns upon the recognized need for a cause of the idea of a perfect Being, also on

⁴ *Meditations*, II, tr. by Veitch, p. 33.

⁵ *Method*, p. 36.

⁶ *Principles of Philosophy*, XVIII; trans., Open Court ed., pp. 139, 155.

awareness of one's finitude. The idea of God thus made explicit implies the existence of God as the perfect Being, existence itself being perfection in that sense.⁷ To deny God's existence would be self-contradictory. God, as first cause, cannot err. By contrast I know my own imperfection and my liability to err. Am I dreaming in thus putting my ideas in relation? No, I am able to co-ordinate all facts of my waking experience, to think them in their connection. God as metaphysically prior to me and to my thought is the final cause, the infinite presupposed by the finite, the higher degree of reality underlying the lower or lesser.

From the clear idea of God, thus made definite and certain, the validity of the existence and knowledge of nature follows; God is the explanation not only of my idea but of the uniformity of natural events. "By nature in general I simply mean God himself, or the order and disposition instituted by him in created things."⁸ Every idea accepted as true accords with this great system; since truth consists of the internal relations of perceptions and ideas, according to the way these relations come into clear view, upon analysis. Thought, for example, exists. Perception implies the existence of my body. My senses might deceive me through what I seem to perceive. But understanding corrects perception, and objects are presented without the mind's consent: we cannot create perception by will, or perceive what we merely wish to perceive. It is impossible to explain perception as illusion. Moreover, God does not deceive us, does not cause perception in us, as if there were no objects. The fact or truth of perception is established, despite any illusions attributable to the senses. Objects exist. Nature exists. The idea of God has brought the mind to this point in its demonstration.

Further analysis shows that the idea of God is in the

⁷ For the argument from causality, see *Meditations*, III, p. 49; *Principles*, XVII, p. 138; for the psychological argument, see *Meditations*, p. 51; for the anthropological, *ibid.*, p. 54; ontological, *ibid.*, V, p. 79.

⁸ *Meditations*, VI, p. 94.

highest degree true: we are at each point dependent on God, both for selfhood and for truth. God created us for truth, also for freedom of choice. As all-knowing, all-powerful, eternal, independent, immutable, perfect, the idea of his existence guarantees the reality of things, the existence of the world. Doubt enables us to withhold assent from any proposition likely to lead the mind into error: here, however, the idea of God is explanatory as most widely applicable and true. My own thought imposes no necessity on the nature of things. This necessity is traceable to God as creator, the immanent or continuous cause of things, originator of motion, basis of the order and system of the universe. At first thought, God seems identical with the nature of things, as if pantheism were true. But although Descartes refers to God as the sum of all things given the mind through experience, he avoids the notion that God as substance is corporeal. For him then the corporeal world, or world of extension needs a basis or cause as unmistakably as our ideas. There can be but one independent substance, God, and to God the nature of things is to be traced. But there are items in our experience, notably the existence of evil (sin as negation), not attributable to God; since God is absolutely veracious. Again, God gives us freedom, although we know not how; and is perfect, in a measure transcends our understanding.

Cosmology.—The existence of the world having been established, Descartes is free to develop his main interest, his view of the physical universe. Our senses are plainly serviceable for all practical purposes. Our sense-impressions need not be like things if they at least correspond with them. To consider nature apart from sense-impressions is to find three attributes of matter standing out beyond dispute: extension, divisibility, motion. Not even in imagination can we think these away.

The idea of substance is of course not applicable to God and to things in the same sense.⁹ By “substance” in the first instance is meant that “which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to

⁹ *Principles*, II, p. 156.

its existence''; hence there can be only one absolutely independent substance. But granted ultimate substance, we may proceed to secondary meanings; to time, as the measure of motion; to number and universals as modes of thought; and to hardness and other qualities, which prove to be qualities of extension as primary; while certain qualities, such as color, pertain to the subject. There is no vacuum or mere extension, space is one with corporeal substance. Nor need we attempt to explain diversity by assuming the existence of indivisible parts or atoms: diversity is explained by differences of motion, as fundamental. The way is prepared then for the study of rarefaction, space, matter, motion, and other topics.¹⁰

We might indeed conceive of the existence of matter part from God, who, as perfect, is immutable. But the principles of the mechanical conception of nature follow from the idea of God, as already made clear. No created thing or being could, for instance, change its state unless there were some external cause other than the one immutable principle already shown to be God in his omnipotence. No material thing can on its own impetus pass from a state of rest to a state of motion, or from motion to rest. The constancy of motion is explained by the divine immutability. Matter is conserved by the continuous divine creative activity. Motion may indeed be variously distributed throughout the cosmos, but only on the principle that the sum-total implanted at creation remains unchanged, no motion being lost, no wholly new motion created. Motion then is the action whereby bodies change relative position, or undergo changes of state. Force is motion defined as impact. No motion occurs at a distance. The law of gravitation had not been formulated in Descartes' time. Instead, Descartes assumes the existence of an everywhere present subtle fluid: rotary motion is fundamental, and each planet is in a vortex or whirlpool. The picture is completed in mechanical terms. Descartes does not venture to interpret nature teleologically, but assigns to theology whatever remains to be said about God,

¹⁰ See *Principles*, Part II, pp. 178, 181, 189, 190.

who doubtless has purposes beyond our ken. It would be presuming too much to attribute purposes to nature as we appreciate purpose in our own experience, and nature exhibits motions and events which bear no relation to us, in our limited activities.

Mind and Body.—The body consists of extended substance, the mind as thinking substance can be conceived as “wholly distinct from the body.”¹¹ Mind is more easily known, is without parts. In any case, I have a “clear and distinct idea” of myself as a thinking and *unextended* substance, and a no less definite idea of my body as an “extended and unthinking thing.”¹² I find a certain passive faculty of perception, and an active faculty of forming and producing ideas; ideas of *corporeal* objects as existing; and I find that while body is always divisible, mind is indivisible.¹³ I may then proceed with the whole series of contrasts, noting that while the soul is united to the whole body its principal seat is in the brain; where it perceives, imagines, understands.¹⁴ The mind interacts with the body at the pineal gland only. The vital spirits, pouring through the nerves, come in contact with the pineal gland, the impact of this incoming motion translates the motion so that sensation arises. In the reverse direction the soul’s activity produces changes in the tendency of the vital spirits by means of this gland. Granted this localization of the soul, with direct emphasis on will as the decisive activity, the description of other phases of mental life follows. Apparently, motion is lost on the physical side by the impact of the soul, and gained by a new excitation of motion when the soul acts on the pineal gland. It has been surmised that this exception to the principle of inertia may have been adopted as a concession to theology. Descartes meant, however, to indicate that the direction of the vital spirits is changed by the soul’s action.

Descartes distinguishes between mental phenomena

¹¹ *Method*, p. 36.

¹² *Meditations*, VI, p. 91.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 93, 99.

¹⁴ *Principles*, Part IV, p. 195.

classed as (1) purely psychical, *actiones* (activities arising from within: mind regarded by itself, with its "clear and distinct ideas"); and (2) those phenomena which involve a psycho-physical basis, *passiones* (mind regarded as united with the body, with the accompanying "obscure ideas"). Under the first head belong intellect and will, judgment, mental recollection. Under the second, sensation, sensory recollection, natural appetites, passions which include motions of the "animal spirits." The moral inference is that the subjective emotions should be cultivated, instead of those dependent on bodily motions. Improvement of the understanding is also of great moment, namely, by appeal to the truth that everything depends on the Perfect Being. It is important to distinguish what is within our power, to realize the wise man's ideal of self-mastery; also to put social above individual interests. Magnanimity and intellectual love towards God are the highest virtues.

In his *Passions of the Soul*, Descartes explains the passions on a psycho-physical basis, starting with six primitive passions or emotions: admiration, love, hate, desire, joy, sadness, from which the others are to be deduced. The highest emotion is the intellectual love of God, as the basis of the highest virtue. Various ethical inferences follow from his psychology, although the ethical doctrines are chiefly adaptations of ancient views, mostly stoical in type, as in Descartes' provisional ethics. Descartes assumes the faculty of election or free choice: God gave us freedom, hence we may fall into error or sin.¹⁵ But as free we can withhold assent, we can abstain from what is doubtful, and thus avoid error.¹⁶ Praise or blame follows from the fact of free-will, but divine foreordination is also true. Stress belongs on the fact that the body is known representatively, namely, by the inner processes, the sequences of activities and ideas which are the direct objects of consciousness; whereas the body as such is in the world of "extended substance." Allowances are to be made for

¹⁵ *Meditations*, IV.

¹⁶ *Principles*, VI.

the "obscure" or "confused" ideas which have a psychophysical basis. It is imperative to cast off all impressions of the senses and trust to reason with its clear and distinct ideas. Hence there is unmistakably sure ground for rationalism in ethics. Descartes is a dualist throughout, even in his doctrine of memory: there are two memories, one dependent on the after-effects of brain-excitations, the other dependent on permanent traces in consciousness. But such emphasis falls on inner memory, inner experience and consciousness, that for all practical purposes a unity of rationalistic principles based on the implications of self-consciousness affords the clue to constructive thinking. Thus the possibility of sure convictions concerning the immortality of the soul depends on our ability to form "the clearest possible conception of the soul itself, and such as shall be absolutely distinct from all notions of body."¹⁷

Historical Position.—The separation of mind as "wholly distinct from the body," the dualism of thinking substance and extended substance, is the doctrine which leads to the problems of Descartes' successors, and makes his philosophy a live issue both in metaphysics and in psychology during a considerable period. His conception of self-consciousness as ultimate, of the centrality and priority of thought, also arouses discussion, notably in the direction of idealism as the philosophy which seeks the ground for Descartes' chief propositions: the existence of a fundamental Being to whom my ideas are due, in whose reality I subsist, with the probability that "I am something more than I suppose myself to be."¹⁸ But another type of thought is implied in the thorough-going mechanical view of nature which Descartes cautiously outlines. Descartes is given an important place in history for his great mathematical discovery, the foundation of analytic geometry by the application of algebra to geometry. His mathematical method would undoubtedly have been applied more extensively had he not withheld his cosmology,

¹⁷ Synopsis of the *Meditations*.

¹⁸ *Meditations*, III.

in part, out of respect for the Church. He might, for example, have proceeded by aid of the axiom of causality to the formulation of the cosmic first principle demanded by the facts, instead of accepting the Christian deity. Again, his recognition of psycho-physical dependence and the mechanical nature of all bodily operations, might have led him to adopt strict determinism. During the Enlightenment, the doctrine that the entire individual is a "machine" was founded on Descartes' mechanical philosophy. Finally, Descartes' arguments for the existence of God prepared the way for decisive criticism of all efforts to prove that God exists.

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§ 5. SUCCESSORS OF DESCARTES

Gassendi.—Prominent among the critics of Descartes was Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), at first a preacher, then professor at Aix, and later, popular as professor of mathematics at Paris, where his lectures were attended by people of all ages, including leading men of letters. While Bacon assigned the first place among ancient philosophers to Democritus, Gassendi revived atomism in the form given it by Epicurus, and brought systematic materialism to the fore. In accord with the mechanical theory of Galileo, Gassendi emphasized quantitative conceptions, and en-

deavored to explain all changes by the persistence of matter and motion. He identified the weight of atoms with their inherent motion and explained the falling of bodies by the earth's attraction. Evolution and dissolution are due to the union and separation of atoms, not to changes of substance. Gassendi conceded certain points to theology, and was willing to admit the existence of God as creator of atoms, or at least a "soul of the world" diffused like heat through the cosmos. Gassendi's atomism is contrasted with Descartes' corpuscular theory. Out of the controversy arose attempts to reconcile the two types of physical theory, in the case of Père Mersenne (1588-1648) and Robert Boyle (1627-1691); while Newton adopted Gassendi's conception of atoms.

Cartesianism.—The philosophy of Descartes came into immediate favor in some quarters, notably in France, among the Oratorians and Jansenists, who found in Augustinianism a common basis for theology and Cartesianism. Among the Jansenists was Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), who raised numerous questions essential to the understanding of Descartes' doctrine. Cartesianism also found advocates in Holland and Germany. The Jesuits opposed it, and in Rome Descartes' works were put on the *Index Expurgatorius*. Gassendi participated in the controversy by raising certain acute objections. Others opposed Descartes on the grounds of orthodoxy and the Aristotelian philosophy.

Geulinx.—Regis, De la Forge, Cordemoy, and Clauberg were chiefly interested in the relationship of mind and body. Geulinx (1625-1669) modified the Cartesian view on the assumption that I am a cause only when I know how an event happens: unaware that my will to move my body actually moves it, I am not a cause; I am ignorant of the way sensation is produced. The body does not give rise to perception and mind does not cause motion, therefore Geulinx attributes both the movement and the sensation to the divine activity: "on the occasion" of the physical motion of the air and nerves, God produces the sensation of sound; and on the occasion of my volition

he moves my arms. So in general God brings things to pass, imposes laws on motion, harmonizing external and internal events, as the only true active Being. In the moral sphere right dispositions are alone required of us, not works; since we can do nothing. Therefore virtue consists in submission to the divine order in self-renouncing love of God. Even the world-picture which seems to be aroused in my consciousness by the world itself is produced by divine activity, and I am a mere spectator of this world.

Malebranche.—Occasionalism is carried to the limit by Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), a member of the Oratory of Jesus, author of *De la recherche de la vérité*, 1675; *Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion*, 1688.¹ A very ardent thinker, Malebranche found his clue in Augustine, starting with an analysis of self-consciousness and knowledge. Sensations are dim and untrustworthy. We know outer objects by means of ideas or representations: ideas are in God, the mind perceives them in him, in whom we see all things. God, possessing all things as archetypes, producing ideas in us, encompasses our minds, so that to know is to partake of his intelligence. He is not only the place of spirits but the universe itself is in him. Even our own bodies are known only through ideas or divine patterns; and when we seem to act on the body this apparent causality is due to the linkage of God's works. The necessary connection or law is not then found in experience, but "reciprocal modalities" or constant successions only; while thought at its best is participation in the infinite Reason.

Bayle and Pascal.—Accepting the rationalism of Descartes with reservations, Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) opposed dogmatism, and found reason more effective in discovering errors than in gaining positive knowledge. Bayle boldly exposed the inconsistencies of religious doctrines, put reason over against faith, in anticipation of the negative criticisms of the Enlightenment, to be considered below. Less sceptical as regards certain ultimate principles than Bayle, with a genius for definitive thought

¹ *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion*, tr. by Ginsberg, 1923.

which found only partial expression in his writings, Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) opened the way to doubt by showing the inadequacy of the philosophical proofs of God. Pascal was a leader among the Jansenists, and added to the controversy in which they were engaged his famous *Lettres provinciales*, 1656. His still more famous *Pensées sur la religion*, 1670, is written in matchless style, and holds first place among writings by French moralists of his type. The compactness of his maxims is shown by his sayings: “the heart has its reasons which reason does not know,” “our soul is placed in our body, where it finds number, time, dimension; it calls this nature or necessity, and cannot think otherwise.” Gifted as a mathematician and physicist, Pascal made several important discoveries, and might have added to the constructive thought of his day had he not given extreme allegiance to religion. His knowledge of nature led him to recognize the existence of matter, space, time, motion, as implying universal principles in the natural world-order. But his religious experience led him, in behalf of the spiritual order, to lay stress on human nature as sinful and human society as corrupt; hence he appeals to divine grace, revelation, and the Church. Dwelling on the relativity of knowledge, the weakness of reason, the necessity for faith and of submission to revelation, he says: “we must be able to doubt when necessary, to be positive when necessary, and to submit when necessary.” Pascal’s spiritual thought is seen in his emphasis on the living personality, conscience, the “heart” or more intimate inward self. His contribution to the “art of thinking” appeared in *The Port-Royal Logic*, 1662.

§ 6. BENEDICT SPINOZA

Life.—Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632–1677) was born at Amsterdam, the son of a Jewish merchant who emigrated from Portugal to avoid persecution. He was educated in the Talmud and commentaries, and became acquainted with the works of Maimonides, and other Jewish

philosophers, also with Cabalistic writings. He was very promising as a student and high hopes were aroused concerning his future. But he studied natural science under a free-thinking physician, became critical of the Jewish traditional ideas, also greatly interested in the philosophical idea of God. Accused of atheism, he was excommunicated by the synagogue in 1656, and was obliged to leave Amsterdam because of his "frightful heresies." Spinoza lived in various Dutch towns, occupied with the study of Cartesianism and the development of his own philosophy, and settled in The Hague in 1669, where he earned a meagre living by grinding lenses. Free and independent as a thinker, he gradually attracted a group of friends, who read his great work, *Ethics*, while it was still in process. As his reputation grew he became known in other countries, and in 1673 declined a professorship in Heidelberg because he feared his liberty as a thinker would be curtailed. His life was an ideal instance of adaptation to conditions, in a simple free mode of existence, inspired by profound devotion to truth. The disciple of no one, standing alone, he belonged to the ages. During his twenty years of isolation he apparently did not turn to literature, art, poetry or history for consolation; but was wholly devoted to his philosophy, in which he found salvation, peace, and freedom. By thus dedicating his life to thought he developed his system with remarkable clearness, within the limits he had established as his field. When he died his few possessions barely sufficed to pay debts incurred during his last illness.

Spinoza's Works.—In the world at large Spinoza's pantheism aroused the greatest dissent, and he was widely condemned as an atheist. It was one hundred years before his greatness as a thinker was recognized. Then he became known as the God-intoxicated man. His influence became great in Germany in Goethe's time, and he has continued to be profoundly influential, although his doctrine has not been adopted precisely as he formulated it. Apparently, his first heresy was the idea that God might have a body. In his first essay, *A Short Treatise on God and Man* (writ-

ten in Dutch), Spinoza attempted to harmonize the scientific conception of nature with the idea of God. Later he wrote an exposition of the philosophy of Descartes for one of his pupils, and this work was the only one published under his own name during his life-time.¹ Although deeply influenced by Descartes, he drew upon works by Jewish theologians and by Bruno; he also studied the works of Bacon and Hobbes.

In his *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, 1670, he advocated religious liberty, made a critical study of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and laid foundations for the critical and historical study of the Bible as developed a century later. In the *Tractatus Politicus*, published after his death, Spinoza showed his familiarity with the teaching of Hobbes, but he separated government from personal conviction. The short treatise on God was a sketch of his system, identifying the divine existence and essence, presupposing God as the cause of our idea of him, and assuming that God as the most perfect being is the being of whom infinite attributes are predicated, each infinitely perfect in its kind. The *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, probably written before 1661, is a fragment outlining rules of life, modes of perception and of improving the understanding, that it may apprehend things without error, and attain certainty or conviction, an adequate or true idea, namely, knowledge of the absolutely perfect being as origin and source of the whole of nature. Spinoza tells us that he tried the usual methods of attaining satisfaction and found them fruitless: what he sought was something which would give him continuous, supreme and unending happiness, an eternal abiding object of love. It was clear that nothing finite could yield this satisfaction; for nothing in its own nature may rightfully be called either perfect or imperfect: only by discovering fixed laws, the eternal order to which all things are related, may one find peace. That Spinoza actually found the peace he sought is evident to every reader of his *Ethics*, however

¹ *Renati des Cartes principiorum philosophiæ Pars I et II more geometrico demonstratæ*, 1663.

one may estimate his pantheism, or acosmism (without a world) as it has been called. The *Ethics*, written during 1662-1665, was frequently revised and was published shortly after Spinoza's death, in 1677. In some respects it is the most remarkable philosophical work ever written, since it opens with definitions and axioms after the manner of Euclid, and proceeds by propositions, proofs and corollaries in accordance with the method of geometry; and holds strictly to this form through a highly condensed argument, which is meant to be a complete demonstration. Part I is devoted to the idea of God as substance, the second Part to the nature and origin of the human mind, the third to a study of the emotions and passions, the fourth to human servitude, and the last to the power of the intellect, with its love of God.

Aim of Spinoza's Philosophy.—Since the usual social life seemed utterly vain and futile, Spinoza sought secure happiness by resolute fidelity to the highest good of the inner life, free to follow truth wherever it might lead. In his moral and intellectual interests he resembled the Stoics; he was fundamentally impressed by the universal order of things, the natural necessity which achieves its ends despite all human volition. As a rational being, it seemed to him possible not only to understand this necessity, adopting it as his point of view, eliminating all error and illusion, but to attain complete adjustment, in an attitude of impersonal freedom, apart from the disturbing incidents of ordinary human existence. Hence the importance of attaining convictions which withstand all criticism, of dispassionate analysis of the human mind, particularly the emotions and passions, that every element of human nature might be mastered. The goal is to be that peace which nothing can disturb. Hence too the need for pressing beyond the dualism of Descartes' philosophy in quest of a single principle, with emphasis on the point of view of the whole, the eternal system of the universe. This quest may involve a limitation, due to the fact that the discoverable laws are those of motion in the material world and association of inner states in the mental. But

here at any rate our knowledge is secure, and the idea of substance, as defined and systematically developed, as central to all truth and reality, yields the great idea of the Spinozistic system. This quest for God involves a method such that, granted the central principle, seen "under the aspect of eternity," all such matters as causality, space, time, are envisaged in the light of their ground. As time proves to be a mode of thought, so space is assigned to its appropriate mode, while causality is identical with rationality as an expression of necessary sequence. To possess this central principle is therefore to possess both thought and being, to be master of the situation which the human mind faces in the study of the causal sequences of which the thinker and his thoughts are a part.

Universal Substance.—Granted the definitions which show that essence involves existence, that substance is that which exists in itself and can be conceived independently of anything else, the way is cleared for the definition of attributes as the essence of substance, of modes as conceivable in terms of substances and its attributes; and of God as the absolutely infinite being whose substance consists of infinite attributes. Substance being by nature prior to its modifications, the conception of anything else presupposes the idea of substance, existence necessarily belongs to it, it is necessarily infinite; and, God being identified with it, is proved necessarily to exist. Being *is*, Being is all, is unity, the whole; nothing is prior; plurality of Beings is impossible. As unitary and indivisible, Being is infinite and external, self-caused and free, absolute; also the necessary world-cause or eternal ground. From the nature of Substance or God as thus defined, infinite in wealth of attributes and modes, an infinite number of things in infinite ways necessarily follow. The universe as known by us follows from God's nature, God is the efficient cause of the existence and essence of things; nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.² All things then are in

² *Ethics*, Pt. I, Prop. XXIX,

God, and two ways of regarding things are disclosed to us: nature as active (*natura naturans*) is the nature of things regarded as universal law, nature as the sum of existent things (*natura naturata*) is the world regarded in terms of duration, as what follows from substance regarded under the form of eternity.

Attributes and Modes.—The attributes of extension and thought follow from substance as infinite. From extension follow motion and rest as modes; hence material bodies, with their modifications. From thought follow intellect and perception as modes; hence minds, with ideas of bodies, that is, human beings. There are then two causal chains cognizable by us: the series of events which belong under extension, with its modes, and the series of associated ideas which belong under thought. The order and connection of ideas in the latter series is the same as the order and connection of things in the former. The idea of a bodily modification is the state of mind which accompanies the bodily modification. The object of thought is the bodily state accompanying that thought. The “ideate” of a thought is the thing described by that thought. It follows that the human mind has no knowledge of the body and its processes except through the idea of the modifications which accompany these processes item by item, and describable in terms of the processes whereby the body is affected. A true idea agrees with its object, that which is represented in the intellect must be occurring in nature. From the ultimate standpoint, thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same, now comprehended through the one attribute, now through the other.³ God or Substance, that is, nature as a whole is eternal, and all attributes are eternal. But thought does not proceed from one attribute to another in order to know it; it is known by regarding substance as a whole, not by passing from thought to extension inferentially or from extension to thought. So too modes are cognizable from a certain point of view, by regarding them as temporal, particular phenomena, under *natura naturata* (what fol-

³ *Ibid.*, Pt. II, Prop. VII, n.

lows from the given attribute). Some modes are infinite and necessary, namely, motion and rest (under extension): finite modes follow from these. Bodies are distinguishable from one another in terms of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, not in terms of substance.⁴ Bodies and minds are parallel, save that the mind not only perceives the sequence of ideas which correspond point by point with bodily events, but also the nature of its own processes. The conjunction and association of mental images determines the trains of thought. Our ideas of the bodily and mental modifications are not indeed adequate. Nor have we adequate ideas of the duration of particular things external to ourselves, contingent and perishable as they are.

Theory of Knowledge.—Our knowledge begins in incidental experience, from particular things represented in our perceptions (fragmentary knowledge, confused, without order); from symbols, opinion, imagination; and confused ideas of bodily modifications (inadequate, involving error). Knowledge proceeds through reason, which yields common notions attained by exact comparison of given facts and proceeds by adequate ideas of the properties of things, attains true knowledge. The third type of knowledge is intuitive, complete knowledge; involves an adequate idea of the essences of attributes and things.⁵ All things are in God and are perceived through God, and nature is known as uniform, without a flaw. Error is due to the first kind of knowledge. The second and third kinds are necessarily true, and disclose the true from the false: man has actual knowledge which corresponds with its object, possesses truth as a standard. It is of the very nature of reason to "perceive things under a certain form of eternity," the human mind has an "adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God."⁶

Our self-knowledge is not then knowledge of an independent soul or ego which as a substance possesses feeling, thoughts, will; for the human mind is the sequence of its

⁴ *Ibid.*, Pt. II, Prop. XIII; Ax. II, Lemma I.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Pt. II, Prop. XL, Note II.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Pt. II, Prop. XLVII.

states, as already indicated; the series of ideas corresponding to bodily modifications. Consequently, to have a true idea of the mental series is once more to start with God and consider what follows. Manifold misconceptions are at once cleared away. For instance, men are born ignorant of the causes of things, all have a desire to seek for what is useful, and all are aware of such desire; whereupon men deem themselves free, because forsooth they are conscious of their volitions and desires, never even dreaming why they are so disposed to wish and desire.⁷ But men are mistaken in thinking themselves free, in their confusion between consciousness of their own actions and opinions regarding the conditions of their conduct. Men act with ends in view and readily infer that nature proceeds in the same manner, ignorant that final causes are "mere human figments." They argue as if God in acting for an object desires something which he lacks, and when hard pressed take refuge in what they regard as the will of God, "the sanctuary of ignorance." By contrast, the truth is that "in the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity," once more.⁸ What is needed in any case is *ideas*, and by an "idea" in this sure or adequate sense (showing the cause of error) Spinoza does not mean images formed at the back of the eye or in the midst of the brain, but conceptions involving sure processes of reason. Granted this certain knowledge, the way is clear to see the bearing of first principles on conduct, which should proceed solely according to the decree of God; since we are partakers of the divine nature. This knowledge tranquillizes the spirit, yields the highest happiness; for we realize that, all notions about free-will having been put aside, all things follow from the divine nature as surely as three angles, equal to two right angles, follow from the essence of a triangle.

The Emotions.—Spinoza's treatment of the emotions

⁷ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Appendix.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Pt. II, Prop. XLVIII.

and passions is characteristic. He proceeds as he would when concerned with lines, planes, and solids. Thus anger, hatred, envy follow from necessary causes: man is necessarily a prey to his passions till he understands them. Emotions and passions are affections of the body by which man's power to act is increased or diminished: the *idea* of such disturbances increases or diminishes his intellectual activity. Given the transition of the mind from a less to a greater degree of perfection, a joyful emotion ensues. The mind, so far as it can, endeavors to conceive of those things which increase or help the power of activity in the body. Desire, longing or conscious appetite is man's nature in this respect: man is centrally actuated by self-preservation. Naturally then man is actuated by love, or pleasure accompanied by an idea of an external cause; for desire, love, sadness are primitive emotions. As love involves the impulse toward pleasure, so hate involves sadness or pain, accompanied by an idea of an external cause. We judge by these emotions, responding to desire as fundamental. Any emotion is describable according to this scheme. Thus envy is hatred in so far as it induces a person to be pained by another's good fortune, and rejoice in another's evil fortune; while hope arises from the image in the mind of something future or past, the results being in doubt; hence hope is an uncertain joy. Emotion in general (regarded from within) is a confused idea whereby the mind asserts itself with respect to a force for existence seemingly greater than before. Since an emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion, the attack must be indirect, and may proceed as rapidly as one knows causes, when one learns how to make successful effort by appeal to the association of ideas of external states and conditions. Not until we know how appetite becomes desire by union with the idea of its object are we in a position to control appetite. Emotions tend to vanish when ideas concerning them become perfectly clear, but adequate knowledge shows why bodily processes change also, how will coincides with the impulse for self-preservation.

Moral Doctrine.—Having shown that God or Nature

acts by the same necessity by which it exists, that God does not exist or act for the sake of an end; also that an alleged final cause is merely a human desire, in so far as it is taken to be the cause or origin of anything; Spinoza is ready to draw the inference that perfection and imperfection are *mere modes of thinking*, notions formed by comparison of individuals of the same species.⁹ Good and bad do not then stand for positive qualities; good is useful to us, evil a hindrance; knowledge of good and evil involves knowledge of emotions of pleasure and pain. Granted knowledge of the power and infirmity of the nature which we have to overcome, the resource is to lead a rational life in accordance with this wisdom. Self-preservation being fundamental, we shrink or desire in response to it; the basis of virtue is obvious. To live under the guidance of reason, trying our best to render love or kindness for hate, anger, contempt, and the other disturbing emotions, is to advance toward freedom. Reason is the guide or test throughout; man is free when led by reason, clear and distinct ideas of the emotions is everywhere serviceable; for the mind has power only through forming adequate ideas. There is need then of a system of right conduct, practical precepts, ideals, insight into cases, culminating in knowledge of God as the highest good. Love of God, as the great incentive, should hold the foremost place, granted knowledge that God is without emotion, above all envy, anger, jealousy, and the like. This ideal is based on Spinoza's third type of knowledge, including the idea that the mind, not wholly destroyed with its bodily modes, has an eternal essence. To know ourselves under the form of eternity (intuitively) is to know God, realize that we are in God. Thus in a remarkable passage of his *Ethics* Spinoza leads his readers almost unawares to the truth that in this intellectual love of God we possess that love by which God loves himself, in sure possession of that freedom and blessedness which in its constancy is immortality.

Estimate.—Spinoza's identification of Nature with God

⁹ *Ethics*, Pt. IV, Preface.

involves a rational naturalism, a mathematical and mechanical conception of nature as a closed system of substance, attributes, and modes, which has proved to be profoundly suggestive. His eternalism, the idea that the universe is fixed or unalterable in its nature as a whole seen under the aspect of eternity, distinguishes his pantheism and has fostered the conception of the Absolute as an all-inclusive experience. The conception of an exact parallelism between mind and body has led to various versions of the double aspect theory in psychology. Spinoza's practical doctrine, with his unsurpassed critique of the emotions and its culmination in a love of God which assimilates the truth in mysticism without being mystical, has proved no less suggestive, although no one has followed his geometrical scheme. It has been questioned whether the mind-body relationship, without interaction, grants us satisfactory knowledge of mind and matter, of error, of our supposed consciousness of freedom; and whether there is ground for an adequate doctrine of the self in terms of substance, a real place for man the individual, with his rights, and for society as actually constituted. Yet Spinoza's individualism has been the more stimulating because of his rigid insistence on the principles which he has laid down as fundamental. The greatness of Spinoza began to be recognized in Lessing's time, with appreciation of his intellectual love of God and the high degree of consistency implied in his doctrine of substance, a conception which was contrasted with the self or ego as the basis of system in philosophy.

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§ 7. LEIBNIZ. MONADODOLOGY. OPTIMISM

Life.—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), born at Leipzig, was a son of a professor in the university, to whose library he had access at the age of six or seven because of interest in learned books. Leibniz became an extensive reader, at fourteen he was deemed a prodigy of learning. By that time he had sketched his system, and when he entered the university at fifteen soon became acquainted with the works of modern philosophers. He received his doctorate in law at the University of Altdorf at twenty, and declined the offer of a professorship in that institution. He early became dissatisfied with scholasticism, but when informed in the natural sciences of his day he seemed as if “transported to another world.” His problem was to find a common basis for the mechanical truths of science and the idea of prescience or purpose in nature. During a stay of four years in Paris, he devoted his studies to the higher mathematics and the Cartesian philosophy. He met Malebranche and Huyghens,¹ and from the latter acquired methods and principles which influenced the development of his philosophy, and prepared the way for his discovery of the differential calculus, in 1676. Leibniz was also influenced in a measure by Hobbes, and by his visit to London, where he met Robert Boyle, the physicist. In 1676, he received an appointment as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, at Hanover, a position which he held during the remainder of his life.

Characteristics.—Educated for the law, of varied interests, as traveller, statesman, scholar, Leibniz enjoyed the society of men of all types, and believed he could learn from the least enlightened: “he spoke well of everybody and made the best of everything.” He read very extensively, not only to find elements of value but to master, and if possible to add something to every science he

¹ Mathematician and physicist, contributed formulæ and a theory of light as due to transverse waves of vibration in the ether.

studied; and he sought points of agreement, not merely for points on which to raise objections. He was equally at home in several languages, and wrote learned works in Latin, French, and German. Remarkably versatile and many-sided in his interests, his great desire seems to have been to cultivate all sides of his nature to the full. If he was the typical optimist, he was also a philosopher in the largest sense, educated not merely by solitary thought, the study of the world's great books, but by life, wide contacts, friendships, public positions. In Mayence, 1670-1672, for example, he undertook a reform of legal procedure; and he went to Paris on a diplomatic position, 1672-1676. He was one of the most remarkable intellectual men of all time, and author of an almost incredible number of treatises on history, mathematics, and philosophy, some of which still lie in the library at Hanover in manuscript form. As librarian at Hanover, where he was also court councillor, he was chiefly occupied with history, jurisprudence, and mathematics, while also devoting himself to philosophy. He corresponded with Newton, visited Spinoza, whose treatment of final causes and the idea of substance proved disappointing; studied Plato, from whom he derived his teleological view; and had the advantage of reading the doctrines of a contemporary, Locke, on points under discussion in his own philosophy. In 1700 he founded the Academy of Sciences in Berlin. A man of remarkable activity and productivity, he was so devoted to his work that he had no regular hours for his meals; food was brought to him at intervals, he ate when it was convenient to pause in his work, and often spent the night in his chair and went on with his work. The prime result of his encyclopedic learning in his many years of assimilative reading, with his orderliness and precision, was the problem of unifying doctrines derived from Plato, Aristotle, and the Atomists; the mechanical conception of nature; mathematical conceptions; principles emphasized by Descartes and Spinoza; religious views acquired from his mother, who was a pietist; and theological and other conceptions taken over from his age.

Starting-point.—Facing the possibility of unifying all knowledge, with a love for exact methods and mathematics seldom united with appreciation of what is finest and most spiritual, combined with an accurate knowledge of the history of philosophy often lacking in great system-makers, his central idea was *continuity* approached from the viewpoint of his analysis of force and substance in the light of problems left unsolved by his immediate predecessors. Leibniz was as deeply impressed as Descartes or Spinoza by the mathematical or geometrical method. Yet he was not satisfied with either the results of that method or the strictly formal mode of presenting propositions. On the supposition that the sum-total of motion in the universe always remains constant, motion is unaccounted for when bodies come to rest or begin to move: motion seems to be lost or to be regained. Motion and rest are therefore simply contrasted states. The principle of continuity, that nature makes no leaps, seems then to be violated: this principle must be established by appeal to the conception of force as the *conatus* (tendency) of a body to move or to continue in motion. When motion ceases, the implied force still persists and can be revived, motion and rest being only relatively opposed. The persistence of force, as containing the possibility of future change (not the persistence of motion), is therefore the underlying principle. This principle in turn rests on the conception of *law*, involving the uniform consistency of changing states; and law in its turn implies the principle of sufficient reason. In all substances there is active expression of force. Force instead of extension is the essential attribute of things: the law of the conservation of force is fundamental. Of the three important philosophical principles here made explicit by Leibniz, the ideas of continuity, the persistence of force, the principle of sufficient reason, the last is the one which discloses the adequate ground of reality.

The Dynamic Principle.—How is the persistence of force to be explained? By a change from the static or geometric conception of the universe to the dynamic view, interpreted teleologically. Nature would retrograde unless

the energy of a cause were preserved in the effect. The mechanical conception of necessary sequences is insufficient; so too is the notion that bodies exist by occupying space, as if extension were fundamental to body. Hence there is need of a different conception of substance. Atomism fails to afford the clue; for the alleged hardness of the atoms is relative: there is no absolute hardness, as there is no absolute motion or rest. Leibniz had already been following a promising clue, when arriving at his conception of force by analyzing motion into infinitely small impulses, an analysis which led to his mathematical discovery of the calculus. Following the same reasoning, having rejected the assumption of Descartes and Spinoza that extension is fundamental, Leibniz notes that extended things are always manifold and complex: since spatial bodies consist of parts, extension cannot be the essential attribute of things, for what is made up of parts is not primary. There must then be simple indivisible realities, the real absolute units which underlie all extension. Only these ultimate units can be regarded as substance in the strict sense of the term. But, since force persists, it follows that this persistent substance is likewise force; for it would be utterly impossible for activity to originate from substances in a state of absolute rest. Otherwise stated, it is a problem of the whole and the parts so conceived that the continuity or complete unity of the whole shall not conflict with the real diversity of the parts.² The quantitative notion of substance is inadequate; substance is intensive rather than extensive, it must be something, must possess specifically determined quality, some essential unity in itself. What are these substantial units whose objective manifestation in the world of extension is what we call matter?

The Monads.—Leibniz had met Gassendi in Paris and discussed atomism, which seemed plausible so far as material bodies are concerned, but failed to account for mind. Furthermore, these hypothetically simple parts are not fundamental but are still extended. Spinoza's doctrine

² Cf. Latta, *Leibniz: the Monadology*, p. 22.

leaves substance without real parts, yields a whole but no parts; in contrast with atomism, which yields parts but no whole, no principle to show how a fortuitous collection of units can become a system. Substance must be both plural and qualitative to account for existent things in the cosmos as actually found, with its order and uniformity, its evidences of law and purpose. Hence emphasis once more falls on force, the essentially dynamic relation of whole to parts. The parts must contain the whole potentially, must have the power of acting from within themselves, so that what is potential shall tend toward full actuality. These metaphysical elements or units, called monads, are defined both with reference to the ultimate parts of physical things and as ultimate units of human consciousness, the self, finally with reference to God as first principle. The central clue is found in the idea of force as indivisible or simple, immaterial, unextended. The monads are metaphysical points or essential forms. As immaterial units they possess quality and a substance which cannot be attributed to atoms as mere physical units, qualitatively identical and extended. They are unlike mathematical points, since they are real substance-forces underlying the given universe of things. In their system, the monads yield the true manifoldness essential to the existence of things describable in terms of parts and wholes. Again, they are eternal, can neither be created nor destroyed. As individual forces they imply an interconnection which is more than mechanical. This systematic connection, as the Force of the total universe, is dynamic, alive, reproductive. Hence no passivity is attributed to nature, as in Spinoza's system: the fundamental energy or life which imbues all things yields a conception of unity more fundamental than that of substance.

Types of Monads.—Created monads are of three classes: unconscious, conscious, self-conscious.³ In general, monads are fundamentally individual, metaphysical, non-spatial units, simple, without parts, intensive centres of force or energy. But the higher monads are not only

³ Latta, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

centres of change; they possess appetition potentially, also perception, so that each in its own way represents the universe. Without windows, without direct influence on other monads, these psychical elements mirror the cosmos, so that each is (in miniature) potentially the universe. Physical things consist of unconscious monads. Self-conscious or higher monads (human spirits or souls) involve the clue to the nature of lower monads; for the soul alone exemplifies a unitary being whose inner states follow law, uniformity, as guide to the nature of things. Conceiving all monads after the analogy of the human self, we presuppose even in the monads or elements of physical things a life or energy akin to our own conscious activity.

Prior to what we call perception, for instance, there are *petites perceptions*, thence perception as we ordinarily know it, and apperception as "reflexive knowledge of the inner state" known as self-consciousness.⁴ There is a development from the confused to the clear state of consciousness, from sensation to thought; a sequence through appetition, perception and idea. There are no leaps or breaks, but everywhere continuity of mental life up to the level of self-consciousness, with innumerable grades or levels of conscious or soul-life. The origin of human consciousness is therefore intelligible in the light of its development. Leibniz realizes that consciousness could not have come into existence suddenly, any more than motion could have arisen all at once out of a state of rest; the relation of the unconscious to the conscious is analogous to that of rest and motion. Taking account of fine shades of difference and changes of state, we note that complex forms have come to be through minute changes. The *petites perceptions* are the minimal elements.

Self-consciousness.—The soul is capable of passing through these many changes of state without itself undergoing change. Thus it involves the idea of a purposive entity whose attributes are contained within itself, and so discloses the nature of substance. The self not only possesses a continuous life which represents

⁴ Cf. Thilly, *His. of Phil.*, p. 369.

the universe; it also contemplates this picturization process, as such, has the power of universal representation to which self-consciousness is the clue. Thus the objective or external world, mirrored in miniature, is seen from another point of view as the self's own states; since each self represents the universe in its own way, and what the self directly perceives is these its own states, whatever may be inferred concerning the world. Thus what is ordinarily taken to be space, as purely objective, is seen as phenomenal, ideal. The progressive states of our self-consciousness disclose the world so that, the more clear and distinct the representation or idea the more truly we know what is real. From the idea of extension as the external form of psychical states, of space as ideal, thought may pass to a complete idealism, to the proposition that all reality is spiritual. The point of view does not shift, as in Spinoza's case, from finite modes to infinite substance; instead, an infinite number of self-conscious monads, each of which forms an inner universe of its own, possess experiences involving separate views of the universe. Yet the idea of a basic unity holding all individuals in an order or system is kept by means of a graduated series of monads whose ground is in God, the Monad of monads, whose being is the harmony of all other beings, whose pure activity is the source of all activities, and whose sufficiency is the ultimate ground of reason.⁵

Pre-established Harmony.—The continuity pervading the life of each monad is such that the whole series of mental states unfolds or develops from within, but with accordance or harmony between the various series so that each monad represents the same world. This harmony is made possible by the divine purpose. Since the relations of monads are ideal, without direct influence, so that externally seen we appear as isolated, the basis of all relationships must indeed be correspondences in God, spiritual union in him; and so God is the perfect activity or being we tend to become. In the long graduated ascent towards his perfection there are no sharp lines, leaps or breaks,

⁵ Latta, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

but everywhere infinitesimal stages. We do not start life with a mind like a blank tablet; for all experience and knowledge must have a sufficient basis, and our psychology must take account of the obscure and faint perceptions out of which came the clear and the strong. As each of us represents the infinite, each has an infinite content; but again we are finite and do not become God. Continuing in our effort to represent a point of view of the whole, we are and we remain true individuals; we are selves genuinely representing the world, and our life as selves is very far from being mechanical, as if we were wound up in order to unfold or evolve what had been involved: pre-established harmony is a teleological principle.

Theory of Nature.—In his conception of nature Leibniz assimilates the whole mechanical conception of his day, and recasts it in terms of the above mentioned dynamic and teleological ideas. The universal striving or purpose filling all things implies the energy which (in place of motion or substance) is eternally conserved; motion is change of position; extension is capacity for receiving motion; space is a term for the arrangements of co-existing phenomena in ordered relations; time the order of these sequences as successive relations, time and space being ideal. The relations between all monads is describable in internal terms. A body is then a phenomenal aggregate, the qualities of matter are *phenomena bene fundata* (not mere appearance). In each body there is a dominating monad which makes it determinate, in its activity according to efficient causes. With no vacuum, no two things precisely alike, a place for everything in the harmony of the whole, the imperfection of parts being due to the fact that they are parts, there is continuity throughout nature from lowest to highest. The whole is perfect, this is the best of possible worlds; for God, with all possibilities before him, chose the conditions, orders, arrangements, plans which were compossible: the divine nature itself is the sufficient reason for this wisest of choices. Leibniz puts the matter in logical terms, but also in theological, to show

that he means the real God of the Christian religion, a theistic conception implying an eternal purpose made manifest in the cosmos as a whole.⁶ As there is a harmony between the motions of the body and perceptions within the mind, so in general there is correspondence between external and internal relations, an organic relation between beings and things, especially between the higher monads, with their individual functions.

Knowledge.—Although Leibniz, in opposition to Locke, holds that knowledge begins in the involuntary and unconscious, not with a mind described as a blank tablet, he agrees with Locke concerning innate ideas, and demands proof for all truths, even those said to be innate, save so far as they are not identical propositions, to which other propositions are traced. Logic culminates in the principle of identity, the criterion of truth in the domain of pure thought; and in the principle of sufficient reason, as already indicated. Contingent and necessary truths differ only in degree; the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths underlies our power to know, in contrast with mere truths of fact. Sense-experience yields examples or particulars. The statement that “nothing is in the mind which was not first in the senses” is a particular truth only. Leibniz added the qualification, “except the mind itself.” The soul then is much more than an empty tablet (*tabula rasa*) on which nothing has yet been written. The intellect supplies the basic principles, involving the idea of unity, substance, identity, cause, reason. This knowledge is not innate in the sense of a psychological idea, but as a disposition or capacity. By developing our capacity we arrive at knowledge of God as foundation of the cosmic order, original substance, creator, source of power, final cause, sufficient, perfect, all-wise. Thus is fulfilled the progressive process which begins in the unconscious, attains reason, and discerns God as intuitive Knower whose knowledge is eternally adequate, perfectly realized, needing no progressive process.

⁶ See his *Monadology*, and *Principles of Nature and Grace*; also the *Théodicée*.

Other departments of knowledge follow from these principles, with reference to the will, pleasure and pain: soul-activity is pleasure, soul-restraint is pain. Freedom is not liberty to do anything you like, choice is conditioned by perception, and our moral acts are teleological. Action is not then due to necessity, but involves spontaneity coupled with intelligence; the goal of conduct, the highest freedom, happiness, knowledge. Although the desire for self-preservation and realization originally prompted our actions, there arises a longing for perfection, a higher degree of spiritual activity and harmony; hence this spiritual desire becomes our motive. So pleasure is in time correlated with higher values which imply spiritual abundance and an endeavor toward the happiness of others in genuinely distinterested love, guided by wisdom.

Estimate.—If Leibniz is a harmonizer, it is through interest in the central problem of mechanism *vs.* teleology, which he approaches in terms of the principle of sufficient reason, with an absorbing interest both in the theological idea of God as creator and in the philosophical idea of a first cause or ground. For the principle of sufficient reason does not wholly explain this cosmos, as if the universe were the merely mechanical or necessary expression of the divine nature. Since God is perfect, any manifestation would involve limitations; in his wisdom he selected the best of *possible* worlds, his preference being in favor of the greatest harmony together with the greatest multiplicity. This selectivity implies divine will as well as divine reason, with evil (as metaphysical limitation) reduced to the minimum. Leibniz seems to be as much impressed by aesthetic as by moral values. In envisaging these values, evils as experienced by us may be insignificant. Leibniz is not merely a temperamental optimist, as if blind to the evil and sin in the world; he harmonizes doctrines as old as Plato, Plotinus, and Augustine. He is the type among philosophers who plead for a world-plan as the ground of our world and of our selfhood; but also the thinker most frequently attacked by the pessimist or the critic who objects that pre-established harmony does not

afford an adequate ground for the meanings of life, for social experience, or a sufficient explanation of the existence of evil.

The historical position of Leibniz is due to a number of highly significant contributions to modern philosophy: (1) the principle of continuity in both organic development and mental life, which, with later modifications, underlies current conceptions of nature and evolution; (2) the dynamic conception of substance, in contrast with substance as merely extended or inert; (3) the principle of change through insensible degrees, with emphasis on minute processes, infinitesimals, *petites perceptions* (subconscious), marking a reaction against the sharp divisions or formal categories of scholasticism; (4) the conception of the organic relatedness of things, parts, individuals, in one harmonious system, metaphysical and ethical; (5) the change from the conservation of motion, or that of the persistence of forms, to the conservation of energy; (6) the interpretation of this dynamic principle as life, non-spatial and spiritual; (7) the doctrine of monads, as originally the same in content, the difference being due to development; and that of self-conscious monads (selves), each representing the universe from its own viewpoint or perspective, each therefore having a distinctive or individual life, a life which mirrors the universe, the finite representing the infinite in what was later called a "self-representative system"; and (8) the idealistic principle, involving the nature, possibility, and gradual development of knowledge pointing forward to perfect knowledge in God, coupled with the view that inner experience is fundamental, the self being a representing centre of the cosmos in which space and time are ideal.

The fact that Leibniz contributed one of the greatest types of thought is shown by profound studies of his philosophy, from time to time, with discoveries of new aspects of his specific doctrines. His monadism has been modified by introducing windows into the monads, adding the idea of interaction between selves, with opportunity for the deliverances of experience, a more secure basis for

freedom, and for the spontaneity of individuality. Recent thinkers have found in him the type of pluralism or personal idealism, as the clue to ultimate reality, in contrast with the monism of substance. He has also received recognition anew on the part of mathematicians who take their cue from his doctrine of perspectives and relativity amidst continuity.

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§ 8. ENGLISH EMPIRICISM. JOHN LOCKE

Although Francis Bacon did not co-ordinate his insights into the nature of things and suggestions of scientific method by analyzing experience with respect to the problem of knowledge as essential to the reconstruction of philosophy, his teachings were wholly in the direction of the essentially practical view of life, of the recognition of positive facts, and the straightforward description of experience which has been characteristic of empiricism in England. By clearing away the artificialities and formalities of scholasticism, and calling attention to the "idols" which beset us till we clear our intellectual horizon and begin anew, he prepared the way. The whole trend of his thought was toward recognition of the direct facts of perception in a simplified universe, a perception which is "far more subtle than sense; so that sense is but a dull thing in comparison of it . . . a subject of a very noble inquiry . . . for it is another key to open nature." Here perception or *taking account of*, is distinguished from

“sense,” as cognitive experience; in its terms a more fundamental inquiry is disclosed than that of the materialistic principles which we so readily assume in behalf of physics.¹ Perception became the central clue for English empiricism, with its differences of emphasis, its trend toward the conclusions that all knowledge begins in experience, all knowledge is a product of experience, concerns experience, and is (cautiously speaking) an explanation of experience. It was Locke who, adopting the viewpoint of perception, developed this intermediate interest in the direction of a critical philosophy, leaving materialism and the mechanical conception of the universe on one side, and the rationalistic systems on the other. There was need of a preliminary analysis of human understanding, with respect to the nature, origin, and validity of knowledge. Locke’s inquiry led to Berkeley’s critique of abstract general ideas, and Hume’s analysis of sense-impressions and the idea of causality; and empiricism at large made contributions to moral philosophy, psychology, political theory, and metaphysics.

Life.—John Locke (1632–1704) was born at Wrington, in Somerset, England. He entered Westminster school in 1646; and Oxford in 1652, where his dissatisfaction with scholastic discipline began, also his reaction against the philosophy then in vogue. Locke expected to enter the clerical profession, but was deterred by liberal views, and became a physician, a choice which indicates his empirical type of mind and interest in such facts as those on which he was to base his theory of knowledge. In 1666, he became acquainted with Lord Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, of whose household he became an important member, and through whose influence he held various public offices. His public life is of little moment, however, save as a further indication of his type and his interest in the practical or political affairs of the world, notably with respect to his theory of government, his tolerance, and broadmindedness. His position in Lord Ashley’s household and in that of Sir Francis Masham gave him abundant

¹ Cf. A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, 1925, p. 61.

opportunity for forming friendships and for literary work. His chief work, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, which had been in preparation since 1671, was published in 1690.

Locke was gentle and lovable in disposition, notable for his great love for his friends. He was an eager, honest truthseeker; a firm believer in personal and political freedom; tolerant to the limit in matters of religion, unsurpassed in candor and shrewdness. Highly esteemed by his countrymen, because of his great influence on philosophical and political thinking, he has been called the most important figure in English philosophy. He it was more than any one else who gave to philosophy in England its empirical turn. In a letter he writes: "To love truth for truth's sake is the principal part of human perfection in this world, and the seed-plot of all other virtues." Locke makes scarcely a claim for himself as a philosopher, but modestly limits his interests in his *Essay*, by telling how he came to write it and indicating what he hopes to achieve within a special field. He refrains from positive conclusions where he does not clearly see, leaving significant issues open for others to reckon with; is cautious in his speculations, even when cherished beliefs are involved. Thus he arouses his readers to essentially psychological interests, by keeping close to the facts of presented experience as clues to the nature of things and the opportunities offered to the moral agent in the sphere of practice.

Locke's Method.—Although philosophy as Locke regards it is concerned with the problems of physics, logic, and ethics, it is directly approached by the analysis of our understanding in order to determine the nature, origin, and validity of our ideas within the limits made possible by experience. Locke owed his awakening chiefly to Descartes, although he was also influenced by Hobbes and Gassendi. He is less systematic than the rationalists, although not less pronounced in his effort to find a fundamental point of view. So far as his *Essay* lacks order, this may be attributed to his empirical method, his desire to be true to experience as given, to follow it that he may

see whither it leads, by abstaining at first from any rationalistic assumption such as the theory of innate ideas. He is in some respects a pioneer, indicating promising roads to follow, without penetrating the issues to see in what direction one can be most nearly consistent. Consequently, he was taken one way in England, and interpreted in another way in France, where the ambiguity of his thought was settled in favor of sensationalism, afterwards in support of materialism. His thought matured slowly, from the period of his early interests in chemistry and therapeutics, while he followed his investigations to see what they might imply, hampered as he was by fewer presuppositions than many philosophers, and less inclined to be dogmatic. His tentative yet engaging and persuasive thought becomes clear as we follow his *Essay*, a work which serves admirably to introduce the reader into some of the central issues of modern thought. The immediacy of consciousness or inward experience is no less certain than in Descartes' starting-point, but with recognition of consciousness as a stream of experiences yielding its own method, in contrast with a rationalistic method brought as a presupposition to experience and due in part to mathematics.

Theory of Knowledge.—Locke indicates the problem of his *Essay* by saying that it naturally resulted from a conversation with friends on the principles of morality and religion. This discussion made clear the need of a prior study of the human mind to determine with what objects our understanding is fitted or unfitted to deal. Locke jotted down thoughts essential to such a study, but found that these involved issues to which he devoted his leisure for many years. His *Essay* was the chief result of these researches. His interest continued to centre about such problems as the nature of the self, the world, the idea of God, and the basis of our knowledge of these subjects with respect to a more systematic view of life and the universe. But this interest was held in abeyance, and in the *Essay* he did not reach these matters until the last Book, in which he considers some of the questions with which Descartes had been concerned at the outset. Locke's

Inquiry is the one which is for him logically prior to that of Descartes, in determining the criterion of clear and distinct ideas, namely, an investigation into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge by questioning the validity of ideas, especially if our ideas are said to be native to the mind, with an authority anterior to that of experience. The grounds of belief and assent are thus in a way fundamental to the nature of ideas as such, however convincing, however secure our conviction that rational or moral ideas are true because we possess them or because the race has them. Locke is not concerned with problems respecting the physical basis of mind, nor with its essence, or even the relation of mind to body as that relation had been regarded after Descartes' time. His account of the mind is not speculative, as if it implied "thinking substance" or a self-conscious monad; it is descriptive, with reference to the mind in its practical exercise, contributing impressions, enlisting thought, and disclosing a process which is its own evidence. His inquiry is further limited by interest in the subjective origin of ideas, not in the relation of motion to sensation, as in the philosophy of Hobbes; but rather in the remarkable fact, which may have been puzzling to Hobbes, that *awareness exists* and reports the meanings of inward experience. Moreover, conduct also occurs, adaptation of our powers to the tasks at hand. Moral conduct, as well as thought about the nature of things, involves the existence of ideas; in fine, the first issue is that of the idea rather than that of our faculties.

Doctrine of Ideas.—The term "idea" in Locke's usage stands for "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."² Assuming the existence of ideas as facts of experience, Locke includes in his term a variety of meanings which were later classed under presentation, image, percept, and concept. Whatever elements should be attributed to objects of sense, to sensation as immediate, or to the mind's equipment wherewith ideas are correlated with experiences, ideas already exist and might appear to

² *Essay*, Bk. I, Chap. I.

be congenital or full fledged. Hence Locke's first argument is against the theory of innate ideas and moral principles, not with reference to Descartes alone; for the English Platonists of Locke's time adopted such a view with special reference to the priority of man's moral and social nature. To analyze the existing knowledge pertaining to the primitive beliefs of mankind seemed to Locke conclusively to show that neither ideas nor knowledge, of the intellectual and moral types which our convictions imply, can be said to be innate. Human experience is varied, general and abstract ideas are not readily formed, but involve effort; and there is no ground for the assumption that such ideas exist prior to "experience," a term which for Locke implies varied contacts with the world. The usual argument in favor of such innateness resolves itself into *general assent* concerning the matters in question. But this proves nothing innate. Axioms, for example, are not universally admitted: they are not known to children and idiots. All ideas are gained gradually, as we learn to count, preparatory to making calculations. Were ideas innate there would be universal assent to them: they would be found not only in children and idiots but in savages. That no practical principles are innate is shown by the fact that faith and justice are not universal. Moral rules are not innate: whole nations reject some precepts that other peoples deem essential. It follows that conscience is our opinion; virtue is utilitarian, comes by use or custom, and customs vary with different peoples. Nor are ideas of worship and God innate. Ideas of God differ in various lands. We cannot rightfully assume then that God is the cause of these ideas: knowledge of God is in fine a discovery. Locke's conclusion is that no propositions are innate, and that there are no innate ideas in the memory.³

An idea, defined as what the mind perceives in itself and as object of thought, is then a derivation from experience. It has two sources: sensation and reflection (the internal sense). Our knowledge is of sensible qualities

³ *Ibid.*, Chap. III.

and of the mind's own operations. No evidence for the existence of ideas is required beyond the fact that "every one is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others." All that is innate in the mind is the faculties by which it perceives, remembers, desires, deliberates, wills, and by which the mind combines ideas due to experience. Most ideas originate from sense-impressions; but ideas due to reflection involve self-consciousness, which is original, independent, howbeit sense-experience yields the preliminary subject-matter which we reflect upon in our self-consciousness.

Classes of Ideas.—A direct clue to knowledge of our ideas lies in the fact that some are simple, others complex.⁴ The qualities of presented objects are so united in these things themselves that there is no separation between them. The ideas produced in the mind by objects also "enter by the senses simple and unmixed." Thus what we call a "thing," which is derived from experience but is "united in the subject" or perceiver so that motion, color, warmth, softness, and other qualities are blended, is apprehended disparately by the several senses. The hand, for example, feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax which appears differently to the eye. The first fact to note is that the coldness and hardness felt in a piece of ice, for instance, are as distinct ideas in the mind as are the smell and whiteness of a lily, the taste of sugar, or the odor of a rose. Thus far nothing could be more plain than the distinctness of perception of our simple ideas, which the mind can neither make nor destroy. These ideas are the subject-matter of all our knowledge; coupled with the mind's reflective power in repeating, comparing, and uniting its ideas, that is, producing new complex ideas. The mind cannot by any quickness or variety of thought invent or frame one new simple idea, nor can any force of the understanding destroy simple ideas already possessed.

First then comes the division of simple ideas, some of which come into our minds by (1) one sense only (ideas

⁴ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Chap. II.

of colors, sounds, odors, of hearing, of taste, which we directly refer to the sense-organs); in receiving these the mind is mostly passive. Other ideas come (2) from more than one sense (sight, touch; yielding extension, figure, motion); (3) from the mind's operations about its other ideas (ideas of perception and willing, derived by reflection); and (4) from both internal and external perception (pleasure, pain, existence, power, unity, succession). All subject-matter whatsoever is due to simple ideas. In general, ideas are *in the mind*; qualities are *in bodies*, and are due to the modifications of matter. The material modifications are classed as (1) primary qualities: extension, motion, number, figure, solidity; and (2) secondary qualities: hard and soft, warm and cold, colors, sounds, tastes, odors, produced in us by the primary qualities. The primary qualities are "utterly inseparable from the body," whatever its state. The secondary qualities are still material, but are more explicitly described as experienced by the perceiver. Primary qualities produce ideas by impulse, secondary by the "operations of insensible particles on our senses." Ideas of primary qualities are "resemblances" of the body, their patterns being really existent in the bodies. There is nothing like our ideas of secondary qualities in the bodies. The primary qualities are however *in the bodies* whether perceived or not. What bodily existence may be composed of ultimately speaking we do not know. But while bodies possess power to produce ideas of secondary qualities in us, our perceptions arise through varying conditions, as when an object at a distance yields a sensation of warmth and when brought near gives a sensation of pain. Granted a moving object in the visual field, our idea of motion *represents* the motion of the object.⁵

Turning from simple to *complex* ideas, Locke considers how impressions, passively received, combine by aid of the mind's activity to yield understanding. The mind makes this advance by combining several simple ideas into one compound one, by comparing simple and complex ideas

⁵ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Chap. IX.

although not yet uniting them, and by abstraction. Simple ideas are all from things themselves. Complex ideas are reducible to three types: modes, substances, relations. An idea of a dozen, or a score exemplifies simple modes; ideas of beauty, theft, running, fighting, illustrate complex modes. Ideas of substances, single or collective, represent distinct particular things; for instance, (*a*) lead, described with reference to its weight, hardness, ductility, fusibility, or (*b*) groups of men organized into an army. Relation is derived by comparing one idea with another. Abstract ideas are acquired by combining ideas due to sensation and reflection. Substance is known in brief by what it *does*. Our thought goes on amidst pulsations of consciousness. Thinking is undoubtedly due to the action of the soul, but thought is not the soul's essence. The idea of motion is not derived from the mind's ideas as such, but from observation of what is passing within the mind, namely, by noting what volition accomplishes when, for instance, by barely willing to do so, we move parts of our bodies: we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear.

Following the clues yielded by this analysis, by which extension, solidity, and mobility are referred directly to the object, perceptivity and motivity to the subject, a clear idea of substance is attained, namely, a compound conception of ideas of both primary and secondary qualities, coupled with ideas of existence, duration, and number. When referring to gold, for example, we well know that the yellowness is not in the gold, but is the power of the object to produce that idea in us when the substance is in a certain light. Thus too we have an idea of the soul as a substance that thinks, which has a power of exciting motion in the body by will or thought, although we do not know the essence of this substance.

Kinds of Knowledge.—Since the mind has no other immediate object save its own ideas, knowledge is definable as “the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.”⁶ This agreement involves a fourfold principle: identity (blue is not yellow); relation (when equals

⁶ *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, Chap. I.

are added); co-existence or necessary connection (iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions); real existence (God is). Knowledge is of three types: (1) *intuitive*: self-evident, irresistible, the agreement being directly perceived, for example, self-knowledge disclosed as clear and distinct; (2) *demonstrative*: rational, more complex than intuitive knowledge, implies intuitive, for example, God's existence; (3) *sensitive*: knowledge of particular existences, sense-perception, sense-certainty; we know intuitively that an idea is in our minds, whether or not it corresponds to reality. These are three different degrees and ways of certainty. There is no knowledge beyond the agreement and disagreement of ideas. Intuitive knowledge is not extensive. Sensitive knowledge is narrow, limited to the actuality of things present in sensation. Our knowledge is indeed more limited than our ideas, falls short of reality. Intuitive knowledge is highest in type. We are ignorant of essences, and we know little about necessary connection. We do not even know whether matter can think—an uncertainty which was to be settled in contrasted ways by Locke's followers. We are often left with faith and probability, when the understanding is baffled. Most of our knowledge is based on ideas of secondary qualities. We know little even about these, or about the connection between simple ideas, between primary and secondary qualities. Our knowledge, in fine, reaches little further than our experience. We know extremely little about real existence. Our ignorance is great in any event, incurable in some respects. Because of our limitations, our lack of ideas reaching beyond these meagre data, there is no science of bodies, the mind is incapable of universal and certain knowledge. Truth resolves itself into an affair of propositions: all general knowledge is in our thoughts. We have, to be sure, intuitive knowledge of self, demonstrative knowledge of God, and sensitive knowledge of the world of nature; but all this is meagre. Locke agrees with Descartes that the existence of the self is beyond doubt, although he does not show how the self can be an idea. As for God's existence, there are no innate ideas of him. By means of reason and

the axiom of causality we can indeed show that there must be a creator, that the world must have a cause, that matter cannot produce spirit. Sensation makes us aware that nature exists; where knowledge is lacking we may proceed by probability and the assent of faith, although faith adds nothing to rational certitude.

Moral Ideas.—Having established sensationalism as the explanation of our experience of nature, Locke readily applied the same reasoning in the moral sphere, by showing that the pleasure or feeling-tone of sensation gives the clue to goodness as the central consideration of that sphere. Experience shows that we possess simple ideas of pleasure and pain, and out of our simpler experience naturally arises the idea of goodness connected with pleasure and evil connected with pain. Granted this intimate alliance between pleasure and pain, good and evil, our attention is naturally directed to the "passions," as Locke describes them, to the "modifications or tempers of mind" resulting therefrom, therefore to the quantity of our pleasures, and thus to happiness as the paramount interest. Moreover, we are aware of uneasiness due to absence of the desired object. We are also stirred by fear, or uneasiness concerning future possible evil. Again, any motive prompting to change is uneasiness of some sort. Desire is uneasiness as a spur to action. The removal of uneasiness would be the first step toward unhappiness. Happiness then is an obligation. The good is conformity to law through which pleasure is attained. Locke finds man capable of conforming his conduct to standards of rectitude, in accordance with this program of the moral life. Moral liberty is for him not mere freedom of will but freedom of the moral agent, power to act or to abstain from action according to preference. To prefer one action to another is to will it. Locke makes emphatic the liberty of the *person* "having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct."⁷ Granted the moral agent, with the capital opportunities open before him, the great incentive is happiness as the end at which

⁷ *Op. cit.*, Bk. II, Chap. XXI.

we all naturally or reasonably aim in all our actions. To be constantly determined to the pursuit of happiness is not to suffer any curtailment of our liberties. It is admittedly a fact that men choose amiss, but the causes of failure are ascertainable, namely, by analysis of experiences attributable to ignorance, by wrong desires due to wrong judgments, and by limitations of our nature not at first understood. We have a direct clue to what is right as established by divine law. Emphasis falls too on education, environment, custom, civil law, and the rules of conduct in general which have been established for public happiness. Locke's whole philosophy in fact reinforces his hedonism, the doctrine that pleasure or happiness is the good. In later English ethics, this doctrine was readily taken for granted without Locke's preliminary analysis of our knowledge. Locke reaches the conclusion which might be expected from the point of view of experience, namely, empiricism as a doctrine of common sense: we are fitted for natural improvement and moral knowledge, our knowledge of the mind and of human nature suffices for all practical purposes, and morality is our proper concern.

Historical Position.—We think first of Locke in connection with his *Essay*, since the critical issues centering about the theory of knowledge in large measure begin with him. But Locke had the benefit of extensive travels, with abundant opportunity for observing the trend of affairs in the world and for developing the theory of government wherewith he reacted against absolutism in favor of natural rights and the constitutional theory. He is one of the founders of the doctrine of civil government, of unsurpassed influence in the field of political theory, one of the great forerunners of democratic or republican government.³ By directing attention to the production of knowledge within experience, in contrast with the innate ideas supposed to be prior to it in the race as a whole—the authoritative conceptions which antedated the experience and thought of the individual—Locke opened the way for the

³ *Two Treatises on Government*, 1690.

same kind of study of religion and revelation. The result was tolerance in religion where coercive tradition had prevailed. Thus Locke's ideas of Christianity readily follow from his doctrine of natural religion: Locke was one of the founders of religious rationalism, a great forerunner of religious toleration.⁹ Locke is, in brief, the ideal empiricist and apostle of liberty, who abides by the results of his empiricism in every field. As the forerunner of the critical philosophy, he makes clear the issues in their simplicity, without the elaborate technicalities which later encompassed the problem on every hand. Essentially practical, he is wisely cautious, excelling in the use of the descriptive method. Locke was also influential because, hesitating to propound a world-view, avoiding both sensationalism and materialism as complete doctrines, he left many issues in suspense. Several lines of inquiry start with him, in the hope that an answer is to be discovered for each of the great problems which he had the genius to propound.

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§ 9. THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN ENGLAND

We have been chiefly concerned hitherto with principles which imply a conception of the external world, such as Hobbes' doctrine of motion or Descartes' idea of extended substance; or the relation of experience to the underlying substratum in which primary qualities inhere, in the

⁹ *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, 1695.

philosophy of Locke. The individual has been to a large extent merged in the universal system. But, beginning with Locke's time, philosophy takes on another of its aspects, by becoming more humanistic or anthropological. This transition of interest from world-view to man reminds us of the change which occurred in ancient Greece when the first period of cosmological speculation gave place to the problems of human nature which were raised by the Sophists and Socrates. When the chief Sophist declared that "man is the measure of all things," he directed attention to the passing perceptions which constituted experience for the individual observer. With the emphasis put by Socrates on the universal ideas or concepts by which individuals arrive at truth, reason became more explicitly the "measure" or criterion. Reason also became the productive standard in the cosmology of Descartes. Interest in the inner world of reason becomes a problem with the stress put by Leibniz on the individuality of the monads, and by Locke on man's powers of reflection in the re-shaping of ideas. Moreover, by Locke's time liberalism had gained sufficient headway to make possible a secular view of life, while in public affairs a theory of morals and politics less intimately allied with religion was possible. This brings us to a more explicit consideration of the age known as the Enlightenment in England, as the *Aufklärung* in Germany, the period which leads to the Revolution in France; in general, the age between Locke's *Essay* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781).

Sources of the Enlightenment.—The beginnings of this period are found in the humanism of the Renaissance and in the scepticism which followed. Naturalism in religion and the study of human society is a result. In Spinoza's philosophy, naturalism finds expression not only in theological and political writings but in the field of biblical interpretation, out of which was to come a critical study of the scriptures, with emphasis on all the human factors, the relativities or limitations of the "human equation." The revolt against the doctrine of the divine right of kings

implies Locke's political teaching, with its emphasis on the ultimate rights and values of the individual. A corresponding belief in inalienable human rights became current in France, and later in America, in the doctrines which led to the Declaration of Independence. Interest in the true principle of law, in the natural rights of man, had already been fostered by Grotius, the Dutch political writer (1583-1645).¹ The vigorous doctrines of Hobbes concerning man's primitive state tended to arouse inquiry concerning man's original nature, his moral endowments and social possibilities; hence moral philosophy came to the fore, with several types of doctrine, some emphasizing the social and rational nature of man as endowed with eternal and immutable moral principles, other thinkers advocating the presence in our nature of a "moral sense." This was also the age of deism, or free thought concerning God, apart from belief in revelation or other types of authority; of naturalism in religion, as in man's entire thought of himself, of the cosmos, a type of philosophy which eventuated in moderate materialism in England, and pronounced materialism and unbelief in France.

The Early Deists.—The foundation of the liberal movement in religion and theology known as "deism" were laid by Herbert of Cherbury (1582-1648), author of *De veritate*, 1624, who favored an original "religion of nature" tending toward recognition of man the natural individual. Five ideas seemed to Cherbury to contain all that is essential to the religion of reason: (1) that there is a supreme Deity; (2) that this Deity ought to be worshiped; (3) that virtue combined with piety is the chief part of divine worship; (4) that men should repent of their sins and turn therefrom; (5) that reward and punishment follow from the goodness and justice of God, here and hereafter. These notions were common to religion before people gave heed to covetous and crafty priests. Any doctrine contrary to these ideas is false. There may be revelation beyond reason, but it is not contrary to it. The record which is transmitted is tradition, not revelation itself. The

¹ *De jure belli et pacis*, 1625.

truth of tradition depends on the narrator and is at best merely probable. Christianity restored the primitive or natural religion. Whatever has been added to this universal natural religion is useless and harmful. Locke's doctrine that knowledge consists in the agreement of ideas, coupled with his contention that Christianity is "reasonable," greatly strengthened this type of thought, encouraged liberalism, and belief in God of the sort called for by free thought and empiricism.

The Deistic Controversy.—The ensuing controversy over deism as a point of view, implying naturalism and a reasoned view of religion, aroused the orthodox defenders of Christianity, who in turn were opposed by the deists as defenders of free thought. On the deist side were ranged John Toland (1670–1722), author of *Christianity not Mysterial*; Anthony Collins (1676–1729), *Discourse of Freethinking*; Matthew Tindal, *Christianity as old as the Creation*; Thomas Chubb (1679–1747), *The True Gospel of Jesus Christ*; Thomas Woolston (1669–1731), *Six Discourses on the Miracles of our Savior*; Thomas Morgan (d. 1743), *The Moral Philosopher*. Toland sought to demonstrate that nothing contrary to or above reason can form part of Christianity. In his *Letters to Serena*, 1704, and his *Pantheisticon*, 1720, he pleaded for a nature-religion by appeal to some of Spinoza's doctrines, coining the term "pantheism" to designate his own view.² Collins combined freethinking with an exposure of priestcraft. As a hostile critic of Christianity he provoked a far-reaching controversy. Tindal undertook to show that natural religion and revelation make the same deliverances. Woolston interpreted the miracles allegorically, and ridiculed the idea that they were actual events. The historicity of the miracles was defended by Sherlock, in *The Trial of the Witnesses*, 1727–1730. Among other defenders of Christianity were Samuel Clarke, William Wollaston, George Berkeley, and Joseph Butler, to be considered below. The

² Toland assigned to *motion* the central place in the universe, including an internal motion to which consciousness is due: God is the guiding principle of all motion.

consequences of the radicalism of the day are seen in extreme form in Hume's critique of all ideas of the miraculous, and in France in the more relentless scepticism which eventuated in unbelief ("atheism"). Thus the argument in favor of natural forces reached its limit. Negatively speaking, this naturalism signified waning faith in religious and other traditions. Positively, it involved greater interest in man as the creator of ideas formerly attributed to revelation, as capable of producing moral principles once referred to the Church. By some, these principles were explained by appeal to an empirical conception of human nature; others founded their ethical rationalism on an interpretation of Plato's idealism, as understood by moral philosophers of the period.

The Cambridge Platonists.—In the group of philosophico-religious thinkers who flourished at Cambridge during the second half of the seventeenth century, Benjamin Whichcote (1610–1683) took the initiative in favor of interest in Plato and Plotinus. These Platonists were latitudinarians (tolerant in religious matters), lovers of antiquity, interested in all types of Platonism, including Jewish Platonism.³ Their thought is characterized by a remoteness from the world, by a theoretical formalism. Their polemical utterances were directed against the materialism of Hobbes, against sacerdotalism and obscurantism. Positively speaking, they sought to reconcile reason and revelation in a tolerant spirit involving convictions in transcendental realities, notably the existence of the soul, with its innate powers and ideas; hence the significance of their appeal to Plato.

Henry More.—Characteristic of this type of thought was the doctrine of Henry More (1614–1687), who was in a measure influenced by Descartes, but who rejected Cartesian dualism and all mechanical principles, on the ground that nowhere in the universe does a purely mechanical phenomenon occur. Adhering to the doctrine of innate ideas in the uncritical form in which this theory was attributed to Plato, More argued for the immortality

³ Cf. Tulloch, *Rational Theology in England*.

of the soul and for the existence of God (after the manner of Descartes), on the ground that God as spiritual substance is incorporeally present throughout the universe.⁴ The mechanical theory, by its identification of matter and space, seemed to involve materialism. To spiritualize space by regarding God as "incorporeal extension," was to lay the foundation of a wholly spiritual world-view; God was assumed to be one, motionless, eternal, independent, incorruptible, all-pervading and all-embracing. More maintained that motion can only be explained on the ground of spiritual substance as its cause, which makes possible motion at a distance. This conception of motion resembles views held by Berkeley, Newton, and others who united theism and naturalism. More also applied his spiritual world-view to ethics.⁵ He cited twenty-three moral axioms in support of his doctrine that moral principles are immediately manifest. This array seemed highly authoritative in the controversy over Hobbism, and thus the formula of benevolence as the universal good seemed to be established.

Ralph Cudworth.—It was characteristic of the Cambridge Platonists to maintain that the principles of absolute goodness are "intellectual," since the essence of goodness is "truth" as defined by the intellect; and also to insist that the right or good exists absolutely, apart even from divine authority. Thus Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), arguing for a spiritual view of the universe, and refuting Hobbes by tracing his materialism to antiquity, maintained that "things are what they are, not by will but by nature." God's nature is the first moral rule and exemplar of morality. Morality then is a system of truths in which good or evil is such by nature, justice is right by nature, not by will or command, and moral nature thus regarded involves an obligation. God himself is guided by law; only modes may differ, moral laws never. The objects of intellection are explicitly these *rationes* or natural principles which yield such concepts as justice,

⁴ *Enchiridion metaphysicum*, 1671.

⁵ *Enchiridion ethicum*, 1666.

duty, truth.⁶ A prime reason for this strong emphasis on our moral nature was the desire to offset the contention of Hobbes that good and evil are determined by the sovereign.

Other British Moralists.—Richard Cumberland (1632–1718), sometimes classed with the Platonists because of views held in common with them, also reacted against Hobbes in vigorous assertion of the universal truths belonging to the human mind, especially the principle of benevolence, which is the deepest thing in our nature.⁷ He is in part an idealist, in part a sentimentalist; hence not easy to classify. Horrified by Hobbes, he makes as emphatic as possible his conviction that the greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all men coincides with the greatest happiness of all. The basis of happiness lies then in our love toward our neighbor, the good of the individual being harmonious with the good of society. There is no conflict between our moral sentiments. The moral ends—self-preservation, self-realization, happiness—lead to the “joint felicity of all rationals.” Because Cumberland identifies the greatest benevolence of all rational agents with the happiness of all, he has been called the founder of utilitarianism.⁸ Departing from the rationalism of the Platonists, Cumberland takes exception to the doctrine of innate ideas, and refers the moral law to God as the law-giver. Ethical principles are obligatory apart from political considerations, and are capable of being demonstrated on the basis of intuitively known truths.

Clarke and Price.—Somewhat in line with Cudworth’s reasoning was the moral doctrine of Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) who, prominent in both philosophy and theology, known especially for his Boyle Lectures, delivered in 1704 and 1706, advocated an ethical rationalism in which he

⁶ *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, written before 1688, published 1731. See Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, Vol. II, p. 247, foll.

⁷ *De legibus naturæ*, 1672.

⁸ The ethical doctrine which identifies the good with utility, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number; see Sec. 29.

put emphasis on the moral relations of the universe by appeal to the "eternal fitnesses" of things. Thus suitability or unsuitability is a test of moral relations. The eternal reason of things is the basis of moral obligation, which in turn expresses the unalterable will, law, command of God. Human will is determined to action by reason, conscience involves universal obligation. Three primary duties follow: piety, righteousness, sobriety. Clarke's aim was to "place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration, from self-evident propositions as incontestable as those of mathematics."⁹ John Balguy (1686-1748) defended essentially the same doctrine in *The Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1729. William Wollaston (1659-1724), who expounded this view of morality in his *Religion of Nature Delineated*, 1722, emphasized our actions as showing what is essentially true or false, happiness being the test of a moral act. Richard Price (1723-1791) postulated an "antecedent right" as the basis of moral relations which Hobbes had tried to explain on the hypothesis of "compacts"; and attributed to the human spirit activity and self-determination, universal and necessary truths, in contrast with the particularities of sense-impressions (Locke).¹⁰

Shaftesbury.—Another type of ethical thinking characteristic of the period and influential over philosophers who were rationalistic in temper was formulated by the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), whose *Characteristics* was influential in both France and Germany.¹¹ Shaftesbury was classed among the deists, but was a churchman; also an ardent devotee of Plato, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In opposition to Hobbes, Shaftesbury held that man has social affections as well as promptings to self-interest or happiness, and virtue implies a balance between social and individual tendencies. The

⁹ *Discourse upon Natural Religion*, 1706; for selections, see Selby-Bigge, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 3.

¹⁰ *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, 1758; Selby-Bigge, *ibid.*, p. 105, foll.

¹¹ *An Inquiry concerning Virtue*, 1699, included in *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times*, 1711.

moral order is a harmony, to which man's "sense of right and wrong" is a guide. Innate sentiment here takes the place of "innate ideas," and an aesthetic conception of the universe implying moral optimism replaces the rigid insistence on rationalistic principles of the Cambridge Platonists. Because of its emphasis on order, balance, the dominance of goodness over evil, this optimism resembles that of Leibniz, whose *Théodicée*, was published in 1710. Shaftesbury was among the first to signalize the *naturalness* of man's social affections, and to find in a balance of the moral sentiments the clue to the good or happiness of human society. Hence his *Characteristics* marked an epoch in moral theory, in the philosophy of feeling, and the recognition of a "moral sense" as the cardinal principle in the psychology of ethics.

Hutcheson.—This ethical optimism, known as the moral-sense theory, was systematically developed by Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747), who was the first British philosopher to occupy a professor's chair, the first of the Scottish philosophers. Hutcheson held that the moral sense is universal, antecedent to instruction; and is hindered only by self-love, love and hatred being man's two original affections.¹² Love or benevolence is the foundation of moral excellence. Benevolence signifies the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Assimilating Shaftesbury's principle that human goodness implies that which is conformable to function through membership in an organism, Hutcheson distinguishes between (1) natural good, pleasure, self-love, personal interest; and (2) moral good, which involves approbation, the good of others: benevolence (as virtue) is never to be confused with interest or mere advantage. The "moral sense" enables us to discern what is morally good. In the stress put on the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" Hutcheson anticipates the utilitarian school.

¹² *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, 1725; *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, 1726; *System of Moral Philosophy*, 1755. See Selby-Bigge, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 69, foll.

David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith (1723-1790) also belong to the moral-sense school. In Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, 1759, "sympathy" becomes the unifying principle or source of the moral law. Sympathy is taken to be instinctive, as the criterion of goodness, involving moral obligation, conscience, the impartial spectator or tribunal of "the man within the breast." Smith strongly emphasizes the social factor in morality and in the individual. In other connections Smith is known as the first scientific writer on economics, in his great work, *The Wealth of Nations*, 1776. The individualism of the latter work was also expressed by Locke and Paley, and by French writers of the period, who held that the individual has a natural right in the economic sphere.

The optimism of Shaftesbury and other sentimentalists was offset in part by Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733) in his *Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Public Benefits*, 1723, in which both convention and morality are treated satirically. Mandeville starts, like Hobbes, with the selfishness of human nature, and is scornful of the human motives, with the implication that "the moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride."¹³

The Doctrine of Conscience.—Joseph Butler (1692-1752), in his *Sermons upon Human Nature*, 1726, is foremost among ethical philosophers of the period. Butler describes human nature as a system, like the universe as a whole, with its central purpose. On one side is impulse, self-love as propension or instinct. But, on the other, benevolence is also instinctive, the moral individual is an organization of the propensions; and conscience is the supreme authority, the organizing form, yielding the law that there shall be law. Conscience is not a feeling or moral "sense," but a principle of reflection. Existent in every man, it is the norm, it distinguishes between the internal principles of the heart and between man's external actions, by passing judgment on himself and on them: it

¹³ Selby-Bigge. Vol. II, p. 348.

pronounces determinately that some actions are inherently just, right, good; others evil, wrong, unjust. Whether consulted or not, without being advised, it approves or condemns man as the doer of these deeds. Were it as strong as it is right, it would absolutely govern the world. Butler also introduces a doctrine of pleasure, or action toward approved ends, in terms of harmony, fitness, or adjustment: pleasure accompanies fulness of function. The propensions by themselves are centrifugal, self-love is strong; but conscience knows the propensions in their system, and without conscience there would be no person. Conscience then is original, *a priori*, not a product of experience, but the condition of all moral experience; in this sense, man is a self because of or through moral law, is a law unto himself, a person through expression of the moral law. As a principle of reflection therefore conscience is greatly superior to a co-ordinating faculty, a "sense" or instinct: conscience persists as the eternal moral principle, the form of all right judgment, even though particular judgments differ from age to age. Both self-love and benevolence are assimilated by conscience, re-appearing as "cool self-love" and "cool benevolence," organized in proper relation to other promptings.¹⁴ In *The Analogy of Religion*, 1736, a famous work, Butler argued that the universe is a scheme in which means are used to accomplish ends by general laws involving the wisdom, justice, goodness of nature, which is part of the moral order of the universe. Owing to the imperfections of our knowledge, the argument is developed by a persuasive and exhaustive appeal to analogy.

John Gay, who wrote in 1731, is known in English ethics for his attempt to analyze and account for the sense of moral obligation. All moral approbations and affections are acquired by means of habits which in turn involve the association of ideas. There are four sanctions: natural, social, civil, and religious. Virtue is conformity to happiness, which is the object of desire, moral obligation being

¹⁴ Selections from the *Sermons* in Selby-Bigge, Vol. I, p. 181.

founded on the prospect of happiness, and pleasure a consequence of association, as the central principle of the human mind.

§ 10. NATURALISM AND MATERIALISM IN ENGLAND

The development of naturalism in the direction of materialism in England after Locke's time was partly due to the influence of Hobbes, partly to the social tendencies of the age, with the popular interests in physics and political economy; and partly to the contributions to the mechanical conception of the universe by Boyle and Newton.¹ Robert Boyle (1626–1691), whose *Chemista Scepticus*, 1661, is regarded as the turning-point in the history of chemistry, in adopting atomism described the universe as a great mechanism, like a clock working according to fixed laws, all alleged purposiveness being due to the mechanism itself. Boyle drew a sharp distinction between the experimental field of the sciences, with the implied methods of investigation, and all transcendental questions. Thus was marked out more clearly the sphere of empiricism.

Newton.—Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727), great as a thinker and discoverer in the field of physics and in his exemplification of scientific methods, is important for the history of philosophy because of his contributions to the mechanical conception of the universe. His cosmology, which was widely adopted in England, later in France and Germany, made far more intelligible the reign of law, the universality of natural causes, and the measurability of the data with which science deals. His *Principia*, 1687, in which the mathematical and physical principles connected with his discovery of the law of gravitation are discussed, is next in importance to Copernicus' *Celestial Revolutions*, 1543.

Known in boyhood for his mechanical ability, when still a young man Newton acquired the conception which led

¹ Cf. Lange, *History of Materialism*, Vol. I, Sec. 3, Chap. III.

to his discoveries in mathematics, optics, and astronomy. His great generalization, the law of gravitation, is profoundly significant as the verification of the teachings of science that the physical laws which hold true of phenomena on the surface of the earth are valid for the universe as a whole. His method of investigation, on the ground that nature is always simple and uniform, pointed the way for the development of science; and exemplified the combined use of deduction and induction.² His discovery of the calculus of fluxions, in 1664, dawned on him independently of the discovery by Leibniz of the differential and integral calculus, but was not published until twenty years after his discovery. He is also known for his analysis of light,³ and for his discussion of the problems of absolute space and time. With the promulgation of the theory of gravitation there began a gradual transition from the ancient idea of immediate contact of particles and bodies in empty space to the conception of action at a distance, also the popularizing of the principle of attraction and the idea of the harmony of the universe. The modern conception of the origin of the universe, as due to properties inherent in matter, is particularly associated with the Newtonian cosmology.

Newton counseled the abandonment of ideas of substantial forms and occult qualities in favor of the reduction of natural phenomena to mathematical laws, with reference to verifiable observations. Hence he warned physicists against metaphysics. Nevertheless he lived in an age when the views of the Cambridge Platonists were prevalent, notably Henry More's doctrine that God is "not bounded," but incorporeal; this doctrine agreed in a measure with Newton's conception of the harmony, simplicity, order and beauty of the cosmos. Hence some emphasis seems to belong to Newton's query concerning God as the ground of nature: "Does it not appear from phenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who, in infinite space, as it were in his sensory, sees the

² Cf. Höffding, *His. of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 409.

³ *Optics*, 1704.

things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them and comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself: of which things the images only, carried through the organs of sense into our little sensoriums, are there seen and beheld by that which in us perceives and thinks.”⁴ To other thinkers there seemed to be insuperable difficulties in this metaphysical argument, and scientific thought took the turn given it by Kant and Laplace in favor of a strictly natural development of the solar system. Newton brought to completion the quantitative doctrine introduced by Galileo, and found the common measurable element in *mass*, with its different amounts in various bodies.⁵ Hence came his formulation of the laws of motion, and the general development of dynamical astronomy, engineering, and physics. The significance of Newton’s naturalism for the Enlightenment is seen in the increasing belief in naturalistic explanations in other fields, notably with reference to phenomena formerly accounted for on the hypothesis of supernatural causes or interferences. But Newton’s conception of the universe also seemed compatible with belief in God, as his cosmology was understood by Voltaire.

Hartley.—In his widely read book, *Observations on Man, his Fame, his Duty, and his Expectations*, 1749, the physician, David Hartley (1704–1757) introduced a teaching which tended to substantiate materialism. Although the principle on which he based much of his reasoning, the association of ideas, had been advocated by Hobbes, Hartley acknowledges his indebtedness to Locke, from whom he adopted this theory. Hartley is generally regarded as the founder of associational psychology, which was adopted by James Mill and John Stuart Mill.⁶ To this explanatory principle Hartley added a physiological conception of the bodily correlates, and described the brain as the instrument of sensation and thought. Taking over

⁴ *Optics*, Bk. III, Query xxix; quoted by Vasiliev, *Space, Time, Motion*, trans., 1924, p. 36.

⁵ Cf. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 66.

⁶ Cf. G. S. Bower, *David Hartley and James Mill*, p. 24.

from Newton's *Principia* and *Optics* the doctrine of vibrations, he assumed that the vibrations of the ether enter the brain and leave traces so that from the resulting "vibratiuncles" all mental states originate. Hartley regarded the vibrations among the molecules of the medullary substance of the brain as causes of mental states linked by the laws of association. The bodily vibrations, products of nature's mechanism, differ in degree, kind, place, line of direction; thus arise qualitative differences, through coalescence in the brain. There is strict parallelism between the bodily vibrations and the accompanying mental states. All mental phenomena being reducible to associated sensations, with their invariable accompaniments, pleasure and pain, complex mental states are explicable in terms of simple groups. Simple or pure sensations, imagination, ambition, and self-interest constitute the lower group; sympathy (benevolence and its accompaniment), theopathy (devotion to God), and the moral sense (including the unity of all the other senses) constitute the three higher groups, with which pleasure is especially associated. The test of morality is pleasure, the last desire preceding action being decisive. Theopathy ought to dominate lower mental states. Hartley does not identify the soul, as thinking substance, with the brain; he stops with the idea of correspondence or parallelism, and does not deny the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul. He also hesitates to calculate the consequences of pleasure: our safety lies rather in general rules. Hartley added a theological section to his treatise. But this section was omitted by his French translator, and so his doctrine, by intimating that all mental states are due to vibrations in the brain, seemed to establish materialism on a secure basis.

Priestley and Tucker.—Hartley's doctrine was popularized by Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), discoverer of oxygen, also known for his opposition to the doctrine of the Trinity. Priestley accepted a general materialism by identifying mental and physical phenomena as due to one substance, the essence of which is force. But Priestley

accepted Christianity, and opposed the radical materialism which became current in France. Hartley and Priestley responded to the general tendency in England to harmonize materialism and deism. Abraham Tucker (1705-1774) elaborated the same doctrine by ardently espousing sequential association, which he interpreted to mean necessity.⁷ He rejected Hartley's distinction between higher and lower mental groups as the clue to the nature of pleasure, and insisted that pleasure is the same in kind wherever found. Since no qualitative distinctions are possible, so-called higher pleasures are complex, greater in quantity. Tucker supplements his egoistic hedonism by an appeal to divine intervention, through which he adds (theoretically) the idea of universalistic hedonism, the same amount of happiness for all. He simplified Hartley's psychology by omitting the theory of vibrations, putting more stress on association, and taking mind to be the result of the functions of the brain and the physics of the nerves. He found place for the happiness of all, with the conclusion that "all people live together in society for their mutual advantage." Tucker's ethical doctrine is significant because of his purely quantitative estimate of pleasure as the good, supplemented by his appeal to the will of an omnipotent and benevolent being as the link between the universal motive (the pursuit of private pleasure) and the rules for the securing of pleasure.⁸

Paley.—William Paley (1743-1805) assimilated Tucker's quantitative doctrine and made more explicit his theological utilitarianism.⁹ Pleasures are only quantitatively distinguished, all apparent differences in quality being due to intensity and duration. Happiness is the goal pursued by all normal persons. But this desire for pleasure or happiness is not explicable by instinct or in terms of an original "moral sense." Everything in the moral sphere turns upon our native capacity for enjoyment. The advance from egoism to the idea of virtue (doing good to

⁷ *The Light of Nature Pursued*, 1768-1774, 3 vols.

⁸ Cf. Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, 5th ed., p. 237.

⁹ *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, 1785.

mankind) is by means of the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness; prudence is for this world, duty for the next. All moral sanctions are reducible to the divine plan of rewards and punishments: the fear of suffering if we do wrong brings us to righteousness. The divine will is appreciable by means of the Bible and the book of nature. Paley interprets the latter by the design argument, in his *Natural Theology*, 1802. God is a kind of superhuman watchmaker who has skilfully devised the world-machine. Paley's theology is the type of this mode of reasoning. His books had an extraordinary vogue. His design argument persisted as a popular approach to the idea of God until the rise of the modern doctrine of evolution.

Paley's ethical doctrine formed a link in the development of utilitarianism, prior to Bentham's time. In his discussion of "utility" Paley distinguished between the particular and general consequences of our conduct. Since we cannot always calculate the precise results of our actions, we should study the *general* consequences, not the immediate results. Utility applies especially to the immediate consequences; duty includes duty to others, to self, and to God. Paley's ethical treatise was the text-book in moral philosophy for half a century. It passed through more than fifteen editions.

Summary.—While Locke's sensationalism prepared the way for the moderate materialism of Hartley and Priestley, the ethical bearings of his sensationalism were developed by Hume and other British moralists who favored a cautious empiricism or a sentimentalism which tended toward the utilitarianism of the nineteenth century. Sensationalism would have become sheer materialism save for the desire to accommodate it to belief in God, the soul, and religion. Theological motives led to deism in one direction; to a more pronounced belief in God in another, implying the divine sanction of morality, the divine will as the ground of duty, and the design argument as a means of correlating the mechanisms of the world with the "contrivances" of God. Much more profound was the ethical

doctrine of Butler, with its appeal to conscience, to moral law or reason. There was in the English Enlightenment a positive content which was to lead to constructive thinking, to psychology, ethics, and political theory, and other disciplines favoring the individual. So too in Locke's doctrine there was a powerful incentive for Berkeley, whose philosophy was directed against the materialism of his day.

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§ 11. BERKELEY'S IDEALISM

Idealism in General.—No term in philosophy is more readily misunderstood than idealism. At first glance, the proposition that reality consists of "such stuff as ideas are made of" seems so absurd, as if visionary speculation had been substituted for common sense, that all one need do is to strike a lamp-post to prove it to be real. Regarded more seriously, idealism does not appear to involve the denial of the existence of matter, but rather the identity of being and knowing. Nothing then seems to be credited to the universe save minds like ours, with a kind of panorama playing on the screen of our perception, projected by a mind common to us all. "To be, is to be perceived." All that we perceive is in our mind. On this assumption, one readily refutes idealism by maintaining the existence of things, such as growing vegetation,

mountains, planets, the solar system, as obviously "out there" whether known or not. To insist on the independence of things, apart from minds, namely, real substances in space and time, actuated by forces which man neither created nor can control, is apparently to undermine idealism and to establish realism on an impregnable foundation.

There are however several types of idealism. To raise objections to idealism in its simplest form is not to refute other idealisms. Philosophy is concerned with Being, rather than with knowing. Being may be Body, as Hobbes maintained; or there may be a more durable substance, possibly an eternal Reality ulterior to the forms and processes of space and time. The mental world may consist of half-spent motions, mechanically combined, ultimately attributable to the external arrangements of things and events quantitatively conceived; or Reality may more directly underlie the inner world, reproduced in the conscious experience of each, apprehended interiorly as spiritual activity, manifested outwardly as force. In either case cognition is secondary. It becomes a question of comparing rival conceptions to see what doctrine most nearly describes, explains, and interprets the total universe which we know: the universe of given things in space and time, the realm of social conduct with its rich implications, the moral order, the spiritual order, the eternal verities, the First Principle. Materialism greatly over-simplifies the world-problem, minimizes the problems of life in favor of mere bodily substance, atoms, or other physical entities; it leaves mind unexplained, scarcely described. Realists often reduce the issues to the minimum by pushing quantitative considerations to the limit, in the effort to construe all qualities as combinations, variations, intensities, and durations of quantity. The result of the dialectic is a gain for philosophy; since all philosophy seeks objectivity or universality of relations, that it may overcome any limitations due to human subjectivity, that is, to finite "modes," the mere "perspectives" of individual monads. Thus idealism, from Plato's time on, has been partly ob-

jective, partly realistic. One of its preliminary approaches to reality is by means of an analysis of the cognitive relation—as a clue to Being.

Idealism in Modern Philosophy.—Reading our history with due caution, we note that idealism with respect to the primacy of self-consciousness follows from an interpretation of a phase of the Cartesian philosophy. Descartes begins with consciousness as the surest fact, made good by formulating its implications: (1) the existence of the finite self as probably wider in scope than it appears to be, yet unmistakably limited; (2) the underlying existence of God; (3) the presence of ideas referring to the world which may be traced outward by formulating their references. Later thinkers habitually reverted to Descartes, to make clear their starting-point. He is taken for granted. A more elaborate idealism follows from the emphasis put by Leibniz on the highest monads as centres of activity and self-consciousness; with implications regarding space, time, the world, and the ground of all reality in God as the *Monad of monads*. Both Descartes and Leibniz had in view the real cosmos as a system. Varied and far-reaching are the problems aroused by such doctrines.

On the other hand, the idealism of Berkeley is to be understood in the light of issues unresolved by Locke, also with regard to the fact that materialism was current. Materialism is particularly obnoxious when it assumes the existence of an independent substratum known as “matter.” For this matter may be eternal. There may be no God. Nature, taken to be a hard-and-fast mechanism, described in terms of mathematics, necessity, rigidly exact causation, seems to leave no basis whatever for freedom, religion, immortality, the soul. Hobbes had accepted the mechanical theory to the full, reducing all phenomena to modes of motion of “body.” The teachings of both Descartes and Spinoza (on one side) involved the conception of material substances as radically distinct from mind. The idea of “substance” was still kept in the foreground in Locke’s time. This view was intensified by popular

thought. Religious conceptions seemed more or less to depend on prior assumptions concerning matter, reputed to be self-existent and self-operative. Hence the importance of a polemic which endeavors to re-interpret nature by reference to the *being* of God as creator, source of all power. The result would be: nature conceived *in relation* to the ultimate world-order, not independent but dependent.

Berkeley's Approach.—Berkeley's polemic is intelligible then in the light of its historical context. The misapprehensions associated with it are partly due to notions passing current concerning his idealism as first formulated, notions which Berkeley foresaw and repudiated. His polemic is directed at first against the ambiguities of Locke's doctrine.

Locke held that solidity, extension, motion, and figure exist in the external world, apart from perception. By making light of his argument on the subjective side, it was feasible to interpret his *Essay* in favor of materialism and assert that "matter can think." But it was also feasible to make the most of his analysis of knowledge as a clue to reality by putting mind or spirit as fundamental over against matter or body as fundamental. This would not mean that the existence of matter is denied; the existence of physical objects and events as parts of nature would be understood by starting with Spirit—a cosmos of spirits with a mutual natural world made known through a cognitive organism—in contrast with the assumption that nature is a self-operating mechanism. Adopting this view, it was permissible to take the cognitive relation as a clue to spiritual reality, on the basis of the existence of our own activity (will, intelligence, thought, the processes of perception). Other issues would be for the time being postponed, for existence, the problem of motion. Thus idealism comes to mean a spiritual view of the universe, a spiritual realism. The approach is subjective for the moment. It is concerned with the inner fact of which we are all directly aware, namely, that perceptions are in process, that is, *for us*, things exist through

our perceiving them. In studying the problem of knowledge we are not considering idealism as a whole. The presentations wherewith our analysis begins may be "signs" of an ultimate order of reality which we must construe in several ways before our account shall become complete, signs indeed of "a divine visible language" which will involve, in one of its aspects, the problem of space perception.

Life of Berkeley.—George Berkeley (1685–1753) was born at Kilkenny, Ireland. At fifteen he went to Trinity College, Dublin, where, Cartesianism having given place to Locke's philosophy, there was great interest in the *Essay*. In addition to a careful analysis of Locke's doctrine, which resulted in the discovery of inconsistencies, Berkeley also began to study the teachings of Descartes and Malebranche, and became greatly interested in the deistic controversy. His *Commonplace Book*, which was discovered in 1871, shows that as early as 1705 Berkeley began to put down his thoughts on philosophical problems. In 1709 he published his *Essay toward a New Theory of Vision*, in 1710 his *Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge*, and in 1713 his *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*.

Going to London in 1713, Berkeley entered society, met people of literary distinction, including Steele, Collins, Swift, Pope, and Addison, and became a great favorite. The same year he also visited Paris and met Malebranche, with whom he had doctrines in common. After spending several years in France and Italy, where he was greatly interested in the fine arts, history, society, he returned to London in 1720, while England was greatly disturbed over the South Sea Scheme. The result of Berkeley's reflections on the current state of affairs was his *Essay towards preventing the ruin of Great Britain*. Berkeley's next interest was a scheme for founding a college in Bermuda and converting the American Indians. Berkeley sailed for America in 1728, and landed in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1729, where he spent two years waiting for a government grant which never came. While in Rhode Island he

continued his philosophical studies, and made the acquaintance of Samuel Johnson, through whom his influence extended to Jonathan Edwards, a pioneer representative of philosophy in the United States.¹ Returning to London in 1731, Berkeley published his *Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher*, 1732, a dialogue devoted to refuting free-thinkers. He issued his later contribution to the theory of space perception, *A Theory of Vision*, in 1733. In 1733 he became bishop of Cloyne, in the south of Ireland. Berkeley's next work was *Siris*, 1744, a peculiar book, devoted in part to philosophical reflections, with a more mature statement of his idealism, also in part to the virtues of tar water. Berkeley went to Oxford in 1752, and died there in 1753. He was a man of enthusiasms, chief among which was his idealism, and tar water his last. In temperament he was independent, individualistic. He was highly esteemed in social life and as a thinker, and so persuasive in personality that he aroused interest in his missionary enterprise by sheer charm and the force of his enthusiasm. It has been said that "childlike piety and acute analysis have rarely been so united as in his clear mind." He was actuated by a strong religious motive in his refutation of materialism and free-thinking. Eager to lead the way back to immediate experience and intuition, he regarded himself as a prophet in expounding his idealism.

Analysis of Abstract Ideas.—Berkeley found the problems of reality and knowledge needlessly complex, as set forth by his predecessors. The perplexities begin to lessen, so he was convinced, with the analysis of our ideas of substance in the light of ideas in general and with reference to the facts of experience. Reality had indeed been described as it is represented in our experience, hence with a view to determining universal principles, their nature and origin. Locke maintained that ideas (as universals) stand for individual things or objects which we take to be real in the context of experience. But universals readily become abstractions, to the neglect of the original context.

¹ Cf. I. W. Riley, *American Philosophy: The Early Schools*, Bk. II.

Thus even "substance" becomes an abstraction. Berkeley strikes at the root of the difficulty by raising the question, so often put by nominalists and opponents of the realistic theory of knowledge which prevailed during the Middle Ages, whether abstract ideas exist. His conclusion is that all ideas are particular—the conclusion frequently adopted by empiricists, by thinkers who consider precisely what a so-called general idea signifies. That is to say, things or objects as presented are individual: they are given amidst relations, each of which may be described by concrete reference to the presented object or event.

There is, for example, no such thing as shape apart from objects possessing shape, no color apart from things having color, or any idea of motion except as bodies moving.² Ideas are concrete. A general idea consists of several particular ideas. Thus the idea "triangle" refers to various types of triangle. We can dispense with abstract ideas in all our thinking. Universality has no meaning apart from the relationship of particulars. Language is a series of signs of particulars taken in their connection. Many difficulties are due to the fact that words have been used to represent reality as an abstraction, hence we have fallen into bondage to names. Berkeley sought to remove "the mist and veil of words," so that things might be disclosed item by item.

In the true sense of the word, an idea is "general" in so far as it stands for particulars of the same kind, for example, in the description of motion as swift or slow, curvilinear or rectilinear. The idea of a material world apart from sensible objects perceived by minds is the most misleading abstraction. There is no ground for this sundering of matter from mind, as if a material substratum as such existed, apart from the qualities of things disclosed item by item in our experience. We never see or otherwise apprehend anything apart from actual perception of it. Nor are we able to conceive of the existence of objects separate from all perception. We should begin then by limiting our thoughts to our own ideas, as particular items,

² See *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introductory, Sec. 10.

considering precisely what we mean; then use words to signify what is given in perception. We may thus avoid the assumption that a general term means more than the association of ideas denoting particulars concerning the one object in question; for instance, a table observed and described in relation to surrounding objects, with reference to its weight, the lights and shades of the room in which its existence is noted.

Existence as Perception.—In short, to exist is to be perceived.³ What is real (as known by us) is presentation in the context of our experience as immediate. Thus a given table existed for perception when first perceived, it is describable as perceived, and can be returned to in order to be perceived afresh. Matter, as an alleged abstraction from our presentations, does not exist. Actual matter, to which we refer when describing a given object, such as a table, is the particulars of sense-experience, a living experience contributing the content of our consciousness from moment to moment with reference to what we call nature. There is no substratum as such or nature by itself. All facts of experience can be described and explained without that assumption. Nor is sensation a "copy" of an object existing wholly outside. There is no object apart from sensation understood as "idea," that is, involving a measure of interpretation. To say that a table exists is to assert that I see it or feel it, that it possesses various properties, each of which has been at some time an item of perception. To affirm its continued existence when I leave the room, is to declare that were I present I could perceive it, or that some other person could when present perceive it. All description is in terms of possible sensation. It would be absurd to say that things exist as such, as if no mind perceived them. Since things have no existence independently of minds, their being or reality as apprehended by us consists in being known by experience.

Sensible Qualities.—Locke had maintained that primary qualities inhere in the object; while secondary qualities, such as color, sound, taste, smell, are effects produced in

³ *Op. cit.*, II; *Selections from Berkeley*, by Fraser, 5th ed., p. 33.

the perceiver. Berkeley holds that primary qualities, as surely as the so-called secondary qualities, are attributable to the perceiving subject.⁴ Ideas of extension and solidity, for example, are derived through sensations of touch. I am unable to think of extension apart from ideas of so-called secondary qualities. If all sensible qualities were taken away, nothing sensible would remain. There would be no great and no small, even if by hypothesis there were extended bodies outside our perceptions of objects as great, small, wide, narrow, we could not know of their existence. We make no headway in trying to conceive of things until we reduce them to sensations and groups of sensations, associated within our experience, and known in their various connections by experience. This is obvious in the case of variations due to pleasure and pain, sensations of odors and tastes which differ with the individual, and experiences of beauty referred to distant objects. But what is plain in such cases also proves true when so-called primary qualities are analyzed. Each time we are driven back to the existence of ideas, regarded as inert or passive; as imprinted on the senses, perceived by attending to our mental operations, formed by aid of memory and imagination, and as like nothing else save ideas.⁵

Objections.—For the moment it seems as if whatever is real and substantial in nature had been banished as chimerical, and a scheme of ideas substituted. Berkeley's reply is that we are not deprived of anything: all that we perceive is real; there is still a *rerum natura*.⁶ There is plainly a great difference between real fire and the idea of fire. Berkeley readily admits this. So too there is a difference between real and fancied pain: yet pain is not without the mind. It is plain that we see things without, at a distance: Berkeley analyzes this consideration in his *New Theory of Vision*. Apparently, things are every moment annihilated and created anew, on Berkeley's theory. Here the reply is that other spirits perceive

⁴ Fraser, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

things when we are absent; all minds whatsoever are included, and God too as the greatest mind, perceiving all things. Seemingly, the mind is itself extended and figured: the point however is that the qualities of extension and figure are in the mind only as perceived by it. Natural science is apparently undermined; but all natural phenomena are equally well explained in their various interconnections, by primary appeal to sense-perception.

Space Perception.—In his *New Theory of Vision*, Berkeley contends that distance is not immediately apprehended, cannot be seen by itself.⁷ The perception of distance arises through the combination of sensations of sight, touch, movement; for example, the combination between ideas of contact and those of sight, the straining of the eye-ball, and other sensations. Thus distance is suggested to the mind by mediation of some other idea, and different ideas are associated with different adjustments of the eyes. The estimate of distances is a judgment based on experience and geometrical knowledge. A man born blind and given sight would have no idea of distance by sight but would at first perceive all things as if equally near. We never see and feel the same object. Colors, as the immediate objects of sight, are never outside the mind. Nor are magnitudes immediately apprehended, as if magnitude could be seen by itself. There is in brief no "space" by itself: space corresponds to a frequent (subjective) association of ideas. We do not see it as such. The solid world to which we refer in terms of "nature" is a *conception*, is a constructive idea. Given ideas of distance and magnitude, there is a customary combination of ideas of vision and touch, the visual image readily suggesting the idea of tactual sensations. We have also learned that we can touch things disclosed by visual sensations, granted certain essential movements in their direction. Hence the inference easily follows that we directly perceive distance and size. But analysis shows that we can no more perceive space by itself than color as such. We have experiences of what we call space in relation to sight, also experiences in rela-

⁷ See Fraser, *op. cit.*, p. 175, foll.

tion to touch; but these are at best types of sense-experience. Thus space resolves itself into varied perceptions, as indeed matter proves to be an idea of the inter-relations of perceptions.⁸

Knowledge of Nature.—Has the distinction between reality and illusion disappeared? Berkeley thinks not, because our knowledge of reality turns upon distinctions between sensation and imagination. Various criteria aid us in this discrimination. Sensations prove to be more intense and distinct than images. They occur in an invariable, uniform order. But images are fitful and irregular. We are well aware that we do not produce our sensations, or their sequences. Science is still possible as the investigation of exact and uniform relations between sensations. Precise knowledge of one sensation will then show what other sensations are to be expected: to interpret nature is to discover the laws governing the relations of sense-experience. To allege that science is concerned with matter in general would be to suppose that there exists an indefinite something underlying all sensations, and Berkeley has already shown that this assumption is needless. To describe sense-experience as he puts it is to show that sensations have some cause other than any thought or will of our own. Nature is more than the sum of our own mere thoughts; the uniform and consistent succession of experiences as given to us involves an order other than that of the mere subjective sequence of our ideas. Berkeley's profounder reply to objections is that the order of nature, which in terms of all human experience is the sequence of perceptions he has been describing, is grounded in the intelligible activity of God: it is God who gives us this orderly experience which we call nature.

Activity.—This conclusion is reached by analysis of activity rather than by the comparison of ideas. This is the point ordinarily overlooked by those who misinterpret Berkeley, as if he merely denied the existence of matter. Berkeley describes ideas as inert. As a mere perceiver of

⁸ Berkeley's theory of space-perception was an important contribution to modern knowledge.

experience man is passive; hence experience is presentational, it consists of certain sensations. Ideas are incapable of giving us our sense-experience. Activity is a more direct clue. We find ourselves possessing it. The self not only perceives ideas, holds them, thinks by their aid; it is also active, is an agent in meeting experience, and this activity is will, which is the essence of the soul, Berkeley saw this clearly from the outset, even in the period of his *Common-place Book*. Our activity is not known by an idea, for ideas are passive. We infer the nature of activity from what it does. Thus we arrive at what Berkeley calls a "notion" of activity, in contrast with an *idea* of it.⁹ If then activity cannot be ideated we have what other philosophers have called an intuition of it, we know it appreciatively, as we do any other phase of the self or the inner life which surpasses our description in analytical terms. In brief, we are within the activity, whereas an idea is in a sense outside. Thus Berkeley intimates that there is an activity prior to the distinction between subject and object. This is the unity implied in Descartes' propositions when he says, "I think, therefore I am," and forthwith proceeds to make explicit the meanings of self-consciousness and the deliverances of its ideas. The starting-point in this process is an intuitively known activity implying thought.

Spirit.—The self as thus intimately apprehended is spirit.¹⁰ A spirit, in Berkeley's usage, not only possesses sense-experience, through which the existence of the presented world is made known; spirit possesses understanding, can conceive the facts, implications, laws of sense-experience, notably in the case of visual perceptions, in terms of their interconnections, and their relation to the deliverances of other senses; spirit apprehends and formulates ideas, passing beyond mere ideas to notions, insights. By possessing will, spirit also produces relationships between ideas construed in terms of conduct; spirit is an agent, has moral experience. Granted insight into our own activity as spirits, we pass to the conception of God

⁹ Cf. Fraser, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 94, 316, n.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 101, 106, foll.

as Supreme Spirit, to whose nature our own activity is a clue. We do not perceive spirit as such. We cognize it by means of its effects, now in the process of perception and thought, now in the processes of will as its more direct expression. We are aware of willing, loving, hating, and of other modes of activity, each of which yields a clue. The various clues yield the "notion" (constructive conception) which suggests where it cannot adequately describe. Discerning the truth that spirit in us is more central or direct than ideas, we also see that God is by nature more than the existence of knowledge or truth implies. God as Spirit is far more real than "matter" could ever be, when regarded as the ground of nature. For God as Spirit is the first principle of the total universe, both of nature and of the society of finite spirits, who, although just now enjoying the present life, belong also to the moral and spiritual order of reality which endures the vicissitudes of time. God is manifested in the natural world-order in a system of events or processes which, rightly interpreted, constitute what Berkeley calls "the divine visible language." To read this language aright is to see that no natural event or process could be a cause, for that would imply the independent existence of mere "things" against which Berkeley emphatically protests. But, given the cosmic series in its proper context, as part of the spiritual series to which it is due, then indeed we are prepared for Berkeley's other proposition, namely, that God produces the world directly in our experience. Berkeley does not then proceed by the circuitous method of thought, namely, by first positing the existence of matter as somehow first in origin, from which come influences on our minds. On that assumption, there would be the problem of passing in thought from nature (as "matter") and mind to God. Berkeley begins with Spirit, and avoids the assumption that nature is ever independent of nature's God.

Idea of God.—As Supreme Spirit, God constitutes the laws of matter by his will. He is eternal Mind, efficient Cause, all-provident Governor and Creator. He is one,

infinite, wise, good, perfect. He is assuredly and immediately known, more surely than we know the existence of men. Whatever we see, hear, smell, taste, touch, is a sign or effect of God's activity or power. Hence we may logically proceed from the known facts of sense-experience, such as those yielding ideas concerning motion, to God as mover, regarding him as possessing power and wisdom greater than those of man. The visible signs and tokens which each of us observes imply an identical language for all men, in the total universe of the divine order.¹¹ It follows that all real causality is divine, the regularities and uniformities of nature being due to the fact that God's operations are regular and uniform. The divine will or activity is not alone the ground therefore of separate perceptions in the experiences of men, but is the principle of their sequences; while these sequences in turn imply the divine purpose in the universe as a whole. There is then a systematic correlation between observed sequences, such as those of day and night, the coming and going of the seasons, the regularity of the solar system, and the underlying divine series of causal activities.

Berkeley's Later Doctrine.—Reverting to the theory of knowledge, namely, Berkeley's conclusions that there are no abstract general ideas, and that knowledge is not a copy of things but consists of concrete items of experience, we note that both the limits and the values of particular facts are taken into account. A "universal" is not determined by psychological content alone, as if it were merely a name, and as if we possessed knowledge of phenomena only. There is need of the "notion" as higher in type than the "idea," and by the term notion Berkeley means a conception which resembles the Platonic Idea. Hence Berkeley supplements the meagre results of his introductory analysis. The spiritual realism of his general doctrine—the existence of spirits and the Supreme Spirit, as not in any sense dependent on our mere knowledge of such existents but apprehended through inter-related ac-

¹¹ Cf. "Divine Visible Language," in *Alciphron*, 1732; Fraser, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

tivities—is therefore combined with the Platonism of Berkeley's last work, *Siris*, in which his constructive thinking leaves much to be desired.

For the moment these larger results seem meagre too. Hence it has been customary to leave the exposition of Berkeley's idealism with his statement that "to exist, is to be perceived." To refute this naïve doctrine is to refute Berkeley, if not idealism at large; hence to show that Berkeley leaves no basis for science. But reconsideration shows that for Berkeley, from the first, cognition is not the sole clue to existence; since the cognitive relation is one of several activities of the human spirit, one of several approaches to Supreme Spirit and the universe; and that the idealism and the spiritual realism are inseparable.

We find indeed that Berkeley has received remarkable recognition from men of science, including mathematicians who (as realists) are especially interested in the concepts of space and time. To see the force of Berkeley's argument is to recollect that he was concerned to refute materialism, and that materialism in his day signified the assumption that space is an external "thing," that physical substance was assumed to occupy a *fixed place*; space, time, and motion were supposed to be absolute.

Berkeley overthrows these assumptions by a twofold approach: first by undermining the abstract ideas of extension (space) and motion, and showing that it is impossible to separate motion from the space traversed by moving bodies and from the time required to traverse the space in question; and, second, by bringing forward his doctrine of space perception, which has led to the modern psychology of such perception. Thus it becomes imperative to take account of the perceptual factors in any comparison between the remote object, characterized as "real," and the perspectives from which it is regarded by various observers. The alleged "absolute" existence of objects themselves, apart from all minds, relative spaces and times, is no longer defensible. The whole mechanical philosophy is seen in a different light; also the forces of nature, with

their efficient causes, formerly attributed to a wholly independent world.

Berkeley's Cosmology.—Since nature is not self-explanatory, the resource for Berkeley is to penetrate to the “incorporeal Agent who connects, moves, and disposes all things according to such rules and for such purposes as seem good to him.”¹² On the assumption that we understand the order and connection of things, by appeal to their ground of constancy and uniformity, emphasis falls on final causes. Hence follows Berkeley's conclusion that all things exist for the sake of the good. “Intellect enlightens, Love connects, and the Sovereign Good attracts all.”¹³ Even excesses and defects conspire to the beauty and harmony of the whole, when things are seen in their *system*, with one Mind as the principle of all order and harmony. While sense-experience acquaints us with fluctuating phenomena, namely, *natural effects*; reason discloses the realm of causality. Obviously the “*principles* of science are neither objects of sense nor of imagination . . . intellect and reason are the sure guides to truth.” Long ago the Pythagoreans and Platonists discerned the “true system of the world.” This system Berkeley interprets in Christian, that is, in theistic terms, with special reference to the “*force* that produces, the *intellect* that orders, the *goodness* that perfects all things.”

Berkeley's doctrine then is not pantheism, but a pluralism of finite spirits and a Supreme Spirit united in an organic relation such that Supreme Spirit is the ground of both finite spirits and the universe which is common to them without being identical with this spiritual society and its environment. This organic relationship reminds us of the monadology of Leibniz, save that the monads have now become interacting spirits. Like Leibniz, Berkeley assimilates Christianity so that theology and metaphysics coincide in interpretation of the spiritual life.

To understand Berkeley's later doctrine is to see the

¹² *Siris*, Sec. 237.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Sec. 259.

force of his cumulative argument for the existence of finite spirits, through appeal to immediate self-consciousness and awareness of activity; the existence of God, as the ground of the regularity, harmony, and order of the created world; the existence of other spirits beside my *self*; and the significance of personal identity, with the implied emphasis on present and constant volitions.¹⁴ Granted Berkeley's "all-spiritual" universe, in which spirits differ in degrees of reality with special reference to their activity, God being pure activity, the way is clear to a spiritual conception of causality, motion, and the general principles essential to a world-view. Causality, for example, corresponds to the gradation of spirits as (1) completely real, God; (2) incompletely real, finite spirits; and (3) of things which are real only in a derivative sense: causality, in brief, is the "relation of sign and thing signified."¹⁵ Since all things exist in the orderly activity of God's purpose in the cosmos, the "divine visible language" is Berkeley's constructive clue. Since every sign in nature is correlated with its significance, there is a pre-established harmony in the divine purpose, in which the cause-and-effect relation is subordinate to the systematic organization of various principles. A "law of nature" is another expression for a type of organic relationship. Any mechanical description of the law-exemplifying system would be secondary, as merely "valid" in terms of a mathematical hypothesis. Fundamental to the observed sequences of natural effects in the world, and their formulation as rules of thought, is the "course of nature" construed by reference to the divine order. Natural philosophers might, for instance, discover certain laws exemplified in such uniformities as that expressed by the law of gravitation; but the divine activity is fundamental to all processes in nature and in the spiritual order as well, the ultimate Cause being spiritual or divine—God as infinite, efficient, the final cause

¹⁴ Cf. G. A. Johnston, *The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy*, 1923, pp. 193, 197, 201.

¹⁵ Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

of the universe.¹⁶ God is specifically the cause or ground of motion in nature.

The Idea of Motion.—Interest in Berkeley's theory of knowledge obscured until recently the fact that even in the period of his *Commonplace Book* Berkeley gave special attention to the questions of absolute space and time, and made use of his new theory of vision in a critical study of Newton's hypotheses.¹⁷ Berkeley's first difficulty was in the effort to reconcile absolute and relative motion, a problem to which he refers in *The New Theory of Vision*, in the *Principles*,¹⁸ and in the *Three Dialogues*. His Latin treatise, *De Motu*, 1721, is entirely devoted to a discussion of the nature, origin, and communication of motion. This work belongs to Berkeley's intermediate period, prior to the development of the idealism of *Siris*.

In attacking the problem of motion, Berkeley advises the student of the laws of motion to distinguish mathematical hypotheses from the "natures of things." Hence he bids them beware of abstraction, and to "consider motion as something sensible or at any rate something imaginable and to be content with relative measurements." The most secure scientific theorem of mechanics will remain "inviolable," while the investigation of motion will be freed from "useless subtleties and abstractions." Thus the notion of "absolute space," said to be infinite, immobile, indivisible, unrelated to anything, will prove to be essentially negative. The prime result is that every place and every motion is regarded as relative, motion being understood with reference to the determination of its directions.¹⁹

Whitehead interprets Berkeley's doctrine to imply a search for a "wider basis for scientific thought."²⁰ Substituting the term "prehension" for the fact of perception

¹⁶ Cf. Johnston, *ibid.*, p. 250.

¹⁷ Cf. Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 226, foll.; Vasiliev, *Space, Time, Motion*, trans., p. 64.

¹⁸ Secs. 10, 14, 27, 99, 101-117.

¹⁹ Vasiliev traces the later development of Berkeley's theory of the relativity of motion, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁰ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 98, foll.

on which Berkeley lays such stress, Whitehead suggests that the process of "prehensive unification" in the *here* and the *now* involves the central issues. The consequence of Berkeley's analysis is that the idea of "simple location" has gone. In place of materialism, with its doctrine of fixed positions, science has a new outlook which leads in time to the *event* as the "grasping into unity of a pattern of aspects."²¹ Berkeley's analysis thus takes on new meanings, in terms of the modern doctrine of relativity.

Ethics.—Berkeley's place in English ethics is shown by his *Sermon on Passive Obedience*, 1712, in which he founds ethics on religion, contrasting self-love in man with goodness, which is grounded in the divine will. Here as elsewhere in Berkeley's system the agency is the ever-present God, sovereign, omniscient; whose nature underlies justice and love; and whose laws make for the good of all his creatures. By aid of the eternal rules of reason man is able to conform his conduct to the divine will so that universal benevolence and happiness shall result.

Estimate.—Berkeley's world-view seems easily won, yet hard to refute. Taking his stand on the certainties of immediate experience, his point of view has proved to be the starting-point of thinkers, who, seeking to simplify or to avoid metaphysics, have analyzed the content of consciousness, characterized by John Stuart Mill in terms of the "permanent possibilities of sensation." Indeed, both positivism and phenomenism have begun with perception as thus emphasized. Berkeley's results were unacceptable to Kant, and yet the limitation of our knowledge to phenomena was taken by some to strengthen Berkeley's position. Constructively speaking, Berkeley's spiritual realism has been a stimulus to personal and pluralistic idealists. Realists still delight in attacking his propositions concerning existence and perception, as if by assailing his idealism they also rendered negligible his spiritual realism, which is a *theory of being* rather than an epistemology. Berkeley paved the way for the lightest of these criticisms by referring to things as "in" the mind, when he meant *for*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 174; see below, Sec. 50.

the mind, in an experience originating above our mere finitude and securely grounded in our spiritual activity. His criticism of abstract general ideas is a permanent contribution to philosophy, and his *Principles* is still an excellent introduction to philosophy. His philosophy remains, despite Hume's criticism and Kant's disparagement; it was admired by Huxley, was a stimulus to John Stuart Mill and to William James; and it has been adopted in part by recent realists of scientific types.

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§ 12. THE EMPIRICISM OF DAVID HUME

Life.—David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Edinburgh, entered the university there at twelve, tried his hand at several vocations, and finally devoted himself to literature and philosophy. His great ambition being to win renown as an author, he was disappointed when his first book, which proved to be his chief work, written while sojourning in France, was received almost without comment. Hume later revised and issued separately the three parts of this work, his *Treatise of Human Nature*, also published other essays on moral, political and literary subjects developing the point of view of the *Treatise*. His fame rests in part on his *History of England*, which appeared 1754–1762, classed as among the first works written from the point of view of all phases of cultural development. His *Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, 1748, is in part a revision of Bk. I of the *Treatise*, and *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, 1751, contains the principles of Bk. III of the *Treatise*. The various restatements were doubtless tried to win public

attention. His *Essays Moral, Political, Literary*, 1741, was the first work to reach a second edition. Later, Hume wrote on the passions, tragedy, taste, in further exposition of the topics of the *Treatise*. His *Own Life* was published in 1777, and his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* in 1779. These dialogues had been long in preparation, but like his essays on suicide and immortality were withheld.

Hume as Critic.—Hume was at first recognized as political and historical writer rather than as philosopher, and was esteemed in France earlier than in England. His character is indicated in part by the facts of his literary career, notably his disclaimer of the unpopular *Treatise* as a “juvenile work.” Hume was apparently not a man of great learning. Nor was he deeply influenced by any thinker of note. He had the power of keen analysis which fitted him to be in several respects the typical agnostic. He was not constructive in dealing with metaphysical issues, although not sceptical in his treatment of ethical principles. His inconsistencies aroused others to critical thinking. This is precisely his function as critic. He is sceptical on such subjects as miracles, where penetrating analysis is particularly called for. But his scepticism neither interfered with his work as a historian nor with the affairs of his daily life. His works imply faith in experience, in man’s chief instincts, and the study of human nature as the guide to practice. The Christian faith is not to him a necessity of thought. He is at all points far from mysticism, alert to detect emotional prepossessions, and is content to close his studies where the analysis leaves him. Thus his influence is far greater than he hoped for when making his various revisions and courting public favor.

Starting-point.—Like other English philosophers, Hume begins with the world of presented experience. Locke and Berkeley have set aside innate and abstract ideas. The essence of mind seems as inaccessible as the nature of external bodies. As thought cannot penetrate beyond experience, what remains is the study of human nature by

aid of its own deliverances, and an analysis of the distinction between an idea and a sensation. Involved in the study of human nature is the analysis of the principles which affect the understanding, the operations of the reasoning faculty, the examination of the sentiments of praise and blame in matters of morals and taste; and of the principles which unite man as considered by politics. Moral science is the most certain of the sciences, and the foundations of this science are to be laid in experience and observation.

The Nature of Knowledge.—The analysis of mind begins with the study of outward and inward impressions; for any idea, to be valid, must be based on sensation.¹ It is not a question whether sensations arise from external objects, from God, or from the mind's innate structure; but whether we may rightly assume that knowledge reaches beyond what is given in sense-impressions. The surest fact is that such impressions exist. The more vivid or lively impressions are experienced when we see, feel, desire, hate, love, or will. The term impression here includes meanings attributed by other philosophers to perception, thought and idea, so far as these signify presentations. For Hume an "idea" is a copy or fainter impression, a less distinct image. Hume does not write as observer of the cause of a stimulus, but as a keen critic who finds in the last analysis that ideas are of two types: either copies of sensation described as outer, or copies of feelings, emotions, etc., described as inner. Vividness and liveliness attest the reality of impressions, of experience; ideas, as less vivid, less lively, are not so fundamental. An experienced feeling or emotion is more pronounced than an idea of it. An outward impression may disclose heat or cold, pleasure or pain; while its copy, recurring, may produce other impressions, hence desire or aversion. The mind's ideas are associated, compounded, transposed. Thus knowledge arises through resemblance between ideas, the contiguity of impressions in experience, and the association between what is taken to be the effect and what is termed the cause.

¹ *Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by Selby-Bigge, 1896, p. 1.

Complex ideas arise from the association of simpler ideas: "every simple idea has a simple impression which resembles it."² Reflection then is not merely an inner process, implying a mental world antithetical to the material world, but is due to sensation, which at best can be attributed to some unknown cause. The association of ideas is not necessarily the same as the association of impressions; but involves ideas of relations, modes, substances. It includes "all those qualities which make objects admit of comparison," namely, the philosophical relations known as resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity, degree of quality, contrariety, cause and effect.³ Scientific propositions are formulations of one or more of the relations. Some of these relations depend on the ideas compared: resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and propositions in quantity or number. The others may be changed without changing the ideas related; hence our knowledge of them is not explained by appeal to the ideas as such.

How Knowledge Develops.—The law of association of ideas is not then sufficient to show how the mind works. Hume looks behind processes which other thinkers have called rational to instincts. He regards instincts as propensities to action and habits of thought, that is, tendencies in the mind itself, not given in the elements with which the mind operates. Reason itself is a sort of "unintelligible instinct."⁴ Hence Hume is first among modern philosophers to make use of this idea of a hidden mechanism to explain thought; we are impelled toward reason even before we think. Given this clue, Hume tries to explain how we acquire our ordinary beliefs and come to deem them necessities of thought. He even endeavors to penetrate the process by which we believe there is an external world.

For example, we identify things that are really separate. Thus we assume that we behold the same tree in spring

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

which we noted in autumn, despite the fact that external appearances indicate that the impression received in spring-time is not the same as that of autumn. Accordingly, we readily pass to the notion that the tree is permanent, although it may be the "same" as representative of a species only. In reality, our perceptions are neither permanent nor identical. Plainly, a distinction must be drawn between the tree and perceptions referring to it, the former being regarded as permanent, the latter not. Hence a contrast appears between experience and its objects. Under the spell of habit and association, we make manifold ideational connections between our impressions, then take these connections to be real relations between things. Thus arises our belief in substances as existing in a world outside. Thus too we come to believe in causality as objectively real. Hume penetrates these ideational associations to show their fictitious character. He uses the principle of the association of ideas to great advantage.

We easily fall into the belief, for instance, that we possess actual knowledge of substance, although all that we ever perceive is single attributes in different degrees of relationship: things or substances as such have never been perceived. We note colors, hardness, tonal qualities, and other characteristics attributed to things as if seen by themselves. But sense-perception never yields anything which possesses these qualities. Within ourselves we also note various feelings, ideas, emotions, sentiments, volitions: but we never observe or feel the soul or ego to which these impressions are attributed. That is to say, we do not apprehend a persistent principle continuing through all our inner impressions to which we may rightfully apply the term "soul." The natural procedure in this connection is to employ the same reasoning which Berkeley used in analyzing experiences attributed to "matter" as an alleged substratum. The soul plainly is not an impression, either vivid or faint; it is not an existence or entity to which you can point, holding it there for analysis. You do not find it when you introspect. Here as in other cases we have arrived at our ideas of substance by noting resem-

blances, by assuming that observed resemblances or connections hold true of matters of fact. Hence we have united our impressions so as to pass not only to the idea of a substance underlying our impressions, outer and inner, but to include an idea of real causal connection.

Causality.—Hume is best known for his acute analysis of the notion of causality. Here his critique is most penetrating, since the idea of cause and effect is implied in all our thinking about nature and inner experience. He points out that we perceive distinct phenomena following one another, hence we have impressions concerning *time*; we do not perceive that phenomena *necessarily* succeed one another, we do not actually feel either the external connection or the internal nexus. Causality is not then an object of experience of any sort. We cannot establish this idea by an appeal to immediate certainty. Nor can we prove it by inference from phenomena in general; since all events as experienced are separate facts. It is impossible to infer from the idea of one fact that another fact necessarily follows from it. We are as unable to attain knowledge of the causal relation *a priori* (in advance of all experience), as a primitive man would be, one who is not yet aware of what will result from fire or any other process unknown as a possible source of pain *until he has experienced the pain*, after the discovery of fire. What is actually given is the succession of impressions, never their alleged necessity. The utmost that can be said is that the impressions occur together. We can think them without the possibility that they will again recur as thus connected. At one time we note the motion of one ball on the billiard table in connection with the motion of another billiard ball. We also observe their collision. But at another time the motion of one ball might be different. There might be a collision, and possibly not. It is a matter of chance so far as any prediction is concerned.

Naturally enough we have come to believe not only in things or substances but in their causal connection. But analysis shows how we come by these beliefs. Our thought readily tends, for example, to keep on with processes due

to intense impressions when these impressions cease. Thus by aid of imagination we complete what has been presented, representing by means of ideas what experience merely suggests. Thence result conceptions of perfect similarity, perfectly accurate figures, although experience has never taken us beyond relativity. So by constructive thought we pass from relative to absolute constancy, from relative connections between events to the idea of necessary connection. With equal readiness our thought tends to combine representations which we have frequently experienced together. What we customarily observe, such as the striking of a match, with the light which follows, the flame which ignites a bit of paper, then consumes bits of wood, next larger pieces of wood, and so on to momentous results, we take as the clue to experience at large. Thus arises the habit of looking for a cause of any effect.⁵ We generalize the habit and regard all experience in the light of necessary connections. This habit is merely one more evidence of our instinctive tendency. From the frequency of associated experiences we cannot rightfully infer necessity. Habit of thought does not prove causality. The idea of cause and effect is due to an idea of the constant conjunction of sense-impressions. Hume's explanatory principle, that of the association of ideas, is for him a capital instance of a habit which cannot be explained save by referring to the instinct by which the mind readily forms such connections. This looks like a vicious circle, but we have no alternative. The bare fact remains that by observation we never detect anything except separate facts, items as contents of sense-experience or consciousness; never the assumed unity which we attribute to experience to explain it. Hence follows the significant conclusion that the mind contributes the idea of necessity: necessary connection is not found in either impressions or objects.⁶ Moreover, we note that consciousness tends to regard its own states as external phenomena. This fact shows why we objectify qualities attributed to things as if these

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 87, 155, foll.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

properties inhered in an independent substratum. Granted this externalizing habit of mind, it is plain why we regard the succession of events as necessary.

Phenomenalism.—The equally significant conclusion follows that we cannot transcend this objectifying tendency to account for it. It follows that we possess no science of nature, merely belief concerning phenomena. The utmost that remains to us is the psychology of the process of acquiring our beliefs, that is to say, the mind's inclination to expand the deliverances of impressions, associate its products, and then to externalize on the assumption that necessary connection is given as well as events associated. What remains is chance, or at best probability, the possibility of sequences, but without proof or predictability.⁷ So-called sciences based on these beliefs are fictions. We cannot pass beyond impressions to test them by appeal to things, consequently we possess no metaphysics and no theology; we cannot trust either imagination or reason. We do indeed possess formal certitude, in developing the implications of mathematics and logic, namely, the relationships of ideas within the mind: but formal certitude is not universal validity in the sense required by objective science. We are unable to pass either to Locke's world of material substances or to Berkeley's spiritual substances and God as Supreme Spirit.

Ethics.—Hume did not limit his psychological analysis to the study of knowledge, but penetrated the emotions with the same cool scrutiny which led Spinoza to trace emotions to their sources.⁸ Thus he notes how one passion may combine with another through the association of ideas referring to the objects of the two passions. It is not by reason but by the checking of one passion meeting another that changes ensue: reason is limited to reflection and comparison, it has no direct influence on the passions. Reason cannot then supply the basis of ethics: it can do no more than show the connection between the facts of experience which come to have moral value. We do not

⁷ See *op. cit.*, Bk. I, Sec. XII.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Bk. II.

ascribe good and evil qualities to moral experience through reason but because of results wrought in our feelings. We are unable even to show that good and evil are ascribed because of a selfish propensity of our nature. To approve or disapprove is not to appeal to our own private nature but to imply that we are social beings. Thus justice is approved of because of sympathy towards our fellowmen. Whatever our hidden interests, appreciation of justice indicates the wider extent of our moral sentiments. Sympathy or fellow-feeling is the fundamental moral motive, as Adam Smith also holds, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

Since moral sentiments are more fundamental than moral judgments, will is determined by the feelings, not by reason.⁹ Hume therefore belongs with Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and other English ethical philosophers who assign the first place to the sentiments or tend toward a strictly utilitarian point of view.

Critique of Religion.—Hume also opposes rationalism in his critique of religious doctrines. He does not trace religion to intellectual motives, but finds its origin in fear, hope, and the tendency to attribute human feelings to other beings. This disposition to give wider extension to human motives eventually leads to the idea of God as infinite, with the implication that there can be only one deity. God is said to be near or far according to the fluctuation of human emotional attitudes. Since he discredits reason, Hume sees no validity in the argument for God based on the assumed order and purpose in the world. He holds that we readily came by our idea of purpose in nature, also our habit of looking for natural causes. But we have somehow leaped to the conclusion that nature as a whole had another sort of cause. In thus arguing we paid scant heed to the incompleteness of actual things in the world, as if we could proceed from finite shortcomings to infinite perfection. The supposed basis of our belief in a perfect God is nowhere discoverable save as we have combined one impression or idea with others, on the

⁹ See *ibid.*, Bk. II, Sec. III; *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, Sec. I.

assumption that we can deduce a perfect whole from such a collection of parts.

Hume is best known in some quarters for his critique of miracles. Hence he is discounted without any inquiry into his contributions to philosophy. Some readers have also alleged that Hume is inconsistent; for if a man has been seen to rise from the dead, Hume must at least admit the sequence. Why then should he not also admit the possibility of uncaused events? Hume in reply would be ready to acknowledge the possibility of miracles. But actual human experience, with its sequences, leads to the conviction that a man once dead does not come back to life. Although our conviction is founded on habit, belief in the return of the dead to life is impossible on the basis of the scanty evidence submitted. Hence, as one critic has put it, it would be possible to believe in a miracle only when to disbelieve would involve a greater doubt. Possibly actions without a cause could occur, but we do not find them. Ignorance is no basis for believing in causeless events. Practical belief in causality accords with scepticism concerning miracles. On empirical grounds there is no reason for disbelief in causality as a practical idea.

Estimate.—With respect to Hume's argument against the existence of a self, it has been pointed out that Hume merely shows at best that it is not necessary to infer that a self exists, and that his argument presupposes the validity of his theory of knowledge based on impressions as the test. Again, his argument fails because it does not meet the point of belief in the soul: no one would assume that the soul is a sensation, an existence to be seized and examined. If there are moments living on in an ideal relation, the soul should be regarded as moral, not psychological; and Hume's psychological analysis does not undermine the conviction that it exists. So too Hume dwells on habits and other psychological matters in his critique of causality, whereas we hold to the principle of cause and effect because of the *regularity* of the world, a consideration which Hume himself admits in arguing against miracles. Yet Hume did great service by empha-

sizing sequences as the actually observed data, and by disclosing the tendency to read our feelings into things and events: it has been much more difficult to believe in causality since his day. Hume's influence is seen in the light of tendencies which resulted through his critique. Granted for the moment that causality, universality, and necessity are simplified into connections between ideas, what becomes of natural science? Not even empiricism can go any further, since reason itself is discounted as an "unintelligible instinct." If there be no real connection or assured ontological relation between cause and effect, no ground is left for inferring the existence of ultimate Being of any type. The prime result is phenomenalism, the doctrine that we know appearances or presentations only. Some have agreed with Hume here. The Scottish philosophers reacted against his views in one direction, Kant in another. Hume's influence is also seen in the development of psychology.

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§ 13. SUCCESSORS OF HUME. SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY

Conceptions of the external world and of mental life reached their limit with the negative results of Berkeley and Hume. Arthur Collier (1680-1732) in his *Clavis universalis*, 1713, undertook to demonstrate the non-existence of an external world; he drew upon Descartes and Malebranche, as well as on Berkeley. Meanwhile the analysis of ideas and self-consciousness which began with Descartes, and continued in the empiricism of Locke and Berkeley, seemed to have come to utter scepticism in Hume,

save in his moral philosophy. If all perceptions are different from one another and from everything else in the universe, if they are not only distinct but may exist separately without anything else to support their existence, there is no reason for attributing them to a self.¹ Even if a self seemed to be demanded there would be no basis for it on Hume's assumption that an invariable impression would be required, in view of his conclusion that no such impression exists. Even the *idea* of a self is at last denied.² Only an illusion due to imagination remains; this illusion is due to mere association, and the alleged principle of union in our trains of thought peters out into a fiction. Having "loosened all our particular perceptions," so that the mind never perceives any real connection between them, between any distinct existences, there is for Hume no escape from the relativities of indifferent and entirely "loose and separate" events. It is when Hume utters his most negative word that he invites the criticism of his Scottish successors.³

The Scottish Philosophy.—The Scottish philosophy proceeds on the method of observation; it employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation; and, by aid of the observations of self-consciousness, principles are reached which are regarded as prior to and independent of experience.⁴ The Scottish philosophers maintained that a science of the human mind can be constructed on the basis of the deliverances or implied principles of immediate consciousness. The term, "science of mind," as here used, does not mean psychology in the modern meaning of the word; it means a theory of mind coupled with a conception of first principles, empiricism but also in a measure rationalism. The first Scottish thinker of note, Hutcheson, appealed to facts, as he saw them; and brought "all theories to the test of the actual operations of the human mind as disclosed to consciousness," in contrast with

¹ See, for example, *Treatise*, p. 207, Selby-Bigge's ed.

² *Ibid.*, p. 232, foll.

³ Cf. A. Seth, *Scottish Philosophy*, Lecture II.

⁴ Cf. McCosh, *Scottish Philosophy*, p. 2, foll.

speculations built up without this empirical appeal.⁵ There were various progenitors of the school prior to the time of Hume and Adam Smith, and a number of intervening thinkers before the leadership of Reid; the whole line of philosophers constituting in a sense a national school, with a history continuing into the second half of the nineteenth century, a school which the Scottish thinker especially appreciates from within.⁶ The general student of philosophy is apt to neglect the point of view of this natural or common-sense realism, because of his interest in the critical philosophy of Kant.

Reid.—Thomas Reid (1710–1796) is the chief founder of the Scottish philosophy. Reid was professor of moral and intellectual philosophy at Aberdeen, then at Glasgow, where he succeeded Adam Smith. His doctrine is set forth in a number of volumes, which were later edited by Sir William Hamilton.⁷ Tracing the meagre results attained by Berkeley and Hume to Descartes' doctrine that what we immediately perceive is a subjective modification or image of the external object, Reid sought to undermine the ideal theory of sense-perception and to establish the doctrine of common sense. Hence his *Inquiry* is for the most part concerned with the senses, involving the denial (1) that we perceive by "ideas" (Berkeley) in the mind or out of it, as if ideas were intermediaries between minds and the objects perceived; (2) that we reach a knowledge of the external world by means of reasoning; and (3) that some "impression" or "idea" resembling the object is necessary in order for the mind to conceive external objects or things. Instead, Reid starts with the *sensation* in the mind, and then considers the process by which sensation "suggests" perception. He borrows the term "suggestion" from Berkeley, also the doctrine of natural language and signs. He agrees with Locke that our senses give us

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁶ Cf. McCosh, *ibid.*, p. 192, foll.

⁷ *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common-Sense*, 1764; *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, 1785; *Essays on the Active Powers of Man*, 1788.

a direct and distinct notion of primary qualities, but finds that our senses yield only a relative and obscure notion of the secondary qualities.

Reid sees the force of Hume's argument against the possibility of objective knowledge, but doubts Hume's premises that sense-perceptions are units of the intellectual life and that experience begins in this way. To limit experience to "loose" relationless units is to have no basis of advance from given particulars to knowledge of their relations. Reid questions both the assumption that distinct impressions are distinct existences and the assertion that the mind never perceives any real connection between such existences. Beginning with an analysis of sensation and perception, he shows that *judgment*, not the simple idea, is the unit; judgment is involved in every operation of the senses. Perception does not begin with "simple apprehension." Sensation "suggests" a reference of sensations to an ego, also the notion of a cause; hence comes about a distinction between sensation and its objective cause which yields a constructive clue. The change in point of view from the mere images of external things to the mind's operations in perceiving the external world enables Reid to make a new beginning in behalf of "common sense."

Common Sense.—By this term Reid meant, not the Aristotelian doctrine, or the mere precepts of those who advocate a practical attitude toward life to the neglect of all metaphysical problems. The term had been used in a general way by Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson. It was characteristic of the moral-sense school to assume the existence of a "sense of right and wrong" which is "as natural to us as natural affection itself [namely], a first principle in our constitution and make."⁸ Hutcheson refers to the moral sense as "that power of receiving these [moral] perceptions."⁹ Reid uses the term with reference to such contingent truths as the existence of everything

⁸ Shaftesbury, *An Inquiry concerning Virtue*, Bk. I, Part III, Sec. I.

⁹ *An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*, Sec. I.

of which we are conscious, and the principles which involve necessary truths, such as logical axioms, first principles in morals and metaphysics. In general, common sense covers the principles which constitute the human mind, to which our perceptions conform.

The mind is not then like a blank sheet of paper on which nothing has been written, and which in itself possesses no organization. The mind is equipped for perception, both of things and of principles which enable the mind to understand experience. Receiving sensations through the appropriate organs, the mind transforms these. *Knowledge is direct*, immediate. Reality is that of which we are directly conscious. The "constitution of our nature" is such that we possess this direct conviction concerning knowledge. All men possess this make-up. All men possess the principles of common sense as the basis of reason and science. This "constitution" is implied in both our intellect and our conduct. The criterion is found in the fact that reality is grounded in relations, and that sensation implies immediate certainty that we know these relations. All demonstration proceeds on the basis of this self-evident knowledge involving contingent and necessary truths, such as the axioms of mathematics, and such metaphysical principles as the axiom of causality, which is essential to all systematic thought. Indeed, man is distinguished from the brutes by his power to pass beyond a single impulse to correlation and co-ordination by aid of reason. Thus man recognizes prudence and duty, putting happiness before him as the goal of action.

Reid's Theory of Conscience.—Reid does not attribute conscience to innate ideas but to native aptitude: education, training, exercise and habit are required in order to pass from the stage of mere moral sensibility to that of moral truths, explicitly recognized as such. Conscience then is not a mere "voice," in the popular sense of the term, whose dicta infallibly tell us what is right and what is wrong: it is rather an intuition, to be understood in the light of man's "active powers," with reference to man's appetites, desires, and affections; and the five fundamental

moral axioms.¹⁰ Reid emphasized free-will as absolutely essential to moral philosophy.¹¹ He carefully discriminated between prudence or interest and duty or what ought to be done. The fundamental capacities of our nature enable us to learn what is our duty. Virtue is discoverable in relation to approbation and praise, greater and lesser goods, and the comparison of such virtues as justice and mercy. Reid's doctrine of conscience bears some resemblance to that of Butler, namely, as an essentially rational principle. His careful discriminations were lost sight of by some of his followers, and popular thought eventually identified conscience with "the monitor within the breast."

Followers of Reid.—Dugald Stewart (1753–1828), more highly praised as a writer and teacher than as a thinker, exercised a very great influence over an entire generation of literary Scotsmen.¹² Adopting Reid's analysis of perception, and empirical method of self-observation, Stewart put for "common sense" the "fundamental laws of human belief, or the primary elements of human reason" as the components essential to reason.¹³ Stewart put more stress on the association of ideas than Reid. So did Thomas Brown (1778–1820), author of the *Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect*, 1803, in which he emphasizes uniform antecedence. Brown described the philosophy of mind as the science of analysis, and rejected the division of the mind into separate faculties. In his *Lectures on the Human Mind*, 1820, Brown discriminates the muscular sense from the sense of touch, analyzes knowledge of extension into a succession of muscular sensations, and knowledge of the external world into various constituent sensations. Sir James Mackintosh (1765–1832) adhered more closely to Reid, but modified the ethical views of thinkers inclined toward utilitarianism. Meanwhile James Oswald

¹⁰ *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind*, V, Chap. I.

¹¹ Cf. Sidgwick, *His. of Ethics*, p. 262, foll.

¹² *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, 1792–1827; collected works, 10 vols., 1854–1858.

¹³ For other differences of view, see Sorley, *His. of Eng. Phil.*, p. 203.

(1727–1793) and James Beattie (1735–1803) applied the common-sense philosophy to theological controversies.

This philosophy was formulated anew by Sir William Hamilton, who encountered marked difficulties in his effort to make Reid's doctrine intelligible, and historians of philosophy have met similar difficulties in their attempts to make common-sense realism plausible. Yet the doctrine has persisted, it found recognition in France; the Scottish philosophy became a kind of official doctrine in the United States, under the leadership of James McCosh (1811–1894) of Princeton; and certain of its principles have reappeared in recent realism, "new" and "direct" in type. The "plain man" assumes natural realism as the obvious philosophy of the external world. The philosophical realist, having acquired (conceptual) knowledge of the external world, readily ignores this fact, and then proceeds to describe physical objects as wholly independent of cognition. The realistic situation was not clarified until long after the time of the early controversies over Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

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§ 14. THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE

Bayle and other Forerunners.—The trend toward free thought and materialism in France in the eighteenth century is traceable in part to the scepticism which began with Montaigne (1533–1592) and Charron (1541–1603), and was fostered also by Sanchez (d. at Toulouse, 1632), and La Mothe-Levayer (1586–1672). But the real pioneer of the Enlightenment was Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), whose *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 1695, prepared the way for Voltaire and the Encyclopedists. Bayle's analyses of

traditions and doctrines seem moderate and harmless enough in retrospect, in comparison with the radical views of the eighteenth century. But his description of the natural weaknesses of the human mind could be taken either positively or negatively, and taken in the latter way they fostered scepticism. Bayle had twice changed his own religious point of view, and had finally sought the freer conditions of life in Holland, where he was professor at Rotterdam, in the latest period of his life. His teachings imply a mild relativism in which he shows the differences between science and religion without undertaking to trace the significant principles to an ultimate basis. Metaphysical knowledge is out of the question, but there is a secure basis for morals in enlightened human reason, which came to be known as "practical reason" in Kant's time. Revelation and faith occupy their appropriate places, but philosophy with its axioms is the leader rather than the servant of theology. Certain objections to the idea of Providence and to some of the Bible stories involve a critical issue concerning the supernatural in general. But it is not so much the radicalism of these utterances which impresses Bayle's readers in the subsequent period as the subtlety and irony of his controversial style. Here his later followers find an instrument capable of being used with telling effect in open assault upon dogmas and a point of view which Bayle had treated suggestively. Hence his *Dictionary* became a great store-house of material to be used by unbelievers and materialists who felt no such caution as Bayle himself employed.

To be mentioned also in connection with teachings which later became more radical is the work of Fontenelle (1657-1757), who, as an independent Cartesian, rejected the metaphysical proofs of the existence of God as too subtle to carry conviction, and espoused a doctrine of the natural equality of minds, the differences between minds being due to exigencies of the natural succession of ideas and discoveries.¹ A general result of the change in point of

¹ Fontenelle also contributed *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes*, 1686.

view from the age of Descartes to that of the eighteenth century was interest in man, the individual, in contrast with a view of the cosmos which implied acceptance of metaphysical principles. While Bayle made easy the road to religious scepticism, the Encyclopedists completed the step from empiricism to sensualism; and other leaders took the step from naturalism to materialism, or from deism to unbelief.

English Doctrines in France.—Among the first to adopt Newton's view of the cosmos was Maupertuis (1698–1759), influential in Germany also, where he was president of the Berlin Academy, after 1745. In his *Essai de Cosmologie*, 1751, Maupertuis advocated the "law of least action," implying the conservation of energy. He had already presented to the Academy of Paris his report *Sur les lois de l'attraction* and his *Discours sur la figure des astres*. In this period of increasing interest in mathematical physics and astronomy, the trend towards naturalism was fostered by the visits of French leaders to England, where they acquired the physical theories of Newton and Boyle, also materialistic views, and other doctrines which could readily be combined with scepticism. Voltaire, whose *Lettres sur les Anglais* (*Letters on the English*), written in England in 1728, was published in London, and appeared later in France, was especially instrumental in winning recognition for Newton's cosmology in his *Éléments de la philosophie de Newton, mis à la portée de tout le monde*, Amsterdam, 1738. Voltaire accepted the Newtonian doctrine of God's purpose in the universe, and in his view this cosmology was favorable to belief in God. But in France the Newtonian cosmology seemed no less favorable to unbelief, its positive aspect being the mathematical conception of the world. Voltaire was also instrumental in introducing Locke's sensationalism into France. Here too naturalism could be called to the support of materialism.

Influence of Locke.—Locke's interest, we have seen, was to determine how far human insight reaches with reference to the precise sources of our knowledge in ex-

perience and the contributions rendered by reflection. By assigning the foremost place to the theory of knowledge Locke determined subsequent inquiries in favor of empirical psychology, however that psychology might be understood in terms of ultimate problems. Hobbes had already made an important contribution by emphasizing the mechanism of association. It was only a step from Hobbes to a mechanical view of mental life understood psychologically, or from the ambiguities of Locke's doctrine to a sensationalism which made possible a purely materialistic interpretation.

Locke had remarked in passing that, "We have ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no . . . since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power."² The passing suggestion, which remains in Locke's case purely conjectural, with the further remark that probably the thinking substance in us is purely immaterial,³ was decided in France in favor of the assumption that matter can think. Locke's *Essay* was translated and published by Pierre Coste, and after Voltaire's *Lettres sur les Anglais* was issued, Locke's doctrine became highly influential.

Voltaire.—The works of Voltaire (1694–1778), a remarkably prolific writer and man of genius, belong chiefly to the history of literature and civilization. Voltaire was not a philosopher in the systematic or constructive sense; he did not contribute new ideas. Yet as critic of superstition and dogma, of social customs and ideas, his writings were of far-reaching service; he was potent in preparing the way for the French Revolution; a pioneer, in his *Essai sur les mœurs*, in showing the natural origins of society and culture. Despite his iconoclasms, he reserved the right to believe in God and Christianity, in an age which tended strongly to atheism. In an age of radical disbelief he stood for moderation, with strong convictions which remained

² *Essay*, Bk. IV, Chap. III, 6.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Appendix IX.

unshaken by the scepticisms and upheavals which were playing havoc with tradition. Although the tone or controversial spirit of much of the writing of the day takes its clue from him, so that his is the typical attitude which we still refer to, his works being more influential than those of almost any other writer, it is to be noted that he retains his philosophical balance, with a profundity of thought not to be lost sight of in admiration for his penetrating wit and keen satire. In addition to important constructive contributions to the *Encyclopædia*, he wrote his own dictionary of philosophy.⁴ Voltaire gave himself arduously to the study of English philosophy, and later to the no less active work of making Locke and Newton known in France, where he directly stimulated thought in favor of English empiricism. The adverse conditions encountered in Voltaire's early efforts toward enlightenment are indicated by the fact that the publication of his *Éléments de la philosophie de Newton* was not permissible in France, and the fact that his *Lettres sur les Anglais*, which did not appear in France until 1734, was condemned to be burned. Voltaire followed up the former work by issuing *La métaphysique de Newton*, in Amsterdam, 1740. The opposition to his first book on Newton was partly due to the fact that D'Agusseau, the censor, agreed with the Cartesians, and deemed Voltaire's work unpatriotic. Meanwhile Descartes' doctrine of vortices lost standing on mathematical grounds, while the Newtonian cosmology gained adherents on these grounds, and Voltaire's works made secure this transition in point of view. Thus French thought tended all the more definitely toward the doctrine of Laplace in his view of the solar system, which seemed to render the hypothesis of a creator unnecessary.⁵

Voltaire seems conservative in contrast with those who presently carried his sceptical naturalism to the limits of unbelief. He not only resolutely held to his belief in God, but continued to believe in the immateriality of the soul,

⁴ *Dictionnaire philosophique portatif*, 1764 (*Philosophic Dictionary*, 1901).

⁵ Cf. Lange, *His. of Materialism*, Vol. II, p. 15,

and in his earlier period argued for free-will. Voltaire was greatly interested in the political institutions in England, and so was prepared to maintain a secure naturalism as opposed to political despotism, just as in ecclesiastical matters he favored natural religion in contrast with dogma and authority. Equality before the law became one of his cardinal ideas. Emphasis on customs and the culture of nations becomes central for him, in contrast with the neglect of social factors and the environment of a social epoch. In so far as he touches on psychological matters, his thought is in the interest of naturalism and empiricism as opposed to the rationalistic speculations of Descartes and Malebranche. He found in Locke the ideal of the modest man who never pretended to know what he did not and the wealth of whose knowledge reposed on a secure principle. Voltaire's criticism of the optimism of Leibniz, his doubt concerning the possibility of reconciling the existence of evil with divine goodness, is also characteristic of his sincerity and caution. His positive teaching was favorable to social betterment in contrast with the theoretical speculations, which his critiques tended to undermine, namely, by indicating the more serious objections. Thus in his later period Voltaire admitted the validity of the arguments against free-will. His *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* was a history of the human mind in the light of the successive stages of social development, written in behalf of truth, wherever truth might lead, and whatever the wrath poured forth upon the author. This work was later recognized as a great contribution to historical science. Voltaire's work in general gave the human mind a great impetus in favor of intellectual, moral social and religious freedom.

Montesquieu.—Like Voltaire, Montesquieu (1689-1755) belongs to the history of civilization. Several years after issuing his *Lettres Persanes*, 1721, he visited England, where he became greatly interested in the English form of government, and on his return to France he made known Locke's theory of constitutional government. In his chief work, *L'Esprit des lois* (*Spirit of Laws*), 1748,

Montesquieu, drawing upon his study of the English system, formulated his own important contribution to the theory of the state. Thus his view was based in part on observed facts, it dealt with political realities, including many of the data which, in the nineteenth century, were to become the subject-matter of the social sciences, namely, social phenomena described and explained with reference to fixed social conditions. Montesquieu characterized man as an actual social being living amidst natural social conditions, as opposed to the speculative account of man's primitive estate in the doctrines of Hobbes. He explained all customs, religions, political institutions on a naturalistic basis, the basis of positive laws and conditions as concretely given in human history. His main thesis in this connection was that the political laws should be adapted to the character and spirit of the nation. That government which best accords with the particular disposition of the people in question is the one which is best for that nation. A state is not then artificial, nor its institutions and laws arbitrary products. A connection exists not only between governments and national types, but between a people and climate, modes of living, and many factors which had been neglected in the study of the total environment of a nation. Montesquieu's description of the modern state fostered the development of naturalism in a very significant epoch for such thinking, although his doctrine fell short on the side of the evolution of states and the vindication of some of the constitutional principles which he advocated.

Condillac.—Locke's psychology, as expounded by Voltaire, was adopted by Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780), whose sensationalism was influential during a long period. Condillac, who was born at Grenoble and was tutor to the Prince of Parma, also became abbot of Mureaux. In his earlier thought, he undertook a polemical analysis of the teachings of Malebranche, Leibniz, Spinoza; but in his chief work, *Traité des sensations*, 1754, he assimilated Locke's empiricism in terms of a complete sensationalism.

Sensationalism.—Condillac makes a thoroughgoing

attempt to reduce all knowledge to experience and to describe knowledge in terms of a single type. Experience here means sensibility, and sensation is the one source of knowledge. There is no internal experience or reflection as a second or independent source: all consciousness is transformed sensation. So too is memory, which arises through attention, also other psychical functions to which attention is fundamental. Thus ideas of difference and resemblance arise, comparison and judgment become possible. All sense-perceptions are passive modifications of consciousness, all ideas are copies of sensation, the law of association being central to their connections. Since pleasure and pain are associated with sensations, no sensation is neutral. Desire forthwith enters into the process, and thence love, hatred, hope, fear, volition. Will is not then a new element added to prior elements, but arises amidst the greater complexity of mental processes, when attention, memory, comparison, pleasure and pain have brought the various impulses into closer relation. Understanding or intellect likewise results from the multiplication of sensations and the subsequent comparisons. The original combinations of perceptions, due to attention and association are the sources of our ideas. Thus too in the case of tactual sensations, making us aware of the existence of external objects: the immediate representations produce this awareness, give the mind its ideas, in contrast with the view held by philosophers who assume that ideas are first in memory before they become known as ideas. Extension belongs therefore to things, although colors and other qualities of a like nature are sensations. Granted a collection of sensations felt or perceived and those recalled from previous sense-experiences, the ego in each of us is just the consciousness of this collection of what is present, and what has been present.

Condillac holds resolutely to his principle of passivity even when describing attention and the feelings of pleasure and pain essential to the arousing of attention. The instincts and wants are also said to be due to the association and comparison of sensations: it is not necessary to postu-

late the existence of any original faculty or faculties, and if any soul-substance exists its nature is not known. All that seems required to make the account of the soul complete is the assumption of two groups of processes which function as habit and as one's self, the latter or reflective group constituting what we call reason. Condillac endeavors to establish this conclusion that the mind is not equipped with either innate ideas or original faculties by introducing his well-known illustration of a statue, organized as our minds are and exhibiting our various functions as the several coverings are removed. He does not employ this fiction of a sense-endowed statue as an argument for materialism, but proceeds in his account of knowledge by showing what results when one kind of sensation is aroused after another, beginning with the sense of smell, and the attention which ensues. Thus as a rose produces one odor, a violet another, each leaving its impression, so all knowledge has come in all its wealth, the simple leading to the complex. Clear perceptions appear in the sense-manifold, all knowledge is explicable by analysis. Speech enables us to establish a sign for each item disclosed by analysis, and the combination of these signs is language in the accurate sense. Words enable us to form abstract ideas. Thought is speech or inward language. Errors are due to confusions of language. Were we able to perceive a collection of objects distinctly at a glance, there would be no need of analysis, and our minds would be intuitive from the first. But, limited as we are, we first have collective impressions, then the transformation of these impressions in the form called knowledge. Observations made in successive order are reducible to the simultaneous order in which things exist.

Thus Condillac's theory of knowledge suggests a synthesis of sensible and rationalistic knowledge which has been called the "most perfect expression of modern terminism." Condillac's doctrine is a contribution to the analysis of sense-knowledge by appeal to the several senses to determine the share of each in such knowledge. His analysis of instinct and habit is a contribution, also his emphasis

on attention; and his separation of psychology as an analytic science from metaphysics as speculative. His sensationalism is essentially a theory of the origin of knowledge, in contrast with materialism, which involves an ontology or assumption concerning the ultimate substances and forces of the cosmos.⁶

Helvétius. — Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771), author of *De l'esprit*, 1758 (anonymous), adopting the egoistic theory of morals advanced by Hobbes and Mandeville, applied sensationalism to ethics. The development of our powers is due to experience and external influences, through which self-love is acquired, as a result of experiencing pleasure and pain. Susceptibility to pleasure and pain, our original endowment, arouses and intensifies attention, determines conduct, which is motivated by personal interest or the pursuit of happiness. Since nothing is innate or hereditary, education creates the differences which distinguish one man from another. Social inequalities are due to circumstance, which resolves itself into the form of government under which one lives; since government determines education. Literature, morals, character, talent, intellect (*l'esprit*) thus depend on circumstances. It follows that the abuses and evils are not primarily traceable to the faults and failures of individuals, but to the social system, which often affords no opportunity for worthy conduct. Whatever is good or virtuous rests on public utility. Amidst the limited opportunities afforded the individual, notably under bad social and political conditions, the majority of men naturally recognize only their own interests. Even when nobility of soul finds expression, self-love continues to be the central motive. We recognize noble ideas and qualities of character only so far as these agree with our own sentiments. In religion, Helvétius espoused deism; and assailed the morality of ecclesiasticism on the ground that it makes war upon private vices instead of directing its engines against public wrongs. *De l'esprit* was taken to be a godless book, it was condemned by the Archbishop of Paris, the Pope, and by Parliament.

⁶ See Rand, *Modern Classical Philosophers*, Chap. X, for selections.

It aroused great interest within and outside of France; and, together with the posthumous work, *De l'homme, de ses facultés et de son éducation* (*On Man*), 1772, (anonymous) is notable for the frank analysis of the social situation, and for its doctrine of the natural equality or sameness of men.

D'Alembert and Condorcet.—The followers of Helvétius included St. Lambert (1716–1803) and Volney (1757–1820), author of *La loi naturelle ou principes physiques de la morale*, who emphasized the union between the happiness of the individual and the happiness of all. D'Alembert (1717–1783), the mathematician, also adopted the view that egoism and self-interest are the real motives of our conduct. He based his theory of knowledge on the doctrines of Locke and Condillac, and accepted Voltaire's moral doctrine. He is especially known as the author of the famous *Discours préliminaire* of the *Encyclopædia*, in which he discussed the classification and method of the sciences from the point of view of Bacon. Condorcet (1743–1794) described the scientific trend of thought of the time, by directing attention to *man* as the great object of philosophy with regard to the conditions which favor his development and happiness. Man is to win his freedom and guard against a return to barbarism by the aid of science. Social progress and indefinite perfectibility is the great prospect. What is needed is a philosophy of history which shows that, Nature having done her best for us, prejudice, error, superstition have checked our progress.⁷ Since there are no limits to the improvement of human powers, the aim should be, first to make men free, then through enlightenment, social science, social art, education for all, to make them happy. Man's native rights will then be realized in a fraternity, the ideal of a humane optimism.

Naturalism.—The tendency toward naturalism in this period was increased by the development of the sciences, mathematics, physics, chemistry; also by the contributions

⁷ *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, 1794.

of investigators who, like Buffon (1707–1788), distinguished those questions which pertain to natural history, and thereby indirectly limited theology to its proper sphere. Charles de Bonnet (1720–1793), construed sensationalism in favor of the dependence of all mental activity on the vibrations of the brain, a view which reminds us of Hartley and Priestley, notably in his effort to retain his religious faith.⁸ De Bonnet's later work, *La palingénésie philosophique ou idées sur l'étât passé et sur l'étât futur des êtres vivants*, Geneva, 1769, is a forerunner of the works of Lamarek and Darwin.

In his quest for a consistent explanation of nature, Maupertuis had tried to overcome an ancient difficulty in materialism by introducing the idea of sensitive atoms. Robinet (1723–1789) attributed both life and spirit to the smallest particles, and explained sensation as due to the activity of atoms.⁹ Hence mental action as a whole was described as reaction to material impressions. Robinet also undertook a description of the gradual development of the forms of existence with reference to a single cause and the development of organic from inorganic forms. Robinet's doctrine, which resembles the monadism of Leibniz and suggests Schelling's Nature-philosophy, is interpreted by Lange to involve absolute materialism.¹⁰ In any case, materialism became more nearly complete with this idea of atomic sensitivity, also the idea of the conservation of physical force, which was presently understood to include even acts of so-called free-will, on the ground that spiritual motives are conditioned by necessary processes in the fibres of the brain. With some hesitation, this view that conscious life is explained by these minute sensitive processes, by means of a kind of continuum, found expression in the *Encyclopedia*.

Materialism.—The outstanding work for materialism was accomplished by Julien Offroy de la Mettrie (1709–

⁸ *Essai de psychologie ou Considérations sur les opérations de l'âme*, published in London, 1755; *Essai analytique sur les facultés de l'âme*, 1760.

⁹ *De la nature*, Amsterdam, 1761–1768.

¹⁰ *His. of Materialism*, Vol. II, p. 29.

1751), who studied under Boerhaave at Leyden, which was at that time the greatest centre of medical studies. La Mettrie was also influenced by Descartes and Locke. He undertook to apply the Cartesian mechanical conception of the animal organism without qualification to the human organism also, by explaining physical and chemical phenomena in mechanical terms.¹¹ Descartes, although espousing the view that the soul is spiritual, described the bodily organism as functioning in response to the stimuli of the senses independently of the action of the soul.¹² Since memory presupposes cerebral impressions, even intellectual operations are subject to mechanical explanation, and the human body (save for the action of the soul through the pineal gland) is a machine. Given the hypothesis that the higher activities are no less mechanical, the soul can be dispensed with; not only memory, but the passions and feelings, also all self-conscious thoughts, are attributable to the bodily mechanism, and man becomes a "machine." Human nature is indeed a machine in which sense-pleasure occupies the central place. Man is no exception to universal law. His "soul" is the form of his body. He is far more complex in structure, but his organism is no less truly a product of gradual development through transformation of species, not a result of special creation. Since the soul increases and decreases with the body, it will cease when the body is destroyed. The ethics of self-love and sensual enjoyment follows, self-love being a virtue, crime a disease.¹³

In the *Système de la nature* (*System of Nature*), 1770, Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789), a German living in Paris and writing under the name of Mirabaud, reduced materialism to a system. Only matter and motion exist. Man, essentially physical, is a part of nature. Existence is an endless series of causes and effects, human conduct being due to external causes. Since necessity reigns in the moral

¹¹ *Histoire naturelle de l'âme* (*Natural History of the Soul*), 1745; *L'homme-machine* (*Man a Machine*), 1748; *L'homme-plante*, 1748.

¹² *Passions de l'âme*, I, 16.

¹³ See Lange's exposition, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 26, 49, foll.

world, there is no reason for believing in the existence of a God. Thought is a function of the brain, matter alone is immortal. These views are sustained by a polemic against any spiritualistic doctrine. Holbach, who was a friend of Diderot and belonged to a group of radicals, systemized views then current, without adding any essentially new idea. His work has been called the Bible of materialism.

Diderot.—Denis Diderot (1713–1784), the “philosopher” of the Encyclopedists, a man of great ability, stimulating as a writer and in the enlistment of others in his undertakings, has been called a French Leibniz because of the diversity of his interests and gifts, and his power to regard things from within. His great achievement was the *Encyclopedie*, an enterprise which he carried through to success amidst manifold obstacles, hiding his own contributions because of the censorship. Educated by the Jesuits, he became an enemy of Catholicism. As editor of the *Encyclopedie*, he brought together a group of writers, including Voltaire, Holbach, Turgot, D’Alembert, who vigorously co-operated in attacking ecclesiasticism, despotic government, dogmatism, and many other forms of bondage.¹⁴ On the surface it was heretical, tending toward unbelief even in Christianity. Yet it inculcated religious tolerance and speculative freedom, it showed the increasing value of science, the place and opportunities of the common people; and, by freeing the mind of superstitions, prepared the way for liberalism and for moral reform. It was sceptical, irreverent, yet keenly critical in the sense requisite for awakening people out of tradition and for evoking ideas of intellectual liberty and spiritual freedom. By combating the Church it pointed the way beyond the traditional view of universals; and applied naturalism to history, politics, morals, also disclosing opportunities for social regeneration.

Diderot was influenced by Shaftesbury’s *Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit*, 1699, which he reproduced in a work of his own in 1745. He adopted the psychology of

¹⁴ *Encyclopédie*, issued between 1751 and 1772.

sensationalism, also the idea of sensation as immanent in all matter, an idea which enabled him to substitute a kind of pantheism for his former theism, and to retain in terms of natural law his belief in beauty, truth, and goodness. Instead of design in nature, in favor of a supposed creator, he saw a gradual ascent of particles, endowed with the capacity of life and consciousness, elements which may be eternal.¹⁵ Diderot elaborated his view of nature in two famous works in the form of dialogues.¹⁶ In his ethical doctrine, Diderot fluctuates between his earlier allegiance to Shaftesbury's moral-sense theory and an evolutionary account of our moral powers as due to innumerable small experiences, although he takes exception to the view that all moral feeling is attributable to self-interest. Apparently, the natural development is chiefly limited to the individual; since society as Diderot finds it is far from rational, is replete with customs and institutions which betray man's bondage in political, civil, and religious matters. Even religious faith seemed to disclose no way out of the maze of difficulties, the arbitrariness and lust of power which was characteristic of the social régime. It has been said that Diderot combined in his own nature all the modern tendencies of French thought, notably belief in the supremacy of the moral life.¹⁷ Diderot was imprisoned for a brief period after the publication of his *Lettres sur les aveugles*, 1749.

Rousseau.—In impressive contrast with the analytical thinkers of his day, who were critically tracing human origins to intellectual or sensationalistic sources, stands Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), who has been called a sentimental deist, and who exercised a profound influence upon men of the Revolution, who saw in him their idol and prophet. A child of his age even in his response to its materialism in his early period, he reflected some of its most inconsistent interests; his own life conflicted with his teachings, and it is difficult to set forth the logic

¹⁵ *Interprétation de la nature*, 1754.

¹⁶ *Entretien entre D'Alembert et Diderot*, and *Rêve de D'Alembert*.

¹⁷ See Rosenkranz: *Diderots Leben und Werke*; Morley, *Diderot*.

of his doctrines. His writings have been found full of flaws, mixtures of eloquence with apparent rationality, visionary yet suggestive. Yet Rousseau described the stirrings, passions, and hopes of his day with a power quite beyond the value of principles or methods which might be detached from the whole for special analysis. He was self-centered in the extreme, an "introvert," we would now say. But in delving into himself he was seeking for the causes of the adverse social conditions by which he was surrounded, and by penetrating into the soul he penetrated far more deeply than many who have been dedicated to objective rationalistic analysis.

It has been said of Rousseau that because of his temperament "life in the wealth and fulness of its content appealed to him with an overmastering charm."¹⁸ Hence his philosophical tenets were the prime result of his heart's inmost tendencies, and Rousseau the philosopher was Rousseau's whole self, and there was a certain unity often lacking in leaders of other types.¹⁹ But this unity is that of the feelings in their concrete significance, the protest of sentiment against many tendencies rife in his day. In his reaction against the social régime, in which civilization is portrayed as a corrupting of the heart,²⁰ Rousseau indulged in a romantic description of man's primitive state as far removed from historic fact in one direction as Hobbes' graphic account of the "state of nature" in another. Society seemed to Rousseau to have deteriorated through an obscuring of the mind involving a loss of innocence and goodness, of elemental feeling and perception. The resource is a return to these elemental feelings and the instincts of the heart, in vigorous reaction against corrupting customs, artificial standards, social degeneration in general. The ideal state of human life was that of existence in its simplicity, when man lived as a free child

¹⁸ Hibben, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, p. 138.

¹⁹ Lévy-Bruhl, *History of Modern Philosophy in France*, Chap. VIII.

²⁰ *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*, 1753.

of nature. The advantages seem wholly in favor of this original state.

When Rousseau undertakes to account for the state however he falls into inconsistencies.²¹ Man, in depriving himself of the privileges of his primitive situation, makes very great gains, exercises and develops his faculties, enlarges his ideas and sentiments, and lifts his soul so that he now becomes truly a man, whereas he was once a stupid and blind animal. Apparently, civilization is not wholly unfortunate. What is demanded is an adjustment between the extravagant rationalism and social abuses of the day, and the primitive values, with the free play of feeling of the romantic past. Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau describes man as not natively selfish, but in possession of an inner light which disclosed goodness intuitively. This immediate feeling as a source of truth is recoverable.

The real conflict is between what is natural and what is artificial: what is right and good is found by penetrating beneath this opposition to what ought to be, in protest against evils due to human conventions. There is need of a new social order in accord with justice, by recognition of conscience, acquiescence in the general will, through the sovereignty of the people, and especially by education. Although Rousseau, as disclosed by his *Confessions*, was abnormally interested in the interplay of his own emotions and sentiments, in a self-regarding attitude which implied extreme individualism, by this exaggerated sentimentalism he aroused his fellow countrymen in the direction of the Revolution as did no one else save Voltaire. The result in the realm of ideas was not a philosophy of feeling as such, but an awakening which stirred Immanuel Kant, prophet of pure reason. Like Hobbes, he was influential not because of his realistic descriptions but through the stimulation of thought, through the protests which were aroused; and the subsequent recognition of neglected factors in the human self and human society. Thus feeling as a mental element, a factor in religion and morals, comes to its own; the elemental is admitted to its

²¹ *Contrat Social* (*Social Contract*), 1762.

place, and the sentiments are brought into significant relation with reason, a contrast which is also noticeable in the history of English ethics. So too there is a suggestive contrast between the individual will, and the common or universal reason and the general will. In his portrayal of an ideal education, Rousseau is still wavering between the reason or open-mindedness which is to be the standard, and the strong tide of sentiment which is so frequently his impelling motive. Consequently, there remains an antithesis between the units of society and the whole, between personal inclination and political or social standards. Hence the limitations of sentimentalism are clearly shown, the deficiencies of a type of virtue which called for praise rather than for fidelity; deficiencies which were apparent in Rousseau's personal neglect of domestic ties and friendship, while urging others to do their duty by their children. Some of these contrasts are due to the vicissitudes of the times and of Rousseau's own varied career, as indicated by his early wanderings, his *Confessions*, and the fluctuations of mood, varying from marked self-centeredness to the enjoyment of the beautiful in nature. The freedom of self-expression which his own life, with all its inconsistencies, involved, accord with the doctrine of his *Émile*, 1762, namely, the expression or development of nature through education, not its suppression. His *Émile* was burned in Paris, and a warrant was issued for Rousseau's arrest. But this doctrine was a contribution to educational theory, and, like his other contributions, all the more influential because of its exaggerations and its charm.

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§ 15. THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN GERMANY

The period between Kepler and Leibniz was a meagre one for scientific and philosophical thought in Germany. Although Leibniz was a German philosopher, he wrote chiefly in French, few of his writings were issued during his lifetime, and the world only gradually recognized his greatness. Not until the philosophy of Leibniz began to be known in popularized form can it be said that the intellectualism of the Enlightenment, with its quest for clear and certain ideas, gave evidences of being an actual movement. Although this movement was virtually due to the philosophy of Leibniz, deism gained moderate hold in Germany; Locke's teachings began to be known in translation, and English empiricism as expounded by French writers also became an influence.

Pietism.—No less significant than the interest in empiricism and deism was the pietistic movement, which originated in the teachings of Spener (1635–1705) and was fostered by Francke (1663–1727). The influence of this movement on philosophy was indirect, but it gave recognition to religious feeling in a way which was to have greater meaning in the subsequent period. Because of the prominence given to personal religion, the disregard of creeds and dogmatic faith, with insistence upon the supreme value of morality, pietism has been called the “Teutonic Quakerism.” Through the stress put upon personal morality as the chief concern of the individual, pietism is allied in a measure with the individualism of the Reformation. It also has points of contact with mysticism, with Eckhart's doctrine of the sentiments, and with the inwardness of the religious life among the Moravians, whose doctrines influenced idealism and theology at a later time.

Early Rationalists.—Another type of thought is represented by Samuel Puffendorf (1632–1694) and W. von Tschirnhausen (1651–1708). The former, who contributed

works on the public law of Germany, on natural law and ethics, mediated between the principles laid down by Grotius and Hobbes by appeal to both sociality and individual interest. He also systematized the principles of natural law. Tschirnhausen, who was a mathematician and physicist, adopted views from Descartes and Spinoza, was personally influenced by Leibniz, and was also greatly interested in logic. The verbal resemblance between his *Medicina mentis sive artis invenienda praecepta generalia*, 1687, and Spinoza's work on the *Emendation of the Understanding* has been noted by Erdmann. Medicine, mechanics, and ethics are said to be the true applications of science, and philosophy should be essentially practical. Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), professor of law at the University of Halle, from 1694, reacted against scholastic arguments and terminology, in the spirit of common sense and tolerance for differing points of view. He gave special recognition to the practical values of philosophy, under the heads of natural law, politics, and ethics. Describing *justum*, *decorum*, and *honestum* as three degrees of conduct, he put imperative emphasis on the Golden Rule in each of these grades of morality. A common characteristic of these three forerunners of the Enlightenment was their effort to deduce the laws of the physical and moral world from reason.

Wolff.—The vogue of Leibniz as a philosopher in Germany is especially due to Christian Wolff (1679–1754), professor at Halle, later at Marburg, and recalled to Halle by Frederick II in 1740. Wolff contributed many technical terms since used by writers on philosophy, emphasized form and didactic exposition, also system, in which he covered the entire field in philosophy in Latin and German textbooks. His works in German treated psychology, metaphysics, physics, physiology, botany, astronomy, ethics, and politics.¹ He divided philosophy into ontology, *philosophia prima* or fundamental science; cosmology or the world-

¹ *Von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes*, 1712; *von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt*, 1719; *Von den Wirkungen der Natur*, 1723, etc.

view, the basis of physics; psychology (*psychologia rationalis*, *psychologia empirica*), which includes the deduction of the soul's existence from consciousness (cf. Descartes), perception, apperception, thought, and the appeal to incorporeal substance; and rational theology, which considers the existence and attributes of God. Practical philosophy includes ethics, economics, and politics. Here Wolff is a follower of Aristotle, whose doctrines he combines in a measure with the philosophy of Leibniz. A disciple of Leibniz in the letter more than in the spirit, he modified the philosophy of Leibniz in favor of the more conservative tendencies of the day, by appeal to fresh arguments. He regarded the doctrine of pre-established harmony as essentially an hypothesis, to be limited to the relationship of mind and body; restricted perception to monads classed as souls, and admitted the possibility of interaction between soul and body. He accepted optimism and determinism, and endeavored to reduce the principle of sufficient reason to the principle of contradiction, as the absolute principle of demonstration. Wolff also reduced the principles of Leibniz's philosophy to convenient formulas and ready definitions. His encyclopedic teachings became the basis of instruction in the higher schools of learning in Germany, and his influence was extensive in favor of a systematic, pedantic or dry mode of expounding philosophy.

Baumgarten.—After Wolff came active followers and vigorous opponents of the Leibniz-Wolffian doctrines. Prominent among disciples was Alexander Baumgarten (1714–1762), who introduced naturalized German terms, and added to Wolff's system "aesthetics," a discipline which was not merely a theory of the beautiful, as a needed branch of philosophy, but also included a theory of the lower forms of knowledge, sense-perception and the confused sentiments out of which develops appreciation of the beautiful.² Baumgarten also used the term *philosophia poetica*. Beauty is the *perfectio phaenomenon*: what appears beautiful actually is so. Baumgarten is the fore-

² *Aesthetica*, 1750, 1758.

runner of later aesthetic theories both with regard to sensibility as a source of knowledge and in the theory of beauty. In metaphysics he followed Wolff. He was author of *Metaphysica*, 1739, the textbook used by Kant.

Forerunners of Kant.—Martin Knutzen (1713–1751), a pupil of F. A. Schultz, who united Wolff's doctrine with pietism, was one of Kant's teachers in the University of Königsberg. Crusius (1712–1775), influential among the opponents of Wolff, rejected optimism and determinism in favor of the divine will as the basis of the moral law. One of his works is devoted to "directions how to live a rational life," with special reference to the powers and qualities of the human will, and to duty. G. F. Meier (1718–1777), a pupil of Baumgarten, contributed works on the sciences and the theory of reason, used by Kant in his classes in logic. Thomasius gave an impetus to the German language by using it in his academic discussions, and Wolff used German in his earlier philosophical works.

Literary Tendencies.—The intellectual tendencies of the time were on the whole unfavorable to materialism.³ The trend of education was against it, so too was the philosophy of Leibniz; and the reawakened interest in the classics, in the idea of the beautiful, interests which were presently increased by the idealistic interpretation of history, by the poetical movement, and the writings of Lessing and Herder. The great effort of the Enlightenment was directed toward the rational supremacy of man over his total environment.⁴ Thus interest centered about the human subject, notably in the case of a group of literary writers who gave more popular and pleasing expression to the philosophy of the Enlightenment.

Mendelssohn.—Thus in the phraseology of Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), who especially sought the causes of religious advancement, the Enlightenment is definable with respect to religion and culture as the forms in which progress is manifested. Man becomes the central figure, man's importance as an individual, in the light of religious

³ Cf. Lange, *History of Materialism*, Vol. II, Bk. I., Chap. II.

⁴ Cf. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, trans., p. 283, foll.

precepts, for example, from the point of view of the complete freedom which belongs to him as a thinking individual. Mendelssohn himself exemplified these rights by learning German when Jews were still forbidden to use it, by studying Locke and Wolff and undertaking to put into literary German doctrines which Wolff had expressed in highly technical language. Thus he won a place for himself, became a friend of Lessing, later of Kant; and stated his national faith in liberal terms.⁵ He also endeavored to prove the immortality of the soul, on the basis of its immateriality, and the existence of God.⁶ Because of the great work done by philosophy, the truths of natural religion in general have been, he thinks, established in a far more favorable light. Mendelssohn was joint author with Lessing of a prize essay on *Pope, ein Metaphysiker*, in which the function of the poet is said to transcend that of formulas, propositions, and systems.

Their mutual friend, Friedrich Nicolai (1733–1811), a leading literary editor of the day, pleaded for common sense in the interpretation of art, literature, philosophy, religion, and the avoidance of academic prejudice and tradition. The *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*, of which he was editor, was the organ of the so-called enlightened philosophers.

Tetens.—Another group of thinkers, taking exception to the intellectualism of the Wolffian school, gave attention to empirical psychology. This attitude was expressed by Johann Nicolas Tetens (1736–1805). “Metaphysical analysis,” he says, “must conclude, not begin our inquiry as to the nature of the soul. It must be preceded by psychological analysis. Once this has been accomplished, metaphysical analysis is reduced to that of a few fundamental faculties and modes of operation, and is then, in the abridged form, to be carried as far as may be. Where this empirical knowledge of the fundamental faculties is still lacking, however, it is useless to attempt to explain

⁵ *Jerusalem, oder Über religiöse Macht und Judenthum*, 1783.

⁶ *Phädon*, 1767; *Morgenstunden*, 1786. See Höffding, *His. of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. II, p. 13.

them by means of so obscure an organization as the soul. Moreover, however far we proceed in metaphysical psychology, the authenticity of its propositions must always be tested by empirical knowledge.”⁷ To Tetens is due the co-ordination of feeling as a fundamental element with understanding and will. Under the term “feeling,” as the receptive faculty, Tetens classed sensuous perceptions, pleasure and pain, and the mind’s inner impressions or affections. His epistemology took account of the fact that conscious perception is the distinguishing of a relation; that attention leads to comparison, which implies relations of similarity and difference. Our acts of feeling, always in process within us, have succession and duration, “even when no perceptible object is felt which could afford material for the abstraction of time.”⁸ J. H. Lambert (1728–1777), who also belongs in literary relation with the philosophy of Kant, was a mathematician. He showed the importance of beginning with experience and using the analytical method: the problem was to determine how understanding of the *form* involves knowledge of the *matter* of our cognitions.

Liberalism and Criticism.—The deism of this period was supported by Schmidt, Semler, Reimarus, and others who adopted a critical and historical standpoint. Reimarus (1699–1768) was author of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, later issued by Lessing, in which the positive content of Christianity is critically analyzed. Edelmann, who began as a pietist, later became a free thinker and adopted a view allied with Spinoza’s pantheism. The historians of philosophy included Brucker, Tiedmann, Lossius, Meiners, and Platner (1744–1818), author of *Philosophische Aphorismen*, which combined historical exposition with critical estimates. Garve (1742–1798) added to translations of the *Ethics* and *Politics* of Aristotle a critical summary of the history of morals. Numerous works on empirical psychology and on the theory of art as founded on em-

⁷ *Philosophischen Versuchen über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung*, 1777, xiii.

⁸ Cf. Höffding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 17.

pirical psychology appeared at this time, for example, Sulzer's *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*, which is a lexicon of aesthetics. Of greater moment for the development of critical thought was the application of psychology and the history of civilization to the problem of historical biblical criticism, which began with the work of Semler (1725–1791), and with recognition given to the critical contributions of Spinoza, whose *Ethics* was translated by Schmidt.

Lessing.—Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781), who belongs to the history of literature and civilization, also contributed to aesthetics and the philosophy of history, in works which were of marked importance in the subsequent period.⁹ Educated at Leipzig, Breslau, Berlin, and Hamburg, Lessing devoted himself to poetry and aesthetics until, as librarian at Wolfenbüttel, he edited the *Fragments* and indulged in a literary warfare with the conservative theologians of the day. Lessing possessed keen critical ability coupled with profound insight into historical relations, and the values of historic periods. Thus he shows the significance of knowledge of the national life, religious development, and traditions amidst which the Bible was produced: Christianity, as older than the Bible, does not stand or fall with it, and its future will depend on the continued life of its “spirit and power.” His view here agrees with the religionists of his time who regarded religion as essentially a matter of the inward life. The pursuit of truth becomes of more moment than possession of it.

In philosophy Lessing was deeply influenced by Leibniz, notably in insisting on the unbroken continuity of history in the realm of action as well as in the domain of thought. Thus the idea of development receives new meanings, and history comes to be regarded as the continuous revelation of God. Religion depends, not on the few supernatural events which tradition has emphasized, but on a great interconnected whole, with its successive stages in the spiritual development of man. The various positive reli-

⁹ *Hamburger Dramaturgie; The Education of the Human Race*, trans. in Bohn Library, London, 1875.

gions are so many disciplinary forces in this process. These indicate "the only road by which the human understanding in each instance has been able to develop and along which it will develop." Revelation in the race at large corresponds to education in the individual. Thus the value of the Bible is seen, as the primer of the race; also the value of the original forms of religion in general and of Christianity in particular, in contrast with the orthodoxy and tradition of given periods in history. The Old Testament belonged, for example, to a certain stage, when the Israelites were learning lessons of obedience and advancing to belief in one God. The truths commingled with the crudities of belief in the Bible appertain to the more permanent *truths of reason* into which they may be transformed, the eternal gospel will include the spiritual lessons of the race, the inner meanings symbolized in such doctrines as the Trinity and the atonement. Lessing gives prominence to the ethical values of religion, the education of doing good for its own sake, in contrast with future rewards. The race passes through periods corresponding to childhood, youth, and manhood. The goal of Lessing's thought, so far as the idea of God is concerned, agreed with the teachings of Spinoza, whose philosophy he discussed in a famous conversation with Jacobi. Lessing was unable to conceive God in personal terms, as if God were finite, or resided outside the world; God is in immanent relation with the world, underlying all extension, motion, thought; the unity of all thinking, willing, creating. He saw little value in the attempt to prove God's existence by appeal to purpose in nature, and inclined toward purely naturalistic explanations in general. Lessing was not however limited by intellectualism. In him the critical and poetical temperaments were combined; he appealed to feeling, to aesthetic appreciation where cold rigorous analysis falls short, to the realm of values or the eternal spirit in contrast with transient forms or modes of expression. Here especially he belongs with the group of literary men, with Klopstock, Wincklemann, Herder, and Goethe, whose works and influence are especially characteristic of the time. As

adopted by Lessing and Herder, the philosophy of Leibniz once more became a spiritualizing or vitalizing doctrine, as opposed to the Wolffian formalism. Spinoza came to his own as the God-intoxicated man whom the world had not appreciated. The optimism, aestheticism, and emphasis on the divine purpose in nature for which Shaftesbury was notable, also came into recognition.

Herder.—The influence of Leibniz on Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), who belongs for the most part to the same age as Kant, is seen in his idea of the interconnection of all factors in human history, the interdependence of individuals and generations, the successive stages of history. While Lessing gave particular attention to the goal of racial development or education, Herder manifested special interest in what Leibniz had called the *petites perceptions* with reference to the origins of all human development and culture; Herder dwells on primitive religions, folk-lore, primitive poetry, and the evidences of instinctive faith and feeling as sources of ideals and truths. Out of this doctrine of the continuity of human development from its most primitive sources, with the idea of the system or harmony of the world, was to come in time a philosophy of evolution. Herder's contribution was in terms of his poetical insight and religious feeling. In the nineteenth century the concept of evolution as a scientific view of the world was a realization of this insight.

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PART TWO

FROM IMMANUEL KANT TO THE
PRESENT TIME

§ 16. RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, AND THE REDISCOVERY OF THE INNER LIFE

Looking back over the period from Locke's *Essay*, 1690, and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781, we realize why it has been called a "century of challenge."¹ It was a protest against speculation which tried to transcend ordinary processes of reason. Hence it tended toward naturalism even in its views of religion and the idea of God; it objected to supernaturalism in all its forms, hence became critical, called attention to human factors, especially to psychology. It attempted to reduce all problems to the basis of extreme simplicity or common sense, to clearly defined ideas, in a precise system implying practical as well as theoretical values. If in this endeavor the age became too formal or rigorous, there came a wave of interest in feeling, sentiment, the beautiful, an appeal to poetry and the inwardness of experience. Thus it was characteristic of the period to examine the phenomena of life as they unfold in our consciousness, the result being a rewarding study which has been called a "rediscovery of the inner life."² Faith discovered what reason was presently to analyze and endeavor to prove. If for the moment philosophy was sometimes reduced to the minimum, in Locke's limitation of our knowledge, or Hume's sceptical analysis of sense-impressions and ideas, productive lines of development also emerged. Thus appeared Berkeley's idealistic doctrine, and the sensationalism of English and French thinkers of the period. In Germany, Locke's doctrine was contrasted with rationalism as modified by Wolff, whose doctrine in turn aroused partisans of inward experience and empirical psychology. While the evidences

¹ Cf. Hibben, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, Chap. I.

² Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, Lect. III.

for empiricism were gaining significant recognition, the conditions under which the critical philosophy was to emerge were also gathering, the later years of the Enlightenment being the same as those of Kant's pre-critical period. The age which witnessed the rediscovery of the inner life was also the one which disclosed a profound antithesis centering about the origin, nature, and validity of human reason.

Summary of Rationalism and Empiricism.—There were, in brief, two modes of approach to an explanation of human experience: the assumptions of rationalism implying a central principle from which everything else follows, or the endeavor to account for experience as nearly as possible in its own terms. Rationalism involved the idea of a systematically developed view of the universe in terms of purely intellectual principles discovered through analysis, with emphasis on mathematical concepts, on necessity, on the logical bearings of such a starting-point as Descartes' *cogito, ergo sum* or Spinoza's Substance. Reason was taken to be the source of cognition. Innate ideas or necessary truths having been established, the proof of God's existence followed, then the system in general. Thus in Descartes' case the mathematical method led to the mechanical view of the universe, including first emphasis on *extension*, the conservation of motion and the vortex theory of motion. In Spinoza's system "extension" implied the existence of things as modes of God's reality, with a static view of substance and an anti-teleological world-view at large. For Leibniz, the starting-point in necessary truths or the principle of sufficient reason led to a reconciliation of the teleological and mechanical views, a dynamic conception of substance, the conservation of force, with stress on continuity within the organism of the universe as a whole. The single principle of highest certainty established through appeal to doubt and the proof of God's existence (Descartes); the definitions, axioms, propositions, and their consequences (Spinoza); and the necessary truths involving the impossibility of the opposite (Leibniz) implied a method common to the rationalists,

which Hobbes also adopts in his dogmatically assumed conceptions of man and nature. Experience was secondary from this point of view, external observation was of little significance, the life of sensation was secondary in importance. The validity of perception was assumed by Descartes. For Leibniz knowledge was a kind of unfolding process from within the self-conscious monads.

By contrast, empiricism was concerned with such questions as the origin and validity of innate ideas. Are all our ideas results of experience, or are they an original possession of the mind, wholly or in part? Are ideas received from without by perception or produced from within by self-activity? Is knowledge a product of sensation or of pure thought? Shall it be said that knowledge of nature arises because the order of thought corresponds with that of things? On the assumption that sensation is more fundamental than knowledge of the inner life, can it be shown that we know things-in-themselves, that is, their true substance, their primary qualities? Do we know real space as objective to perception, so that real knowledge of nature is possible in contrast with *belief*?

Beginning with Locke, especially, the question had arisen, What is the nature and origin of knowledge so far as our own minds permit us to answer? Locke endeavored to answer within the limits of an inquiry which, by being persistently circumscribed, implied sceptical criticism, an inquiry which was further limited by Berkeley's analysis of the idea of substance and reached its limit in the empirical field with Hume's critique of causality and necessary connection. This analysis seemed to undermine the basis of science and to leave only the relativities of the habitual association of ideas. Yet the natural sciences existed, and Hume himself was positive in his treatment of moral science. How was it possible for science to be successful on the basis of its assumptions of universality and necessity? Is a psychological study of human reason adequate to solve these problems? What is the relation between certainty in the natural sciences and moral certainty? Is metaphysics still possible? If so, it must somehow pass

beyond the doctrines of Wolff. Plainly, it was necessary both to define more clearly the nature and limitations of experience, and to ascertain the limits of reason in its efforts constructively to pass beyond experience to sure knowledge of ultimate reality. It was also necessary to show in what sense even our ordinary sense-perception is possible, as partly a product of the understanding, with its structure (somehow prior to the experience which it knows). The philosophy of common sense undertook to show what the intellect brings to experience. It remained for Kant to reckon with these issues by his criticism of reason.

In reviewing the period which leads to Kant we also note both the remarkable development of mathematics and the use of the quantitative method, from Galileo to Newton, and the significant empirical discoveries, including Galileo's contributions to physics and astronomy and Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood. Speculative conceptions gradually gave place to those of empirical demonstrations, for instance, Gassendi's atomism with its application to chemistry by Boyle, the researches of Lavoisier, which made possible the founding of chemistry on the basis which led to its great development with the contributions of Dalton. So too scientific induction displaced speculation by its observational methods leading to the derivation of general laws, notably the laws of motion and gravitation. While the "geometrical method" in Spinoza's system was employed to develop a speculative conception, geometry in the case of Descartes, Desargues, and Pascal was developed as a science; and the differential calculus was formulated as a method of mathematical reasoning by Leibniz and Newton. Hence came into being the mathematical physicist with contributions leading to the age of "victorious analysis."³ One hundred years after the publication of Newton's *Principia* came the demonstrations of Lagrange (1736-1813), the great French mathematician, in his *Mécanique analytique*, 1787, followed by his *Théorie des*

³ Cf. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 81.

fonctions analytiques, 1797; thus the Newtonian theory received important verifications.

Meanwhile materialism, in the period from Hobbes to Priestley and Holbach, had been winning its successes, apparently substantiated by the development of the mechanical theory in general, and by the sciences of rational dynamics, physics, and chemistry. With the principle introduced by Lavoisier, for example, that matter is neither lost nor gained in any chemical transformation, materialism received new confirmation. Hobbes had argued that thinking is "calculation," explained by the motion of material particles; Hartley and Priestley, with the French sensationalists, had supplied the psychology essential to a materialistic theory of knowledge. Yet we have found Leibniz and others breaking into the alleged universe of sheer material substance, offsetting the idea of fixed positions in space by the idea that force is primary, also the doctrine that space is ideal; while Berkeley contributed a doctrine of space perception, undermined the idea of "simple location," and assigned prominence to the relativities of perceptions and perspectives at large. If space, time, extension, and motion are not "things," but *modi considerandi* (methods of contemplating them), as Leibniz contended, philosophy has the problem of relating the self or monad (with its perspectives as modes of apprehension) with the "real" universe. If space and time prove to be sensuous intuitions, what shall we say concerning universality and necessity (after Hume's critique of causality)? And if the self, with its constructive unities of sense-perception and of pure reason, proves to be the centre of philosophic interest, what shall we say of the so-called real world of "things," of primary significance for materialism and realism? These queries lead directly to the problems of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

§ 17. THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT

Life of Kant.—Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, in East Prussia, a province which he never left in his life, April 22, 1724. His father was a strap-maker, notable for his patience and fairness. His mother, a deeply religious woman, to whom the pietism of the family was a living faith, was markedly influential in Kant's whole life. Kant had the greatest respect for the moral atmosphere of his home, where honesty, truth, and peace were the prevailing influences. The influence of pietism, with its emphasis on what is vital in Christianity, in contrast with dogma, continued during Kant's preliminary training, at school; and Schultz, the pietist pastor, encouraged the young Kant to persist in his studies. Although a good student, Kant did not at first show special aptitude for philosophy. When he entered the university in Königsberg, at sixteen, his first interests were in mathematics and the natural sciences. In time he became greatly interested in Newton. Kant's parents were poor and he had to earn his own living while at school and college. After leaving the university he became tutor in a well-to-do family, and in 1755 was appointed private docent at the university, where he lectured on mathematics, physics, logic, metaphysics, ethics, physical geography, and other subjects. In 1746 Kant wrote his first book, *Thoughts on the True Estimate of Living Forces*, based on a study of the philosophy of Leibniz. His first important essay, *Universal History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens*, 1755, outlined a theory of the origin and constitution of the universe in an effort to explain the structure of the cosmos genetically, with special reference to the planetary system. The essay with which he qualified as docent was entitled *New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge*.

Although Kant had never traveled, he was a very ex-

tensive reader, and had the power of making his knowledge so real and vivid that his lectures had the effect of actual description. When Rousseau's *Émile* appeared, in 1762, Kant became so absorbed that he omitted his afternoon walk, that he might read through to the end, a significant exception to a life which was methodical in the extreme. A new valuation of knowledge began with the influence of Rousseau's teaching, in favor of the primacy of the moral life. Kant's wide interests are indicated by his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, 1764. Between 1760 and 1765 he turned to the moral philosophy of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, in reaction against the doctrines of the rationalistic school.

In 1770 Kant became professor of logic and metaphysics in the university, a position which he retained until 1804. He lectured two hours daily, six days in the week, and kept this up regularly for twenty-five years. A student who heard him during nine years said that Kant never missed a single lecture. From five minutes of five in the morning until ten at night, after he had prepared his mind for slumber, Kant maintained the strictest routine, with his literary labors, his dinner with friends, his walk, his period of evening work precisely limited. By strict attention to hygienic precepts and persistent care of his frail health, he managed to keep in condition. Kant was a bachelor, first because he was poor during the early years, then by measured decision. Because of his view of sectarian differences he did not care for religious services. He was a lover of nature, but had seen no art galleries; his aesthetic and emotional side seems to have been developed by means of reading only. Austere in disposition, strong in will, dedicated to moral reason, the thoroughness and persistence of his intellectual life admirably fitted him to be the first great philosopher to become a professor of philosophy. His extreme formalism was due to his type, training, methodical habits, prim, precise, and conventional as he was. His isolation from the world aided him to specialize with remarkable penetration.

As a Writer and Teacher.—Kant's style is difficult, technical, abstract. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* illustrations are entirely omitted, on the ground that any one persistent enough to read it understandingly will supply what is needed. The poetic element does not appear in his writings. His own training was in scholastic philosophy, and he remained scholastic in temper. But, with his remarkable power of critical analysis, he is perhaps the greatest of all philosophers. One whose life was according to principles in minutest detail, with nothing left to inclination or the mood of the moment, with reason absolutely first in everything, was sure to be profoundly instructive when he reckoned with the greatest issues of life. Great as a teacher, Kant held from the first that philosophy cannot be learned, as one acquires mathematics, physics, or history, although one can learn to philosophize. He made it clear also that although every philosopher builds his system on the elements of other systems, no system had as yet become permanent in all its parts. Philosophy could not then be acquired as a perfect science. Kant's aim was not to make professional philosophers, but to quicken men into independence of thought and character, to recognize the value of knowledge in its relation to human ends, namely, as practical wisdom.

After passing through a long preparatory period, Kant wrote his chief work, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the first edition of which appeared in 1781, and the second, with various changes, in 1787. In 1783 he published a work which was more adapted to the average reader, the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*. Then followed his treatises on ethics, moral theology, aesthetics, and other branches of the critical philosophy. Kant's philosophy met with some opposition in official circles, and after the publication of his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, 1793, he was rebuked for doctrines which seemed to "disfigure and depreciate" Christian teachings. Meanwhile the critical philosophy had been exercising profound influence both on general and on philosophical thought in Germany and other countries. In 1795 Kant

restricted his lectures to an hour a day, on logic and metaphysics; in 1797 he retired from active professorial work, and after 1799 steadily declined in health, until his death, February 12, 1804.

Philosophical Development.—The understanding of the critical philosophy depends in part on one's view of its origin.¹ In the earlier period Kant departed in a measure from the doctrines of Leibniz and Wolff concerning natural philosophy, in independent interest in the teachings of Newton; but he held a theory of knowledge and a metaphysical doctrine which retained the characteristics of the conventional school. Then came a period of interest in the natural sciences in which Kant was gradually freeing himself from the old school, and approaching the empirical and sceptical thought of English philosophy. In the third period came the criticism of rationalism and empiricism. Kant himself dated the beginning of his critical epoch with the *Dissertation Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds*, 1770. The continuity of his thought is seen in part from the fact that in his teaching Kant used Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, which inculcates a monadism essentially scholastic in form, throughout his instruction, and that he changed his theory of knowledge rather than his metaphysics, continuing to develop principles acquired from Plato and Leibniz. What is notable is Kant's increasing distrust of the old methods and the quest for a new method. In his first pre-critical period Kant still held firmly to the idea of a pervasive uniformity of nature which determines all phenomena. This is the period of his interest in the evolution of the solar system, namely, an explanation of the cosmos in terms of a rotating nebulous sphere by reference to the known laws of nature. Evidences of God's existence are found in the uniformity of nature, and the concepts of philosophy in general are derived from experience. Such concepts are however imperfect because experience is never universal, nor is the concept of the soul complete. Granted

¹ For a detailed study, see Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, trans., p. 74, foll.

the principle of causality, how does the analysis of experience show that one given phenomenon necessarily involves relationship with another given phenomenon? The idea of causality plainly involves the assumption of necessary connection. Although Kant seems to have approached the problem how things can be thought in necessary connection independently, he was apparently influenced by the study of Hume's empiricism as early as 1762; and it was Hume who gave him the great impetus away from the old speculations.² In the second pre-critical period, extending from 1769 to 1781, Kant carried on a sceptical inquiry into the ideas of space and time, with the result that space and time were regarded as separable from the forms of arrangement of our sensations. Space had once seemed to belong to the external universe as described by Newton, now it is analyzed in terms of our modes of apprehension of nature, and various properties which once seemed to be wholly objective are regarded by reference to the conditions of sense-perception, the method by which we apprehend things under the relationships of space and time. Interest now centres about the fact that, while we experience everything in space and time, we also possess the purely intellectual science, mathematics, which enables us to think the laws of space and time to which our experience conforms.

Kant's Problems.—Apparently, it is still possible for the understanding to grasp the absolute nature of things in the world around us. But Kant's analysis leads him to consider more and more acutely the productive processes of the understanding. How, for instance, can the mind's products retain their validity in relation to perceptions produced objectively? It is plain that in addition to unifications wrought by sense-perception the understanding also accomplishes its syntheses by aid of the principle of causality. Hume was baffled by the fact that the mind itself unites given experiences in terms of cause and effect: Kant found in the process of uniting the data of sense-perception, accomplished by the forms of thought (in its

² See the *Prolegomena*, Introduction, Open Court ed., p. 7.

utilization of the given material of experience), a clue to knowledge. It is this synthesis wrought from within by the understanding which discloses the solution of Kant's problem.

There plainly could be no solution if thought were to remain at the stage of Descartes' dualism of extended substance, independent of the thinker, and thinking substance, with a resulting dualism of knowledge. Thought comes nearer a solution with Leibniz's conclusion that the true relations are not space-relations, but are intelligible relations. Granted geometrical explanations of such relations, space-time relations may be said to correspond in as perfect a way as possible to the actual relationships of the monads; but the correspondence is not absolute and the conception of the space-world remains confused. Kant tried as a young thinker to adapt a monadology to the theory of nature he then held; and he always retained the monads (as his "things-in-themselves"). The difficulty lies in the effort to determine how much space belongs to the monad, since geometrical points do not correspond to monad-points.

The Transitional Issues.—For Kant very much depended on his insight of 1769 that the most important relations cannot be expressed by reference to monads. There are, for instance, the problems of the relation of the part to the whole, of regional differences in space which can be determined only in relation to the whole. Since space as a whole predetermines these relations within it, it stands or falls as a whole; and this universal form Kant now attributes to the knowing subject. On the assumption of an external order in which the monads find their place, there would be two worlds: nature, and the world of space regarded as a form of intuition. But if space and time are no longer taken to be external, the situation is radically changed. We are unable to regard space as representing the pluralistic order of the monads: space as monistic implies far more than is explicable by reference to experience. Once regard it as belonging to the mind, in its apprehension of nature (formerly conceived as infinitely extended

and infinitely divisible), and our whole world of spatial experience is seen to be phenomenal. Then the problem is, How can our ideas relate to objects? Do any of the necessities of thought apply to experience? How are we to distinguish phenomena as not only *presentable* but *conceivable* so that we can think them in their system, and define facts with reference to the raw material of sense-experience on the one hand and to the forms of the understanding on the other? Kant advances to the point of view of his *Critique of Pure Reason* with the conclusion that space and time are ideal; and with the problem concerning the relation of the pure concepts of the understanding to the world of objects which the mind is supposed to know, the question how the understanding is able to lay down principles applicable in the sphere of experience. With his change in point of view from that of the mechanical philosophy, with its dominating idea of causality, to the viewpoint of the ideality of space and time and the implications of the intelligible world, it also became possible to find a basis for freedom. This for Kant is a vitally significant transition, as we note when we turn from the criticism of pure reason to the meanings of practical reason in the sphere of morals.

The question for Hume, as Kant indicates in the *Prolegomena*, was not whether the concept of causality is indispensable to our knowledge of nature; but whether it can be thought by reason *a priori*, whether it possesses an inner truth, independent of all experience and implying a wider application than to the objects of experience. Kant's insight disclosed the rationale of the principle of mathematics and metaphysics, the secure basis for these sciences. What Kant found in Hume was a serious obstacle to overcome, what he received from him was an impetus. Having found his solution of Hume's problems, Kant rejected Hume's empiricism and scepticism, and proceeded with the development of the critical philosophy.

The Criticism of Reason.—Kant's criticism of reason is an inquiry into the origin, extent, and limits of human knowledge, "pure reason" being the faculty of knowledge

regarded without reference to experience. The critical scrutiny of reason in its pure speculative activity is a prerequisite to the whole metaphysical enterprise. To engage in this enterprise without such an examination would be to fall into dogmatism, to assume that all knowledge is limited to experience would be to begin and end with empiricism, to doubt that knowledge can transcend experience without analyzing the faculty of knowledge would involve scepticism; the critical philosophy is transcendental because of its searching scrutiny of the possibility concerning knowledge of what lies beyond experience. Kant's examination of pure reason is concerned with what is *a priori* in the sense of what is universally present in experience, necessary to its existence, but essentially constitutive, in contrast with what is learned by experience: the principles of pure reason *a priori* are involved in the fact that knowledge exists, are discoverable by analysis of what experience implies. Granted the structure which makes experience and knowledge possible, *a posteriori* knowledge is knowledge yielded by experience, as the process of learning proceeds, although a particular fact does not prove that knowledge exists, but is rather a contingent item to be analyzed. In experience (as given) items of sense-perception and constitutive principles are combined. To assume that perception involves knowledge of material objects existing in space apart from the perceiving subject would be to adopt a dualistic point of view, and interest would be likely to centre about an "objective" world. But Kant is concerned with the analysis of perception in the light of the mind's structure, which makes sense-perception possible. He is more directly concerned with conception, that is, the process of knowledge made possible by the *a priori* forms in the mind's assimilation of the data of sense-perception.

Noumena and Phenomena.—The sense in which there are still objects of knowledge for Kant becomes clear only when we take account of his distinction between noumena and phenomena. A noumenon is an object of reason, notably in the case of the subject or self which may be

inferred to remain identical during the whole process of the unities of knowledge which Kant describes in analytical detail. The self thinks in terms of the categories or various relations which, like cause and effect, make knowledge of particular objects possible in terms of synthetic activity, also with reference to whatever exists in an external world from which the subject-matter of sense-perception is derived. Phenomena are contents of experience as given, what appears to us in the process, in contrast with what we may infer concerning reality when we have reached conclusions regarding the process of assimilating sense-material. Our sensibility, receptive and passive, derives its material as "given"; the imagination performs an intermediate service in reacting upon sense-material, and so it is in part constitutive; while reason, essentially active and constitutive, performs a still higher synthesis by means of its *a priori* forms.

Judgment.—Intuition also participates in this elaborate process, namely, by its judgments of perception, of the facts or phenomena present in consciousness. Judgments belong under two heads, analytic and synthetic (amplificative). In the analytic judgments the principle is that of identity and contradiction, in the synthetic the predicate is not contained in the concept of the subject. In the light of the distinctions already mentioned, a judgment *a posteriori* is a judgment of experience; but a judgment *a priori* is independent of all experience. Absolute judgments *a priori* involve necessity and strict universality, that is, no combination of experiences or empirical data would produce them. The analytical judgments are *a priori*, because the judgment, resulting from analysis of subject-matter already given, does not require further experience. But synthetic judgments may be both *a posteriori* and *a priori*, the former when the synthesis of the predicate with the subject is accomplished by the aid of experience; the latter when it is effected apart from all experience. The well-known general proposition that in all the changes of the material world the quantity of matter remains identical is an instance of a synthetic judg-

ment *a priori*. Apart from all experience we know that this principle of physics is true. Still more familiar is the principle that every event must have its cause. More certain still are the principles of mathematics. Plainly, these principles of the natural sciences and mathematics exist. How then are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?

This question involves the more general one, How is knowledge possible, how is it valid? It is clear that judgments involving knowledge arise. They cannot be merely psychological. If made after experiences occur, this fact would not show why things or events *must* occur in a certain order; nor would analytical knowledge suffice. In order that law shall hold universally, our synthetic judgments concerning nature being valid, law must be *a priori*. Synthetic judgments *a priori* are possible, because the mind is equipped with the pure forms of knowledge; the mind brings to the subject-matter acquired by experience forms into which this matter is fitted. Pure reason makes such judgments possible, it legislates concerning the sort of experience we have and which we are able to think by aid of the categories. These pure forms make both experience and knowledge possible. Equipped with the forms of space and time, the mind can think nature in terms of necessary sequence or causality—nature as the world of our own inner representation. My very self is of a character such that, thus equipped, it can *think* the deliverances of sensibility and the imagination in the “transcendental unity of apperception” which shapes all these presentations.

The Nature of Knowledge.—For example, I think this room as occupying space, the room being one of many empirical objects; and I know many things about space before I thus philosophize concerning the room, which I now think as a part of the whole of space, think it in time, also. I find I cannot think the room otherwise, and my reflection shows me that this my necessity of thought is not empirical, that the plan of nature wherewith I think is not given me by the subject-matter of my perceptions of the room. My reflection shows me then that the mind, thus contributing the order or plan of my thought, con-

structs nature as it represents it. I make the discovery then that my mind is its own ground for being, in contrast with any experience or even the sum of experiences which may seem to have produced it. I *start* with causality as a rational principle essential to my reasoning, implied in my generalizations, as indeed mathematical principles are involved in the demonstrations which prove them true. Kant, by deducting these the principles of my thought explains to me what reason actually was all along; he discloses the "I think" which "accompanies all my representations"; he shows me that the forms wherewith I think are logically prior to the processes wherewith I think what is given. Of the successive unities which he discloses the deepest is this unity of apperception, which implies more than a mere succession of apperceptions, namely, a unity wherewith to think the world as a whole, a power to *make* the unity which we know. Granted the mind as the logical basis of science, science is possible, showing how events and laws imply one another in a system.

Given this explication of the validity of knowledge, it becomes clear why the objects to which knowledge is applicable are not things-in-themselves (not transcendental objects, noumena, or objects apart from our mode of conceiving them); but are only empirical, phenomenal, existing in consciousness as representations. We know that the raw material of sensibility must be given to fill the pure forms of our cognitive constitution, hence that something exists outside our organisms to yield this sense-material. But the matter cannot be deduced from the form of knowledge, or separate out the raw material as such, as crudely *given* to our sensibility. Nor can we construct a science of the ideas of pure reason alone, or argue from the fact that the self has the synthesizing power before described to the conclusion that the soul is a spiritual "substance." In any case form and content belong together, we are unable to separate the self as a noumenon from its activities. One would need to be a creative universal mind, at once creating and knowing its objects in all their relations,

in order to know things-in-themselves. By contrast, what we popularly call "things" conform to the understanding which represents them: it is only phenomena that are plastic to the mind's pure forms. Things-in-themselves would not be plastic to our cognizing forms unless our mind were creative, unless it possessed an intellectual intuition apart from the conditions of knowledge as already described. We cannot even infer that the pure forms of the mind conform to things-in-themselves, as if our knowledge were merely empirical. What we can declare is that the mind so shapes its subject-matter as to impose its own conditions on phenomena, we can affirm that all empirical objects conform to the forms of human knowledge. Knowledge is valid because it applies to phenomena. When we try to make it apply beyond phenomena we encounter manifold difficulties, as in our efforts to think of the universe as necessarily beginning in space and time, whereas we find it impossible to conceive of either the beginning or the end of space and time.

Knowledge is classed by Kant by reference to its two stems, arising from an unknown common root: *sensibility*, which yields objects, and *understanding*, which gives thought.³ Transcendental Aesthetic is the "science of all the principles of sensibility *a priori*." Sensibility is the faculty of receiving representations, intuition "forms the ultimate material of all thought." Space is the form of external sensibility, the form of all phenomena of the external senses through which objects are represented as external and in space. Time is the form of internal sensibility, a subjective condition under which our intuitions occur. Time and space are not then empirical concepts; but, anterior to all experience, are the *a priori* conditions of external and internal sensation, pure forms rendering synthetic propositions *a priori* possible. We know nothing of objects and events, supposedly coexistent and successive, save the fact that sensation gives raw material to these pure forms, with the result that phenomena as appre-

³ *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 12. References are to Max Müller's translation.

hended by us are *in ourselves*.⁴ The unity of our perceived objects is indeed a unity wrought within; even the qualities and relations of objects in space and time would disappear except for these forms.

The Categories.—Transcendental logic, which treats the forms of thought—of the origin, extent, and validity of concepts—is divided into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic.⁵ The forms of thought are the twelve categories, the *a priori* concepts of the understanding by which all the forms of our judgment are conditioned. By their aid knowledge advances from the stage of mere perception of objects in space and time, such as trees, to various relationships so that these objects may be thought in their connection, for example, the influence of the soil, moisture, sunlight, on the growth of the trees. To pass to this stage is to change from percepts to concepts and relate the latter intelligibly. The data of sense-perception are items merely. Intuition gives percepts, representations referring immediately to objects. So far there is no understanding. Yet, as the understanding cannot intuitively envisage anything, it is dependent on these representations. Knowledge in the sense of understanding becomes possible with the union of percepts and concepts, when a judgment occurs. In the judgment that all bodies are divisible, the concept of “divisible,” which applies also to other concepts, is related in particular to the concept of body. Judgments then are functions of unity among our various representations by which various cognitions are collected into one. The understanding is specifically the “faculty of judging.” The functions of unity in judgment are represented by leaving out the contents of any judgment and noting the mere form of the understanding. These functions belong under four heads, each with three subdivisions; hence there are twelve kinds of judgment: I, *Quantity*: universal, particular, singular; II, *Quality*: affirmative, negative, infinite; III, *Relation*: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive; IV, *Modality*: problematical,

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 28, foll.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

assertory, apodictic. The twelve categories coming under these four heads are: I, unity, plurality, totality; II, reality, negation, limitation; III, inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community (reciprocity, active and passive); IV, possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency.

The source of the subject-matter for these concepts of the pure understanding has already been indicated. The pure intuition involves a manifold, but thus far the mind is receptive only. The spontaneity of thought begins to function when the manifold of the pure intuition is examined and connected in the synthesis which produces knowledge. Imagination, to be sure, produces a synthesis, as what Kant calls a "blind but indispensable function of the soul." But the understanding must function before this relatively unconscious synthesis can produce knowledge. The manifold in pure intuition (the synthesis of sensibility) being given, the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination follows; then ensues the synthesis by the understanding which produces true knowledge. The third contribution is the one which implies the categories.

Deduction of the Categories.—Granted this third type of unity, presupposing the two prior deliverances which the understanding assimilates, how shall we justify the objective validity of the categories? What is the objective validity of the categories? What right have we to read them into experience, in view of the fact that they are independent of experience, not derived from it? Kant calls attention to the fact that jurists denominate the proof of rights and claims involved in a legal process the *deduction*.⁶ What is required in the case of knowledge is a transcendental deduction in contrast with any attempt to show how a concept can be derived from experience. Kant develops his proof by showing that without these pure concepts it would be impossible to know objects in general, impossible to have experience. Since concepts supply this objective ground which makes experience possible, they are necessary. This necessity is already implied in the

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

fact that in addition to the apprehension of perceptions and their reproduction by the imagination the recognition of our representations in their connection is also essential to knowledge. This recognition involves concepts which make it possible, and concepts imply a general principle which can serve as a rule. The unity necessitated by this process must be the formal unity of our consciousness in its synthesis of the manifold in our representations. We have already seen that necessity is always founded on transcendental conditions. What we are now seeing more clearly is that there is a transcendental ground of the unity of our consciousness, of all concepts, of all objects of experience. This original condition Kant calls the transcendental apperception. Plainly, the unity of self-consciousness here called for could not be the flow of our internal perceptions, for these are empirical, transient, and there is no permanent self in the mere stream. The unity here called for is prior to all data of intuition, is pure, original, unchangeable, a unity of transcendental apperception which makes possible a connection of all representations according to laws. Our own permanent identity is essential to this fundamental activity of the mind in which the different kinds of consciousness are connected in one self-consciousness. The understanding then is the law-giver which makes possible the thinking of nature as a whole, the thinking of the manifold as belonging to *one* object. This dependence of knowledge on ourselves, whereby the understanding prescribes laws to nature, will seem strange indeed unless we remember that the whole which is thus conceived is only a series of phenomena.

Schematism.—Kant now compares the categories with empirical or sensuous impressions. The question is how the categories can be applied to phenomena.⁷ There is need of a third something to mediate between the sense-impressions and the intelligence. This representation is the *transcendental schema*, that is, a formal and pure condition of sensibility, the function of the understanding in this connection being the schematism of the pure under-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

standing. The time-form, as the condition of the manifold in the internal sense, already implies this relation to the sensuous on the one hand, and the *a priori* on the other. We represent our empirical data in succession. Time is the principal *schema*, the form which we chiefly make use of in relating our sense-experiences, when we connect one image with another, for example, in noting a series of events. This representation of the general procedure of the imagination whereby a concept receives its image is what Kant calls the schema of such a concept. Thus we generalize triangles, right-angled or acute, we do not depend on mere images of triangles, as if the images were adequate to the concept. So too space is the pure image of all quantities before the external sense, time that of all objects of the senses in general. Again, there is the schema of a reality as the quantity of something which fills time, of substance as the permanence of the real in time, of causality as a certain succession of the manifold: the schemata as determinations of time apply to all possible objects. The phenomena determine to each other their places in time and render them necessary in the series of time. The principle of the causal relation in the succession of phenomena is valid for all objects of experience, since that principle is the ground of the possibility of such experience.

Things-in-themselves.—We have now provided for the form, the condition, and the succession of the states of every change.⁸ The important consideration to bear in mind all along is that the connections here involved are merely the coherence of phenomena in the pure schema of possible experience: the understanding can never pass beyond the limits of sensibility. We naturally refer our representations to a something outside as the object of our sensibility, for example, the tree whose relations we have been describing. But this something is an *x*.⁹ We can know nothing about it. It is merely a correlate of the unity of apperception. The categories have not extended

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 163, 165, 169.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

our knowledge one whit. The object of our understanding is not an object in itself, but the representation of phenomena under the concept of an object in general. Only in case I free my thought from sensuous intuition and assume the existence of a radically different type of intuition, can I legitimately refer to noumena: but Kant's *Critique* grants us no intuition of this sort, and the only value in assuming a noumenon out of all relation to our sensibility is that this concept is limitative, it keeps sensibility within bounds.

Transcendental Dialectic.—Turning from the understanding as the “faculty of rules” to reason as the “faculty of principles,” it becomes a question of the criticism of ideas and the possibility of error.¹⁰ It is right of course to say that the senses never err, for illusions are errors of judgment. Kant is especially concerned with illusions due to misuse of principles (which reason was never meant to apply beyond experience) regarding that which is *transcendent*, the landmarks of experience having been removed. The principles and maxims of reason seem indeed to be objective principles; hence we readily mistake subjective for objective necessity, neglecting the truth that reason merely contributes another unity. Pure reason refers indeed to objects, but what it actually refers to is the understanding and its judgments. Everything turns then upon the limitations of the understanding, as already established. By an idea Kant means a pure concept originating in the understanding only. It is now a question therefore of transcendental ideas determining the use of the understanding within the whole sphere of experience. By aid of these ideas reason seeks a synthesis of the absolute totality of conditions, seeks the unconditioned. This attempt at transcendence involves the absolute unity of the thinking subject, of the totality of phenomena, and of the condition of all objects, that is, the soul, matter, and God.

Rational Psychology.—The first group of these ideas is psychological, the pretended science is rational psychology. There appears to be a sure basis for this science in the

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

consideration already noted: the "I think" which accompanies all my representations. Here the ego as thinking subject might be regarded as the object of a pure psychology by aid of which many fundamental discoveries can be made concerning the soul. This science would be a deduction from what is present in every act of thought. Kant examines this pretended science, together with doctrines held by Descartes, Wolff, and other philosophers, and undermines it by showing what its paralogsms are and how the mind enters into these illusions or fallacies.

The ego, as the only condition which accompanies all thought, is indeed the central consideration; but Kant shows that this is a formal condition only, the logical unity of every thought: the pure category does not enable me to think the object, but only the unity of the representations requisite in order to determine an object. What we really wish to know of the soul is not forthcoming. This apperception is the ground of the possibility of the categories, as already shown; the self-consciousness is the representation of that which forms the condition of all unity. But from the fact of this accompanying consciousness it does not follow that we know the self: what the ego knows is the categories only, and through these the unity of objects, as objects have already been defined.

From the consciousness of the ego this science undertakes to show, for example, that the soul exists as an immaterial substance, incorruptible; that as intellectual substance, ever identical with itself, it is one personality; and that from these considerations follows the soul's spirituality.¹¹ Furthermore, this science represents this thinking substance as the principle of life in matter and as immortal. Rational psychology, by developing these considerations, seems to be concerned with a richly complex concept, although claiming to be a pure science without empirical elements. But its concept is perfectly empty, what it represents is an *x* (an unknown thing-in-itself); it cannot form the smallest representation of a thinking being. This concept really calls for a sensuous intuition, but there is

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

no such intuition. We are not even able to show that the soul is different from matter in any respect, since we do not know what matter is as such. Our alleged "simple" substance does not enable us to distinguish the soul from matter as *composite*. The idea of the soul as simple admits of no application to any real object: the soul is a substance in *idea* only. The identity of my consciousness from moment to moment is merely the formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence.

Kant is ready to admit the immediacy of perception in ourselves. Thus far Descartes is right. Thus far idealists are right, also. I am conscious of my representations; these exist as well as the ego which thinks them. It is also clear that objects are inferred from the facts of perception. Following up this inference, we once more note that phenomena are referred to something external, as permanent. But we cannot turn about and apply this reasoning in terms of time or the internal sense, for our internal intuition has nothing permanent, makes us aware of the change of determinations only, not of the determinable object. What is given in the internal perception is a continuous *flux*. The permanent ego which we seek is not forthcoming. To be known as what the ego is said to be, it would have to be an intuition, which might supply synthetic propositions. But, as the mere form of consciousness, something else would have to be given in order to represent the ego as an object. Since the ego lacks this content or manifold, the whole undertaking of rational psychology fails at the crucial point, the powers of human reason cannot be transcended.

Yet, although we cannot thus extend our knowledge, rational psychology has a certain negative value. There is no ground left for arguing that materialism is true, on the possible assumption that to take away matter would be to destroy the soul. On the contrary, the real calamity would be to take away the thinking subject; since the whole material world (merely a phenomenon in our sensibility) would then vanish. Kant's analysis has shown

that we mistake the subjective condition of thought for the knowledge of the object, we hypostatize what exists in thought only. Assuming that what is thought is a real object, rational psychology proceeds with its dialectic, which is now exposed, because we know where its fallacies lie. We have no ground for denying the unity, substantiality, spirituality, and immortality of the soul; but neither have we the knowledge requisite for showing how these ideas can be proved. Formerly, the difficulty was in trying to show how matter—consisting of substances totally heterogeneous and different from the object of the internal sense—could be associated with the soul: now, it is a question of connection between the representations of the internal sense and the thinking subject; and we guard against the fallacy of hypostatizing these representations as things existing outside with qualities which they possess inside ourselves. Thus our analysis undermines various types of doctrines founded on an assumed dualism of extended substance and thinking substance, a theory of physical influence, of pre-established harmony, or supernatural assistance in connecting mind and matter. We need not try to decide the question of the beginning of the association of the soul with the body at birth. The concept of substance gives no ground for concluding that the soul continues by itself after death. The fate of the soul remains untouched. The soul may indeed imagine that it knows itself because of its categories, and may try various ventures in pursuit of its theories. But we now know that no empirical predicates are attributable to the thinking subject, and we will not mistake a formal condition for the soul as supposedly known by experience. The result is the same as before: we know phenomena only, in terms of the pure science which shows how experience and knowledge are possible within the restricted field which the *Critique* grants us.

Cosmology.—Reason must also give up its pretensions in regard to the cosmological ideas: these involve a conflict (antinomy) of the laws of pure reason, in its quest

for the unconditioned as the synthesis of the series of conditions which it regressively investigates.¹² Granted present conditions, the whole of past time is regarded as a necessary condition of the given moment. Given the world as the totality of phenomena, reason postulates the absolute completeness of the conditions. To expose the difficulties involved in this regression to the unconditioned, Kant puts the propositions in the form of thesis and antithesis, each with equally valid and necessary grounds for its support. (1) *Thesis*: The world has a beginning in time, and is limited also with regard to space. *Antithesis*: The world has no beginning and limits in space, but is infinite, in respect to both time and space. (2) Every compound substance is divisible into simple parts, incapable of further division: no compound thing consists of simple parts, and there exists nowhere in the world anything simple. (3) In addition to causality according to the laws of nature from which all the phenomena of the world can be deduced, it is necessary to admit another causality, that of freedom: there is no freedom, but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature. (4) There exists an absolutely necessary Being belonging to the world, either as a part of or as a cause of it: there nowhere exists an absolutely necessary Being, either within or without the world, as the cause of it.

The solution of the antinomies lies in the distinction between phenomena and noumena, and the opposition is dialectical. In the first two antinomies, both thesis and antithesis are false. In the other two the thesis is true of the noumenal world, the antithesis of the phenomenal: while phenomena depend on other phenomena, noumena are free; there is no unconditioned cause within the sphere of phenomena, but the unconditioned (or noumenal) exists outside the whole complex of phenomena. The illusion consists in applying the idea of absolute totality (as a condition of noumena) to phenomena, existing in representations only: phenomena in general are nothing outside our representations. Hence we understand why Kant calls

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 328.

the principle of reason a "rule" only. It is not a principle of the possibility of experience or of empirical knowledge. It is not even constitutive, as if we could extend the concept of the world of sense-experience: it is merely a principle of the greatest possible continuation of experience, no empirical limit being absolute. It is indeed regulative, namely, by showing how the empirical regressus is to be carried out, when the invalidity of the supposed constitutive principle has been shown. Many instructive results follow. If, for example, phenomena were things-in-themselves, freedom could not be saved. But, granted causality outside the phenomenal series, its effects are discoverable in that series, amidst empirical conditions. Hence a causality through freedom is possible which harmonizes with the universal law of natural necessity.

Theological Ideas.—We readily conceive of a being of highest reality originally containing in itself the sufficient cause of every possible effect. This argument for the Supreme Being carries special authority because of the need of grounding obligation and practical laws. But this alleged proof of God's existence is merely a conclusion from conception to existence, as if the unconditional necessity of a judgment were the same as the absolute necessity of the thing.¹³ Being is not a real predicate, but merely the admission of Being as given. The argument is therefore mere tautology, an analytical proposition; whereas every proposition involving existence is synthetic. So the ontological argument falls to the ground. The cosmological argument fares no better. From the fact that anything exists it concludes that an absolutely necessary Being exists, and then (falling back on the ontological argument) identifies this Being with God as the most perfect or real Being. While everything contingent must have a cause, this principle is valid for the sense-world only. The utility of this idea does not warrant the assumption that there is an extramundane cause, does not prove that this cause is the absolutely perfect Being. This proof does not then make valid the transition from a regulative to a

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 477.

constitutive principle of reason. The physico-theological argument proceeds from the fitness and harmony of existing things to a sublime and wise cause. This argument arouses respect and quickens conviction. As an argument for purposiveness or design it has genuine value. Yet it is invalid, and depends on the other two arguments for support. It might indeed suggest an architect of the universe, hampered by his material; but does not show that there is a creator, an all-sufficient Being.

Theological arguments fail both in the form of an appeal to an original Being from an experience in general, and as an inference from the constitution, order, and unity of the world. But while the alleged theoretical proofs of God's existence fail, Kant admits the practical argument of moral theology according to which we presuppose or postulate the existence of a Supreme Being. Kant is concerned for the present in laying bare any speculative attempt to prove that God exists, on the ground that such attempts involve a transition from the legitimate or immanent use of the understanding to a transcendental use, for which our understanding is not prepared.

Ideals of Pure Reason.—What remains is the *ideal* of reason, finishing and crowning our thought, an ideal which can neither be proved nor disproved. It is wholly permissible to systematize all our knowledge with respect to the ideals of pure reason, always reminding ourselves that we are merely arranging concepts in their unity. Granted that the universal is given, reason may indeed subsume the particular as determined by it. What is to be guarded against is the hypothetical use of reason, resting on problematical concepts, as if reason were constitutive. Reason has no object beyond its own formal rule in the extension of its empirical use, the development of the idea of unity. Our knowledge, beginning with intuitions, advances to concepts, arranges these in their unity, and ends with the ideals which they imply. This result is, for Kant, very significant; for, having shown that knowledge is limited to phenomena, he expresses his firm conviction that the way is open for faith to fill in the gaps. Scepticism and

dogmatism having been undermined, there is no obstacle to keep us from emerging as practical beings into the world of our reality. The world is for each of us the world of various types of ideas, mathematical, cosmological, teleological. We possess categories by which to think any and all these groups of ideas in the light of their meaning. Reason meanwhile has submitted to uttermost discipline, metaphysical speculation has been consigned to its restricted sphere; and the moral order, with its laws, its central principle or obligation, applies to practice, remains untouched, with moral theology intact. Rational psychology has also been properly curbed. What remains as the central issue is the unity of self-consciousness, now shown to be formal or functional.

Kant's conclusion looks for the moment like Berkeley's idealism. But Kant never doubts that bodies exist outside our perception as real things, independent of our representations, yielding the raw material of our sensibility: he does not undertake to generate this material by reference to an immediate activity upon our spirits. Things are to be conceived in their empirical reality by appeal to transcendental ideality, the forms of space and time. What is lacking is *transcendent* knowledge whereby the mind can as it were leap outside itself and compare things with representations as if Kant's highly elaborate scheme of unities separating us from things-in-themselves were not presupposed. What we actually possess is a *transcendental element* of knowledge showing why we cannot make any such transition.

Ethics.—In his ethics Kant follows the scheme of formal rationalism of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to show how the practical reason is legislative, how the moral law is the purely logical law of action.¹⁴ It is a question of the spontaneous self-activity which yields the moral law, freedom, that is, morality as an act of freedom. Were it a question of prudence as guide to life according to the data of experience, the starting-point would be with con-

¹⁴ *Critique of Practical Reason, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.*

crete life as given: desire, sensibility, a plurality of impulses seeking satisfaction, a general tendency toward pleasure or happiness; in brief, sensibility without reason, without the restraints of will as moral. But so far we would have inclination only, not duty. Here, as in the study of pure reason, the decisive point is the contrast between sensibility and understanding. The inquiry centres about the moral law regarded as *a priori*, without relation to practical guidance or the teachings of experience: law as holding for all rational beings in all circumstances, to be unconditionally obeyed, as the principle of that which *ought to be* in contrast with anything that *is*. The moral law is the norm for all judgments of the will, already implied in the recognition given to moral obligation, in our judgments on the worth of our actions and those of other people, in our awareness of duty in contrast with inclination. In actual moral life there is indeed a union of sensibility and reason, the human will implies a determining form yielding a higher object of desire. But the problem now is, How is the central imperative of morality possible?

Moral Will.—In contrast with the well-known frailties of human nature, the fact that men do not always act as they ought, stands the great truth that man should always act from pure respect for law. All empirical elements having been abstracted, only the will is good in and for itself.¹⁵ Here is the basis of moral consistency, the kingdom of moral ends. Hence the analysis of the will involves the definition of ethics as the science of the laws of freedom, the conditions of that which ought to happen. Without any qualification, the will is identified with character as essentially stable, superior to all inclinations, with reason as its governor, the supreme condition of all other goods. The good will is included in the idea of duty, it is the seat of practical love; it stands between its *a priori* principle and its *a posteriori* spring; is determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty; objectively determined by the law, subjectively by pure respect. As indeterminate in regard to all objects

¹⁵ Abbott's trans. of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, etc., p. 9.

it is the form of volition generally, chooses only that which reason (independent of inclination) recognizes as practically necessary. Hence, as the ground of moral laws, universally legislative, it is autonomous, self-consistent, causal, an end in itself, good in itself. There is no alternative, moral reason is absolute in its own sphere. Thus to make explicit its basis, as law-giver, is to see that the moral law as object of respect is imposed on ourselves.

Hence follows the categorical imperative: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law; so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.¹⁶ This imperative implies (1) conformity to law, (2) the universal prerogative of rational beings as ends in themselves, (3) the truth that the will of every rational being is universally legislative.

Freedom.—Freedom is the same principle otherwise stated. “Inasmuch as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason it is the *keystone* of the whole system of pure reason, even the speculative, and all other concepts (those of God and immortality).”¹⁷ If reason completely and infallibly determined the will, moral conduct would of course be perfect. But Kant reserves room for the imperfect actions of men. The commands of reason are unconditional, and thus far the will has no liberty to choose the opposite. Sin is inconsistency. When righteous, that is, self-consistent, we are free. The ground of our freedom is that of the autonomy of the will, as already indicated. As rational it is a cause; this causality is free, efficient, independent of any power or thing save that it acts according to immutable laws. The freedom of the will is not in any sense the liberty of indifference, for all its acts are significant. Nor is it free in the sense of mere chance or caprice, since its acts are part of a closely knit system, the kingdom of ends: it determines the causality of rational beings by the con-

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 38, 47.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

ception of rules.¹⁸ If the will were incapable of any maxim conflicting with the moral law it would be definable as "holy." As subject to pathological affections it is "elective." Its autonomy being the sole principle of all moral laws, the heteronomy of the elective will is opposed to the morality of the will. By virtue of its freedom the will appertains to a sphere wholly different from will regarded empirically, its freedom is that of the intelligible world.

We come then to recognize that we belong not only to the sensible world (of phenomena) but to the intelligible world (of noumena). Our inner states as phenomena are conditioned, caused by any number of forces and tendencies. But as rational beings we are free from these, able to give a law unto ourselves. This recognition gives us a feeling of respect for the law which is inspired by the law itself: with this respect comes our sense of duty. We cannot indeed explain how and why we are free, in this our legislative power, our causal efficiency in the noumenal world. We start with freedom as basic, as the "sole fact of the pure reason" thereby announcing itself as originally legislative. But we are nevertheless sure that our freedom does not rest on empirical principles. Freedom, in brief, is a practical postulate, not to be further explained; to undertake to push the explanation farther back would be to discover that reason has limits beyond which we cannot pass. Foregoing the attempt to explain the "inscrutable," our thought begins with the possibility of a supersensible system of nature, with the concept of freedom as the regulative principle of reason.

The Moral Self.—To accept the determination of the will by the moral law is to reject all sensible impulses, to check any that might be opposed to the law. An active attitude with respect to our impulses is therefore essential. The elective will is *affected* (not wholly determined) by impulses: hence it can be determined to actions by the pure will.¹⁹

Thus Kant says that man wills his own happiness, al-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

though such volition is to be distinguished from what is done from duty. Kant leaves room too for cultivation of the will (*Wille*, moral disposition), but up to the point only where begins the purest disposition, in which the moral law is also the spring of dutiful actions. For Kant it is the legislative will which produces moral feeling, in contrast with the "moral sense" of English ethics. He also allows room for individual judgment and moral progress, as well as for subject-matter for the elective will. While laws proceed from the legislative or rational will, maxims are due to the elective.

Freedom, as made known by the moral law, is in a sense negative, that is, we are not *constrained* to action by any sensible motives. This being understood, it is permissible to say that every action which is intentionally performed springs from choice. Its free causality expresses its character in its manifestations. These, on account of the uniformity of conduct, exhibit a natural connection. This does not however make the vicious quality of the will necessary. Man is responsible for actions due to the evil in him. As a "creature" man is never quite free from desires and inclinations, resting on physical causes, never of themselves coinciding with the moral law. To compare one's self with the moral law is indeed to be humbled. Self-love is a powerful factor in our make-up. We *ought* to check and control our propensities, but do not necessarily do so.

The Postulates of Faith.—The conception of God as the supreme good follows from the *idea* of moral perfection which reason frames *a priori*.²⁰ We have no intuition of the divine perfection. Moral consistency demands the conception of God and immortality as conditions of the practical use of our pure reason, conditions of the application of the morally determined will. God does not impose the moral law upon us, although he binds us *a priori* and unconditionally. We may however say that the law proceeds from the will of a Supreme Law-giver, as one who has only rights and no duties. God may be thought of

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 220, foll.

as the cause of nature, and we may say that we have actual knowledge of the supersensible world. But this knowledge is merely for practical purposes, and does not extend to our theoretical knowledge. Hence Kant does not venture to erect a theology, but remains within the sphere of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. He permits us to say the intelligible world is the kingdom of God, but this is the kingdom of ends implied in the categorical imperative as the supreme principle of conduct. No doubt too God is the supreme good. But we are directly concerned with good as virtue, with freedom as an ideal of reason needed for practical purposes: lacking the knowledge which we might like to attain, we possess the Reason which proposes the laws, makes all the postulates. As for the rest, experience can alone decide what conforms to the feeling of pleasure, feeling being always empirical. Possessing the form of volition, indeterminate as regards all objects, it is for us to supply the content, discover the natural goods, including those which make for the happiness of others. Kant assigns a very high place to love and connects his doctrine with Christianity. The *summum bonum* may be the whole object of our practical reason. In fact Christianity supplies an indispensable element of the greatest good by representing a world in which rational beings devote themselves with all their soul to the moral law as a kingdom of God.

Morality and Religion.—Kant opens the door into the world of religion at the point where the moral law needs its spiritual incentive: religion recognizes all duties as divine commands (not as sanctions or arbitrary ordinances of a foreign will), as essential laws of every free will in itself. Only through harmony with a morally perfect and all-powerful will can we hope to attain the *summum bonum* disclosed by the moral law as our duty. The chief considerations turn then upon the postulates of practical reason—God, freedom, immortality—as necessary implications of the moral law. Religion follows from morality, not morality from religion. Morality demands a fulfilment of conditions without which a complete realization of its ideal

is impossible, hence immortality becomes a postulate of faith, while the existence of God is required as the power underlying the harmony of the two worlds, the natural and the intelligible. The *symbolical* value of religious ideas survives all criticism, whatever the shortcomings of theoretical reason. From the standpoint of ethical values Kant thus interprets positive religion.²¹

Critique of Judgment.—The third *Critique* is devoted to a field of inquiry into the forms and principles of aesthetic feeling, a field which lies between the true and the good, between pure and practical reason. The term judgment corresponds to the feeling of pleasure and pain, as a faculty between understanding and will. This term is also used because it is the faculty by which the particular is conceived under the universal. The judging faculty subsumes the particular under the rule, principle, or law, as *given*; it is then known as “determinative.” But when the particular is given and the universal must be *found*, it is “reflective.”²² The reflective judgment is either aesthetic or teleological. It requires a principle it cannot borrow from experience to establish the unity of all experience, a principle which the judgment must give as a law from and to itself. In respect to the form of things in nature under empirical laws this principle is the purposiveness of nature. Susceptibility to pleasure from reflection upon the forms of things indicates this purposiveness of the objects in relation to the reflective judgment. Natural beauty may be regarded as the presentation of the concept of formal purposiveness, and natural purposiveness as the presentation of the concept of a real or objective purposiveness. The former implies a theory of taste, the latter a teleology of nature.

Taste, as the faculty of judgment, is essentially subjective, is aided by the imagination in making its product, beauty. The beautiful pleases, produces satisfaction in the percipient subject, is in quality disinterested. This satisfaction in quantity, is universal, the beautiful pleases all.

²¹ *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, 1793.

²² *Kritik of Judgment*, tr. by Bernard, 1892, p. 17.

It also pleases without a concept (relation), the object is beautiful without any accompanying conception of an end: we enjoy the beauty of a flower without presupposing what its beauty ought to be. The object pleases necessarily (modality), not in a theoretical or objective way, but as exemplary; the aesthetic sense, in free play, yields an ideal norm. Thus a beautiful picture may be said to set the standard for others to follow. The beautiful, in brief, is that which "apart from concepts is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction."²³

While the beautiful in nature is connected with the form of the object, the sublime is found in a formless object, in boundlessness. Beauty charms, gives play to the imagination, tranquillizes, gives a sense of harmony; the sublime arouses admiration or respect, instead of yielding a positive pleasure, and may seem to violate a purpose, and even the imagination. Some objects in nature are called sublime which we would not think of calling beautiful. Thus we call that object sublime which is great beyond all comparison, which surpasses every standard of taste, implies the infinite or the absolutely great. Thus nature is sublime in those phenomena which suggest the idea of infinity. The sublime may bring a feeling of pain, it moves us, makes us aware of an incapacity, as in our efforts to conceive of an absolute totality. So nature stands for might, is dynamically sublime. An object arousing fear, like bold overhanging rocks, may be the more sublime the more fearful it is. So in general the sublime in nature may suggest to us the unattainability of nature in our efforts to make a complete presentation by means of ideas. We readily pass from a mental disposition to a moral one, realizing that it is the moral law which exercises full might over us, in unconditional satisfaction. Enthusiasm is sublime, because, enabling men to achieve what is great, it is a tension of forces produced by ideas, gives an impulse which operates powerfully and lastingly. Beauty is the symbol of the morally good. Although there is no science of the beautiful, only a critique of it, we are assured that the

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

development of moral ideas and the culture of moral feeling is the true preparation for the foundation of taste.

Purpose.—The question of purposiveness in nature is especially significant for the critical philosophy. There is good ground for assuming subjective purpose in nature, with reference to human judgment and the connection of experiences in a system, but we have no ground for a universal idea of nature as a totality of things serving one another as means to purposes.²⁴ We cannot prove our idea of a particular kind of causality. Nature as a mechanism may operate in a very different way. But the idea of purpose in nature gives us an additional approach, we may utilize analogy if we do not pretend to explain what we thus interpret, as if a regulative idea of reason were constitutive. It is permissible to regard nature *as if* a sublime purpose were everywhere exemplified. Indeed, there is very great value in the idea of purposiveness in an organism in which there is adjustment of parts to the whole, with effective causes judged to be final. Thus a given object of nature may be regarded as an organized product in which every part is reciprocally purpose and means. Advancing to a consideration of nature as a whole, we may envisage it as a system of purposes on this principle. Thus teleology becomes the internal principle of natural science. Fallacies begin to enter our thought however if, undertaking to explain this universal purposiveness by appeal to the idea of God, we forthwith try to prove that God exists. A natural purpose is explicable. The concept of an objective purposiveness is a critical principle of reason for the reflective judgment. In the actual processes of the physical world we cannot determine how far the mechanism of nature is a means toward each final design in nature. Physico-theology can disclose no final purpose in creation. In man as a moral being we recognize the supreme purpose in creation, and so moral theology supplies what is lacking in physical theology. That is, as an *a priori* principle of reason the idea of an intelligent cause as a final purpose is justifiable: we may assume

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

a moral World-Cause required by the moral law. The idea has subjective practical reality.²⁵ And we are determined by moral reason within us to promote in every possible way the greatest welfare of rational beings. Our moral teleology passes into our moral theology with the conviction that God, as the supreme moral Being, is the author of the world. Carefully limiting his proof in this way, Kant reaches the conclusion with which his ethical treatises culminate. There is no theoretical proof of God's existence, of the existence of the soul as an immortal spirit. Nor can we even determine the content of the supersensible world: what remains is a concept of a non-sensible something containing the ultimate ground of the sense-world. But we have practical faith producing belief, with emphasis on freedom (rather than God and immortality) as the only concept of the supersensible proving objectively real in nature by means of effects wrought in our conduct. We are left without any idea of the way in which moral and natural causality are combined.

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²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

§ 18. SUCCESSORS OF KANT

Kant's influence was manifold and widespread in directions which can barely be indicated here. With him began an era of criticism which, concerned at first with the theories of knowledge and being, eventually affected the special sciences, literature, religious belief, theology, all ideas pertaining to revelation and a supersensible world. Apparently, by restricting speculative knowledge to a sharply defined sphere, Kant made room for faith; certainly he retained his own convictions with an enthusiasm for the moral law which won for him the greatest respect. No one has more vigorously defended the moral integrity of man, the power of the good will, the supremacy of universalizing conviction. Yet Kant directed such persistent scrutiny to the sources of knowledge and experience that the issues centered about pure reason, with its *a priori* principles, rather than about practical reason, with its ethical postulates. Since these issues involved the transcendental deduction of the categories, the analysis of the knowing self became a central interest. Granted that in studying the conditions of knowledge and experience we are learning nothing whatever about realities supposedly existing beyond the self, one still meets difficulties when trying to forego all ultimate inquiries. Constructive thinkers will still endeavor to find some way out of the intricacies of Kant's analysis, to discover a way to bring into synthesis his three critiques.

Kantian Problems.—Kant's results were dualistic. There was the dualism of the intelligible and phenomenal worlds, the relation of freedom (teleology) and mechanism, especially the dualism of things-in-themselves and the world of the ego. Plainly, there is some immutable or invariant reality behind the various unities and pluralities of knowledge and experience. Is a monism of substance called for, with a return to Spinoza, or a monism of the Absolute Ego? What is to be said concerning causality, now that it no longer ranks with time and space? Is a

constructive idealism of the will possible, or shall thought content itself with the description and purely relative explanation of phenomena?

There were difficulties enough for the moment in the mere effort to understand the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and scarcely a reader satisfied Kant. Conservative opposition naturally came from the ranks of the Wolffian school. Other critics took their stand upon empiricism, in favor of feeling and the living connections of experience, where Kant had introduced formal distinctions. To some readers Kant seemed to be essentially a Prussian Hume. Garve saw in Kant an idealist of Berkeley's type, despite what Kant had said in the *Critique*, a protest which he made the more vigorous in the *Prolegomena*, in which he referred to the "mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against which and other similar phantasms our *Critique* contains the proper antidote."¹

Meanwhile, Kant's doctrine became very much the vogue, and presently it was taught in all the universities. Hufeland and Schütz established a periodical as the special organ of the critical philosophy.² The attitude towards the *Critique* is shown in a minor way by the objections of opponents and the comments of followers. In a constructive way this attitude is indicated at length in the systems of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, also in the doctrines of later idealists.

Although Kant appealed to moral insight and made room for faith, this type of faith did not always bring satisfaction. For example, G. Hamann (1730-1788), a devout believer in the integrity of religious experience and in the inner life as a whole, opposed Kant on the ground that his criticism attributed independence to reason in contrast with faith and experience, exalted pure thought as an abstraction, introduced manifold separations into that which is vital and undivided in spiritual reality.

Herder.—We have already noted Herder's significance,

¹ Open Court ed., p. 49.

² *Die Jenaer Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung*, 1785.

in part, in the age of Lessing.³ Herder attended Kant's lectures in his youth and was deeply influenced by Kant's early doctrines. He adopted an independent position in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*.⁴ From the point of view of the organic forces of nature and the active forces of human thought, there are different degrees and stages of development throughout history. The individual possesses the opportunities for development and happiness made possible by the given stage, involving an interaction between individuals and the race. Humanity is a product of this interconnection between individuals and the generations. The philosophy of history makes explicit this interaction, with its ideal forces. Man, receiving from and giving to this great whole, acquires reason through tradition, speech, social influences in general; hence reason is a product, and religion, as a form of spiritual culture, is prior to abstract thought. Man is organically related to humanity, to education, the successive stages of history; he is highly dependent, and develops toward ends which are also ends for the race. Since reason is a product, it cannot develop all things out of itself. By contrast to the abstractions of reason, our thought returns to the ages when poetry, philosophy, and religion were still one, when all man's powers functioned together. To draw sharp distinctions between mind and matter, consciousness and the unconscious, the individual and society, God and the world, is to depart from the values of this insight.

Thus Herder's thought tended toward sympathy with Spinoza as the most logical of philosophers, the thinker whose mysticism is genuine. The result was a break with the Kantian doctrine in favor of a philosophy in which ideas borrowed from Leibniz were commingled with those taken over from Spinoza.⁵ Herder expressed his sympathy with Spinoza in his work entitled *Gott*, 1787; and in his *Metakritik*, 1799, put forth his criticism of Kant. He ob-

³ See Sec. 15.

⁴ 1784-1791; tr. by T. Churchill, London, 1800 (*Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*).

⁵ Cf. Höffding, *His. of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. II, p. 116.

jected to the distinction between mental faculties, in contrast with the unity of the inner life, and gave prominence to the living reality which he had treated organically in his conception of history.

Jacobi.—Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) was a prominent figure in the group of literary men which included Lessing, Hamann, and Goethe, notably in his controversies with Herder and Lessing over Spinoza. Jacobi had already pleaded for the heart, in his novels, as the faculty which intuitively lets man know what the good is. He attributed virtue to a fundamental instinct of human nature, hence he found the basis of morals in an immediate certainty. Jacobi did not then undertake to propound a system, but rather to pour forth in full vigor what came out of the depths of inner experience. He stimulated controversy by his *Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza*, 1785, addressed to Moses Mendelssohn, in which he related his conversation with Lessing, in opposition to the views of Herder and Goethe. Although Spinoza's doctrine appeared to be the only consistent philosophy, it seemed to Jacobi to conflict with the demands of the human spirit. Nor could Jacobi assent to the limitations assigned by Kant to theoretical knowledge. Kant had relegated the law of cause and effect to phenomena, and yet had attributed to things-in-themselves the sources of the material of sensation. Here the *Critique* is inconsistent. Kant's moral doctrine falls short because of its empty formalism, its neglect of the immediacies of moral feeling. For Jacobi there is an immediate certainty of the existence of a supersensible world, a certainty which yields quickening faith.

Jacobi's literary activity had much to do with determining the direction taken by followers of Kant who objected to Kant's rationalism, and found obstacles in the doctrine of things-in-themselves. The result indicated by his works was that the *Critique* leads to subjective idealism as the philosophy which it implies. Hence while Spinoza at one time seemed to him the most logical of philosophers he later gave this distinction to Fichte as the "Messiah of speculation." But all logical systems fail, every system

falls short of the unconditioned, the immediate, or free principle. No system attains God, the realities of the heart. There is no proof of the existence of any reality beyond consciousness: even sense-perception is to be accepted as a given fact. The starting-point of philosophy as a whole is intuition, faith, or feeling. This is especially true with regard to the thought of God as the creator of all things, the source of values; God is unknown by mere thought, although vividly real for our faith. So too our own selfhood is immediately revealed, as are the beautiful, the true, and the good. Thus the primacy of faith or intuition becomes for Jacobi the basis of a philosophy of feeling which makes him the type in this field, the most persuasive leader of thought in pleading for the rights of feeling in contrast with those of the understanding. Idealism as such might still imply scepticism, rationalism might lead to fatalism or even atheism: feeling, with its implied spiritual sense, discloses that which the understanding can neither prove nor disprove. God, freedom, immortality, as inner certainties, imply a God who is much more than the moral order of Fichte's philosophy; hence Jacobi accepts Christian theism. The difficulties of Jacobi's position are those of anyone who puts a more or less wavering faith in terms of feeling and an all-encompassing intuition.

Fries.—Jacob Fries (1773–1843) set aside Kant's method in favor of an empirical psychology as the basis of the criticism of reason, and combined the teachings of Kant and Jacobi by systematizing Jacobi's ideas of the immediate certainties of faith. Hence for him the sensible became the object of knowledge, the supersensible the object of faith; self-observation discloses in our own consciousness that which Kant tried to establish *a priori*. The view that Kant leaves us with scepticism, instead of doing away with it, was maintained by Schulze in his *Ænesidemus*, 1792. Eberhard represented the dogmatic Wolffian opposition to Kant. Beck rejected the things-in-themselves. Bardili proposed a rational realism which anticipated later speculation.

Schiller.—Krug (1770–1842), who succeeded Kant at

Königsberg, in 1805, popularized the critical philosophy in a number of works, and formulated a conception of being and knowledge in terms of an *a priori* synthesis. Bouterwek (1766–1828), professor at Göttingen, is chiefly known for his *Asthetik*, 1806. Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), sometimes called the most gifted of all Kantians, although essentially a poet, early became interested in English moral philosophy, in Rousseau, and the optimism of Leibniz. Later, he turned to Kant's philosophy, and, in 1791, began a thorough study of Kant's greater works. In his *Grace and Dignity*, 1793, Schiller gave prominence to moral grace as the harmony between mind and nature, duty and inclination; moral dignity is the elevation of the mind above nature. In the beautiful soul it is the whole character rather than individual actions, that is moral. Schiller discloses the problems of culture in his famous *Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man*, 1793–1795, in which the first place is assigned to aesthetic culture. Art is eventually to conquer nature through the best influences, by means of aesthetic education, by appeal to symbols of goodness, and the free play of man's higher powers. The aesthetic whole, lifting the soul above mere time, is the condition of the freest development of all our powers.

Reinhold.—K. L. Reinhold (1758–1823) became an enthusiastic disciple of Kant, and in his *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, 1786, gave the critical philosophy a popular expression which made it much more widely known. Reinhold became professor of philosophy at Jena, in 1787, while the university was the centre of the philosophical movement. In his *Attempt at a New Theory of Human Understanding*, 1789, Reinhold sought to reduce Kant's philosophy to its ultimate presupposition on the assumption that philosophy becomes a true science only when its doctrines are reduced to a single principle. This principle from which the *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements of knowledge are derived is the faculty of representation or principle of consciousness. Every idea is related to the subject and object, as form and matter; hence the unity

and activity of consciousness affords the central clue. Here Reinhold anticipates Fichte.

Maimon.—Salomon Maimon (1754–1800), a Lithuanian Jew who educated himself in philosophy by the study of Wolff, Spinoza and Locke, made an independent criticism of Kant's *Critique* in a work entitled *Essay on the Transcendental Philosophy*, 1790, which was highly praised by Kant. Maimon maintained that as the forms of knowledge can only be discovered by experience neither their necessity nor their completeness can be shown; and that the distinction between matter and form is only relative. In contrast with Reinhold, Maimon held that it is impossible to establish a single principle for all philosophy. The given world exhibits temporal relations only, not necessary transitions. The categories cannot then be applied to things objectively. Our objectively valid rational knowledge is limited to pure mathematics. Hume has not then been refuted. Experience stands for a mere relation of actual continuity between perceived phenomena, not for necessary relation. For Maimon the thing-in-itself disappears, since an object can only exist in and for consciousness, and it cannot be demonstrated that the given is due to existences unlike our knowledge. The result for Maimon is the study of phenomena in their interconnection.

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§ 19. POST-KANTIAN IDEALISM. FICHTE

Several factors combine to make Fichte's philosophy particularly interesting. Coming into prominence while the critical philosophy was beginning to exert its great influence, Fichte was the first to undertake the extension

and reform of the Kantian doctrine. His active career coincides with a period of far-reaching changes in the German nation, changes in which Fichte played an important part. Again, the relationship between temperament, personal history, eccentricities of character, and philosophy has rarely if ever been more clearly shown. Ardent, impetuous, frequently at odds with the authorities and his friends, Fichte passed through many vicissitudes, quarrels, and controversies. Yet this same ardor, from another point of view, animated the patriotism, the efforts toward reform in the state and education which made him one of the great moral leaders of his day. His many mistakes were the faults of genius, the excesses of one who is the ideal representative of a type.

Life.—Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) was born at Rammenau in Saxon Lusatia. He attended school at Meissen and Schulpforta, studied theology at Jena and Leipzig, then won his livelihood as private tutor until he found his vocation as philosopher when he became profoundly interested in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Fichte visited Königsberg in 1791, and through Kant's influence secured publication for his first book, *An Essay towards a Critique of all Revelation*, published in 1792. Fichte applied the critical principles to the investigation of the possibility of a revelation, on the ground that an analysis of the conditions of possibility determines the form and content of the revelation. He reached the conclusion that if revelation be possible its contents must coincide with those of the moral law, the emphasis being on the requirements of the practical reason. Because the author's name was by some chance omitted, the book was attributed to Kant, and when Kant made known the real authorship, Fichte's fame was established and his career marked out for him. In 1794 Fichte became professor of philosophy at Jena, then the centre of liberal thought and culture in Germany, and at once rose into prominence as the leader of the new idealism, and as a valiant defender of the rights of man. Fichte's philosophy was in the ascendency from 1794 to 1799. In this period belong the *Science of Knowl-*

edge, *Natural Right*, and his *Science of Ethics*. With his increasing fame as professor and orator Fichte won many friends, also made vigorous enemies. His characteristic motive was to establish his philosophy as a vitalizing system in practical life. But he was restless and impetuous in disposition, relentless and critical, inclined to quarrel. The result of a controversy over freedom in academic teaching and of equivocal statements concerning God as somehow identical with the moral order, was a public accusation of atheism, and his departure from Jena, in 1799. Because of this accusation, Kant disclaimed all connection with Fichte's philosophy. Fichte moved to Berlin, where he won new friends, engaged in fresh controversies, and eventually quarrelled with Schelling, Reinhold, Nicolai, and others who were prominent during the romantic period. Beginning in 1805, Fichte also lectured in Erlangen. To this period belong his lectures *On the Nature of the Scholar*, *On the Characteristics of the Present Age*, and the *Way towards the Blessed Life*. These lectures expressed the central idea of Fichte's system, that the world of experience is the expression of the divine Idea. After the battle of Jena, Fichte gave more attention to the need of a new system of education, and in 1807-1808 delivered in Berlin his famous *Addresses to the German Nation*, in which he made a strong appeal for patriotism. Basing his plea for a united Germany on an analysis of the German spirit interpreted as urgently needing moral regeneration, Fichte emphasized the possibility of a noble moral life for the individual as citizen of a pure and rational state. His influence was a leading factor in the uprising against Napoleon. In 1809, Fichte became professor of philosophy in the newly organized university of Berlin, where he continued to lecture until his death, in 1814.

Characteristics.—Fichte combined moral strength and eloquence in the inculcation of the national and ethical ideal, for which he was best known in Germany, with an obstinacy regarding his own opinions which made all social adjustments difficult for him and involved him in many mistakes. This inner self-dependence meant an incapacity

for appreciating human experience and a negative attitude towards nature, as if all science could be constructed from within. Hence the extreme emphasis on the postulates of the ego, and the obscurity of his system, save so far as it led to practical results in his popular works and lectures, such as *The Vocation of Man*, 1800. The many vicissitudes of his life tended to strengthen the particular trend of his thought, notably the opposition due to his alleged atheism. As an enthusiastic, vigorous and courageous moral idealist, he took his clues as much from his own moral character as from any intellectual problem. Hence the esteem with which he was held by those who would have been unable to follow the subtleties of his *Science of Knowledge*.

Idealism and the Ego.—Fichte has been called a subjective idealist, the best representative of his type. If this characterization seems to mean absorption in one's own states, as if nothing existed beyond personal ideas and one's own finite self-consciousness, it is highly misleading. Fichte's doctrine is subjective in the sense that the whole content of his philosophy is developed by analysis of self-consciousness in contrast with the assumption of a material world, or a primal substance from which all things are generated. Fichte maintains that it is impossible to deduce knowledge, thought, the ego, and the moral world from a material world: such a standpoint would be dogmatic. But to begin with the ego, which already possesses knowledge, thought, self-consciousness, is to find that it also possesses very much more; it is indeed already one with the moral world whose activity is to be understood in the light of the will, in terms of productive consequences, with respect to an entire sphere of creative life. Idealism makes the ego, with its activity and thought, with the rich implications of self-consciousness, its starting-point, then shows how experience is related to the self, how knowledge as science is involved in the ego. This does not mean postulating a world merely because of ideas. The ego contains nothing formulated as "idea" which is not postulated by its activity. The ego possesses a world which

you and I, as thinking beings variously endowed, with moral ideals which we hope to realize, can verify by taking up the Fichtean point of view and endeavoring to see how Fichte comes by it.

Instead then of beginning with critical metaphysical issues and eventually considering the moral ego with its postulates in terms of Kant's hard-won primacy of practical reason, Fichte strikes boldly into the heart of the moral cosmos and finds it identical with the metaphysical world-order. He does not first consider pure reason, in order to show what principles are *a priori*; for the ego already is the unity of pure and practical reason; God and freedom are already fundamental. Nor is Fichte constrained to postulate things-in-themselves to make sure that his world possesses all needed content. His philosophical undertaking is simplified by an ethical monism which implicitly possesses his world, a world which is to disclose the freedom of self-activity before it shall be taken to be mere "nature," with its engaging moral issues in the actual Germany of Fichte's time. The theory of knowledge and of being (reality), and the idea of the good are so intimately one that the difficulty we encounter in following Fichte's philosophy lies in its intricacy, in contrast with its reputed subjectivity.

Fichte's exposition repeatedly begins with the well-known "I think" of Kant's deduction, only to return and start anew, each time in the development of a different aspect of self-consciousness, now regarded by reference to duty, now as activity, again by appeal to freedom, to being, truth, and to ideals not yet realized. This intricacy is due to the fact that for Fichte there is but one science where two or more are ordinarily looked for, namely, the science of the ego, which, by creating, by actively seeking its goals, also produces its facts, its truths, its world. It is also difficult at first to make out whose ego is in question—mine in my finitude or the Absolute Ego with which I am somehow one. Yet the extreme subjectivity of one moment of thought proves to be the universality of another moment.

Again, Fichte is frank in admitting that a man's philosophy depends on his character. Nothing could be more natural than to endeavor to give a reflective account of one's own active character. To have accepted mere things, the world, dogmatically, would have been to deny that character. Fichte starts then with full recognition of the subjective factors which might at first seem to interfere with the philosophical enterprise. He begins with the activity of the self, and shows that this is discoverable by contrast with the not-self. He does not mean that we are directly conscious of our volitions and activities, but that our ideas and their contrast imply these. Direct consciousness reveals the products but not the activity as such. Our free, unconstrained activity, transcending as it does the contrasts of subject and object, must be apprehended through a higher type of awareness, by intellectual intuition. Our concepts imply antitheses. Activity in the sense of will is above these contrasts. The self in an empirical sense then is on a lower level, beset by limitations, in contrast with objects.

The Dialectical Method.—The self is implied in all our thinking. We cannot think without thinking the ego. To think the ego means for Fichte to *posit* one's self, to be a subjective-object, a representing subject and a represented object. The self as thus postulated is logically prior to the world as ordinarily known. By the aid of this principle Fichte makes explicit the latent idealism of Kant and overcomes Kant's dualism. His procedure implies the dialectical method, which he is the first to define as the universal philosophical method, with explicit reference to the self as the central principle of philosophy.¹ The self as starting-point involves whatever I know, acknowledge, experience. This original act of the self, made explicit, involves the three stages or moments of the dialectic: (1) the ego posits itself (states its existence as the act by which it takes possession of itself creatively, with no ego presupposed as prior); (2) a non-ego is opposed to the ego; the ego is negated; (3) the ego and non-ego

¹ See Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, p. 96, foll.

are recognized in reciprocal limitation, as the outcome of this movement from thesis to antithesis and synthesis.

Reflectively understood, the contents which are in and of the self are implied in my first assertion, I posit this (the thesis of the ego, involving the antithesis of the non-ego, then the synthesis of the two). In other terms, I affirm myself as a subject, but this affirmation implies contrast with an object. Hence I posit facts which I as subject seem rather to have found, and so I know myself as limited by an opposite, as if my object were not mine. Yet the dialectic discloses to me the profound truth that I can know nothing which the self does not define, determine, posit as the self's own object; howbeit I treat my world as somehow not myself, frankly admitting that the self posits both itself and a not-self, thereby defining its own object.

The Science of Knowledge.—What I need is an ethical conception of the self by which I may live a life of action, in this life of action winning my own full self-expression. For I cannot start with a something which the self reacts upon as a world of disparate things without assuming a world of things-in-themselves, and for Fichte there are no such things. Instead, I must postulate this which the self reacts upon as generated from a fundamental principle, I must *begin* with this principle as incapable of proof yet as the basis of certainty, certain in and through itself: as the ground of all that is known, its contents presuppose its form. There is indeed a system of knowledge presupposed in our ordinary thinking. The system implies the certainty. The realization of the attempt to make it explicit as already indicated shows that the principle exists, that a science of knowledge is possible. This is a science *of* something, not the mere knowledge or the mere something. This its positive character is already implied in the above exposition, namely, the self (and its activities) is already prior. The self already exists as *active*. The science begins to become explicit with the propositions which thus show what was involved in these acts of the self. In the science of knowledge the self is indeed

represented among other objects, but the self is more than this. Thinking is not the essence of the self, but only one of its activities. In an absolute sense the ego is the totality of all reality, the source of all reality, that is, all activity. The chief consideration at the outset is that although the ego opposes an objective to its own subjectivity it also unites both. Whatever the ego seems to find is already implied in it and should therefore be postulated. This original fundamental postulating activity Fichte calls the deed-act, as the basis of all consciousness: positing itself as limited by a non-ego, the self functions cognitively; positing itself as determining the non-ego, the self functions volitionally. In positing itself the ego takes possession of itself, creates itself; it advances to the second stage by opposing the non-ego to itself; in the third stage ego and non-ego are seen reciprocally limiting each other, in a synthesis already implied in the beginning.

Ego and Non-Ego.—The assumed "external something" posited for the ego makes this doctrine difficult to follow until we note that we could not think the process known as representation save on the presupposition that the hitherto undetermined and infinite activity of the ego *receives a check*. Hence the tendency of the ego is first posited as impulse, then the counter tendency of the non-ego is posited as check, and the significance of the third stage of the dialectic is seen. Unless the ego felt itself yearning, it would not feel itself limited. In this its yearning it goes beyond itself, posits something which shall be external, an external world revealing itself in the ego. Sensation, for example, is the finding of a foreign "other" as a cancelled or repressed activity of the ego; and since this relating of a foreign something in itself to itself occurs in the ego, the ego must posit it originally in itself. The sensation seems indeed to be given as if merely due to an external influence. Hence the ego seems limited by an external world. But, granted pure self-consciousness, the ego discovers that in postulating itself as limited the ego has only limited itself.²

² Cf. Falckenberg, *His. of Mod. Phil.*, p. 432.

According to Fichte then philosophy teaches us to look for everything in the ego: from man alone does regularity proceed and extend around to the boundaries of perception.³ It is impossible by mere thinking to produce an object valid for life and for the physical sciences. Nothing is to pass for real that is not grounded in the immediacy of experience, in *life* as object; life is higher than cognition, which merely looks on.⁴ No object possesses independent reality save so far as it refers to the practical capacity of the ego. Hence Fichte can give no explanation of the existence of the world of non-egos except to say that we are intended to act. For the moral law is prior to all and conditions all that we know, the world being merely the stuff or opportunity for moral action. The real world therefore is the sphere of conscious activity, spiritual relationships, society, friendships, love, national existence; matter is recognizable only as mere stuff needed to embody moral work, it is "a mere condition of our common tasks."⁵ If I did not thus recognize something beyond myself, I should have nothing to do, nothing to resist, fight for, win, or love. The world then is just so large as my own spiritual activity makes it, as Fichte made his Germany by arousing his compatriots to great opportunities, in resistance to Napoleon.

The Significance of Self-consciousness.—Implied in this account of the self is a distinction between the ego as ideal and the ego as empirical. Naturally enough, the empirical ego experiences an impulse to transform objects into a means for its own pleasure, for activity appears at first in pursuit of a finite object. But no finite object can satisfy the ego, consciousness forever strives to transcend the given; the highest moral obligation involves realization of the pure ego; each act in man's self-development belongs to a series which leads to spiritual liberty. Radical evil is due to the indolence which holds fast to existing conditions and resists progress; it leads to cowardice and

³ *Science of Knowledge*, trans., p. 331.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 351.

⁵ Royce, *The Spirit of Mod. Phil.*, p. 152.

treachery; the tendency toward liberty arises when men who combine natural impulse with liberty attain equilibrium. Hence moral leaders become types, winning spontaneous respect and admiration, an idea which Fichte enforced in his famous addresses as the basis of national education. To attain such self-consciousness is very far from being centered in one's self; for when I reflect upon my own inner activity I find it to be essentially a longing for a universal life. My true self needs an eternal world to complete its expression. Each of us as finite is at best only a partial expression of the moral law, only a partial expression of the Absolute Ego. Thus it is that all experience is an appeal of my momentary to my own deeper self.⁶

The Moral Ideal.—Each of us then makes Fichte's absolute starting-point, there is an element in his thought which each must discover for himself as an element of faith or resolve. There is an "absolute tendency to the Absolute" which starts within each of us. Granted that each has found this self-activity, Fichte endeavors to show each man how to think it as the principle of all idealism. Then one aspect of the situation leads to another. Freedom, for example, does not follow from the law, nor the law from freedom: one is from the other, freedom being an immediate discovery of our selfhood. So too we find reason determining our activity. But in finding my "nature" I do not find all nature; since there is nature outside of me, and this external nature is posited for the sake of explaining my own nature, and not even nature as an organic whole exists "by itself." Again, I recognize that my moral nature should be realized in concrete deeds. This practical demand is for Fichte so emphatic that he believes each moment discloses something corresponding to our moral destination, some deed we ought to do. For him the moral impulse always has particular content. Fichte calls attention to the fact that we feel impelled to do this or that, that we reproach ourselves if the deed is left undone. There are no indifferent acts. Conscience

⁶ Cf. Royce, *Spirit of Mod. Phil.*, p. 157.

is our immediate awareness of the fact that at each moment there is something we *ought* to be doing. Thus the ego looks forward to that which is not but which *ought* to be.

Fichte's Results.—So too in his critique of all revelation Fichte shows how revelation could come to appeal to us through its moral excellence. The historical revelation anticipates what our own spirit would in time reveal as the ethical ideal. From this result it follows that all revelation is self-revelation, the inspired writers were ahead of their time, in anticipating moral reason. The authority of revelation rests then with the people to whom it is revealed, as indeed I recognize God within me as good for me. Unless I see the meaning and content of revelation in the light of its inward source I do not understand it. Thus everything for Fichte is inward in nature and origin. As the "classic representative of pure inwardness in philosophy," he is more subjective than Berkeley. While Berkeley assumes that God has endowed us with sensibility, which discloses the world, Fichte finds no need for a world until it is required by the moral ideal. Berkeley found the moral world in large measure external to the self, calling for a certain response in conformity to an ideal. Fichte finds the moral order created from within by that deeper self whose being our own lesser self implies. Berkeley is frankly theistic, and in his later doctrine gives us a world of finite spirits in active relation to the Supreme Spirit; Fichte's God is so nearly identical with the moral order, that in discovering that order our own finite self seems to be the Absolute Ego, and one misses the great world of nature as disclosed by the special sciences. Thus idealism, endeavoring to overcome the difficulties of the Kantian philosophy, leaves us with the world of "practical reason," with a moral philosophy as one type of possible solutions of the Kantian problems. Fichte carries to its logical conclusion the Cartesian starting-point: I think, therefore I am. But in so doing he leaves us in the inner world with its intricacies. It remained for his idealistic successors to find a more objective approach to these the most baffling issues of our moral self-consciousness.

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§ 20. THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT

We found Kant coming to the conclusion that the world of our experience is the world of our own understanding, whose schemata remain to be filled out; while his analysis of practical reason disclosed the truth that the moral self is the author of its own deeds. For Fichte, the world of my significant experience is abundantly filled out by the ideal activities which my moral selfhood implies. Since then every activity centres about the ego, I may round out the conception of my world with whatever mood or emotion, moral or aesthetic sentiment my life freely interpreted in literary fashion may yield. Thus the history of the period we are considering passes over into the various mental worlds of the romantic movement, with its craving for unity in the absolute and its aesthetic attitude toward the universe.

Romantic Motives.—The tendencies of the golden age of poetry in Germany, the age of Goethe and Schiller, readily led to the conviction that poetry is the innermost essence of things. The development of natural science, especially after the founding of modern chemistry and the developments of comparative anatomy, also suggested unity as the central idea in thinking one's world to its culmination. Interest in Spinoza's philosophy as the ideal monism of substance was an additional motive. The individualism of Fichte's popular works, notably *The Vocation of Man*, became a motive for those whose ethical interests were prominent. For thinkers who were more

directly inclined toward the beautiful there were the ideals of romantic poetry and fiction, ideals of unhampered self-expression in which every mood should have free play. Again, there was the religious motive, with its strong tendency toward a pantheistic or mystical view, which was in reality an enlargement of the romancing selfhood of the thinker.

While the romantic movement belongs more to literature than to philosophy, and to philosophy in a less technical sense, the movement is significant as typical of any protest in behalf of the imagination, art, poetry, religion, against that view of human nature and human existence which regards it as a dull round of uniformities. The philosophy of romanticism is one phase of the whole trend of intellectual activity from Lessing's earlier works to the death of Heine, in 1856, with special reference to the great centres at Jena and Weimar, and the younger men who were roused into activity by Goethe and Schiller.¹ The clue to the philosophy lies in the Fichtean description of my world as the expression of my character, the world which gives me my opportunity for self-realization, occasions for work and for doing my duty; in the development of the meanings and values of self-consciousness to the full. Given the impetus, the romanticists outdistanced Fichte in applying the ego to the world, gave free play not only to imagination but to caprice, even to moods and waywardness. Hence by becoming more absorbed in his own genius the romanticist was less ethical in type; moral philosophy was merely one of several major interests. But while the romantic movement included Augustus and Friedrich Schlegel, Tieck, and Novalis, it included Schelling; also in a measure Schleiermacher, the great theologian, whose sphere of influence can hardly be identified with romanticism as a movement.

Schlegel and Novalis.—Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), with his many moods, his romantic irony, and exaltation

¹ Royce, *Spirit of Mod. Phil.*, Lecture VI; *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, p. 68; Wallace, *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Phil.*, Bk. I, Chaps. V, VI.

of fickleness, is typical of those who substituted the man of genius for the ego, who made a cultus of genius. In his opposition to the formalism of the categories Schlegel assigned to art the first place in the effort to rise above the laborious routine of duty: genius transcends all the limitations of common consciousness. Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenburg, 1772-1801) is a favorite figure among the romanticists because of his lovable personality, his ardent faith in the Fichtean philosophy, combined with his conviction that poetry, as the innermost essence of all things, is the mode of action peculiar to the human spirit. He too was a creature of moods, producing philosophical fragments, never completing any of them; yet profounder in type than Schlegel, expressing romanticism at its best, intimating that every man might poetise, might see in poetry and romance pictorial forms of the eternal.² For the time being philosophy as a technical enterprise has entirely given place to that dreaming, spontaneous mode of life which is both a protest against all that is stereotyped and formal and an impetus to create, to see in the world what the spirit brings to it. The romanticist, by carrying a tendency to the extreme, shows the limitations of any purely subjective point of view, whether sentimental, mystical, intellectual or anti-intellectual. Yet out of romanticism comes appreciation of values, of history, and of evolution or the stages of natural development. Romanticism in extreme form was the type of thought to be expected from any disciple of subjective idealism who lacked moral incentives to inspire him to work for the good of his country. As an appeal to poetry, romanticism was on more secure ground, and was akin to the romanticism of the English poets. As an appeal to the spiritual life, romanticism was in line with the English writers of the age of Carlyle and the type of thought known in America as New England transcendentalism.

² See Royce, *Spirit of Mod. Phil.*, p. 177.

§ 21. SCHELLING

Life.—The philosopher of the romantic movement was Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) who represented both the literary people who were creatures of the moment and those who tried to portray the intuitions and symbolisms underlying the interest in art, nature, literature, religion. Schelling was born in Würtemberg, entered Tübingen at sixteen, and was interested at first in theology. Later, he turned to Fichte, Kant, and Spinoza, and after leaving the university took up the study of natural science and published his first book, *Ideas Toward a Philosophy of Nature*, 1797. In 1798, he became professor of philosophy at Jena. From 1803 he taught at Würzburg, then at Erlangen. At Munich (1806–1820) he was Director of the Academy of Plastic Arts. In 1827, he was called to the University of Berlin, where he taught until 1841. His most brilliant period was that of his residence in Jena, where he was affiliated with the romanticists. Schelling passed through various periods of influence and produced one work after another as his doctrine changed, now from its Fichtean type to his interest in Bruno and Spinoza, Neo-Platonism and Boehme; from his interest in the special sciences to his devotion to revelation and mythology. In 1800 appeared his *System of Transcendental Idealism*, in 1801 the *Exposition of my System*, in 1802 *Bruno*, and in 1803 his *Method of Academic Study*. His *Philosophy and Religion*, 1804, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, 1809, *On the Divinity of Samothrace*, 1815, set forth later stages of his thought. His works record the inner life of one whose career was full of promise, but who somehow failed to realize the vision of a comprehensive system, and brought forth fragments amidst successive variations of his philosophy. The various motives of this philosophy include his effort to overcome the extreme subjectivism of Fichte, a very genuine attempt to explain nature from the standpoint of the spirit in contrast with the externalism of the mechanical philosophy, and the sym-

bolisms of art and spiritual insight in which Schelling expresses the motives of the romanticists.

Starting-point.—Among the various explanations of Schelling's difficulties offered by historians, we note especially the fact that Schelling does not interpret nature as a real process in time, also the fact that he comes before the modern doctrine of evolution. To overcome the limitations of scientists who are unaware that nature is a symbol of Spirit, he must resort to various interpretations, no one of which is adequate, satisfying. Although Schelling endeavors to meet the larger issues of Fichte's philosophy, he is only secondarily an ethical thinker. He is to be understood rather as a genius in speculative imagination, devoted to theoretical construction, notably in the most nearly complete of his works, his *System of Transcendental Idealism*.¹

For Schelling's analysis, the Fichtean philosophy is not yet monism or absolutism; since the ego, in postulating the non-ego, discovers an unconscious product, an object which is very far from being a subject. Neither one produces the other, although there is a reciprocal relation between them. Without a world the ego does not exist. Neither the world nor the ego is absolute. What then is the absolute? This question cannot be answered until we understand in what sense nature is to be regarded. If nature be a manifestation of Spirit, it must be other than the kind of world-order which mechanical science finds it to be. But to develop this clue is also to bear in mind the relation of my conscious to my deeper self, to the universal divine thought or Spirit which is also the spirit of nature. Spirit is then to be portrayed as coming to itself in man because it has first been manifested in nature. Thus Schelling develops in his Nature-philosophy the complement to Fichte's thought. This attempt to proceed from nature to Spirit, to approach the ego by the reverse way, is Schelling's characteristic idea. This is not, as some historians of philosophy maintain, a mere attempt to

¹ Cf. Royce, *Spirit of Mod. Phil.*, p. 184; *Lectures on Mod. Idealism*, p. 100.

substitute a symbolical reading of ideas into nature for the painstaking efforts of scientists to describe nature. If nature be interpretable as God's thought disclosed objectively to our eyes, the inner world is that same thought become self-conscious. Schelling's philosophy falls short because of the magnitude of his task. Hence his *Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature* looks forward to an enriched system for fulfilment.

Dialectic of the Ego.—The dialectic of the self is developed in the *System of Transcendental Idealism*. There is a parallel dialectic of the not-self in nature, a system of processes involving the objective dialectic. In this external process everything seeks its opposite, transcending by its relationships its own being. As in the inner world, there is both an infinite and a limiting force; forces in opposition which imply lower and higher planes. These gradations from matter as slumbering Spirit approach conscious life. To understand these levels in their system one must view nature from within as an aspiration amidst ascending forces which, externally viewed, seemed to be mechanical. Each force contains within itself a principle of contradiction or polarity, by which a lower degree is related to a higher.

Three natural aspects come into view. Gravity as the characteristic expression of the first power corresponds to the thesis. Light represents the second stage, anticipating the spiritual process of becoming. Organized matter unites the matter and form of the two lower stages, implies a world of processes in which the stages of evolution are united in a reciprocal system of means and ends. Thus the inorganic, the vegetable, and animal kingdoms belong to one system. So knowledge, action, art, are powers of Spirit in the higher system. In other terms, the three aspects are these: (1) the total relativity of natural phenomena, unity, polarity, for example, with the same essential form as those appearing in the life of the conscious self; (2) the series of levels (*Potenzen*), the general forms of lower levels being repeated on each level in a more complete and organized embodiment, in the contrast between

inorganic and organic nature; (3) the tendency toward the evolution of subjectivity of mind. Hence Royce calls Schelling a half-way evolutionist.² The result is that nature appears as a sort of image of the self: nature is the self taken as objective, unconscious, hidden, endlessly striving to free itself and to become conscious. But nature, viewed as the construction of the self, is the basis on which self-conscious activities are to be founded, including the development of the categories and a system.

Aspects of the Self.—A philosophically exact conception of the self is therefore needed in contrast with the empirical ego or “me” as one of the phenomena. The self is not to be known then as ordinary objects are known, it exists only in so far as it is known to itself. The self as “*kein Ding, keine Sache*” (no mere “thing” of any sort) is “nothing different from its own thought; the thought of the self and the self are absolutely one.” But, furthermore, the self has two aspects: (1) ideal, subjective; (2) real, as existing for the ideal aspect, because of internal differentiations of its own nature, not upon the same level. The self in its ideal aspect is without determination of structure; as object known to itself it has a definite constitution, although there is no one objective form which is an adequate expression of its own ideal nature as knower. Whatever is known then, as limited, determinate, definite, is not yet the knower. The forms of the finite constitution through which the single deeds, determinate contents or particular facts are known are the categories. Indirectly then the self views itself as divided. This is not a merely subjective idealism; for, “in beginning to understand its ideal activities, the self advances only through a *social consciousness*.”³ Hence true self-consciousness is possible only for a social being, a doctrine which Schelling derived from Fichte. The world of intelligence becomes for the first time a real world then in so far as it exists for the many subjects. Three factors are here involved: the natural processes of the phenomenal

² *Lectures on Mod. Idealism*, p. 103.

³ Royce, *ibid.*, p. 125.

world, the free will of individuals, and the ethical or absolute ideal which is to override the individual caprices and result in an ideal evolution of the ideal.

The system of this most productive period of Schelling's thought is divided then into a philosophy of Nature and a philosophy of Spirit, with the implication that Nature is subject as well as object, inasmuch as it expresses spiritual activity, both Nature and the inner life of man being products of a higher principle. The higher explains the lower throughout the system. The philosophy of Spirit involves representation, action, artistic enjoyment. Under theoretical philosophy belongs the exposition of the dialectic as already indicated; under practical philosophy belong the ethical considerations which correspond to Fichte's moral doctrine; and under aesthetics the theory of art in which Schelling incorporates the Kantian conception of the beautiful. Since in art there is a perfect union of the subjective with the objective, it supplies the standard, contains the solution of the problems of philosophy. Art discloses the unconscious in action and production, the original identity in the conscious; overcomes the antithesis between the real and the ideal, between impulse and reflection. On the level of the theoretical and the practical, there is still a dualism of subject and object; in intellectual intuition thought rises above the antitheses of reflection. In this blending of ideal and real, ego and non-ego, the higher unity is seen, a unity which is above our mere selves as finite beings, in an impersonal reason.

Intellectual Intuition.—Here Schelling's doctrine resembles Plato's intuition of the Ideas, Plotinus' vision of the One, and the beatific vision of the Christian mystics, with points of resemblance to Spinoza's insight "under the aspect of eternity." Schelling says, "There dwells in us a secret, wonderful faculty, by virtue of which we can withdraw from the mutations of time into our innermost disrobed selves, and there behold the eternal under the form of immutability; such vision is our innermost and peculiar experience, on which alone depends all that we know and believe of a suprasensible world." To objectify

this intuition in a realistic sense, or regard it as does the mystic, would be to lose one's self in the absolute. But to regard it as our own experience is rather to see that the world is absorbed into the intuition, and to strive to realize the absolute. Schelling does not then completely identify subject and object, but retains the polarity of the dialectic, God and the ego. He finds a direct point of contact with Kant's proposition concerning the "I think" of the transcendental deduction; for this is a purely intellectual apprehension of the self, preceding all empirical thought.

Identity-Philosophy.—Although in his later period, beginning in 1809, Schelling's thought becomes more mystical, the idea of opposites continues to yield its clues. Since it is impossible to deduce difference from identity, plurality from unity, the underlying *living* unity contains the opposites. Boehme, to whose influence Schelling now responds, had taught that without opposition there is no life. For Schelling there is opposition even in the deity. The problem of evil is also the problem of opposites, in the tendency to revert to the chaos which preceded Nature's evolution. Metaphysical speculation seems then to fall short, and Schelling turns rather to the philosophy of religion: finiteness and corporeality become a sort of falling away from the Absolute, as in some mystical doctrines. Schelling also inclines toward voluntarism, in a doctrine of the divine will. In his Identity-philosophy, objective and subjective become appearances in the Absolute, which now figures as "indifference" in contrast with its sometime determinations. At this point his later teachings become a stimulus to thinkers who restore these lost differences in an Absolute which becomes the permanent ground of all determinations. Schelling is known in the history of philosophy for his reconstruction of Fichte's subjectivism, with emphasis on *will* as the ground of subject and object, as the basis of union of Kantian doctrines, and his extension of the dialectic to include nature; also for his philosophy of nature, a conception which was not adopted in the form of a speculative physics but was a stimulus to

such naturalists as Steffens, Burdach, Oken, Carus, Oersted, G. H. Schubert. His doctrine of nature needed the theory of organic evolution to substantiate his conception of successive stages of development. Hence as a basis of union between science and philosophy his doctrine was incomplete. In the philosophy of religion Schelling influenced Baader and Schleiermacher. His idealism, with emphasis on thought as prior to being, on intellectual intuition as the culmination of thought, suggested a constructive idealism in one direction; while other thinkers dwelt on the realistic implications of his theory of nature and his emphasis on the will.

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§ 22. SCHLEIERMACHER

Through his interest in the critical philosophy, and because of points of contact with Schelling, Schleiermacher was in a measure affiliated with the romantic movement. But he is chiefly notable for a profound philosophy of religion which made him a prominent figure, a leader of very great influence. As the founder of the new theology his thought belongs in some respects outside the present history. Within the field of philosophy he succeeded in uniting elements of thought where others were not able to compass the demands of feeling, faith, the heart, and the life of reason in a single system.

Life.—Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834) was born in Breslau. His father, a chaplain in a Prussian regiment, represented the stern and unbending theology of the old school. His mother, with her keen

intellect and deep piety, and close sympathy with her son, represented another type of influence. Schleiermacher also acquired a deep strain of piety from the Moravians, who were pietists, in whose schools he was educated, at Niesky and Barby. In these schools the foundations were laid for the type of thought which is characteristic of Schleiermacher. But this intensely subjective pietism, with its independence of the ruling church and of social life in general, left Schleiermacher with a longing for other instruction which was realized by studies in the university at Halle, then a centre of rationalism. There, Schleiermacher studied theology and philosophy, and became greatly interested in Kant. After serving for three years as a tutor in Halle, he became a preacher, in 1795. Going to Berlin as preacher at Trinity Church, in 1809, his contact with the romantic movement came when that movement was at its height, and was most likely to appeal to his sensitive and imaginative spirit. Friedrich Schlegel was in particular his intimate friend. In 1810, Schleiermacher became professor of theology at the university in Berlin, a position which he held until his death, in 1834.

Sources of his Philosophy.—Schleiermacher is especially known for his famous *Reden über die Religion*. (*On Religion*), published in 1799, in which he outlined his ethical system and asserted the freedom of the human spirit. Rarely has deep religious feeling been so united with great intellectual power. The problem before him, namely, the possibility of doing justice to the demands of the heart or inner experience in relation to the questions raised by the critical philosophy, is one of the fundamental issues of human thought of modern times. He is the ideal representative of responsiveness or surrender to the promptings of the spirit commingled with critical ability and constructive thinking. Again, his pronounced individualism kept him from entire acceptance of the monism of Spinoza and Schelling, as indeed the constancy of his faith was a safeguard against the mysticism and wayward genius of the lesser romanticists.

Schleiermacher worked out his doctrine during his early

period as a preacher, by comparison of the critical philosophy with the influences of his youth, and before his affiliations with the romanticists. His ability to reckon searchingly with the critical philosophy without losing his faith has been explained by the doctrine which has made him so conspicuous in the philosophy of religion, namely, the conviction that although religious doctrines are not allowed objective validity by the critical philosophy, their values remain as symbols of the innermost life of religion. Moreover, he sought a more interior basis of union between ethics and religion, advanced from Kant's moral theology to his own deeply subjective basis. Having successfully passed through this dialectic in his keen criticism of the Kantian philosophy, Schleiermacher was ready to study Spinoza and Jacobi, and encounter the influences of the romanticists, with whom he was associated after he moved to Berlin. Schleiermacher also studied Greek philosophy and made the classic translation of Plato into German.

Religious Intuition.—His early interest in the intense feeling and rich content of the religious life might have led Schleiermacher to derive all reality from the ego had it not been a question of the transcendent ground of all thought and being, feeling and experience, the ego and its world. Although we lack adequate knowledge of the infinite ground of all reality, thought and life, in the external and internal worlds, we are assured that the infinite ground exists, we have approximate or appreciative knowledge of God. This assurance is reached through Schleiermacher's significant distinction between religion and other disciplines, in favor of the intuition or immediate feeling on which religion at its best is founded. This intuition is an immediate feeling of the infinite, which embraces the universe or world-spirit: God as the ground of all finitude and individuality. Religion is definable with respect to this feeling of absolute dependence on the infinite. There is then a moment in the inner life which involves a wholeness or undivided unity, prior to the discriminations of thought, the adoption of symbols and dogmas. Religious experience thus being seen in the light of its priority, with

emphasis on feeling as larger in scope and value than thought or formalism, the function of religious symbols becomes clear, revelation is understood as a fact of experience, not as a doctrine, and dogmas are classed with reference to their production and acceptance on the basis of experience. Although our religious doctrines may not always stand the test of criticism, may not have objective validity, they remain as values, as symbolic expressions of the experiences to which they are due. Moreover, Schleiermacher assigned a high place to individuality as an expression of the various phases of the religious life, as a characteristic embodiment of humanity. His work as a preacher kept him in touch with the demands of practical life so that he could emphasize the need for profound self-knowledge and meditation without exalting the inner life out of proportion. His doctrine that religious dogmas are symbols made possible his liberalizing activities. He could respond to Schelling's idealism without adopting its formalism, in contrast with his own conviction that it is feeling or intuition which yields the living unity of things.

The Organic Absolute.—Schleiermacher found his solution of Kant's difficulties in a presupposed unity of being and thought which also involves the unity of being and willing in the sphere of action. The idea of God implies this unity of thinking and being as the presupposition of all knowledge. Thought indeed by itself involves opposites, contrasts which cannot be overcome, and all our conceptions are limited, as the critical philosophy had shown. But religious feeling in its best estate is already a unity of opposites, a harmony or reconciliation of contrasts. Although the conception of an absolute being involves difficulties, such a being is a postulate of our God-consciousness, and the incarnation is a fact of surpassing importance, unaccounted for by mere history. The unity of ethics and religion, intellectual, moral and aesthetic culture is found, not through an external synthesis of dogmas; it is found by that appeal to immediate feeling of the infinite which already includes and needs the varied

forms of expression which Schleiermacher pleads for in the name of individuality. His Absolute is not the Identity or Indifference of Schelling's later idealism, but is organic, a union of characteristics, in intimate relation with the world, yet separable from the world through the fact that God is spaceless and timeless, and in even closer relation with human personality (although above personality because it is finite). The individual is in a measure free and independent, endowed with talents or gifts, with opportunities for self-development, yet is so related to the social whole that each person's self-expression should be contributory. Thus there is recognition for the promptings toward self-realization, even the genius, and longing for fidelity to life in all its moods which was characteristic of romanticism; but always with the saving grace of social relationships, and the deep inner feeling of dependence which shows that individual experience is a sharing of divine life and power.

Historical Position.—Schleiermacher exemplified his ideal by his effective work as a preacher and the part he played in fostering the rebirth of the German nation, while also teaching systematic theology and writing works which enlarged his influence. His *Christliche Glaube* has been called the greatest work produced by Protestant theology since the Reformation. Schleiermacher is especially known for his conception of religion as a feeling of immediate dependence on God as infinite. In his doctrine, spiritual vision, moral insight, religious feeling and intuition are given full recognition. Yet he offers more than a philosophy of feeling. He distinguishes between feeling and thought, values and dogmas in the sphere of religious thought. The term "value" is a positive term, representing the higher phases of inner experience, where analysis falls short. It stands for that superior reality which, for the religious believer, is persistently made known in the life of the spirit despite all the negations of critical philosophy. Schleiermacher developed essentially the same point of view in all his works, beginning with his famous

addresses, *On Religion*, a point of view which has continued to have marked influence on thinkers of a confessedly theistic type.

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§ 23. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM. HEGEL

Life.—Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart, in 1770. At school he was known as a responsive student in all subjects, giving evidences of many-sided observation. His diary shows that he early became interested in history and the concept of history, also in the passions which stir men most strongly, in the foundations of the State and in humanity at large. He gave evidences too of marked critical ability, and began early to make systematic notes, definitions, alphabetical arrangements, with special reference to philosophy, the history of literature, aesthetics, and the special sciences. His diary also indicates his effort to grasp the point of view of others, objectively, impartially, in minutest detail and fidelity, apart from his own reflection. His bent toward philosophy became evident when he was fifteen. Thenceforward his biography is that of the development of his system, with the interpretation of external deeds in the light of their meanings and values.

At the University of Tübingen, which he entered at eighteen, Hegel studied metaphysics and theology, read Rousseau, and sought to overcome the Kantian dualism. His friendship with Schelling began in this period and continued until his philosophical development brought him to a point where their views diverged too greatly. Then came a period as private tutor in Switzerland, when Hegel

discarded the lifeless theology acquired at Tübingen, and reflected on the relationship of love and reason as clues to reality. Hegel discerned in the movement of love (as an empirical principle) a dialectic, or the passing out of self into another, with a subsequent enrichment: the unity of the divine and the human is the presence of love, the truth of life.¹ Becoming deeply interested in the subjective development of the Idea in Christ as God-man, Hegel wrote a *Life of Jesus*, in 1795; also gave much attention to scriptural exegesis, and wrote a *Critique of Positive Religion*, 1795-1796. He now adopted the term "spirit" to designate the higher principle of the self which overcomes opposition, struggle, and contradictions in a reconciling unity: only he who has the divine in him can believe in the divine, only the spirit knows the Spirit. With his study of Gibbon, Montesquieu, Thucydides, and other historians, begins his special interest in the philosophy of history. Schelling's system was also a powerful incentive at this time, in the effort to assimilate its central principles. So too was the study of Fichte, Kant, Spinoza, Plato, Aristotle.

From 1797 to the last of 1800 Hegel was a tutor in Frankfort, where he gave his system its first formulation. He now saw that philosophy is the self-knowing process of the Absolute. First there is the Absolute in its pure ideal implicitness, involving the determinations of Being and Thought in general. Then comes its development as a process of expression. Its true "notion" (*Begriff*) is known in the free transition toward realization, and the equally free return to itself in which its pure ideality becomes explicit. In nature the Absolute perceives itself, but its cognition is external; hence the need of self-cognition, of the logical Idea, and of the categories, dialectically following one another. Hegel does not deduce the existence of nature from a concept of the understanding, but from Spirit. He acquires the architectonic and terminology of his system from Plato, departing from Schelling's Nature-philosophy. His philosophy is distinguished from

¹ Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 46.

that of Fichte and Schelling by his definition of negativity and his emphasis on the unity of opposites through the development of successive stages, which he later expresses in systematic detail in *Logic or Metaphysics*, the *Philosophy of Nature*, and the *Philosophy of Spirit*. He had found his central clue in part in the moral principle of Christianity, namely, in the movement from negation to affirmation, from opposition to reconciliation, implied in self-realization through self-sacrifice or dying to live.²

Hegel became private docent in the University of Jena in 1801, and professor extraordinary in 1805; and began to teach the history of philosophy and the philosophy of nature and spirit. In 1801, he published his first work, in which he showed the difference between the systems of Fichte and Schelling, or subjective and subjective-objective idealism. In 1802, he became co-editor with Schelling of the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, of which he wrote the greater part. Diverging more widely from Schelling, after a period of adverse criticism, Hegel later vigorously assailed the Identity-system. After the battle of Jena, 1806, Hegel edited a newspaper for a year at Bamberg, then became rector of the *gymnasium* in Nuremberg. In 1816 he became professor of philosophy at Heidelberg; and from 1818 to 1831 he was professor in Berlin, where he lectured on all parts of his system, which now gained many adherents and became a dominant philosophy. His first important work, his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*Phenomenology of Mind*), was completed on the eve of the battle of Jena, and published in 1807; his *Wissenschaft der Logik* (*Science of Logic*) was published in 1812-1816, and the *Encyclopedie* in 1817. His lectures on the History of Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Right, and Philosophy of History were published by his pupils after his death. Hegel died in Berlin of cholera, in 1831.

Characteristics.—Hegel combined dispassionate analysis or persistent rationalism with keen appreciation of love and the beautiful, and sympathetic insight into the reali-

² Cf. E. Caird, *Hegel*, p. 43.

ties and values of religion culminating in a knowledge of the spirit, as uniting sentiment and reason, experience and truth. In 1811, he was married to Marie von Tucher, who came from an old Nuremberg family, and whose markedly feminine nature excellently counterbalanced his intellectual reserve, with his habits of systematic reflection. One of their two sons became professor of history at Erlangen. As a teacher Hegel united love of freedom with insistence on system and discipline. He was somewhat rigid in manner, ruling out all compromise, overmastering in polemic. This inflexibility was partly due to the stress put on logic and justice, in an attitude which kept him apart from political and revolutionary tendencies, and outside of doctrinal controversies. His position as an almost official philosopher, after he went to Berlin, subjected him to adverse criticism, and he himself was severely critical in making clear his attitude as teacher, concerned with principles rather than with personalities. Few philosophers have given themselves so resolutely to a single task, to the convincing development of a system intended to embody all essential principles. His style combines technical accuracy with extreme difficulties which have been forbidding to most students of philosophy. His highly abstract mode of exposition is partly responsible for the traditional summaries of his doctrine in the text-books and the conventional objection to his idealism, as an attempt to deduce all reality from pure Thought, to the utter neglect of nature, the sciences, and the facts of evil and irrationality in the world.

Philosophical Sources.—Hegel investigated not only life or the world as he found it to determine what is real, what has value; he penetrated history as a record of what civilization has achieved, and the history of thought, out of which philosophy has been selectively developed. Thus he contributed both to the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy, or the progressively discovered logic of philosophy as a systematic development: philosophy has a method, pursues a dialectic which has gradually disclosed itself in the actual history of thought. To read him

to advantage is to presuppose the entire history of philosophy from the initial insights of the Eleatics, and the idealism of Plato and Aristotle, to the *Identitäts-System* of Schelling. Thus from ancient times came the clear conception of the real as absolutely independent Being, regarded in the light of universals, logical principles, the Idea; in contrast with appearance, with the sense-presentations which Heraclitus had described in terms of perpetual flux. From insight into Christianity came Hegel's clue to the movement and negativity of the dialectic, as already indicated; while Spinoza's principle that "all determination is negation" was still more specific. To see the significance of affirmation and denial, was for Hegel to see in what sense negation is determination, how positive and negative conceptions yield their content as correlatives, and how the third moment of thought makes this correlation explicit. Moreover, the shortcomings of Spinoza's doctrine of "substance" served indirectly to establish the significance of "self" as the higher category. Kant's philosophy proved defective because it did not co-ordinate the fields of ultimate reality, but left the mind in isolation from nature. Fichte left the ego and its postulates in a merely moral cosmos, merging the thing-in-itself in the activity of the subject. For Schelling, the Absolute became neither the ego nor the non-ego, but a pure indifference or perfect identity in which the antithesis of subject and object disappeared. Schelling's limitation gave Hegel a special incentive to begin the great enterprise anew by developing the idea of an immanent activity or richly productive dialectic already suggested by Greek idealism. For the Absolute as mere source, which does not explain nature or our selfhood, Hegel substitutes the Absolute as implicit ground by putting the major emphasis on the ensuing development which reveals the Absolute as richly concrete; the differentiated universal as the ground alike of nature, finite egos, and their relationships, becomes the constructive clue.

Aristotle's principle of development, in contrast with the conceptions of fixity which had prevailed, implied im-

manence as the clue, although Aristotle, like Kant, left a dualism to be overcome. Hegel's system contains no things-in-themselves, apart from one another or from knowledge. His is not merely a philosophy of the moral self, but of nature, of history, religion, mind, aesthetics, social ethics, each with its dialectical correlations. The motives which led to the doctrines of Kant, Fichte, Schelling are assimilated into a complete rationalism. To see how this philosophical synthesis is accomplished is to subordinate the moral reason and all other practical considerations to the theoretical inquiry which discloses the basis of the entire system. It becomes clear that Hegel starts neither with thought alone nor with things alone; but with the whole cosmos of nature, history, moral experience, and Spirit. What has been alleged to be a system of ideas or categories from which nature is said to be deduced by neglecting the world as given will prove to be a universally applicable system.

Logical Basis.—The crucial consideration is the movement of thought from a beginning which for the moment appears to be in the highest degree abstract through a process or exposition involving the inner development of all things, events, minds, to the point of their greatest significance. This universal movement is a development from Being into its simplest implicit form, its immediacy or bare objectivity, thence into a second or essential stage, and into the third stage, that of the Idea. Every content disclosed or assimilated along the way has a place in the developing process, which as a complete anticipation is thus a realization of the Absolute. Yet the development is a real victory in which the contrasts and conflicts of finite things are overcome. While then the world-ground is indeed potentially all that is ever to be drawn forth from it, the truth in highest form (as the Idea) is discoverable only through the development by means of its opposites. The developmental process must itself become explicit; otherwise it will not be understood in relation to irrationality, sin or evil, the sheerest externality or superfluity. Thus in the dialectic Hegel finds place for what he regards

as the non-essential, a term which will become clear as we proceed.

Being is taken at the outset as the merest starting-point or basis. Essence is its larger truth. But what Being is is as Essence, only the dialectic development can show, and this Becoming is discovered in its fulness only in the light of the goal which it attains. If we say that Being already is Becoming it is only that we may make intelligible the successive stages of thought, starting with a descent into the unconscious sphere, tracing these stages into the awakening self-consciousness of man, and noting the several enrichments in relation to nature, science, art, history, religion, and in philosophy as the highest discipline with its disclosure of the meanings of this long series. While Hegel at first develops this system into what appears to be its barest skeleton, his purpose is to assign to each phase of activity its proper place in the scale of truth and reality, regarded in the light of its deepest meaning and highest destination. The sequence thus disclosed is not causal, as if the forthgoing in progress toward truth necessarily produced sheer externality, utter error or evil: it is an ideal series in which the several terms are brought into correspondence with their opposites. When the system of logical concepts is before us, it will be possible to see its relation to a given causal series of phenomena, to correlate the dialectical development with development in the world-process. Again, it will be noted that while Hegel seems to be transcending experience into a realm no longer possible of attainment after Kant's *Critique*, he is making a more adequate formulation of the critical philosophy by aid of the immanent principle.

The Objectifying Process.—We may venture to put his whole undertaking in the more familiar terms of the relation of God to his world. Not even God knows himself or is complete in himself, but becomes so only through the universe of his own manifestation, which, as a process of becoming, is an "other" yet *his own other*, his own progressively realized meaning. Nothing is complete in itself, as implicit or immediate; and this is true of any fact we

may cite from observed experience. Everything must be negated, made objective through its opposite; and this objectivity must in turn be negated, or carried forward to a higher stage of being. The highest or third stage, containing the truth of the two lower stages, is the union of the objective and the subjective in which God is fulfilled in his world. In this union the differences and contrasts are preserved, but in the light of their significance, not their immediacy. The implied and ever-enriching universal is differentiated by anticipation, by correlating and holding differences all along the line, and retaining the meanings or truths. God at the end is not an Absolute in which all differences are lost or absorbed, but a Being whose actuality would mean nothing apart from these degrees of truth and reality in which systematic becoming has its complete realization. This Becoming is not a self-positing and antithetical process within the ego, but is intelligible rather as a development in which God himself is seen objectively, and in which we ourselves may see our thought freed from all those elements which might seem to limit it to self-analysis. Thus it is characteristic of Hegel to welcome precisely the contrasts and contradictions which baffle philosophers; since the truth is made clear only through exhaustive victory. The uttermost conceivable dualities—mind and matter, self and not-self, God and the world, with the most difficult antitheses therein involved—are first to be searchingly admitted and penetrated, then grasped from the unifying point of view. The stand-point of reconciliation is confessedly a point of view, not a mingling of degrees and realities. It is formal, and meant to be formal. But from this viewpoint we can look back upon life's total process, understanding why, for Hegel, it is struggle, passion, or contrast which affords the clue to unity.

The Significance of Reason.—Hegel was unable, with the faith-philosophers and mystics, to lapse into immediacy, by discounting reason. He believed as profoundly in reason as any philosopher, and had an advantage over Aristotle in the long intervening period of reflection on the

nature of the self. Reason for him is essentially objectifying. It is never the reason of your own mere finite self-consciousness, howbeit all reason is one. Nor is it the partial reason of the sciences. It is the completed reason of the thoroughgoing systematic philosopher who follows the implications of interconnected concepts to the uttermost, acknowledging no limits. But reason for Hegel is never abstract, despite the fact that he seems to be the most abstract of all philosophers, wilfully so, almost arbitrarily obscure. Reason is at once objective and concrete in a sense which takes you beyond the analytical and critical into the presence of fundamental connections. It makes the complete venture of what Hegel has called a "voyage of discovery" even at the risk of becoming utterly separate or external in its bare immediacies. Hence it incurs the risk of becoming hopelessly relative. But the Idea, toward which it persistently tends, would have no significance without this courageously achieved content, won even at the peril of sheer self-contradiction or absolute inconsistency. Knowledge of a limit is here in a profound sense knowledge beyond it. You need not then stay wrapped up in the limits of your own self-consciousness. Every relation you seize upon qualifies either existence or actuality: deny the differences or relations, the oppositions and antagonisms, and you deny the principle of your dialectic, which is presently to be correlated with the given world of history. We may well let even the most threatening opposite do its worst, as we might watch a child at play with sharp-edged tools, or observe a fool playing with fire. Hegel encourages us to believe that everything finite contains the principle of its own destruction so far as it would be separate: it must lose its mere finitude to find its true being. It is not the mere negation or "losing" that signifies (the original Christianity had shown that), but the "finding." The given thing, such as a tree, has its immanent sequences disclosed in outward processes, which we may well observe in their entirety to see whither they tend in organic relatedness with other things. It is not now a question of the alleged *a priori* equipment by

aid of which we can formally *think* the sense-disclosed facts pertaining to the tree. Our categories are discovered amidst the actual process of thought, and Hegel is interested to determine their logical sequence by beginning with barest immediacy, instead of trying to determine the complete table of categories in advance. If these are the true categories, their dialectic use will prove it. To follow their sequence either in their application to nature as given and observed successively, or by reference to the stream of thought as given and analyzed in successive moments, is to find the same dialectic development. The self implied in this our venture in pursuit of the categories is already concrete, is never the merely formal self of a transcendental deduction. We know both things and our conscious states by the same logic: these have developed toward their objective in our mutual world to which no fact is foreign, no meaning outside the scale of truths. Neither experience nor the logical analysis would suffice by itself. We need both the empirical observation of life's processes in all their diversity and the voyages of dialectical discovery, from the mutual deliverances of which we are to propound the absolute system.

Phenomenology.—The voyage of discovery yields the Phenomenology of Spirit, or genesis of philosophical cognition, in a systematic survey of stages through which experience passes from unreflecting consciousness through reflection and self-alienation to the higher mental life and absolute knowledge.³ The term "experience" here signifies, not "phenomena" in the restricted (Kantian) sense, but any relationship of subject and object in the entire series from mere "sense-certitude" up through the scale. Experience thus taken discloses moments, factors, types which may be regarded in their connection as constituting a continuous series, each type having its essential place or meaning in the light of the whole. By describing the various individual types in serial order Hegel makes not only a study of human nature and human life, but exempli-

³ *Phänomenologie des Geistes*; see Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, VI, VII.

fies the transition from common sense in the naïveté of its unquestioning thought to philosophical reflection in its highest estate. His choice of types, as Royce shows, is due to the state of politics and literature in Germany just before the battle of Jena, when he was writing this work. He also has in mind the Kantian deduction of the categories, with the realization that in developing the dialectic method one must show by a systematic exposition how the various types of thought appear in systematic form. This method has now become more conscious and elaborate than in Fichte's science of knowledge and more explicit than in Schelling's usage. It is applied pragmatically, that is, by showing what it concretely signifies in the history of science and the history of civilization, with the implication that history itself is a dialectical process. Its concreteness is indicated, for example, by the inseparability of thought from will; since for Hegel logic exists only as the logic of life, truth being immanent in the significant life-process which includes both the objectives of humanity and the purposes of the Absolute.

Types of Consciousness.—Since *Geist* (Spirit) is the typical mind of the race, Hegel undertakes what Royce calls a sort of biography of the world-spirit in which, instead of dealing with concrete events as one might in a mere history, Hegel treats the comedies and tragedies of the inner life, depicting these as fortunes which occur to ideas or purposes.^{3a} The term *Weltgeist* (World-spirit) is therefore explicitly allegorical, as if it somehow lived its life by means of just such historical and individual processes: it is never a technically philosophical term. The accompanying *Gestalten* (forms of consciousness) are the attitudes, reactions, or ideas which express, each in its own way, the genuine nature of the self, passing away to give place to another and richer view. Thus come the stages of consciousness classed as mere consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, and spirit (in which *Geist* is fully concrete).

In this description of types Hegel is very far from de-

^{3a} Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

ducing the existence of the various forms of consciousness through which you and I as given individuals must successively pass. He selects here and there illustrations of the various stages, taking actual historical types as illustrations, the illustrations being empirical, the analogies logical. Sometimes indeed the chronological relationship is important, for example, in the inevitable decay of small states wherein provincial ideas and logical instability plainly lead to ruin, or when individualism leads to a temporary anarchy. Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* is a literary example of a suggestive type. Such a personage becomes for us almost an actual historical individual. Each type in turn affords opportunity for keen criticism. Surveying the types as a series we come into possession of a view of humanity in process. All the while we are learning what the self is, and by noting the lessons of history we pass to their law, their logic, and so to philosophy. The logic of human activity and of the human will combines with the logic of history to make this disclosure.

We need not demand to know why precisely these forms of expression exist. For thus far we have an introduction to philosophy as system, not the system itself. In his study of the evolution of religion, for instance, Hegel is free to regard the evolution of religion as somewhat parallel to social evolution, to seize upon essential forms of religion without correlating these with the given history of one of the positive religions or with the struggle between Moham-medanism and Christianity. Again, the idea of the Absolute is left in doubt as the *Phänomenologie* draws to its conclusion. The Absolute seems to acquire its most complete form of consciousness in rational individuals possessing insight into the entire process of rational life. Here, Hegel leaves his exposition in ambiguous form; his system demands a "conscious Absolute whose consciousness, while inclusive of that of the rational individual, is not identical with the mere sum-total of these individual consciousnesses."⁴

In any event, Hegel indicates the consequences of the

⁴ Royce, *ibid.*, p. 168.

development through the several stages of the practical consciousness, the theoretical, and the absolute consciousness which unites the practical with the theoretical. There can be no true rational self-consciousness which does not express itself in a series of incomplete manifestations whose forms and interrelations are to be reconciled in the complete consciousness. Finite forms are thus shown to be essential to the Absolute, while all finite expressions of consciousness in themselves are defective, self-conflicting. The relation between the transient forms is shown to be dialectical; each lower form is contradictory in itself, and, in passing away, seeks its truth upon a higher stage. By somehow persisting, each lower form preserves its meaning as an organic part of the higher: everything leaves its mark. The truth of these successive stages is *logical*, not temporal; it culminates in a non-temporal consciousness of the meaning of all temporal processes, in an absolute consciousness which, as world-possessor and as self-possessor, is complete self-realization, an interrelated unity of selves, completely uniting finite and infinite.

Dialectical Method.—The result of this inquiry is evidence of the validity of the dialectical method with its three stages: in-itself, out-of-self, and for-itself. As a child passes out of simplicity into surrender of freedom through disciplinary education, thence into the mature freedom of manhood which is surrendered in the discipline of law and order essential to the larger freedom of citizenship, so the concept passes from the stage of mere thesis by going out from itself antithetically and returning to itself in the synthetic stage. The dialectic everywhere discloses this rhythm or triadic movement, which starts with the given concrete concept, the universal in the particular, or unity in its immediacy; advances into the divergence of opposites through self-mediation; and attains the higher relation of these opposites in an explicit unity which is the deliverance of the self-mediating process. The third moment discloses meanings not apparent in the beginning. Reason, the implied faculty of the process, is the "faculty of concrete concepts." The self, utilizing reason, is not

mere substance, but active subject, dividing its own living activity into distinctions. Philosophy, as the complete system of the dialectical deliverances, culminates in the Idea which embodies the meanings of the system of concepts. The energizing principle of the system is disclosed in the negativity, that is, in the passing of thought through contradictions which seem direful indeed until transmuted and conserved. The system is made complete through Idea, Nature, Spirit; the Subjective, the Objective, and the Absolute Spirit which unites the two. Logic, or the science of the pure Idea, treats the principles and moments of the dialectic in which these triadic relations are reduced to their system. The Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit bring the basic principles to completion from which follow the special disciplines.

Since philosophical knowledge of reality in its system is possible, however, this possibility must be established by apportioning as objects those factors of the self which are favorable to true knowledge, those that are detrimental. For human finitude has proved essential to the expression of absolute truth, yet our finitude is subject to error. Neither the psychological nor the logical factors are to be left in the dubious sphere of the personal equation. Every subjective factor is to be taken into account in absolute fidelity to impartial judgments, an utter objectivity or dispassionate criticism by reference to moral matters wherein the individual should regard and treat himself objectively from the point of view of the family, the state, and humanity, with all exclusiveness overcome.^{4a} Thus in putting one's self sympathetically in another's place one passes beyond the rule that we should do to others as we would that they should do to us, by lifting one's self out of the "close atmosphere of personal feelings." In the world of science it means overcoming all bias, mere opinion, feeling, the merely immediate or apparent; and bringing all considerations out into the open where they can be tested: it means the exchange of the Ptolemaic viewpoint in which all things revolve about *us* for the Coperni-

^{4a} Cf. E. Caird, *Hegel*, p. 151.

can which symbolizes the universal centre. Intelligence is to be envisaged as a *universal capacity* devoid of foreign elements, with nothing to prevent complete understanding of the universe. Granted that the individuality of a self-conscious being rests on this basis of universality, the individual is not limited to himself, but is capable of relating himself to all things, his intelligence being implicitly universal. It is through this renouncing of every accidental and particular element that the self, becoming thus far one with universal life, realizes that Thought and Being are no longer separate, that the union presupposed in their difference is made clear. Hegel expects his readers to achieve an objective attitude such that the individual will be Man Thinking, any mind at any time using the categories as instruments, grasping the method as universal.

Logic.—Command of the method involves insight into typical attitudes, as the *Phänomenologie* suggests, also erroneous points of view in the light of their significance, in relation to which truth is to be more clearly defined. Thus common sense although self-contradictory is an inevitable beginning for philosophy, also other popular modes of thought and the objects of religion; the objective is that core of truth or significant content which Hegel distinguishes by the term *Wirklichkeit* (actuality).⁵ Reason necessarily expresses itself in a totality of individual forms possessing genuine actuality, namely, those forms which find expression in the universe for a good reason; while existences not thus significant are to be overcome. Hence our inquiry begins with experience which includes both this inwardness or significance and an outward relation to the world through which we discriminate between what is apparent (transient, meaningless) and what is *actual*. Thus modern philosophy “derives its materials from our own personal observations and perceptions of the external and internal world, from nature as well as

⁵ *Encyclopedic*, tr. by Wallace (*The Logic of Hegel*), Introd., p. 9, foll.

from the mind and heart of man, when both stand in the immediate presence of the observer.”⁶

In developing its subject-matter into a system, philosophy does not neglect the empirical facts of the sciences; it recognizes and adopts while appreciating and applying these facts in their universal bearing; it adds other categories, so that “speculative logic” assimilates all previous logic and metaphysics. The essence of the process in ourselves is *thought*, which, penetrating entanglements and contradictions, passes through the stage of mere understanding into the clarifying insights of the *Begriff* (philosophical “notion”) which becomes genuine and self-supporting, intrinsically concrete as Idea (in the whole of its universality, the Absolute). The history of philosophy discloses from an historical and external point of view the stages in the evolution of the Idea which logic expounds connectedly according to its principle: the Architect in both series is the same, the one living Mind whose nature is to think, to bring its own implicit wealth to self-consciousness in a higher stage of its own being.⁷

Logic, the science of the Idea in-and-for-itself, leads to the Philosophy of Nature as the science of the Idea in self-alienation, and the Philosophy of Spirit as the science of the Idea returning from this state into itself. In Logic the dialectical method is made explicit by disclosing the activity of the understanding eventuating in the negative or sceptical reason which transmutes the implied differences into the higher unity already mentioned. The science of the pure Idea treats the idea in the most abstract mode, howbeit for Hegel logic is also metaphysics and is therefore concerned with God or the Logos as the *Prins* of both mind and nature, the total universe prior to creation. This science includes the doctrines of Being (the Idea in its immediacy), the doctrine of Essence (the Idea in its reflection and mediation), and the doctrine of the Notion (*Begriff*, or the Idea returned to itself in developed form).

Being.—The dialectical method begins with Being as

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

both pure thought (concerned with concepts in their most abstract form) and as immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate.⁸ Being is for the moment devoid of content and thus far identical with *Nichts* (nothing), from which it is also different, a difference which is forthwith made explicit when determinateness is put over against indeterminateness in the stage of the dialectic through which Becoming emerges. Hence identity amidst diversity begins to yield its content. Our thought regularly follows this procedure: in asserting that an object *is* we do not as yet relate it with other objects or enunciate its meaning, since it is for the moment taken as isolated both from all other objects and from all minds cognizing its existence. Thus in common-sense fashion we take the world to be a mere collection of separate things, like blocks side by side, apart from all relation to life or value, essence or reason; in our naïveté we take things thus abstractedly, ignorant of what abstraction signifies. Some of us remain in the stage of naïve realism. Others adopt realism as a doctrine by affirming the independence of "reals" in contrast with all cognitive relations. But from another point of view cognition is essentially apprehension and interpretation of relations. To insist on the utter independence of an object, say a boulder, would be absolutely to negate it, to find it identical with *Nichts*; but forthwith to recollect one's self by realizing that even to say the object *is* (has Being) is already to declare that it is far more: one regarded the boulder *as if* it were isolated, hence absolute in its independence, when in very truth it was wholly relative. Once in process, our dialectic responds to Becoming, which discloses determinate Being in contrast with nothing, hence quality, the many in contrast with the one (quantity in relation to quality), measure (the union of quality and quantity), from which results *Wesen* (Essence).

Essence.—Having negated its first stage, Being now comes into mediation with itself, reflected into itself, concerned with the pure principles or categories of reflection,

⁸ *Wissenschaft der Logik: Werke*, Bd. iii, 2te Aufl.

especially identity, difference, ground (sufficient reason).⁹ Essence implies a contrast with appearance, hence with the mere moments of thought which are tainted with untruth, as sheer phenomena or bare existents. To regard things in this aspect of sheer relativity, in what Hegel calls the "motley play of the world," is to find them merely conditioned and conditioning something else.¹⁰ The dialectical term for such an appearance is *Existenz* (merely immediately existence, before it has been related with *Wirklichkeit*). Here for the first time Hegel refers to an existent "thing," in contrast with the unqualified immediacy at the beginning of the doctrine of Being, namely, a thing regarded as you and I take it in ordinary experience.¹¹ Thus noted, a thing is said to possess properties, characters or "matters"; hence diversity or manifoldness. Specifying *this* thing, we describe it as if wholly independent and consisting of self-subsistent "stuff." We describe, in short, a group of appearances as thus far "non-essential," not yet related with the ground of things. Thus I characterize the glistening appearance of yonder roof in the light of my own perspective, amidst changing conditions in the glinting sunlight and within my psychical processes. The utmost I can say of *Existenz* as such is to mediate its detached particularities as appearances, a given phenomenon being for the moment postulated as independent. When Essence merely "shines," as such a phenomenon it returns into itself with nothing achieved—the passing glint of the moment, for instance, which I am neither able to identify nor to explain by reference to what I know about light, about surfaces that reflect, and perspectives which disclose. But when Essence *erscheint* it "appears" in the sense recorded with Hegel's minutely technical exactitude as *realer Schein*, and to discern the relation of *Schein* and *Existenz* is to mediate things in the light of diversity of content and a law, to discriminate between the reciprocally changing and the abiding: the positive or abiding aspect

⁹ *Werke*, Bd. iv.

¹⁰ *Encyclopedia*, trans., Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

¹¹ Cf. *Werke*, Bd. iv, p. 116, foll.

of phenomena is law, law and appearances having the same content.¹² Amidst the appearances and the reign of law the same Essence abides. The appearances belong in an ascending scale from (1) things which possess seeming independence and supply thought with its first data; (2) sensuously apprehended things in their subjective aspects as *feeling*; (3) detached, particular, disparate phenomena; to (4) things as unified in terms of law, system, totality; and (5) as grounded in the supersensible (essential) order of the universe. The cosmos regarded in this system is the realm of Actuality or meanings. What is classed by Hegel as the *unessential* aspect of things includes the whole sphere of contingency or irrationality. To understand his classification is to avoid the traditional error in interpreting his logic. His famous proposition *Alles Wirkliche ist Vernünftig* (what is actual is rational in the sense that it is an expression of a principle essential to the world)¹³ does not mean, as usually translated, "What is real, is rational" the term "real" here being taken to mean *everything that exists*. Hence in every part of Hegel's system it is necessary to distinguish between "mere existence" and existence which is assimilated into Actuality as an organizing principle. The "truth" of appearance is what signifies. This does not mean that the appearances have been "lost" or "absorbed," as English Hegelians sometimes say. The parts still "exist" in the empirical world, on which the dialectic necessarily depends for its subject-matter *when it reaches the stage of thought about the given world*. It is natural to regard the parts in their independence. The dialectical whole which systematizes their meanings is admittedly *a point of view*. No one is obliged to take it. It is permissible to stop with subordinate categories—if one will. But it is also legitimate to carry the dialectic to completion. Hence Hegel notes the fact that, taken entirely by themselves, the appearances "destroy" one another; "each has its independ-

¹² *Op. cit.*, pp. 135, 140, 144.

¹³ Cf. Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

ence not in itself but in another.”¹⁴ To see the “truth” of their relation is necessarily to pass beyond the mere givenness of things to their mediation. Thence the relation of the whole and the parts passes over into the relation of force and its manifestations. *Existenz* in comparison with *Wirklichkeit* is contingent, irrational; contingency being the unity of actuality and possibility.¹⁵ To remain at the point of view of the contingent would be to explain all things from the outside, or the groundless. To advance with the dialectic is to consider the categories of content and form, power and expression, inner and outer, substance and accident, cause and effect, action and reaction (reciprocity), the truth of necessity (freedom), and the Notion (the truth of Being and Essence).

The Notion.—“The true meaning of the *Begriff*,” says Stirling, “must be seen into; and he who understands Hegel’s word *Begriff* understands Hegel.”¹⁶ “What the character of the *Begriff* is,” says Hegel, “can as little be conveyed immediately as the conception of any other object.”¹⁷ It is a result, yet far more: Being and Essence have not only “gone over into it,” but are therein “contained” and “preserved.” Hegel’s critique of “substance” is an illustration, also his analysis of the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception. The *Begriff* is not to be identified with person or personality, although the ego possesses it, seizing the reality of the directly given, pressing through appearances to the truth.

While the dialectical process of Being was Becoming, and that of Essence was Reflection, the movement of the Notion is Development. Since the earlier categories (such as quality, quantity, necessity, freedom) are nothing without the Notion, the foregoing principles are implied in this their “truth,” in which freedom and substance, for example, are realized. In the Notion as *subjective* or as such, there are as *momenta* universality, particularity, and

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 162.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 198, foll.

¹⁶ *The Secret of Hegel*, p. 52.

¹⁷ *Werke*, Bd. v, p. 5.

individuality, with judgment and the syllogism. As *objective*, the Notion is concerned with the totality of objects in the universe under the forms of *mechanism* (independent objects held together as an aggregate), *chemism* (objects in mutual attraction), and *organism* (the unity or purposive action). As *absolute*, the Notion is the truth in and for itself, reason, subject-object, the union of the real with the ideal; of life, cognition (the true), the absolute Idea (uniting the truth of life, consciousness, the good).

The actuality of the truth is not some far-off thing: everything possesses actuality by virtue of the Idea. The objective and subjective world is not merely congruent with the Idea; it is itself the congruence of the Notion and reality. Any reality which did not correspond with the Notion would be appearance and therefore contingent. The mechanical and chemical objects do not possess their particular characteristics through their own free forms; they contain something true only so far as they are the union of the Notion and reality. Otherwise they would be like dead bodies without souls. Spirit itself, were it not the Idea, were dead, a mere material object.¹⁸ Thus explicitly is the Idea linked with the concrete. Finite things are admittedly finite in so far as they do not possess the reality of the Notion completely in themselves, but require an "other" to be complete. The highest point which they can attain as finite is in their external purposiveness. All defects are overcome in the Idea, which in turn passes over into otherness as Nature, and returns as Spirit.

Philosophy of Nature.—The Idea in the form of otherness or self-alienation is Nature. Being, prior to all expression or manifestation, is presupposed; God as creator before creation. The transition from Logic to Nature is then the going forth of creative activity in the processes of self-alienation to which is due the universe in space and time. The Idea in its priority is abstract, but absolutely free: in this its freedom the Idea "resolves" to let the element of its particularity go forth freely from itself as Nature. Here as elsewhere in the system the beginning is

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

as abstract as possible (unmediated) but from this its most external form the Idea progresses through the various realizational forms, up to finite spirit. Each form occupies its appropriate place in the series of stages from abstract Being-out-of-self to the Being-in-itself of individuality.

Nature is far from being a cosmological principle assumed as a first thing or element, such as fire or water. Nor is it a contingent "overflow" from a negatively described Absolute, a "lapse into otherness," or an evil force or substance antithetically opposed as "darkness" to the Absolute as "light." Again, it is not a mere dream or *mâyâ* (illusion). Hence no such doctrine as materialism, naturalism, or a mystical disparagement of nature is plausible from the Hegelian point of view. Finally, nature is not a merely mechanical or mathematical scheme; nature is real, objective. As Idea, which is inherently system, order, purposiveness, nature is a unity embracing all branches of knowledge essential to a complete description and interpretation in spatial and temporal terms through the entire series from the inorganic up to the highest organic species. Hence while the philosophy of the cosmic process includes the data, events, principles, and laws which materialism or naturalism in any of its forms would signalize, this philosophy does not stop at the state of merely given things and events as characterized by a mechanical or mathematical doctrine: Hegel's doctrine presses on to the stage where it is in part a moral philosophy. Hence his scheme of things has in view a complete interpretation of nature. Accordingly, nature is portrayed at first as if the inorganic world could be regarded by itself, with its physical or mechanical processes in the most tangible forms. Thus the concepts of space and time are abstractly regarded, as Being was characterized in the Logic, until, with the disclosures of the forward movement or becoming, the things and events of the world are progressively concrete. Thus too such a unity as gravitation can be appropriately conceived, as if universal gravitation existed apart from the objects of nature which are attracted. The implied externality as bare form can then

be infilled with the heavenly bodies, and the solar system envisaged as a whole. Again, primitive matter is regarded in the light of its progressive distribution and gradual attainment of form; through the immanent processes the advance occurs from the mechanical to the chemical, and from the chemical to the organic. The second evolutionary stage (chemism) marks the progress from physical forces in general (light, electricity, heat) to the plane of development where specialized things become the subject-matter of such sciences as physics and chemistry. The advance to the organic stage presupposes the vital energies adequate to the immanent production of all genera and species in the fulness of animal existence, the attainment of individuality, and the appearance of the human species culminating in humanity in the most highly organized types. With the highest product in visible form, the creative process passes to the realm of spirit. This process is obviously not essentially temporal; the succession is logical, not chronological. The actual cosmos put before us in the richness of spatial and temporal forms is spread out as it were in dialectical analysis from least to greatest, lowest to highest, that we may witness its structure. Granted the rich totality at last, Philosophy of Nature gives place to Philosophy of Spirit.

Philosophy of Spirit.—The return from self-alienation as Nature brings the logical development to Spirit as Being-with-self in the stages known as Subjective, Objective, and Absolute Spirit. Here follow the usual dialectical stages in detail from lowest to highest forms. The term "spirit" includes man as mind, with his consciousness and freedom, humanity as a society of spirits; and Spirit as Idea. The human mind in the objective sense passes through its developmental stages through which consciousness as we know it appears and freedom is achieved. To envisage the process in detail would be to witness the logical succession from the crudest instinct and passion to reason in its fulness, with the passage from the individual to society, from the objective to the subjective and the union of the two. Mind is at first dependent on nature,

it then appears as consciousness opposed to nature, but finally as reconciliation with nature through the higher type of knowledge. Anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology correspond as sciences to these stages. The immediate blending with natural determinateness or the stage of dependence on nature yields the subject-matter of anthropology: the Idea, creating a body for itself, becomes "soul" in the sense of particular and individual functions wherein unconscious production leads on to the stage of conscious evolution. Becoming progressively aware of itself, mind passes through its stages of sensuousness, perception, understanding, self-consciousness, reason. Thus cognition rises from sheer externality to recognition of inmost essence. A complete psychology is implied, from mere presentation to the passage from psychology into ethics, as mind in the form of intelligence discloses will and freedom. Intelligence (as the theoretical) discovers itself as determined, makes explicit what it finds as its own (the practical), and passes through this self-realizational discovery into the union of thought and will, or self-determining freedom (the ethical in its highest sense). The second section of the *Encyclopedie* includes ethics and social ethics; the third covers art, the philosophy of religion, and philosophy as such.¹⁹

Ethics.—Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* develops Part II of his *Phänomenologie*.²⁰ The Idea, which has expressed itself in nature, in individuals, also expresses itself in human institutions, in socialized will; hence as right or law (contract, property, wrong), morality or conscience, and the moral life or ethical observances (social ethics: family, civic society, the State). The unity of the rational will with the single will constitutes the "simple actuality of liberty." Instituted as an authoritative power, this form is *law*; set and grafted in the individual will so as to become habit, temper, character, it exists as manners and customs, *usage* (*Sitte*); and law as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom finds expression as *duties*.

¹⁹ Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* (trans.), p. 103, foll.

²⁰ *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, 1821.

Moralität, as the morality of the heart or conscience, is the immanent life, concretely existing in each member of the moral whole, without which there would be no *Sittlichkeit* (the *mores* or customs which constitute conventional morality). Hegel gives special recognition to social ethics as the realization of the ethics of the individual.

In Kant's ethical doctrine the practical reason "never shakes off the formalism which is represented as the climax of the theoretical reason."²¹ The recognition of the will's power to modify itself in universal modes is not enough and does not avail to tell us the contents of the will or practical reason. Hegel therefore endeavors to supply the needed contents of the will, to develop the idea of the "kingdom of ends" and to apply the fundamental principles in a complete theory of the family, society, and the State. The moral point of view is indeed the standpoint of conscience, the right of the subjective will, of the free ethical decision. But the good for Hegel is the unity of the particular subjective will with the universal will. As a moral being I do not look upon my freedom as that of an empirical personality which belongs to me as an individual, and in which I might subjugate my neighbor by means of strategem or force, but I regard my freedom as *universal*. I am *will* in this universal sense, I am not desire or inclination alone. As will I am free, and if my will is rational it is universal. The rational will is very different from the contingent will, prompted as it is by accidental impulses or inclinations. Opposed to this rational will is evil, or the elevation of the subjective above the universal, the attempt to set up the peculiar and individual choice as absolute. Although the will is the man and the ethical man is will realized in social institutions as already indicated, it is necessary to show how, by appeal to the "science of right," the true form of the will is achieved by tracing its stages, the various forms of self-determination known as "rights," also the contrasts between right and wrong, good and evil.²²

²¹ *Encyclopedie*, Sec. 54; Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 110.

²² *Philosophy of Right*, tr. by Dyde, p. 1, foll.

The will merely regarded as free may be either rational or irrational, equally the possibility of good or of evil. Hence the need of attaining the complete point of view, the identity of the good and the will in which the subjective good and the objective good are united. The will lives in a progressively larger sense in proportion as the good becomes an actuality. Thus legal right as an objective actuality is the product of free-will. Right includes the right of property, contract, and right *versus* wrong. In possession or property I put my will into things in an external way. Through contract, what I possess (by common consent) is more real and secure. Right becomes universal and decisive through the adjustment of wrongs, unintentional or civil, fraud, violence and crime. The right being preserved and its universal form maintained, the transition occurs from the contingencies of the will and avenging justice to the reflective stage, the internal forum of conscience or true subjectivity of the will. Here it becomes a question of purpose and responsibility, intention and well-being, and the absolute worth of moral action as the Good. The standpoint or attitude of the moral agent having been made clear, the transition is made to social morality (ethical observance).

In this part of the discussion Hegel makes his characteristic contribution to ethics. The individual, having recognized what ought to be, now goes forth into the concrete world of social life as it exists today, his moral activity becomes actualized when the uncertainties of conscientious reflection give place to duty as his motive. Duty and right coincide, and man's spiritual history discloses itself amidst the actual spirit of a family and a people. The natural ethical spirit expresses itself in the family as the first moral institution. Love is the characteristic motive, in the consciousness of unity with another in which man attains a larger self-consciousness by renouncing his exclusive independence. The union of the sexes in marriage, ostensibly external, is transformed into a spiritual communion of love and confidence. The consideration of property rights in the family, education, and the expansion

of the family into a people, leads to an analysis of the civic community; the system of wants and their satisfaction, the nature of labor, wealth, and the social classes, with their administrative relationships. Civil society, as a union from necessity and for the preservation of mutual rights, finds place for individuals in an organic relation of means and ends in which the isolated individual no longer exists. This organic totality in completed form is the State.

The State.—As the actuality of the ethical Idea, the ethical spirit as “manifest substantial will” become fully self-cognizant, the State is absolute, a *whole* in which individuals are means to this end. Interest in the individual as such carries us no farther than the civic community. In the State the ethical Idea commands individuals so that they live a universal life in organic communion with others, this corporate life being supreme. Hence particular or private interests are subordinate to the good of the whole. But this dominance of the State over the individual does not mean a speculative ideal state, nor any given historical state in which the idea of the supremacy of the State as such has risen to the fore. Rousseau failed to grasp the rational idea of the State, because he did not see beyond a universal rational will as the sum of individual wills. No internal or external principle is adequate: the ethical State is a union attained through the life of the Spirit in the world in which individuals are essentially “moments” of the total historical process. Nor is any historical scheme of things adequate. Universal Reason, actualizing itself as will, in a sphere of activity more richly significant than that of “Nature” as above characterized, is more than the sum of particular states and institutions: the course of God through universal history has constituted the State. Given states do indeed in a measure embody the true Idea, and there is no reason for disregarding historic limitations: amid the strife, the victories, the subjection of individual races, the power of spirit is to be seen. But the disfiguring activities of the invalid, the cripple, and the criminal are not intelligible apart from

the affirmative principle which presses forward to its triumph. Amidst the organization of state power in constitutional law and foreign policy (international law and world-history) with the vicissitudes of development (such as war), it becomes a question of the peoples that have exemplified the successive stages of the Idea. Hegel's emphasis on external conditions is such that one might readily identify his conception of the State with the probable supremacy of the industrial class, in terms of the materialistic view of history and economic determinism; hence state socialism would seem logically to follow. But Hegel sees in the constitutional monarchy the special achievement of the modern world, and looks forward to a community of nations in which the world-spirit is to realize an essentially *ethical* ideal for all humanity.

Philosophy of History.—Reason being “sovereign of the world,” the history of the world presents a rational process in which the philosophy of the State is more fully exemplified, individual states being organic and subordinate to the Idea.²³ History as the embodiment of Reason therefore discloses Spirit as the guiding force using the spirits of great men and the nations as instruments, the Spirit being the unity in the “infinite complex of things” or the inward history of mankind as one vast society of nations. Spirit displays itself in its most concrete reality in universal history, which thus becomes the subject-matter of the philosophy of history. Presupposing the principles with their stages which Logic has already made explicit, this philosophy is concerned with the potentiality of the Idea made *actual* in the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its “essence.” The Idea then has a *process*, and clues are found in the aggregates of peoples and important stages of history in which the idea at the basis of the given movement of history finds illustration. The various significant ideas imply, in turn, a teleological connection between the attainments of the various stages, namely, the logic of history. Facts remain facts in this undertaking, and must not be coerced into preconceived meanings., This

²³ *Philosophy of History*, tr. by Sibree, p. 9.

is an important consideration in an age when, through the prevalence of the romantic spirit, it was a simple matter to create one's own ideal world on an *a priori* basis. A "thoughtful consideration" of given history is what Hegel proposes. The Idea, actualizing itself as will, does not suffice. The interest of the given participants in recorded history is a vital factor, notably their *passion*, without which nothing great has ever been accomplished in the world.²⁴ The Idea *amidst the complex of human passions* is then the inclusive conception.

Given history does not of course disclose a *conscious* aim of any kind. One turns to the study of it therefore with faith only, hoping to discern the meaning in the struggle of passions: the view that history as a development is a rational process is admittedly an "inference." One avoids the widely current fiction that there was an original primeval people who were taught immediately by God and supposedly endowed with perfect insight, possessing knowledge of all natural laws and spiritual truths. Nor can one fall back on the assumption that nature is a rational system in itself. Since freedom has its conditions, it becomes a question of envisaging the successive stages of freedom as the human spirit attains consciousness and individuality.

In history the Idea develops in *time*, as Nature it develops in *space*. History, travelling from East to West in the progress of freedom, discloses the consciousness that (1) One is free, (2) some are free, and (3) All are free, namely, in successive world-kingdoms: Oriental despotism, Greek democracy and Roman aristocracy, and German monarchy. In the German spirit Hegel sees the spirit of the new world triumphant, "the destiny of the German peoples is to be the bearers of the Christian principle."²⁵ To establish this thesis Hegel applies as usual his dialectical analysis, with an interpretation of the Trinity, and a study of the three stages of Christian dogma. The forms assumed by Christianity as historically representa-

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

tive become in turn rational principles embodying the Idea. Thus the transition is once more made to philosophy.

Theory of Fine Art.—Hegel distinguished “Aesthetic” as the science of sensation or feeling (Baumgarten) from the Philosophy of Fine Art, which in turn is distinguished from the beauty of nature, artistic beauty being higher.²⁶ The beauty of nature is but a reflection of the beauty which belongs to the mind, and so it is imperfect: in the beauty of fine art we “enjoy the *freedom* of its productive and plastic energy.” Fine art is real art, free, when achieving its highest rank in the same sphere to which religion and philosophy belong by bringing the Divine Nature to expression. Here too human interest with its spiritual values is attained in higher form, as the divinity in man becomes operative.

The work of art, although presenting itself to sensuous apprehension, addressed to sensuous feeling as outer and inner, to perception and imagination, also addresses itself to the mind, which is meant to be affected by it and derive satisfaction from it.²⁷ The sensuous aspect is therefore a means only, a surface or semblance. The content of art is borrowed in a measure from the sensuous, from nature, in representation of some spiritual fact; the end of art is other than the formal imitation of the given, however essential natural shapes may be as its foundation. Art is a realization of the “truth” in the form of sensuous artistic shape; is a representation which is its own intrinsic end or purpose in contrast with the alleged purification, instruction, or moral benefit, for which art is sometimes said to exist. In another sense, art proceeds from the Absolute Idea and has its end through the sensuous representation of the Absolute itself. The content of art being the Idea, its form lies in the plastic use of the images which are accessible to sense.

The first requirement is that the content offered for artistic representation shall be worthy, the second that it

²⁶ Cf. Bosanquet, Hegel's *Philosophy of Fine Art* (Hegel's *Einkleitung* to his theory of fine art).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67, foll.

shall not be anything abstract in itself, and the third that it shall be something individual and concrete. "*Defectiveness of form* arises from *defectiveness of content*." ²⁸ The types of art have their genesis in the different modes of grasping the Idea as developed into concrete form fit for actuality. Hegel discusses (1) *symbolic* art as the first form, the search after plastic material; the sensuous externality of concrete forms represented as transient and fugitive; (2) *classical* art as the free and adequate embodiment of the highest excellence of sensuous expression, for example, the Greek god as an object of naïve intuition and sensuous imagination; and (3) *romantic* art, or the higher stage which coincides with the Christian conception of God as Spirit. Hence follows his analyses of architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry.

Philosophy of Religion.—Withdrawing himself from temporal things in quest for that superior region of truth where eternal peace is to be found, in religion man places himself in the centre which "gives life and quickening to all things, and which animates and preserves in existence all the various forms of being." ²⁹ Thus for Hegel the ultimate centre in religion is in the thought and feeling of God, regarded as the beginning and end of all things. Here man unburdens himself of all finiteness, through the feeling of the Eternal. Not to apprehend religion in the region of eternal truth is not to possess the essence with which the philosophy of religion is concerned. Philosophy by itself may not bring this consciousness to man, for philosophy may not edify. Yet philosophy can disclose the necessity of religion as the universal destiny of Spirit, although individuals may fail to grasp what has been brought into their presence. Philosophy as knowledge of what God is and of what follows from his nature makes its highest contribution in unfolding the nature of religion. Again, it is knowledge of man in the highest region of his nature, which is divine reason in him. To know himself in very truth is to realize that religion is not his

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

²⁹ *Philosophy of Religion*, tr. by Speirs and Sanderson, Vol. I, p. 2.

discovery, but a work of divine operation and creation in him, a product of the divine Spirit.³⁰

The triadic movement of thought of his system as a whole now becomes for Hegel the rhythm or pure life of Spirit, giving itself an object, becoming finite in manifested form, and returning from the relation of objectivity with the attainment of freedom. The "moment of universality" of the dialectic in general is here God in his universality, without finiteness or particularity. Then, after the finite as a moment, in the stage of reflection, comes the union of finite and infinite. Our thought, starting with this universal, rises above the sensuous and external, recognizes the necessity of the religious standpoint, the forms of religious consciousness, including feeling as the immediate form, also figurate thinking, and passes through these stages to the speculative conception of religion. The religious consciousness thus brings a realization of the sources of religion in feeling, poetry, art; but its most significant stage is higher, namely, on the plane of *reason* as the "region in which alone religion can be at home."³¹ When thus explicitly related to the True, religion possesses all content in itself. Granted the central principle, as a relation of the finite spirit to absolute Spirit, the progressive analysis can proceed, through a study of worship or cultus, faith, the sphere of true moral will (the State), to the point of explicit recognition of Spirit as absolute.

The religious consciousness in its primal state is the immediate form of "definite religion," namely, natural religion in its immediacy, religion prior to the distinction between its sensuous nature and its essential reality. Out of this union of the spiritual and the natural proceeds a division or dualism of consciousness within itself, thence a conflict of subjectivity, and an advance to a yet higher stage when man becomes aware of his powerlessness in relation to God as Power. As in his study of history, Hegel follows developmental stages from Orient to Occi-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

dent. God is conceived as substance in the natural religions of the Orient; the religions of measure, imagination, and Being-within-itself are the Chinese religion, Brahminism, and Buddhism. The transitional types occur in Persia, Syria, and Egypt. In Judaism comes recognition of God as subject; in the Greek religion beauty is recognized, and the finite in contrast with the infinite and abstract in Oriental religion; in the Roman religion utility or adaptation is seen; and in Christianity, reconciliation of infinite and finite, God and man. As the form in which religion is most fully realized, Christianity is absolute religion, the final synthesis which brings to completion such imperfect forms as pantheism and historic types prior to revealed religion. Hegel introduces his triads in an analysis of Christian dogma as recapitulating yet transcending the successive or representative types of lesser religions. As the highest type Christianity represents the supreme truth of the religious triad in the Trinity of Father, Son, and the religious community or kingdom of the Spirit (the self-alienation of God reconciled in the Church). The triadic development of immanent Reason here reaches its culmination, in the enriched supremacy of the Idea. For Hegel the doctrines of three "persons," of the atonement, of the unique historical event in Palestine, have philosophic places through what these dogmas signify, when the content of Christianity is seen to be identical with that of philosophy. Where religion represents or symbolizes, philosophy becomes explicit by bringing to light the implied concepts as Reason, the comprehended truth of absolute consciousness.

Philosophy.—The history of philosophy discloses the necessary stages or logical development of the Idea in which the essential systems, in opposition and contradiction, in reconciliation and higher synthesis, reveal the one absolute system as the unifying product.³² Here the absolute content given in the philosophy of religion and the other disciplines attains its encyclopedic culmination. The genetic succession of systems and their connections in the

³² *Werke*, Bd. xiii.

history of culture is that of the system of the categories, notably in the case of Eleaticism as philosophy of Being, in Heraclitanism as philosophy of Becoming, and in the philosophy of the Idea which eventuates in absolute idealism (after the preliminaries of consciousness, self-consciousness, and pure thought, in Descartes, the Kantian and Fichtean philosophies, which find correction in the Hegelian system). The Spirit is shown to be absolute in philosophy only through the complete forms of objectification which the system makes explicit. Spirit attains an absolute stage in art, regarded as the immediate intuition of the Idea present to our perception as "beauty" amidst the forms of stone, color, tone, poetry; but even in poetry the Idea is expressed in limited types. Through religion the individual endeavors to become consciously one with God; yet feeling, symbol, dogma, institution falls short, as indeed the attempted proofs of God's existence disclose their limitations. Granted the highest advance of the externalizing Idea in nature, in history, in the world at large, there is still need of reconciliation. Philosophy is alone able to envisage the entire process in which the unity of art and religion is the starting-point for the highest enterprise of the Idea. Here is gained the utmost triumph of the concrete universal, in the system of all *essential* principles as "actual," hence rational; in contrast with the contingencies of given history in each of the disciplines. Where the finite is exposed in the superfluities, accidental variations, and failures of the phenomenal embodiments of the categories, philosophy assimilates the internal or significant and mounts constructively to its goal.³³ The finite mind, expressed in a special instance of the conflict with nature, chance, or the accidental, is (on its higher side) a process through which the Absolute makes its conquest over its own self-alienation. Philosophy masters the essential forms which find lesser expression in art and religion by making explicit the necessity of Absolute Being, the identity of thought and being, the deduction of the

³³ Cf. Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, p. 228, foll.

categories and the ultimate nature of reality, and the dialectical method which yields this completed result.

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§ 24. SUCCESSORS OF HEGEL

Speculation won its most audacious triumph in the absolute idealism of Hegel. To make an impartial estimate of this system is to note the great impetus which it gave to the philosophy of history and the history of philosophy, developed after Hegel's time as independent disciplines, apart from Hegel's over-zeal in identifying the categories and dialectic of his system with history as supposedly culminating in his Germany and his philosophy. His pan-logism does not ignore facts, does not pretend to deduce the principles and the method essential to the complete system from pure thought; it endeavors to make explicit the method and principles which life or history implies: Hegel himself was dependent on his early insight into Christianity as historical, for the method which he everywhere used. What he ventures to offer is the system by

which all that is essential to any philosophic branch of knowledge whatsoever can be discerned and thought. The ambiguities which led to divisions in his camp, to the discrediting of his system in Germany, were due to his unprecedented abstractions. His system is formal in the extreme, and is readily misunderstood by those who do not distinguish between (1) what Hegel derived from the knowledge available in his day, (2) the principles he put forth as "essential," and (3) the data he rejected as not essential to the systematic development of universals. His dependence on his age is notable in the case of his Nature-philosophy. Chemistry was still far from complete, the principle of the conservation of energy had not yet been formulated, great progress in applying mathematical conceptions was yet to be made; and, more significantly still, the triumph of biology and the modern philosophy of evolution was yet to come. To see the force of his dialectic as applied to nature, is to consider what would be his criticism of the various naturalisms current in our day. Hegel would not try to deduce nature from pure thought, to show how nature was created; but he did not make this venture in his own time: the given world of nature, then as now, was but one of several fields in which the development of universal principles could be investigated in their abstraction. So too in his estimates of human history Hegel was dependent on the researches of his day, a day which marked the beginning of the history of philosophy as we know it. Whatever the limitations of his judgments, the philosophy of development owes a very great debt to him. Philosophy remains the highest discipline, whatever may be said about the limitations of speculation as exemplified by the Hegelian system. Thought actually pursues a dialectic, despite any excessive use made by Hegel of the triadic form. What is called for is a reformulation of certain phases of the dialectical method in order to make more explicit the relation between truth and error, good and evil, the rational and the irrational. What was imperative indeed, when Hegel ceased his labors, with portions of his system left in the form of lecture-notes only

and far from complete, was a correlative study of will and reason in idealistic opposition, with due recognition of catastrophes in nature, of the facts of disease, crime, sin, social conflict in all its forms, in order to determine the universal meanings or values. This investigation begins with Schopenhauer and continues with the development of the philosophy of evolution in its reaction against design in nature. Another reaction was aroused by the theory of economic determinism, leading to a type of socialism which assimilated Hegel's ethics by eliminating his idealism and commingling it with a radically different theory of history. It was not in Germany, but in England, America, and Italy, that neo-idealism arose in re-interpretation of Hegelian metaphysics.

Successors of Hegel in Germany.—After the death of Hegel, his followers divided into conservative and liberal groups, chiefly over religious or theological issues on which Hegel had expressed himself less definitely. The conservatives inclined towards a supernatural view, in favor of theism, personal immortality, and the incarnation; the liberals favored a spiritual pantheism, the incarnation being interpreted as the divine spirit in humanity. The so-called "right wing," resisting this pantheistic interpretation, included I. H. Fichte (son of J. G. Fichte), C. H. Weisse (1801–1866), H. Ulrici (1806–1884), R. Rothe (1799–1867); and A. Trendelenburg (1802–1872). Trendelenburg, who was an acute critic of Hegel, returned in a measure to Aristotle, adopted motion and purpose as fundamental, common to being and thinking. He substituted motion for the dialectic principle; regarded space, time, the categories as forms of both being and thought; and classed ethics as a higher stage of the organic process. The "left wing" included A. Rüge (1802–1880), L. Feuerbach (1804–1872), D. F. Strauss (1808–1874), author of the famous *Life of Jesus* and other critical works, in which the orthodox dogmas were given a mythological interpretation, the biblical narrative being considered in large part as non-historical. Karl Marx (1818–1883), author of a no less famous work, *Das Kapital*, 1867, very prominent

in the history of socialism, put an economic interpretation on history and interpreted the dialectic in terms of class conflicts. Thus private property, originally right and rational, is to be overcome and superseded in the process of economic development. Feuerbach, taking man as his starting-point, explained religion on psychological grounds. Man, by objectifying himself, knows his own true essence, knows himself in his idea of God. The "absolute" is our own universal nature freed from limitations. Among the historians of philosophy who felt the influence of Hegel's teaching without being limited to a particular school, may be mentioned E. Zeller, well known to students of Greek philosophy; J. E. Erdmann, K. Prantl, Kuno Fischer, and W. Windelband.

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§ 25. PESSIMISM AND THE WILL. SCHOPENHAUER

Life of Schopenhauer.—Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), born in Danzig, the son of a rich banker, was educated in France and England, by means of European travel, by experience in a business house in Hamburg, and at the universities of Göttingen and Berlin. He early became interested in philosophy and natural science, also in Sanscrit literature; and was chiefly influenced by Plato and Kant. In Berlin he heard Fichte, whose influence was no doubt greater than Schopenhauer would have acknowledged. His first publication, a graduation essay, was entitled *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, 1813. Schopenhauer lectured in Berlin 1820–1831, then settled in Frankfort, where he lived until his death. His chief work, *The World as Will and Idea*, appeared in 1819.

Schopenhauer owed his characteristic grouchiness and pessimism in part to his father, who was irritable and unbalanced. On his mother's side there was also mental weakness. Temperamentally inclined to melancholia, anxiety, suspicion, Schopenhauer began as a boy to brood over human miseries, and was given to anger and extreme self-assertion. At seventeen he found himself as sorrowful as Buddha over the miseries of the world. In a measure contemplative and inclined toward Hindu philosophy, his life was torn between choleric and bitter moods, emphasized by a sensual nature and self-love, and stirred by a desire to find rest and satisfaction. His experience as a teacher and his long struggle for recognition as a writer also embittered him, an antagonism which is shown in his contempt for other thinkers, notably Schelling and Hegel. Thus his own life yielded abundant subject-matter for his philosophy, combining as he did abilities inherited from his mother, who was a novelist, with his father's irascible disposition. His attention was early focused on the problem of moral and physical evil, while the unsolved problems of the critical philosophy gave him opportunity to become, as he believed, Kant's true successor. His temperamental reactions are seen in his envious references to Schelling and Hegel. He is even irritated by the Hegelian proposition concerning the rationality of the world. For him, the beginning of philosophy is not wonder, but confusion and despair; hence he finds a clue in the conflicting energies and impulses of his own inner life, and in current events which aroused his pity and anger.

Epistemology.—Starting with the methods and results of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, but mindful of Kant's inconsistency in attributing to things-in-themselves the raw material of sensation, while refusing to apply the category of causality, Schopenhauer assigns to causality the central place, by beginning with his preliminary analysis of the principle of sufficient reason. This principle is fundamental to all science, involving the *a priori* assumption that all things have their reason for being which underlies our search for the *why* of things. This principle cannot

be proved: it is already implied as the ground of all proof. Hence philosophical inquiry begins with the linkage of all objects within our representations in the current of time, the complex of empirical reality. In this uninterrupted nexus of changes succeeding one another in time, the law of causality refers exclusively to changes of material states, the entire present state being the cause of the one which forthwith ensues. The law of causality is known *a priori*. All necessity is based on it. Its forms belong under three heads: (1) inorganic changes, mechanical, physical, chemical; (2) organic changes, stimuli; (3) motives, consciously performed acts. Accordingly, in his account of perception Schopenhauer adds to the outer and inner forms of our sensibility (space and time) *causality*, by means of which we are able to construct the body as the cause of sensation.¹ Space is the form of perception, time is the form of change; causality is the regulator of the passing in and out of changes, the first condition of all empirical perception. Since causality is supplied by the understanding, it is through causality alone that we gain knowledge of the necessity of a succession of two states. The principle of sufficient reason, as fundamental, is the form common to all representations. The first class of objects for the subject involves the principle of sufficient reason of *becoming*. The second involves the principle of *knowing*: if a judgment is to express knowledge of any kind it must have a ground, must be true. The *a priori* intuitions of the forms of space and time involve the principle of *being*. The immediate object of the inner sense (the subject knowing itself exclusively as willing) involves the principle of *acting*. In this fourfold scheme the ego conditions all representations as their necessary correlate, but never becomes a representation or object. The identity of the willing with the knowing subject is inexplicable, is immediately given; all other kinds of knowledge are mediate. Arranged systematically, the fourfold roots of the principle of sufficient reason apply to formal intuitions, to empirical intuitions, to acts of will, and to abstract con-

¹ *Fourfold Root*, trans., p. 65.

cepts. The fourfold necessity is logical, physical, mathematical, moral.

The World as Idea.—Starting then with sensation as given, as the correlate of bodily change, we conceive of an object as the cause of sensation, on the ground that the causal law is the presupposition by which the perception of outer things becomes possible. In his *World as Will and Idea*, Schopenhauer first describes the world as my representation (idea), as object for the subject. Time, space, causality presuppose that the world only *is* in relation to consciousness. Idea or representation (*Vorstellung*) is one aspect of my world. The thinking subject or ego does not come under the forms of space and time, but is presupposed by them; always the knower, never the known; the supporter of the world, the condition of all phenomena; that which every one finds himself to be. The principle of sufficient reason being the general expression for all the forms of the objects of which we are *a priori* conscious, the world of representation is seen as subject to this principle of the *ground of Being*. Considering my representation in the first place as matter, I find that its true existence is in its activity: only as active does it fill space and time; only for perception does it exist. It is describable, to be sure, in terms of cause and effect, as impenetrable, extended, infinitely divisible, indestructible, possessing mobility (weight). Yet it is only through, for, and in the understanding. As animal body, it is the immediate object for the subject, through which the perception of other objects becomes possible. Bodily changes being immediately felt, the perception of effects referred to their causes arises, and so begins our experience as attributed to objects.

The grade of reality which Schopenhauer assigns to the sphere of experience as representation is comparable to that of dreams, life and dreams being leaves from the same book. Yet the understanding could never come into operation unless sensation, that is, awareness of the changes of the body, were given. The sensibility of animal bodies is therefore one of the conditions of knowing, although

the body as a whole is not the immediate object; the brain is immediate. To start with the bodily object as such would be to fall into materialism. To start with the subject as such would also involve one-sidedness. Nor is it possible to begin with the principle of sufficient reason as if we could know things in themselves by its aid, as if we could know either the nature of the world or the nature of the subject. Reason can only give after it has received. Rational knowledge is abstract, conceptual. Reason does not actually extend our knowledge, but gives another form to it. We start with sense-perception as valid in the particular case, as the foundation of science, as the primal, original evidence: immediate evidence is preferable to reasoned truth.

Schopenhauer explains on physiological grounds certain phases of the process of knowledge which Kant had undertaken to explain *a priori* by an elaborate analysis of the understanding. The organism does not merely give the raw material of our sensibility, but in part produces our cognition: we are dependant on external things through the brain, with its mechanism. We are justified in declaring that the power of material things to act upon one another, to affect our animal bodies, is a condition of knowing the world objectively. Granted this emphasis on bodily changes, we may indeed formulate the implications of the knowing process on the subjective side, and point out that the perceived world is only an appearance. The limitations of our cognitive processes are such that reason can at best explain the connections of phenomena, never the phenomena themselves.

The World as Will.—While however the principle of sufficient reason pertains only to cognizing beings, there remains a way to apprehend the thing in itself. As a *will* I am such a thing. In my aspirations and yearnings, in the impulse to self-assertion, in the depths of my being below pleasure and pain, in my inmost nature I am will. We understand the inmost nature of the world by apprehending our own inmost nature. Our knowledge of the will does not rest upon direct introspection alone, but we

have other means of apprehending the will: our whole body is its material expression. The body is given as an idea in intelligent perception and in an entirely different way it is immediately known as will.² The act of will and movement of the body are one and the same. The action of the body being the action of the will objectified, only in reflection does a distinction appear between will and action. Every impression upon the body is an impression on the will: of pain, when opposed to the will, of pleasure when in harmony with it. By contrast with the body as the manifestation of the will, the will alone is a thing-in-itself, and as such quite different from its phenomenal appearance, entirely free from all forms of the phenomena. In itself therefore it is completely groundless, although its manifestations are wholly under the principle of sufficient reason. It is free from all multiplicity; in self-consciousness the will is known directly and in itself.³ The personality however is not will as a thing in itself, but is a phenomenon of will, already determined.

The operation of the will in the cosmic sense of the term is manifest in the whole of nature, in all nature's forces and changes. The will reveals itself as completely in one oak, for example, as in the millions; it is present entire, undivided in every object of nature, in every living being. Force is a definite grade of manifestation, law the relation of the Idea to the form of its objectification.⁴ Through space and time the Idea multiplies itself in innumerable phenomena, space being the *principium individuationis*. That is to say, the will is never a cause: it is only through space that things become diverse. In the lowest grade there is blind striving. The idea of design in reference to organized beings and of conformity to law in unorganized nature is introduced by the understanding; hence both belong only to phenomena. In the construction of nature we are indeed guided by the idea of an end, but

² *The World as Will and Idea*, trans., Vol. I, p. 129.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁴ That is, different grades of objectification of the will (cf. Plato's Ideas), *op. cit.*, p. 168.

what we think as means and end in every case, both in inner and outer teleology of nature, is what we are obliged to think because of the unity of the one will, thoroughly agreeing with itself. This unity has assumed the form of the multiplicity of objects which exist *for our manner of knowing*.⁵

The Will in Man.—The central consideration is not our cognitive process: it is the endless striving of the will, the eternal becoming or endless flux. Every man finds himself as this will. Every particular act is describable with reference to its end; but no end is assignable to the will as a whole: it is irrational. In itself the will is unconscious; for consciousness is conditioned by the intellect and intellect is a mere accident of our being, a cerebral function which will cease with the brain.⁶ Willing does not require to be learned, like knowing, but immediately succeeds; it can subsist and manifest itself without knowledge, although will conditions knowledge. The will is the eternal, indestructible part of man; it manifests itself everywhere as the will to live for the sake of living. Given this impulse of self-assertion, we become involved in the illusion that life is good, and so we strive to live at any cost. To discern this situation to the core is to see that this insatiable impulse brings pain, that life is a rush and confusion in which living beings fight and destroy one another. While nearly everybody is under this illusion that life is worth while—produced by the desire to live—a few are able to lift the veil and see the hollowness of it all. Through denial of the will to live, its suppression through asceticism or mystic self-denial, one can escape into the heaven of non-willing.

Schopenhauer further distinguishes between will (*Wille*, *voluntas*) in its widest sense as the fundamental essence of all that happens, including vegetative and vital functions, the agent in all functions; and free-will (*Willkühr*, *arbitrium*).⁷ Man has power of elective decision, in delibera-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 369, foll.; *Fourfold Root* and *The Will in Nature*, trans., p. 238.

tion between motives; but the most powerful motive decides, man's acts follow of necessity when this motive is perceived. Freedom to do anything we like would be freedom without a cause, whereas the will is moved by representations. Since I will according to my character, every action follows with strict necessity as an effect of motive upon character.⁸ But regarded as will human character is without ground. Each of us can indeed give an account of particular actions, as if we rationally guided our conduct; if asked why we will at all, or why in general we will to exist, we would be unable to answer.⁹ Since a man is nought except will, his nature consists in the striving of his will, on and on forever; what he calls happiness and well-being consist in the quick transitions from wish to satisfaction, and then to other wishes and their eventuations, through which we seek freedom from suffering. Every man being what he is through will, character is original, and in this sense man is his own work; for, knowledge not yet being given, a man cannot resolve to be this or that, cannot be other than the will already makes him. In this essential and peculiar sense, precisely what he finds himself to be, as willing individual, a man must continue to will.¹⁰

Pessimism.—Man is in bondage to life and its conditions. His intellectual life is not the resource claimed for it, as if it were spontaneous, free to energize after its own fashion; it is wholly subservient to the wants and needs of this natural existence. We readily fall into erroneous ideas concerning both reason and life, our knowledge is not worthy of the trust bestowed on it. Pain is often our real motive, when we seem to act on rational grounds. We act on the assumption that pleasure will exceed pain; here too we are under misapprehension, since there is excess of pain. Suffering is inevitable just because of the will to life. Human existence, tossed backwards and forwards between pain and ennui, is a vain pursuit

⁸ *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. I, p. 146.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

of happiness, a happiness which proves to be negative and illusory when found. Genuine, enduring happiness is wholly out of the question. Life as a whole is a tragedy for every individual. The fate of men is want, wretchedness, affliction, misery, death; and men are worthless as a whole. Schopenhauer confesses that he has never been able to think himself into the point of view of Leibniz's *Monadology*, with its "palpably sophistical proofs," and "lame excuse for the evil in the world, that the bad sometimes brings about the good."¹¹ This is the worst of all possible worlds, so arranged as to be able to maintain itself only with great difficulty: a worse could not continue to exist. It offers us conditions in which life for the individual is a ceaseless battle for existence, with destruction imminent at every step.

Pantheism would be no more defensible than optimism. Eventually all pantheism must be overthrown by the demands of ethics, by appeal to the facts of evil and suffering in the world. If the world were a theophany all that men and brutes do would be equally excellent, nothing would be censurable, nothing praiseworthy: ethics would be impossible. Nor would the situation be any better on the assumption of goodness in nations; for masses have no more content than individuals, in each of whom the will to live resides undivided. It is also out of the question to believe in God in a theistic sense of the term, since this belief cannot be reconciled with the existence of evil.

Ethics.—The basis of ethics is already implied in the foregoing. Man's empirical character is wholly determined by the conditions environing the will to live. Ethics is not concerned with actions and their results but solely with willing, and willing occurs only in the individual. Awareness of remorse suggests indeed that the will is free, but there is no possible ground of freedom save in the intelligible ego, wholly removed from these empirical conditions, from the acquired character which is due to contact with the world. Repentance never proceeds from a change of will. Choice is merely the possibility of a thor-

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 395.

oughly fought out battle between motives in which the strongest will necessarily prevail. Fate is the infinite concatenation of causes: if people were not worthless as a whole their fate would not be so sad.

Obviously, a greatest good under such conditions need not even be mentioned as a possibility. An absolute good would be a contradiction. Relatively speaking, good signifies the conformity of an object to any definite effort of the will. A wrong assertion of the will to live goes so far as to deny the will in others. Since man is selfish and grasping, intent on securing his own ends, success in the world means competing with one's neighbor in self-assertion. Underneath many so-called virtues lurk egotism, meanness, selfishness. Thus love of labor, perseverance, temperance, frugality, are mere disguises. Schopenhauer is entirely sceptical concerning them all. For what would the supposed virtues lead to if successful, save further effort ending in merciless, irremediable suffering? Even the alleged perfecting of life would but render it the more intolerable.

Schopenhauer softens the description however in favor of pity for the miseries of others. Although weeping is sympathy with ourselves, and friendship is a mixture of sympathy and selfishness, a standard of goodness is possible, that is, sympathy which contains no element of self-assertion, due to the denial of the will to live. This denial comes only when the meaning of life's struggle is seen, its waywardness and hollowness, its illusions, deceptions, miseries. With the discovery that life is inane and futile, the will turns against it, negates life, renounces its alleged joys, cultivates non-attachment, indifference. Voluntary and complete chastity, intentional poverty, and an inner life of holiness are to follow. Since suffering has the potentiality of sanctification, it can aid this process of renunciation. As the will to live (original sin) was typified by Adam, so its denial (salvation) was exemplified by Jesus, through freedom from sin and the will to live. Christianity in later times lost its true significance and degenerated into dull optimism. The kingdom of grace

which it offered in its purity is identified by Schopenhauer with the freedom or heaven (*Nirvâna*) of Buddhism. Thus he adopts a negative terminology hard to follow in the Occident, but appreciable in terms borrowed from the Orient.¹²

Aesthetic Intuition.—Schopenhauer grants man only one respite from this tragic round of self-assertion and negativity, namely, by his doctrine of contemplation of the Platonic Ideas implying his theory of art. While in our miserable finitude we are endlessly subject to this waywardness of the will for which no reason can be assigned, the Ideas do not come under this direful necessity; the Ideas lie outside the sphere of the individual's knowledge, as the immediate objectivity of the will, accessible as objects when the individuality of the knowing subject is transcended.¹³ This transition occurs suddenly when the subject ceases to be individual and becomes pure will-less subject of knowledge, free from the relationships of the principle of sufficient reason, one with its object. Then only does the world as idea appear complete and pure, in adequate objectivity, as will in itself; will recognizing and knowing itself in the Idea as the abiding and the essential. In this moment of escape from the will to live, the world of beauty is envisaged. Art reproduces the eternal Ideas grasped through this pure cloudless insight, free from the forms of space and time, the relationship of subject to object, in which the inward meaning of the world is seen.¹⁴ Thus art is a kind of consolation which on occasion lifts us above the struggle into a vision of things seen under the guise of eternity. Music is especially a means of deliverance. Genius is the capacity for knowing the Ideas, for communicating this vision of transcendental reality. The contemplative moment arises by sinking one's self in intuition, losing one's self in the object, forgetting all individuality through an inward dis-

¹² See P. Deussen, *The Elements of Metaphysics*, tr. by C. M. Duff, 1894; Royce, *Spirit of Mod. Phil.*, Lecture VIII.

¹³ *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. I, p. 219.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

position in which the enjoyment and contemplation of the sublime displaces the slavery of the will.

Estimate.—By indulging in thorough-going pessimism, substantiated by appeal to the darker facts of life and the importation of Oriental motives, Schopenhauer achieved a type, compelling attention to the suffering and misery of the world, exposing the shallowness of mere optimism and the difficulties which beset any theism or teleology that neglects the problem of evil. His doctrine of the will offers the great alternative conception over against rationalism; it implies that as the world is simply will, caprice, existing because it thus likes to express itself, no explanation of the world is possible. By substituting the mechanism of the brain for portions of the *a priori* scheme of knowledge, in the Kantian doctrine, and identifying volition with bodily behavior, Schopenhauer cleared the way for voluntarism and the physiological psychology of recent times. Although he uses the same term for "life" in the biological, the mental and the religious sense, identifying the world with will, and also intimating that through intuition we know ourselves as will, his doctrine involves a profoundly suggestive unity.

He is plainly irritated when his thought threatens to pass over into rationalism, lest he should make full use of the principle of sufficient reason. He declines to make explicit the implications of his Platonism. Yet he is all the more instructive, because he holds resolutely to the Will as his central principle. With penetrating grasp of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, he seems to be unaware of the profounder bearings of Kant's ethics. His essentially negative view of Christianity is characteristic of his adoption of Oriental conceptions. He dwells too on the difficulties rather than the values of theism. His doctrine that the true foundation of philosophy is subjective, seems a melancholy truth for a thinker of his temperament, imprisoned as he is in the thought of sad experiences, tending to identify the intellect with the processes of the brain. Psychology does not sustain his radical distinction between will and intellect. Having lowered intellect to the level

of the transitory brain, and the principle of sufficient reason to the plane of the mere understanding, there is for him no possibility of emerging from his subjectivity. The considerations for which he pleads, under the term "will," had already been recognized in a measure by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in other terms. Hegel's "impotence of nature" is for him the irrationality of the will. Schopenhauer ventures in a measure to *rationalize* the will in all its phases, from the plane of the unconscious to the highest moment of self-consciousness and the universality of the will in the cosmos. Thus he prepares the way for further consideration of the "unconscious," and for the enrichments of later idealism in its assimilation of the metaphysics of the will. Like Hobbes, Hume, and Rousseau, he is influential by what he compels people to think; not by virtue of ideas to be adopted in the form he gives them.

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Hartmann.—In his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, 1869, Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906) offered a modification of Schopenhauer's voluntarism and pessimism. Idea is added to will, and the combined principle, as the ground of reality, is conceived as operating in nature as if intelligent but as more strictly speaking unconscious. Matter is not describable as force alone, but also as will and idea; hence mind and matter are explained in their unity with respect to development. Instinct, for example, cannot be accounted for by appeal to material organization alone, nor is it due to reasoning. So too perception belongs in the region of the unconscious, feelings and motives have unconscious sources; even conscious volition proceeds by aid of an unconscious will. The unconscious has been a factor all along in human history. In our rational processes

and in our inspiration we are dependent on the unconscious, as the source of the spontaneous and the unpremeditated.

Like Schopenhauer, Hartmann finds existence evil, and is deeply impressed by the sorrow of the world; but he claims to have passed beyond the limitations of his temperament to theoretical grounds for his pessimism. In contrast with Schopenhauer's doctrine that evil is irreparable, Hartmann develops his view in evolutionary terms by appeal to a possible redemption; since hope lies in the unconscious, with its efforts toward overcoming the blind or refractory elements of the world. There is however an irreconcilable conflict between civilization and happiness, and every advance is followed by retrogression. It would be better then for the race to decide upon non-existence, the final goal being a return to the state of rest which preceded the long strife of the will.

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§ 26. REALISM AND EMPIRICISM IN GERMANY

Herbart.—Reacting against the idealism of Fichte and Hegel, Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), who became Kant's successor in Königsberg in 1809, combined the realistic elements in Kantianism with doctrines derived in part from Plato and Leibniz. Herbart rejected Kant's idealistic doctrine of space, time, and the categories, also his *Critique of Judgment*. He is concerned with the critical analysis of inner experience and the study of formal conceptions, with the contradictions implied in these conceptions. Philosophy is indeed the elaboration of concepts. Thus aesthetics differs radically from metaphysics. Philosophical inquiry starts with the given, with appearances,

and leads from phenomena to metaphysics. The given is that which we necessarily perceive. Thus we come upon such problems as change, which in itself is self-contradictory. Reform is needed in metaphysics, that all conceptions may be brought into systematic relation: conceptions which cannot be developed as one are to be thought as many in accordance with various points of view.

Herbart endeavors to keep close to given experience; since experience is the ground of certainty, the starting-point of philosophy. Very important for philosophical analysis are such contradictions as that of the thing and its attributes; the contradictions involved in our ideas of space, time, and motion. These contradictions have been evident in the history of philosophy since the time of the Eleatics and Sceptics; they underlie the starting-point of Socrates, Descartes, Kant; and are recognized in the Hegelian paradoxes without any real solution. Herbart finds his clue to these difficulties in views suggested in part by the doctrines of the Eleatics and Atomists.

The Reals.—That which exists is positive, simple, unchangeable; possesses being without becoming. There is a manifold of existing entities or essences (*Realen*), some of which are non-spatial, non-temporal monads. These entities are differentiated by their properties; not by quantitative relations, such as size and figure (atomism). The higher type of reality is a plurality of suprasensible reals. The reals are characterized by self-preservation or persistence, despite their disturbances or supposed modification of qualities. In the case of change, nothing occurs within the individual in question save that in meeting other reals inward disturbances are produced which arouse the individual to resistance. The changes which things appear to have undergone, as noted by an observer, are explained by the fact that things are seen in relation to other things. All phenomena are explicable by reference to these inner disturbances, the tendency toward self-conservation, and the accidental standpoints of observers. Space-relation, for example, is an objective appearance. External relations are intelligible, valid, however. The

thing is to be conceived as in itself simple, unchangeable; but also in the light of relations which do not pertain to it as a simple entity, which leave it intact in the presence of disturbances describable as contingent. Hence all changes, ordinarily attributed to the substances of which an object is said to be composed, are successive relations in which the reals stand to one another.

The Self.—The soul is absolutely simple, indestructible, spaceless, although it is located at a single point in the brain. Other reals affect the soul, in the processes of sense-experience. Remaining unchanged even by the severest disturbance penetrating inner experience, the soul's acts of self-preservation are reported in consciousness, as ideas or representations. The relations between external things, reported as spatial, are explicable with reference to a psychical mechanism which cannot be transcended. The relational process seems to be wholly transitory; but ideas or representations persist after the occasion ceases, and become unconscious. Our self-preservational acts are immediately known to us; yet what Herbart undertakes to explain is merely the empirical ego, not the pure ego: the self remains an unknown real. From the fact that the soul's disturbances begin with sense-presentations which meet arrest and that arrested presentations remain in the soul as tendencies to further responses, we cannot legitimately infer the existence of "faculties" or ultimate qualities.

Psychology.—What results from this analysis is psychology, as the science of these acts of self-preservation. The ideas disturb and inhibit one another, producing states of arrest. The whole course of our psychical experience is describable in terms of this reciprocal tension of ideas, with their mutual interactions and combinations. Consciousness is said to depend on the intensity of this process through which ideas sometimes blend by assimilation, sometimes combine by groups, a process which suggests the associational psychology of Hume and Hartley. Since only those processes can persist which blend with the controlling ideas (in apperception) the soul is to be described

as the controlling group of ideas formed by assimilation and aggregation in the apperceived mass. The alleged faculties of the soul are mere class-concepts attributed to psychical processes. Sensation arises through the soul's effort to maintain itself against another soul. All psychical phenomena are described and explained by reference to sensations and ideas as single elements, the manifold of elements being the foundation of psychical life. Herbart's place in psychology is largely due to this insistence on a doctrine of elements in contrast with the theory of faculties, although Herbart also attributed a soul-substance to the self as one of the *Realen*. A school of followers advocated his psychology, which was also influential in education; while critics pointed out that, had he based his psychology entirely on experience, not on metaphysics, Herbart could have overcome psychological atomism.

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Empiricism.—F. H. Beneke (1798-1854), who was influenced by Herbart, by Fries, and the English empiricists, rejected speculative knowledge in favor of experience.¹ Since the foundation of all knowledge is in experience, metaphysics is an empirical science based on self-observation; hence psychology is fundamental. The inner sense discloses our ego as it really is, being and representation are one in our self-consciousness. Beneke adopts the associational psychology, and regards the simple elements of all mental life as impulses, elementary faculties

¹ *Psychological Sketches*, 1825, 1827; *Text-book of Psychology* (*Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft*), 1833; *System der praktischen Philosophie*, 1837.

originally aroused into activity by stimuli. These powers for receiving and appropriating stimuli pertain in part to the soul and are partly derived by experience. Mental processes in general are explained by the persisting traces of this interchange, through the addition of new mental faculties, the reciprocal transfer of the movable elements in representation, and the combinations of mental products due to similarity. Thus result judgment, comparisons, witticisms, collective images, collective feelings, collective desires. The soul is the bundle of these impulses, faculties, collections. Values are attributable by reference to the increase or decrease of the impulses (*Triebe*).² K. Fortlage (1806–1881) combined Beneke's psychology with Fichte's science of knowledge.³ Consciousness, as the presupposition of all representation, is explained by reference to attention ("questioning activity"), interest (described in terms of "arrested impulse"), which in turn is "will" in Fichte's doctrine. Will contains both an element of feeling and an element of representation, combines pleasure and the effort-image. In metaphysical terms Fortlage's doctrine implies the system of identity of the absolute ego.

§ 27. NINETEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE PRIOR TO 1850

The reaction against authority and the past which culminated in the French Revolution was followed by a period of readjustment to values which had been neglected during the great upheaval. Thus the critique of religion gave place in a measure to a eulogy of religion and recognition of the function of the Church. Hence with the revulsion against materialism came a return of authority in some quarters, an effort to substitute supernatural for merely natural causes. Meanwhile, the naturalism and sensa-

² For the followers of Herbart and Beneke, see Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

³ *System der Psychologie*, 2 vols., 1855; *Beiträge zur Psychologie*, 1875.

tionalism of the Enlightenment persisted, with a neglect of metaphysics which coincides in some degree with the conclusions of the critical philosophy in Germany. The type of psychology which persisted was that of Condillac, and the development of thought is almost continuous from the one century into the other. The reaction in favor of ecclesiastical tradition expressed itself in one school, the interest in psychology in another, while the third tendency took the form of positivism.

The Traditionalist School.—The revolt against the radicalisms of the Enlightenment and the Revolution in favor of the Catholic Church belongs to the history of philosophy only so far as it signalizes the rejection of rationalism and materialism. Louis Gabriel de Bonald (1754–1840) led the way to return of belief in the divine creation of language, in revelation as the principle of all knowledge in contrast with the doctrine of innate ideas. The result was tradition as the test of truth. This appeal to tradition also involved the idea of social organization as prior to the so-called “social contract,” with emphasis on the family as the social unit and on the authority of rulers and ministers in a monarchy. Joseph de Maistre (1754–1821) defended the principle of papal authority in his work, *Du Pape*, 1819–1820; and assailed the philosophy of the eighteenth century in his *Soirées de Saint Petersburg*, 1821, in which he discussed the temporal relation of Providence to mankind. The Abbé de Lamennais (1782–1854) undertook a critical analysis of human faculties and of rationalism, to show that the human mind cannot attain certitude.¹ *Raison sociale* (universal consent) was substituted as the new criterion of truth. Hence follows tradition in support of belief in God, religion, Catholicism. Later, Lamennais broke with the Church, and undertook a new philosophical synthesis involving elements of mysticism, Neo-platonism, pantheism, and theology.² He has been called the founder of theological scepticism in the nine-

¹ *Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion*, 1817–1827.

² *Esquisse d'une philosophie*, 1841–1846.

teenth century, but he had a constructive influence on his followers, Gerbet, Rohrbacher, Bautain, Bonnety, Ventura; and Gratry (1805-1872), author of a famous work, *De la connaissance de Dieu*.

The Psychological School.—The teachings of Condillac were dominant at the outbreak of the Revolution and in the philosophical section of the Convention. Condillac's sensationalism became in time the basis for a new school. The physician Cabanis (1757-1808), known as the last representative of psychological materialism in the eighteenth century, modified the doctrine of Condillac in the physiological direction with reference to the history of sensations. He especially noted the influence of age, sex, temperament, disease, diet, climate, sleep, and the influence of the moral life. In his *Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*, 1805, the moral is reduced to the physical, the soul is regarded as a faculty, thought as a secretion of the brain. "*Les nerfs—voilà tout l'homme.*" Hence philosophy cherishes no illusions. Cabanis introduced the term "vital feeling" into psychology, and put stress on instinct. Gall (1758-1828), the founder of phrenology, also adopted an extreme physiological point of view. Another physiological school was that of Montpellier, which included Barthez (1734-1806), Bichat (1771-1802), Bertrand (1795-1831), and Buisson (1766-1805). Bichat, who remodelled biological studies and created the science of histology, adopted vitalism on the ground that life is not reducible to mechanism: "life is the totality of those functions which resist death."³

Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), who succeeded Cabanis in the Académie in 1808, modified Condillac's doctrine in a more psychological direction, by putting emphasis on the voluntary motions and the resistance of objects without which matter cannot be known.⁴ Metaphysics being impossible, because we cannot know origins, philosophy is "ideology," or the study of what occurs when we think, reason, speak. De Tracy held that attention is more than

³ *Recherches physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort*, 1800.

⁴ *Éléments d'idéologie*, 1801, 1815.

transformed sensation: there are four faculties, sensibility, memory, judgment, volition.⁵

De Biran.—Maine de Biran (1766–1824), who adopted the viewpoint of the ideologists at first, later brought introspection forward as the method of philosophy, and became very influential in both philosophy and psychology. The ego makes itself known by means of the inner sense, through the exertion or movement of the will.⁶ This volitional activity, disclosed by immediate perception or introspection, is the fundamental fact of our consciousness. A conception of the ego as essentially *will* follows from this direct awareness of effort. The ego is a free cause of its own volitions. De Biran's emphasis on the immediate disclosure of consciousness is highly significant for psychology in contrast with Condillac's doctrine of mental passivity. Passivity now drops into the background as the mere counter-tendency of activity. Habit results from the interaction between the sensitive and reflective phases of our selfhood. The desires and passions represent the lesser self; memory, reasoning, will, the greater aspect of the struggles of our inner nature. There is a multitude of dim sensations which we know only by their effects, namely, activities which come before and after self-consciousness. These pure impressions, constituting the affective life, may also exist in a measure apart from any distinct personality; the affective life is independent of our will; is a sum-total of organic dispositions, the source of our powers and volitions. De Biran anticipates the doctrines of later psychologists, in his references to the duality of self, somnambulism, and the unconscious. In his emphasis on the dim unconscious background which in large measure enfolds, sways, and directs the conscious personality, De Biran's doctrine resembles that of Schopenhauer, who in turn was indebted to the physiological schools. Only one of De Biran's works appeared during his lifetime, his *mémoire*

⁵ Among other ideologists may be mentioned Daube, *Essai d'idéologie*, 1803; Laromiguière and his disciples.

⁶ *Les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'homme*, published 1834.

entitled *De l'Habitude*, 1803. His *Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie* was discovered and published later.⁷ Ampère (1775–1836), the famous physicist, was one of the few who recognized de Biran's worth during his lifetime. De Biran's influence is seen in the doctrine of Ravaisson, Lachelier, Guyau, Boutroux, and Bergson.

The Eclectic School.—Laromiguière occupied an intermediate position in the transition from Condillae to eclecticism. Royer-Collard (1763–1845) introduced the Scottish philosophy into France, as a factor in the new unification of systems, with special reference to psychological inquiry, and the importance of instinctive perception and immediate moral conviction, in contrast with teachings of the ideologists. Jouffroy (1796–1842), a pupil of Cousin, sharply discriminated between psychology and physiology, in opposition to the confusions due to Cabanis, Broussais, and others of their school. He wrote significant introductions to his translations of the works of Reid and Dugald Stewart; also works on aesthetics, natural right, and ethical systems in terms of a critical survey.

Cousin.—Royer-Collard, who introduced Reid's doctrines in lectures at the Sorbonne (1811–1814), was succeeded by Victor Cousin (1792–1867), the chief eclectic philosopher. Cousin was professor at the Sorbonne 1815–1830, and director of the École Normale Supérieure, 1830–1851. His influence was due in part to the fact that as an enthusiastic orator he aroused great interest among his students, and partly to the fact that as a minister of state the educational system of France was under his control. Cousin followed the genetic method in his teaching, and introduced the study of the history of philosophy into the academic courses. He classified the philosophic systems under idealism, sensualism, scepticism, and mysticism. Agreeing with Leibniz that "systems are true by what they affirm, but false in what they deny," he sought the common basis of all important doctrines. He acquired this eclectic or synthetic interest in part by reverting to Locke and Reid, partly from Royer-Collard, De Biran, and Ampère; but

⁷ *Œuvres inédites*, edited by Naville, 1859.

also by seeking a middle ground between Scottish common-sense and German critical philosophy. Cousin also borrowed from Plato and the Alexandrians, and found a unifying clue in a conception of intellectual intuition resembling Schelling's doctrine. Reid's theory of the immediate apprehension of reality, united with De Biran's theory of self-activity, when combined with the idea of intellectual intuition, yielded a conception of impersonal reason as an immediate apprehension of the absolute. This eclecticism, as an effort to comprise the truth in all preceding systems, involved special reference to the irreducible facts of sensation, volition, and intellection; also to the rebuilding of the "eternal truths" on the more secure basis of the *vérités de sens commun* of the Scottish philosophy.

In his later period Cousin gave more attention to natural religion and the spiritual phases of Cartesianism. In these teachings he hesitated between spontaneity and reflection in his account of the inner life, and gave more attention to history and politics, with leanings toward opportunism. Hence his later work is suggestive rather than persuasive, and exemplifies the defect of eclecticism, namely, the mere unifying of philosophical principles selected here and there but not necessarily correlated. His career as a whole typifies the protest against materialism in favor of a true spiritualism: the doctrine that man is a spiritual being in his freedom, moral responsibility and obligation, through charity, justice, beauty.⁸ From these fruits of the spirit there follows a quickening belief in the existence of God as the author and ideal type of humanity. It was Cousin who rediscovered De Biran and made him an influence in the ensuing period. Sir William Hamilton was influenced by Cousin's critical lectures on Locke, and the influence of Cousin in England played a part in arousing interest in German philosophy.⁹

Jouffroy was one of the leading followers of Cousin.

⁸ *Du Vraie, du Beau et du Bien*, first published in 1846.

⁹ Cousin's lectures were gathered in *Fragments philosophiques*, 5 vols., pub., 1866.

Damiron, another follower, produced a work on French philosophy in which eclecticism figured as the unity between the school of Condillae and theology.¹⁰ Garnier, Franke, Caro, Jules Simon, and Paul Janet (1823–1899) were also disciples. Janet was prominent in ethics, two of his works being widely used in English translation.¹¹ In Janet's doctrine the ethics of Aristotle and Kant were brought into suggestive relation. The formalism of Kant's doctrine was modified by the content of Aristotle's conception of happiness (eudæmonism), with special emphasis on humanity as the ideal end.

Positivism.—We have noted the fact that during the Enlightenment in France the cosmology of Newton became an influential conception, with resulting interests in naturalism; also the development of naturalistic explanations of social phenomena in anticipation of what was to become the science of human society. The principles which had already been applied to astronomy and physics were extended to chemistry and physiology by Lavoisier and Bichat. The foundations of electro-magnetism were laid by Ampère in 1820. Cuvier and Laplace had made their great contributions to the science of the century. In other European countries, also, the foundations were being laid for new special sciences which were to be of great moment in fostering the idea of science in general, notably in the case of the researches of C. F. Wolff, who founded scientific embryology and studied the genesis of vegetable and animal organisms,¹² and K. E. von Baer (1792–1876), whose important embryological investigations (1819–1837) demonstrated the truth of epigenesis (the progressive formation and differentiation of organs from a primitively homogeneous germ). The next advance in this direction was toward a philosophy of evolution. Positivism, or naturalism in terms of the positive sciences, which rest on

¹⁰ *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France en 19^e siècle*, 1834.

¹¹ *La Morale*, 1874 (*The Theory of Morals*, trans. 1884); *Les causes finales*, 1876 (*Final Causes*, trans. 1878).

¹² *Theoria generationes*, 1759.

established facts, with the laws which those facts imply, began to receive explicit formulation before the rise of the modern doctrine of evolution. In its first stage, positivism developed out of the increasing interest in the origin, nature, laws, and possibilities of reform of human society. Thus too the socialistic movement in France comes before the positivism of Auguste Comte.

Saint-Simon.—Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) represents the transition from the eighteenth century, with its yearnings for social reform, to the nineteenth, with the advancement of the positive sciences. Although a journalist and social reformer, Saint-Simon is significant for the history of philosophy because of his teaching that a new world-view must be established before the new order of human society can be ushered in. This new world-view is to be based on the positive sciences. Although untrained in the sciences, he gathered a group of scientific men from the Polytechnic and the medical schools, including men of eminence who, like Comte, were to become leaders. He also had plans for a new encyclopedia of the sciences, as essential to a new catechism. Saint-Simon assigned the first place in his efforts to the nature of things envisaged apart from all beliefs and dogmas. With the prospect of a new order of society in the foreground, his attention was chiefly directed to industrial and economic conditions, in contrast with which governments were secondary. Consequently, he looked back to the Middle Ages as the period of beginnings. The temporal power is to be transferred to the manufacturers and producers, all men must work, idleness and drones are to disappear; the working class is to be raised intellectually and economically. “All by industry and all for industry” was Saint-Simon’s motto. Since social organization is to be brought to the fore, progress will depend on dispensing with metaphysical doctrines in favor of “positivism,” a term which Saint-Simon was first to use.

Much depends also on regarding history as a continuous process of development. History shows that although

science began with theological presuppositions, these were gradually discarded in favor of natural presuppositions and appeal to positive facts. The field once cleared of theories, positivism can be established on the basis of given experience, on an encyclopedia of the positive sciences in which the results are correlated. A new Christianity emphasizing brotherhood or love, and love of the world rather than self-denial, should give heed to the poor and the lowly, and aid in social emancipation.¹³ Since brotherhood is the watchword of true religion, woman is to be socially and politically equal to man. The shortcomings of Catholic and Protestant Christianity are traceable to individualism, in contrast with the *social* salvation which is to be the central idea, that is, social betterment in the natural world first. The sciences and economics should be united in the effort to establish this the true religion. By this emphasis on social organization and authority Saint-Simon was the forerunner of many leaders who have favored the rule of the industrial class, although in his own plan for social betterment artists and intellectual people were also admitted to leadership.

Socialism.—Saint-Simon's group of co-workers and followers included Augustin Thierry, Pierre Leroux, and Jean Reynaud, who favored social reorganization on the basis of material progress by substitution of industrial and economic ideals for dominant ideas in intellectual and political life. Say (1767–1832) and Bastiat (1801–1850) opposed this type of socialism in favor of *laissez-faire*. The socialism of Fourier (1772–1837) was an exposure of the incoherency, hypocrisy, waste of strength, misery, and oppression of modern society. Fourier traced the evils of the world to repressed human passions: if given free expression these passions would function harmoniously, the law of social attraction being the central principle. In his *Traité de l'Association domestique et agricole*, 1822, Fourier advocated the organization of *phalanges* (groups) for the union of capital and industry. Proudhon (1809–1865) was more pronounced in favor of the common

¹³ *Le Nouveau Christianisme*, 1825.

people, with special reference to equality, social justice; the right of the industrial class to the whole product of labor. He was strongly opposed to private property. In contrast with the materialistic view of history of Karl Marx, Proudhon anticipated the great social change through the promulgation of ideals, notably moral and spiritual ideas and influences.

Comte's Positivism.—Chief among Saint-Simon's associates was Auguste Comte (1798–1857), who acquired a knowledge of the exact sciences at the polytechnical school in Paris, studied history and biology; and after a number of years spent with Saint-Simon developed positivism independently. Comte looked back to Diderot, Hume, Kant, the Scottish school, and called Condorcet his “spiritual father.” Tracing the dissolution of the old social order to the twelfth century, with the freeing of the towns and the introduction of the positive sciences into Europe from Arabian sources, Comte also saw important beginnings in the substitution of science for theology, and reacted against the critical spirit in favor of a more social view of life founded on recognition of social laws. With great energy Comte threw himself into the task of developing the needed social science which, founded on a conception of nature, man, and society, is to be logically harmonious and so persuasive that it is to convince all minds.

Law of the Three Stages.—In his *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830–1842) Comte undertakes to develop the law of the three stages through which the sciences have passed. In the *theological* stage, human knowledge plays a small part, imagination a large part, the chief idea at this stage being that of gods and spirits, appealed to in explanation of events; moral doctrines were based on theological doctrines; science was under bondage. In the transition from fetichism to polytheism and monotheism there was promise of empirical investigation by removal of supernatural beings from the particular phenomena of nature. In the *metaphysical* stage, gods and spirits gave place to universal energies and an idea of nature as a whole, then to ideas of vital energy, chemical forces; speculation took the

place of theological imagination; through criticism the old authorities were destroyed; individualism, nationalism, and ideas of popular sovereignty took the place of the absolutisms of the first period, although no new basis of certitude was supplied. In the *positive* stage, interest in inner essences gives place to interest in experience, agreement with facts becomes the test; and there is quest for laws, constancy, the invariability of phenomena by precise methods of observation. Although this period was anticipated by the Greeks, Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes were its real founders. It is no longer a question of the nature of heat, light, electricity, and other forces as such; but of the conditions under which these forces occur, the laws implied, and the practical consequences foreseen. Although the numerous laws cannot be referred to a single objective principle, our knowledge being a subjective unity, there can be unity of method in the study of nature, man, society; and unity in the explanation of facts. In the earlier stages, myth and speculation were drawn upon because of the lack of empirical knowledge. Positive knowledge is not negation or criticism; it signifies what is real, certain, exact, useful.

Positive philosophy, profiting by knowledge of the three stages, begins with a classification of the sciences according to the order of appearance at the positive stage. Hence mathematics is put first (it became positive among the Greeks), then astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology (theory of society). This advance also shows a change from the simplicity to the complexity of objects, from universality to particularity; from the deductive to the inductive method; in brief, a decreasing generality and increasing complexity. In this scheme psychology has no place save under biology; the law of the conservation of energy is not included, and Comte came too early to take advantage of the modern doctrine of evolution. Logic belongs before mathematics, and ethics which might also have been included under the sciences which were recognized by the Greeks was not added by Comte until later.

The Nature of Knowledge.—Unlike empiricism, Comte's positivism does not involve a theory of knowledge to show why and how the mind combines scientific facts in terms of law. For Comte knowledge is biological, is acquired through interaction between the organism and the world of external objects. Comte rejects materialism, on the ground that organic phenomena cannot be explained on a mechanical and chemical basis. But he also rejects idealism, or any view which assumes knowledge of a metaphysical entity or soul, and introspection as a method. What remains possible is an organic study of mental life, which, for Comte, is much more than the intellectual life, but includes the affectional functions, feelings and passions, as far more decisive in constituting man a social being. Thus for Comte emphasis falls, not on epistemology, but on the social nature of man, without which a positive theory of knowledge would be impossible. Since science is concerned with laws rather than facts, relative knowledge is alone possible, and the unity of the sciences is found in sociology, a term which is due to Comte. Sociology includes the philosophy of history, political economy, and psychology (as implied in biology); *social statics*, or the reciprocal relations of the factors of society, its ideas, customs, institutions, in a given period; and *social dynamics*, or the law of the three stages of progress, studied in the development of civilization. According to this law, the intellectual stages correspond to definite social and political developments, theology and regulative authority coming together, while industrialism belongs in the positive stage. This "encyclopedic law" therefore involves the idea of progress as the development of social order, with a far-reaching philosophy of history, history being the sacred science, indispensable to all real knowledge of moral experience. The maxim, "Know thy history" is first in rank.

Human Solidarity.—The philosophy of humanity, the grand fact of human solidarity, is central and decisive. Hence in Comte's later view even nature is to be regarded

from the standpoint of *le grand être* (humanity or the highest being). Hence it is that the affections play the prominent part in contrast with the understanding. Comte finds that there are two kinds of innate propensions: egoistical and altruistic. Therefore the problem is to make altruism, originally weaker, prevail over egoism, or the tendency toward mere self-preservation, so that humanity shall triumph over animalism, making the "Great Being" the "union of all beings, past, present, and future, who freely contribute to the perfection of the universal order." Individuality is compatible with unity, continuity includes the past as well as the present in the solidarity of the race on which this whole doctrine is founded; and so continuity and solidarity are the essentials in the "religion of humanity" in which Comte's later doctrine culminates. With the progress toward altruism the individual is seen to be an abstraction, the family comes to be regarded as the social unit; and since we are all members of society in process all should co-operate, all ought to be co-laborers in the great social whole. Some of Comte's followers declined to follow in the idealization of humanity past and present as an object of worship; for in matters of dogma, worship, management, Comte's religion was patterned in a measure after Catholicism. Comte's later thought is classed by some as mysticism, because Comte abandoned the intellectual standard of positive science; by others as Utopian romanticism; while one of Comte's leading followers joined the Catholic Church.

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Comte's Successors.—Comte's place in history is due to the emphasis put by him on the positive element in all knowledge in relation to our human situation and to social progress; his classification of the sciences from the viewpoint of the third stage, with special reference to sociology as the science of sciences; and the importance assigned to humanity, as opposed to the mere individual, with the prominence given to altruism. Whatever the defects of his classification, Comte stood for a certain spirit or attitude toward life by appeal to social forces and social facts. One of Comte's distinguished disciples, Littré (1801–1881) took special exception to his later religious views. With the introduction of ethics as the seventh and highest of the sciences, it was possible to assimilate Comte's sociology in essentially ethical terms, without accepting the worship of humanity. Thus the term "altruism" was given currency in England, where John Stuart Mill was Comte's most distinguished follower. Positivism was also easily connected with empiricism and utilitarianism. Lewes and Spencer were in a measure influenced by positivism, and positivism in England became a cult among certain groups of liberals, some of whom adopted it as a religious view. In France, Comte's influence is traceable in the teachings of Taine, Renan, and Cournot, who, with Renouvier, raised objections to positivism as a philosophy. In a later period positivism was a factor in the teachings of such thinkers as Fouillée, Guyau, Lachelier, and Boutroux.¹⁴ Positivism was adopted both by writers who specialized in literary criticism, and by psychologists (Th. Ribot) and sociologists (Tarde, Durkheim).

The term "spiritualism," used in French philosophy, and to some extent by personal idealists in other countries, later gave place to idealism or "personalism." Originally, spiritualism signified the opposite of materialism. The term was applicable to one aspect of dualism (the doctrine of "spiritual substance"), also to idealism (when idealism included belief in the existence of finite spirits or selves, as in Berkeley's philosophy). A "spirit" is a being

¹⁴ Cf. Gunn, *Modern French Philosophy*, 1922, p. 37.

capable of continued existence despite the interruptions of consciousness, and possibly persisting in the life after death, with the same identity. The identity of a spirit is not said to depend on consciousness or cognition, but to include moral character as a permanent principle. Spirit or "soul" is thus a higher term than "mind," as used with reference to direct relationship with the bodily organism. French philosophers early noted evidences that the human spirit or personality is more extensive than ordinary consciousness indicates.

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§ 28. SCOTTISH RATIONALISM

Whewell.—The Scottish philosophy and the critical philosophy of Kant were brought into relation by Whewell and Hamilton in their studies of induction and the relativity of knowledge. W. Whewell (1794–1866) had given special attention to the formulation of hypotheses in scientific inquiry, a study which led him to note the peculiar contribution of the creative intellect, an element of the process which empiricism had ignored.¹ Sense-experience contributes the facts, as a mere collection. The ideas and principles by which the content of experience is unified are given by the mind itself. Without these organizing principles we would possess only empirical laws of phenomena. The inferences concerning the sense-data are unconscious, but they function in all activities of the mind.

¹ *History of the Inductive Sciences*, 1837; *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, 1840; *Elements of Moral Philosophy*, 1845.

Without the general forms of apprehension inherent in the mind the organizing principles would not be forthcoming, and yet these principles are not ready-made: they are brought into activity with the response of the mind to its material. Space, time, cause, purpose, and the moral principle or "ought" belong under this head. Whewell's works on the inductive sciences aided John Stuart Mill in developing his theory of induction. In his moral doctrine Whewell also assimilated Kantian principles.²

Hamilton.—Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856) gave to philosophy a powerful impetus at a time when interest in metaphysics in England was at a low ebb. Educated at Glasgow and Oxford, he was professor of logic and metaphysics at Edinburgh; and became prominent with the publication of his articles on the philosophy of the unconditioned and the philosophy of perception, in the *Edinburgh Review*, beginning in 1829. His edition of Reid's works was published in 1846, his *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*, 1852; and his *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, were published after his death. A man of cosmopolitan learning, known as the most learned man in England in his day, Hamilton gave a new perspective, overcame provincialism, and brought English thought into relation with the greatest German philosophy, with which he was well acquainted.³ He endeavored to advance beyond the Scottish philosophy in the direction of the critical philosophy of Kant.

Doctrine of Relativity.—Hamilton begins with a formulation of the doctrine of natural realism, with its implication that in the simplest act of perception I am aware of myself as perceiving subject and of an externally perceived object, of which I have an immediate knowledge. Further analysis discloses subjective and objective factors in this cognition of external reality: sensation proper and perception proper. Between the primary and secondary qualities of matter are the secundo-primary qualities; the

² See Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 233.

³ See Sorley, *His. of Eng. Phil.*, p. 237, foll.; Rogers, *Eng. and Am. Phil. since 1800*, p. 16, foll.

object of perception is either a primary quality or a certain phase of a secundo-primary. I do not immediately perceive primary qualities as external to the organism, but infer their existence from objects as perceived *in the organism*. The most direct evidence of the existence of a world outside the organism is in the awareness of resistance to our muscular energy. Touch therefore yields more secure evidence than visual perception. The result is a theory of the relativity of knowledge. Calling attention to the suggestive ambiguities of the term "relativity," Rogers indicates that it may mean (with Reid) that we know only the qualities or modifications or modes of substance, not substance itself; but it may also mean that an object, in becoming known through its qualities, is always relative to our human faculties.⁴ Rogers distinguishes five meanings of the term, and concludes that while Hamilton seems to have in mind the fact that the full object as presented to the mind is compounded of the external object, the external medium, the living organ of sense, and other elements of the process, the simplest way out of the confusion is to adopt Reid's plain meaning: the authority of consciousness means only that of common sense.

Limited to relativities then, however these may be defined, we cannot know the infinite or whole, which Hamilton calls the "Unconditioned." Yet, although "*to think is to condition*," the unconditioned may exist. Knowledge may then be founded in a relative way on the self and not-self, on the idea of the self as persisting as a unity amidst successive changes, and on the world represented as a reality underlying our various modes of perception of it. The mind is unable to think apart from necessary or *a priori* truths, self-evident truths involving universality and necessity. Thus our belief in causality is due to the inability to think except under the conditions of space and time. These forms of thought do not make impossible a knowledge of really existent things in time and space. Hamilton finds no ground for disbelieving in the deliverances of immediate perception of an external world.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

We must hold that the perceived object possesses certain *quale* and *quantum* not limited to phenomena as we know them, but also really existing prior to our perceptions. We cannot penetrate beyond causality. At best we have only a negative conception of the absolute or infinite. We are limited to analogy between the relations of things and our faculties. While in one direction we are aware of the "imbecility" of human knowledge, in the other we possess religious *belief* in the unknown God, who may be disclosed by a supernatural revelation, supplementing our ordinary knowledge, or may at least be represented as an object of consciousness. Thus Hamilton leaves us with what has been called the ambiguity of relativity as the unsolved relation between the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of the unconditioned.⁵

Logic.—In the field of logic Hamilton is known for his doctrine of the quantification of the predicate, which grants the privilege of stating explicitly in language all that is implicit in thought, with the consequences of this doctrine. Hamilton makes the well-known division of the mind into cognitions, feelings, and conations (will and desire); and further divides by special reference to the "presentative faculty," which includes external and internal perception. Hamilton's reservation in favor of belief in the unconditioned as the basis of our spiritual experience prepares the way for the application of his philosophy to religion, an approach to the subject which is still current among us.

Successors of Hamilton.—In his *Limits of Religious Thought*, 1858, Mansel (1820–1871) applied the doctrine of relativity in defense of Christianity. Since our knowledge of God is negative, and knowledge of absolute morality is beyond our range, arguments against theology on the ground of good and evil, known phenomenally only, fall far short. In our limited knowledge, reason must be supplemented by faith. Mansel's results could be taken constructively by those who were not critical, or lead to "agnosticism," as learned ignorance was presently called,

⁵ Cf. Sorley, *op. cit.*, p. 241; Turner, *His. of Phil.*, p. 600.

by Huxley. Mansel called attention to the *evidences* of revealed religion, such as the historical proof for the miraculous, in contrast with the *content*.⁶

Henry Calderwood (1830-1897), in his *Philosophy of the Infinite*, 1854, attacked Hamilton on the ground that God or the Absolute is not a being characterized by absence of relations, but possesses internal relations and is related to the world of his creations. A limited knowledge of God is possible; for we have an immediate intuition of him as all-wise, powerful, just, an intuition which involves its own evidence. Among the adherents of Hamilton were Henry Veitch and Robert Flint. J. D. Morell united doctrines of the Scottish school with distinctions between reason and understanding derived from German philosophy. James Ferrier (1808-1864), *Institutes of Metaphysic*, 1854, *Lectures on Greek Philosophy*, issued posthumously, 1866, sought to escape from relativism and scepticism by rejecting empirical psychology and the common-sense assumption that we know matter by itself. In agreement with Berkeley and Fichte concerning the nature of spiritual reality, he undertook to deduce a system of "reasoned truth" involving the existence of a "supreme and infinite and everlasting mind in synthesis with all things." This process of thought involves the distinction between "*agniology*" (the theory of ignorance) and epistemology, by analysis of error and truth at a point where the theory of knowledge passes into ontology with the conception of God, as the ultimate object to which the self with its objects refers. Subject and object, thus inseparable, imply necessary truths, a sure method of attaining knowledge of reality.⁷

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⁶ Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁷ Sorley, *ibid.*, p. 276; Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

§ 29. UTILITARIANISM

Bentham.—Although the larger part of the life of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) belongs in the eighteenth century, utilitarianism, which was formulated in its modern form by him, is identified with the nineteenth century. In contrast with the partisans of liberty in the period of the French Revolution, Bentham lived a secluded, uneventful life, with limited contacts, absorbed in his dry analyses and codifications. The title of his chief work, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1789, suggests his early interest in the analysis of law and his work as a publicist for the good of the state. His *Deontology* was published in 1834. In time Bentham gathered a group around him, including James Mill and John Stuart Mill. The *Westminster Review* was founded as the organ of the utilitarian school in 1824. In his *Fragment on Government*, Bentham applied the principle of utility systematically to the theory of government, in criticism of Blackstone's *Commentaries*.

The Utilitarian Principle.—Cumberland had identified the greatest good of all moral beings with happiness.¹ Shaftesbury had referred to the "Good of Virtue" by reference to all those particulars which constitute the "main *sum* or general account of happiness," and imply a "scheme of moral arithmetic."² Hutcheson assumed that "virtue is as the quantity of the happiness or general good"; therefore that action is best which procures the "greatest happiness for the greatest numbers."³ But Hutcheson retained the distinction between quality and quantity of pleasures. It was Tucker who declared that satisfaction or pleasure is one and the same in kind, however much it may vary in degree, for example, in listening to music, "seeing prospects, tasting dainties, performing laudable actions, or making agreeable reflections." Hence

¹ See Sec. 9.

² Cf. Selby-Bigge, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 63.

³ Selby-Bigge, *ibid.*, p. 107.

it is fitting to refer to the good we do to our neighbor as an "addition" to the sum of pleasures. Since pleasure is pleasure wherever found, the purely quantitative estimate of pleasure being the standard, to admit quality as a test (with Hutcheson) would be to abandon hedonism, or the doctrine that pleasure is the good.⁴ But Tucker holds that no hedonistic calculus is possible, and in theory at least he remains an egoistic hedonist. To make the utilitarian doctrine complete, Bentham's contribution is needed, namely, by extending hedonism to human society as a whole, in terms of a calculus of all pleasures.

Hume's Doctrine.—Bentham states that it was the third volume of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* which convinced him that utility is the foundation of all virtue. Hume argues that when we consider the proportion or fitness of means to ends, the "suitable pleasure and satisfaction" which we receive arises from *utility*.⁵ The useful is also a source of beauty, and a source of morals through sympathy.⁶ Benevolence on the whole tends to produce, not individual, but general happiness; benevolence is useful; and so utility becomes the test of virtue, including the appeal to justice.⁷

Utility as the Test.—Accepting utility as the basis of morals, and assuming that man desires and pursues pleasure as the good, Bentham formulates hedonism as identical with utilitarianism as a universal principle. His doctrine is notable for the unity and consistency with which he pleads for the quantitative principle, namely, "the greatest happiness principle." He declares that the fundamental axiom of morals is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the "measure of right and wrong." Accordingly, Bentham adopts the *principle of*

⁴ *Light of Nature Pursued*.

⁵ *Treatise*, Bk. II, Part III, Sec. X.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Part III, Sec. I.

⁷ Hume argues more conclusively in the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* that "reflections on public interest and utility" are the "sole source of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, justice, veracity, integrity," and other important virtues: Sec. V, Part II.

utility as the foundation of his *Morals and Legislation*, the principle on which the individual approves or disapproves of actions and the standard of conduct implied in every governmental measure.⁸ Since the community as such is a fictitious body, it is a question of the individuals who compose it; the members of society are actuated by their several interests; and the interests of the individual are resolvable in turn into the sum-total of his pleasures. Thus Bentham clears the way for a psychological analysis of these pleasures in relation to the possibility of diminishing the sum-total of the individual's pains.

True to the empiricism of his predecessors, Bentham appeals to individual experience as the test of his propositions. Nature has placed us all "under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*." These masters not only show what we "ought" to do, but determine what we shall do. They rule us not merely because they imply the standard of right and wrong, but because the chain of causes and effects steadily holds us down to their sequences. By these masters our whole life is governed even in what we think, what we say, as decisively as in what we do: to try to throw off their dominion would be the more surely to demonstrate their rule. The strength of all motives depends on the pleasure or pain connected with them. Man, in brief, is a pleasure-seeking, pain-avoiding animal. Since these standards yield the principle of utility, we may use the term "utility" to summarize our whole moral situation: pleasure is "useful" through its approval of activities making for human benefit. Granted this insight, the happiness or interest of the community becomes unmistakably clear. Pleasure being pleasure wherever found, the sole criterion is quantity. Thus the practical clue lies in estimating the probable balance of pleasures over the pains which are likely to result from a given action. Hence the need for a calculus of pleasures by reference to their sanctions or sources.

The Sanctions.—There are four sanctions of pleasure and pain: physical, political, moral, and religious. The first

⁸ *Op. cit.*, Chap. I.

source is that of the ordinary course of nature, apart from any interposition.⁹ The second sanction is implied in any judgment passed by our rulers. The moral or "popular" sanction is that of the community. If the action of a superior or invisible being is involved, the sanction is religious. The clue to the different sanctions lies in the circumstances accompanying their production, the physical sanction being the groundwork of the political and moral. The individual, always aiming exclusively at pleasure, secures the happiness of society by contributing his portion. The situation is simplified for the individual by the fact that, whatever the sources, pleasures differ in quantity only, never in quality. It is further simplified by regarding pleasure as such with reference to its four cardinal circumstances: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness (nearer pleasures are preferable). To these conditions are added: *fecundity*, or the chance that pleasure may be followed by sensations of the same kind; *purity*, or the possibility that pleasure will not be followed by sensations of the opposite kind; and *extent*, or the number of persons affected by the pleasure in question. To carry out the sanctions as tests is to note the distinguishable value of pleasure in the first instance, the value of each pain, the values of subsequent pleasures and pains; and the *sum* of all the values of the pleasures in contrast with the sum of all the pains, the "balance" of pleasure being the test. Moreover, there are sources of both inner and outer pleasures and pains, including pleasures and pains of sense, of wealth, skill, amity, good reputation, power, piety, and sympathy. Motives, such as avarice, indolence, and benevolence enter into the account, no motives being either constantly good or constantly bad. Good will is pre-eminent, most likely to coincide with utility.

Objections.—Granted knowledge of the various dispositions which make up our nature, Bentham thinks we should be able to disengage self-regarding from other-regarding motives, discern the benefits due to the latter or the essen-

⁹ *Ibid.*, Chap. III.

tially *social* motives, and thus concentrate upon the conduct which will augment the happiness of the community. He easily assumed that quantitative principles can be decisively applied to feelings as elusive and difficult to analyze as pleasures and pains; that these feelings do not differ in quality; and he as readily passed by the possibility that allowances must be made for the personal equation, that is, the differences due to individual susceptibilities. He also assumed that private ethics and general legislation will somehow coincide so that the good of all will ensue. Despite his references to the community, his emphasis falls on the individual, as if society were atomic; he puts stress on egoistic rather than on other-regarding motives; and exactitude becomes the chief virtue. Bentham was himself a relatively isolated individual, neglectful even of the fact that Paley announced the principle of utility as clearly as he did, in a treatise published four years earlier than his own work.¹⁰ Yet Bentham enforced his doctrine with such thoroughness and mastery of detail that he founded a school. Bentham wrote as a legal and political reformer. The objections to his doctrine are those of his critics in the ethical field who question the possibility of a calculus of pleasures and pains.

James Mill.—Bentham's chief co-worker was James Mill (1773–1836) who defended utilitarianism by elaborating the political theory and by overcoming its psychological deficiencies. While not an original thinker, James Mill is credited with a clearer view of political theory and a wider knowledge of historical conditions than Bentham possessed. In his chief philosophical work, he endeavored to lay the psychological foundations for utilitarianism; hence his work belongs to psychology rather than to ethics.¹¹ Following Hume and Hartley in part, Mill interpreted sensation as a kind of "feeling," while ideas are said to remain when the sensations have disappeared. He is chiefly known in psychology for his doctrine of inseparable association, which is the explanatory principle underlying belief of

¹⁰ *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, 1785.

¹¹ *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, 1829.

every kind, including assent to propositions. Mill also accounted for the emotions and volition by association. He reduced mental states to their simplest elements, and explained the association of groups and successions of mental phenomena by reference to a single law, contiguity. Thus he tried to account for all data of consciousness by association: sensation and association are ultimate terms. Mill's extreme simplification leaves unsolved the problems of the activity of the self, with its richer content and wider relationships.¹² It was characteristic of utilitarians to assume that as human nature is a product of associations of ideas, it can be changed by education according to plans for utilitarian reform. Mill proceeded in this way with his famous son, who was deprived of opportunities of free development of all sides of his nature.

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§ 30. THE EMPIRICISM OF JOHN STUART MILL

Life.—John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), born in London, was reared by his father, who did not allow him to attend school or associate with boys. He began Greek under his father's instruction at three, and Latin at seven. He spent seven hours a day in study with his father, in the father's library; he had no general social life, no recreation or opportunities for developing the emotions. Bentham's doctrine was at first his sole creed, religious and philosophical. Mill edited his father's political economy at fifteen, and organized a club of young Benthamites. At seventeen he began to write for the *Westminster Review*. From 1823 to 1858 he was a clerk in the East India House.

¹² Rogers, *English and American Phil. Since 1800*, p. 58, foll.

In his remarkable *Autobiography*,¹ Mill tells how in later years he reacted against the restricting ideas and principles which were instilled into him in his childhood and youth, and describes the depression which fell upon him at twenty. He writes also of the influence of John Stirling, F. D. Maurice, Carlyle, Wordsworth's poems; and the eventual widening of his life to admit feeling and emotion, as influences which counteracted the stern rationalism relentlessly inculcated by his father. His larger outlook is shown by his reviews of Carlyle's *French Revolution* and Tennyson's poems, and his articles on Bentham and Coleridge. He recognized the importance of Bentham's central principle in relation to politics and morals, but found Bentham's knowledge limited by an empiricism which was based on a narrow experience. Hence Mill saw the need of seeking light from thinkers of a very different type. He also took exception to his father's views, became interested in French socialism and positivism; and was influenced in the direction of feeling and emotion as factors in mental life by his friend, Mrs. Taylor, who became his wife after Mr. Taylor's death, in 1849. Mill confesses that he had never been able to love his father, and plainly shows that Mrs. Taylor was the one great influence in his life. He retired on a pension in 1858; was elected a member of Parliament in 1865, and served three years. Later, he moved to southern France, where he died in 1873. Mill's characteristics are apparent in his works, which express an uncommon dedication to truth, an exceptional candor; but also the keen critical ability which led him to modify utilitarianism and relentlessly to disclose the inconsistencies of Hamilton's philosophy.

Empiricism.—Mill's chief work was his *System of Logic*, 1843, which ran through many editions, and is widely recognized as a great book, the most important contribution to English empiricism. Mill was in a measure indebted to Whateley, Dugald Stewart, Whewell, Hamilton, and Comte; but his work is an original formulation of the first principles of empiricism and the analysis of the inductive

¹ 1873; new ed., New York, 1924.

method. He based his logical doctrine on the psychology of Hume and James Mill, on the assumption that consciousness involves a number of elements united by the laws of association, psychology being the fundamental science; and on the history of the modern natural sciences, with an analysis of the modes and principles of investigation implied in those sciences. Hence as a thoroughgoing empiricist Mill held that no principle prior to experience need be assumed: all knowledge proceeds from experience, experience is the test of all knowledge derived from it.

Psychological Basis.—What we know by consciousness is immediate, certain, intuitive, beyond all question; to see or feel by bodily or mental sensation is to be sure that we know. The immediate data of consciousness, our intuitions, are the original premises from which follow all inferential knowledge. Feeling and consciousness are identical terms. The term “feeling” covers not only bodily sensation but also emotions, the entire experience of sentiency or awareness, including thought in its immediacy. Any thought, whatever its object or quality, as experienced, as an apprehended state, is a feeling; and psychical facts, with the implied activity or volition, are to be carefully distinguished from the physical facts to which they may be due. Feelings include four species, sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions, as possible types of inner experience joined together according to a fixed law. Granted groups of sensations, united by similarity and contiguity of phenomena, in a series which becomes more rapid by repetition, the mind takes an attitude of expectation with reference to other possible experiences.² Thus grows up the idea of a world in which cause and effect are associated by habit, with special reference to the reality and permanence of visual and tactual sensations. Matter is the element of resistance in the world of sense-experience. We regard matter as external because of the permanent possibility of having such sensations due to an objective cause, associated with the uniform sequences of observed phe-

² *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 234, foll.

nomena. The idea of causality, acquired and generalized by experience, especially implies the greater objectivity which we attribute to primary qualities by this idea of the permanent possibility of sensation. Sensations which correspond to primary qualities are always present when the group is also. Hence we come to regard these as constant by contrast with the occasional sensations associated with secondary qualities. Sensible qualities are not inherent in the object, as if external things could be described apart from our experience of them: a "body" is an unknown exciting cause of sensation, the inmost nature of matter being unknown.³ The attributes of a thing are describable as peculiar or unresolvable in terms of the sensations we have of the object in question. Thus the sensation of white is the foundation of the quality of whiteness. Given sensations are subject to succession and simultaneousness, a relation is resolvable into states of consciousness; resemblance is a feeling; quantity is grounded in sensation, succession is our feeling of succession. So in each case the situation is describable with reference to permanent possibilities of feeling.

Subject and Object.—As matter is the permanent objective basis of such experiences, so mind is a permanent possibility of its states or modifications. We know only the series of states of the "self," not the inmost nature or essence of mind. Generalizing on the basis of my own experience, I infer that other people have a series of experiences like my own. The body being connected in a peculiar manner with all my sensations, as an antecedent condition of every sensation, I infer a world of conscious existences connected with other peoples' bodies. I need not infer that the notion of a self and a not-self was immediately present in primitive consciousness; since we do not acquire the idea of a subject and object until by experience we refer certain feelings to the one in relation to sensations which we refer to the other. Eventually the conception of matter is reducible to resistance, extension, and figure; resistance is seen to be most fundamental, tactual

³ *Logic*, Bk. I, Chap. III.

sensations become representative of the sensations of resistance with which they habitually coexist; and thus we come to possess an idea of matter as the resisting cause of our sensations.⁴

Basis of Induction.—Although Mill agrees with Hume that experience is a sum of impressions and feelings, he seeks to show how universals have been derived from experience, not as a sum, but by reference to individual cases and their general implications. Only individual cases can be observed, and all general truths are drawn from individual instances. But the laws of association as fundamental to actual or possible states of experience imply a “bond of some sort among all parts of the series” which leads to the conviction that they are states of an identical person or ego. Our knowledge in fact unites and distinguishes its data in an order which is more than that of the laws of association. A general truth, although it is an abridged statement covering an indefinite number of individual facts or aggregations of particular truths, has validity; it is possible to reason from particulars to particulars and arrive at universal laws, the laws of the sciences. How is objective validity possible, in view of the fact that reason is empirical?

There is no logic of the preliminary process, only the psychology of the steps from particular facts by appeal to the ultimate elements of knowledge, as already indicated. The truth of intuitive knowledge is assumed: logic is not the science of belief,⁵ it does not undertake to find evidence. Logic is the science of proof or evidence and of the operations of the understanding subservient to the estimation of evidence, it takes account of those activities which lead to command of knowledge for use. The significant assumption is that the immediate object in experience is already mental, does not require an *a priori* principle to show how it becomes so by undertaking to determine the connections of objects. The objective reference is implied in the terms we employ, the propositions we formulate. The general

⁴ *Examination*, Vol. I, pp. 261, 272.

⁵ *Logic*, Introd., § 4.

term is a shorthand record of our particular observations, and by the aid of general terms we pass to generalizations of experience, the important consideration being the relationships of phenomena. But these relationships are not the mere connections of names or ideas. The laws of nature, or the order existing among phenomena, are the real objects of belief in our propositions. Mill does not then stop with Hume's conclusion that causality is subjective, as if it were merely mental habit or association; but maintains that *as objective* causality involves just this constancy of succession which we generalize in terms of law. The causal connection between particular phenomena having been noted, the inductive inference to general laws as applicable to new phenomena readily follows; since we have constantly verified our generalizations by new experiences, we are justified in accepting causality as the basis of all laws of nature. We pass from the fact of existence to coexistence and resemblance, and continue with our whole description of the sequences of phenomena. Resemblance between two phenomena as given, observed, is more intelligible than would be an alleged explanation of this fact. The real significance of a general name lies therefore in its connotation, and what an abstract term concretely signifies is what gives it value, not some supposed ulterior origin sundered from experience.

The Nature of Truth.—All our beliefs are grounded in axioms, and these in turn are experimental truths based on observation and special inductions. All laws of nature are uniformities existing among phenomena discovered by induction. Hence Mill readily uses the term "uniformity" although he frequently employs "probability" with reference to aggregates of particular truths. Geometry is not disproved because there are no "real" geometrical objects precisely corresponding to its terms. Mathematical necessity is not a sheer illusion. It is justifiable to refer to points, lines, circles, and squares as "copies" of objects known by experience, so that our geometrical propositions are "nearly true." The laws of number involve the "rigorous universality" which we need. Nowhere in

nature does anything exist or any event happen which is not connected by any uniformity or invariable sequence.⁶ The indestructibility of force or matter is entirely conceivable in these terms. Mill does not however unify his various references to the uniformities of nature into a single system; he leaves the subject with the probability that there is no proposition concerning a permanent necessity in which every human mind must eternally and irrevocably believe. We neither require nor attain the absolute. We are safe in acting on what is universally provisional.⁷ There are undoubtedly ultimate coexistences between the ultimate properties of things, properties which are the causes of phenomena but are not themselves caused by any phenomena. But Mill does not venture to say what these noumena may be, or to supply a basis for what he calls "ultimate truths," one of which is the uniformity of nature. He is not concerned with a universal in this sense, but with inductions from particulars to generals.

The Inductive Method.—Induction, in brief, includes observation, experiment, ratiocination, inference by resemblance; assumptions regarding parallel cases, the course of nature or the events of the universe; it proceeds by arguments from similarity; and is based in general on the assumption of the uniformity of nature as the ultimate major premise. This premise implies partial irregularities amidst the constancy of varied phenomena, also invariable sequences which involve the coexistence of primeval causes. Induction is the fundamental logical process, deduction being only an incident in the general process. Since logic is essentially empirical, formal logic is of slight consequence; and as logic is chiefly employed in the physical sciences and is concerned with relative generalizations, its generalizations are subject to modification. Ultimate questions therefore fall outside, although Mill has much to say about the philosophical systems, and undertakes to meet objections. Mill is especially known for his formulation of the four rules and methods of experimental inquiry:

⁶ *Logic*, Bk. III, Chap. V.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Chap. XXI.

the methods of agreement, difference, residues, and concomitant variations, with examples of these methods taken from the special sciences.⁸

Ethics.—In his ethics Mill adopted Bentham's utilitarianism on the ground that the good cannot be proved good but is generally admitted to be so, with the implication that what is required is a general formula, namely, happiness or exemption from pain, the useful or agreeable, as the only desirable end.⁹ It follows that actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, wrong so far as they tend to produce the opposite. Mill departs from Bentham however by frankly admitting that the pleasures of the intellect, the emotions, and the imagination are higher in value than bodily feelings; that pleasures differ in kind as well as in quantity. He finds that people prefer the higher pleasures despite susceptibility to lower. Moreover people work for the good of others. The end to be pursued is not then the agent's isolated good, but the happiness of all concerned, in the greatest amount. Impartiality is therefore needed, hence the Golden Rule follows from acceptance of utility as the standard. In this pursuit of happiness each person's happiness is to count for as much as another's, and the test is to be *social* welfare in the light of both internal and external sanctions. The internal sanction or feeling is conscience, which involves not only the shrinking of the individual from what is wrong but the support of the conscientious feelings of mankind. Conscience is binding, its authority is as august and strong as if it were imposed by a higher being or order of reality. Strongly emphasizing the "feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures," which constitutes the persuasiveness of this doctrine, Mill shows that utility involves justice, keeping faith, impartiality, equality; and he discriminates between justice or moral worth and the expediency with which mere utility might be identified.¹⁰ Justice is traced to the social, sympathetic promptings of

⁸ *Op. cit.*, Bk. III, Chap. VIII.

⁹ *Utilitarianism*, 1863, p. 9.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, Chap. V.

mankind; it involves a rule of conduct which sanctions the rule. The "right" is what society must guarantee. Social utility is more fundamental than justice, although under justice belong the most important social utilities, the utilities which are guarded by a sentiment differing both in kind and degree, and are absolute and imperative. Thus by admitting *quality* of pleasure as the standard, and almost imperceptibly changing from individual to social utility, desire to conscience and justice, and from happiness as actually sought to *moral obligation*, Mill abandons Bentham's doctrine for a greatly superior view. By tending toward intuitionism and altruism, Mill won adherents from various schools, and greatly fostered interest in ethical inquiries. Here, as in his famous essays on *Liberty*, *The Subjection of Women*, and in other essays on social and political matters, Mill reveals himself as a reformer, winning people by his frankness, far more interested to pursue liberalizing truth wherever it may lead than to subscribe to logical consistency. The aim of his philosophy as a whole is to be faithful to the leading incentives to human thought and conduct as implied in successful scientific procedure and in moral values wherever found.

Criticism of Hamilton.—In his keen analysis of Hamilton's philosophy Mill brought into close conjunction the philosophical interests of the time, and made highly suggestive the antithesis between empiricism and any doctrine which adopted principles from the critical philosophy.

Apparently, Hamilton held that we know things by immediate perception, as possessing extension and other primary qualities inhering in the object, secondary qualities being known as they are in ourselves. Hence it seems plain that Hamilton meant by "relative knowledge" merely our knowledge of secondary qualities; for knowledge of things ulterior to their effect on us is obviously not wholly relative. The result then is that we possess authentic knowledge and also relative knowledge. But this after all is not the crucial point. Hamilton had argued that we have no immediate consciousness or intuition of

God, we have no faculties capable of apprehending the infinite and absolute; hence the Infinite and Absolute are unknowable. Yet Hamilton unites the ideas of the Infinite and Absolute in his conception of the *Unconditioned*, which proves on inspection to be a negative conception. With his characteristic emphasis on the concrete Mill points out that Hamilton has shown that we cannot know "The Infinite" or "The Absolute": he has not shown we cannot know a concrete reality as infinite or as absolute.¹¹ The conception of infinite space is positive: what we lack is an *adequate* conception of space or duration as infinite.

"The conception of infinite as that which is greater than any given quantity is a conception we all possess, sufficient for all human purposes, and as genuine and good a positive conception as one need wish to have. It is not adequate; our conception of a reality never is. But it is positive; and the assertion that there is nothing positive in the idea of infinity can only be maintained by leaving out and ignoring, as Sir W. Hamilton invariably does, the very element which constitutes the idea."¹² Hamilton's argument applies only to an "abstract" Unconditioned, which cannot possibly exist.

Again, Hamilton had asserted that "thought necessarily supposes condition: *to think is to condition*." Mill interprets this conditional thinking to mean that our "perceptive and conceptive faculties have their own laws." To think is to give an object a correlative (by giving it a thinker) and as many more correlatives as may be needed to distinguish it from other objects. Naturally then we discriminate between the thing perceived or conceived and the elements derived from our powers, the "conditions of thought" with which the mind cannot help investing every object articulated by perception and conception.

Unable to show that we have "knowledge" of the Infinite, Hamilton restores under "belief" what he had denied under *knowledge*, the sphere of belief being much more extensive than that of knowledge. Belief then proves

¹¹ *Examination*, Vol. I, p. 61.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

to be the primary condition of reason, the necessity of believing is imposed on us by our nature. Indeed, belief is a higher source of evidence than knowledge; it is ultimate, while knowledge is only derivative. Since knowledge rests finally on belief, natural beliefs are the sole warrant for all our knowledge. But, says Mill, this nullifies the argument for the relativity of our knowledge: "we have the best grounded and most complete assurance of the things which were declared unknowable."¹³ What we believe, in fine, is premises; what we know is conclusions from them. The ultimate facts of consciousness are given in the form of beliefs, consciousness as a primary experience is a *faith*. We are conscious of some things outside the mind, some perceptions are of outward objects; hence we are conscious of objects. We also have representative knowledge of the past—by belief. Hamilton proves to be a natural realist: the non-ego is an original datum of consciousness. He also proves to be a nominalist.¹⁴ As the outcome of his critique, Mill concludes that it would be more intelligible to say that "we think by means of ideas of concrete phenomena, such as are presented in experience or represented in imagination, and by means of names, which, being in the peculiar manner associated with certain elements of the concrete images, arrest our attention on those elements." Concepts do not exist as separate or independent objects of thought, but are always parts of our concrete imagery. Thus Mill's logical doctrine is confirmed anew. By applying his concrete criterion, he finds in almost every instance that Hamilton has failed to make a contribution to our understanding, his prevailing fault being "over-anxiety to make safe a foregone conclusion," namely, belief in free-will as essential to the doctrines of natural religion.¹⁵

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 75.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

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§ 31. OTHER TYPES OF BRITISH THOUGHT

While Mill's thought was still dominant, arousing both adherents and opponents in the discussion of its central issues, other thinkers were developing the traditional philosophy in the analysis of logical and psychological problems. W. S. Jevons (1835-1882), author of several works on logic, including *Pure Logic*, 1871, *Principles of Science*, 1874, urged the purely tentative character of all scientific laws, and formulated a theory of inference which widely differed from Mill's theory of induction. Alexander Bain (1818-1903) continued the tradition of associationism by appeal to recent physiological researches.¹ In contrast with Hartley's reference to nervous process, Bain directed attention to organic conditions and a primitive activity or spontaneity, also to the emotions and volitions. Bain undertook to explain beliefs as rules for action, due to an "impulse of perseverance" or preparedness to act. Noting the tendency of ideas to possess the mind as "fixed ideas" and eventuate automatically in action, he directed attention to sympathy as the noteworthy source of social action.

George Grote (1794-1871), the historian, developed the social character of moral obligation, the moral supremacy of society, with its rights to make demands on the individual. In addition to a group of radicals who carried Bentham's doctrines into politics, John Austin and Sir

¹ *Senses and the Intellect*, 1855; *The Emotions and the Will*, 1859; *Mental and Moral Science*, 1868.

James Fitzjames Stephen also belong among the utilitarians. Thomas Arnold (1795–1842) opposed the utilitarians in favor of the Church as the great institution for fostering goodness. In his *Grammar of Assent*, 1870, J. H. Newman (1801–1890) developed a theory of the grounds of belief. The Oxford movement in general was an effort to infuse new life into the Church. The influence of Wordsworth's poems, the liberalism and extensive personal influence of F. D. Maurice,² and the rationalism of Matthew Arnold are also to be noted in this period. Arnold made clear and persuasive the results of the new or higher criticism of the scriptures; and gave currency to the idea of God as the "Power that makes for righteousness," with emphasis on conduct as "three-fourths of life."

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834), although not a systematic writer on philosophy, invigorated philosophy by his insights, and the introduction of distinctions and terms taken over from German idealism, for example, the idea of intuitive reason in contrast with the shortcomings of the mere understanding.³ Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) strongly emphasized duty and the moral order, in contrast with current doctrines which were greatly inferior to ethical idealism. Deriving inspiration and ideas from Goethe and Fichte, his influence on the literature and thought of the day was intimately related with that of Emerson and the transcendentalist movement in New England.⁴ The influence of Coleridge is seen in the poetry of Wordsworth, who, with Shelley, gave expression to the romantic reaction against the mentality and the conceptions of nature of the eighteenth century in favor of aesthetic intuition. Whitehead finds in the doctrines of the poets, including Matthew Arnold and Tennyson, six significant ideas: change, value, eternal objects, endurance, organism, interfusion.⁵ Thus the romantic movement marks the change from the materialistic concepts of the older science.

² *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, 1871–1872.

³ *Aids to Reflection*, 1825.

⁴ *Sartor Resartus*, 1823; *French Revolution*, 1837.

⁵ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 127.

Interest in positivism in England began with a group of writers at Oxford, and with translations and lectures.⁶ John Stuart Mill's influence was in favor of positivism as a general philosophical attitude. Herbert Spencer adopted the idea of altruism. Frederic Harrison, and other writers, gave expression to practical, historical, and literary values, which also found formulation in the ethical culture movement in England and America.

James Martineau (1805-1900), who belongs to the history of liberal theology in the latter half of the century, also contributed to the philosophical literature of theism in his *Study of Religion*, 1888, in which he argued for the being of God as Power and Will. In his *Types of Ethical Theory*, 1885, Martineau analyzed Greek, English, and other types of ethics in favor of his own moral doctrine. Giving special prominence to moral judgment and the moral law, in contrast with prudence, Martineau directed attention to the springs of moral action; hence he showed the importance of a scale of values.⁷ The result was an elaborate psychology of conscience with emphasis on the moral order of incentives to action, sustained by acute criticism of current doctrines, and a strong appeal to intuitionism in contrast with utilitarian or empirical conceptions of ethics. Martineau's work was the greatest on ethics for a considerable period.

Empiricism as a general philosophy was formulated anew by S. Hodgson (1832-1912).⁸ Hodgson regarded simple feeling as the ultimate datum of experience, involving the distinction between consciousness and its object; and proceeded with a general analysis of experience without attempting to construct a world-view beyond matter. Hence Hodgson is sometimes classed among the physical realists.⁹

⁶ H. Martineau translated Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, 1853.

⁷ *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, 3rd ed., 1891, pp. 95, 129, foll.

⁸ *Time and Space*, 1865; *The Theory of Practice*, 1870; *The Philosophy of Reflection*, 1878; *The Metaphysic of Experience*, 1898, 4 vols.

⁹ See Sorley, *op. cit.*, p. 274; Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

§ 32. THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION. CHARLES DARWIN

When considering the idea of the whole cosmos as an evolution from the conceivably simple stage of far-off geological ages to the highly organized astronomical system of today, with animal and human life on our earth as typical of nature's greatest products, we note that evolution is not a new idea but the one which the mind most readily adopts. Cosmology in ancient Greece began with the notion of an original element or elements from which sprang the then known world. One rival view succeeded another. With the teaching of Empedocles it became possible to depict the cosmic process as a struggle of opposing forces in cycles of distributed and co-ordinated elements attaining order. With Democritus the process became an achievement of atoms cohering by chance. Finally, with Aristotle development was envisaged in terms of potentiality and actuality, a dynamic advance from stage to stage as the least degree of form and greatest degree of matter gave place to the greatest attainment of form and the least obstacle due to matter. Especially needed was the idea of the vast solar system in which the sun was to become the centre of the universe (Copernicus). The universe itself became infinite (with Bruno), and was regarded as a law-exemplifying system definable in precise terms by Galileo and Newton. But although the universe could now be conceived as a system which was presently to be interpreted with reference to the conservation of matter or energy, the uniformity of nature, it remained relatively static as described by the mechanical philosophers. The transition to a dynamic, then to a vital or living view, with inspiring ideas of progress and great human attainments in the moral and spiritual realms, came with the epoch-making views of history and civilization, beginning in the age of Lessing and Herder, and continuing in the contributions of the romanticists and Hegel's philosophy of history. It was the idea of history as a developing

process implying inner meanings and the culmination of values which prepared the way for the modern doctrine of evolution as a concept of nature, leading the way in time to a comprehensive philosophy of evolution.¹

Herder, especially, applied the idea of development to history, Laplace (1749–1827) applied it to astronomy; Buffon (1707–1788), Lamarck (1744–1829) and Cuvier (1769–1832) to various fields of natural history; C. F. Wolff (1733–1794) and Von Baer (1792–1876) to anatomy and embryology; and Lyell (1797–1875) introduced into geology the idea of uniform stages through the entire process of slow modifications of the earth's crust. The idea of the organic evolution of species in terms of effort, gradual change of the organs, use and disuse, came into vogue with Lamarck; but this idea was insufficient without the empirical evidences of the development of species.

Darwin.—The hypothesis of natural selection contributed by Charles Darwin (1809–1882), in his *Origin of Species*, 1859, brought into the foreground these various approaches to an evolutionary conception of nature in demonstrable terms. Darwin was not a philosopher in the usual sense, but a specialist whose researches came as a culmination and whose cautious conclusions marked the beginning of a profound controversy. Darwin formulated his hypothesis as a result of exceptional opportunities to observe various fauna and flora in different parts of the world. He then entered upon a period of prolonged investigation before publishing his views, in ideal exemplification of the methods of empirical research; and found a public ready to apply the same methods in all fields. By his hypothesis of natural selection through chance variation he directed attention both to the organic conditions favorable to survival and to the small variations which figure in this process. Darwin did not undertake to show the ultimate origin of species or variations, but to show the effects of variations by describing the influences of environment and the selective processes by which variations are made useful and are preserved. A “chance varia-

¹ Royce, *The Spirit of Mod. Phil.*, Lect. IX.

tion" is one whose causes are thus far unknown. Natural selection does not guarantee perfection, and does not necessarily make for progress; it involves a conception of the conditions of life in essentially biological terms. Hence Darwin's doctrine removed an obstacle to widespread applications of the biological view, by making available the facts of embryology, and indicating the significance of struggle in nature as a whole. For Darwin did not stop with a study of variations in animal forms, with the implication that the human organism is a product of natural evolution by means of physical forces; his *Descent of Man*, 1871, was far more suggestive because of the probability that mental and moral life are also products of organic evolution.

Darwin's Influence.—The general result was a vindication of the principle of natural causation, applicable universally, without further reference to possible interventions from a supernatural source; the substitution of impersonal forces, under the universal reign of law, for the theory of design or a world-plan due to a creator outside the cosmos; profound light on the conditions of physical life, with hitherto neglected facts in regard to the preying of one species on another, the sufferings involved, and the difficulties of progress; and an impetus toward positivism and the application of Darwin's method of observation and experiment. It became extremely difficult to defend the design argument, as if man had been produced by the creator as a watch-maker might proceed in making a watch, and as if man had been placed in an environment which had little connection with him. Man became as definitely as possible a part of nature, subject to every force in it, his mind an outcome of organic processes, his moral nature no longer requiring a special faculty as if "conscience" had been put into him by supernatural endowment. Man's animal ancestry seemed to account for the existence of evil, the possibility of revelation and miracles seemed undermined, and even the existence of God put in doubt. But the first suspicious reactions against Darwinism led in time to efforts to reconstruct the whole idea of God,

substituting the idea of an immanent divine energy or life for the former view. Thus the controversies have continued to this day. The central problem for many is that of mechanism *vs.* teleology. For others, it is the problem of ethics, in view of nature's apparent neglect of moral values. Again, it is a question of the origin of religion, with tendencies toward naturalism, an effort to explain all later or higher religion by primitive forms. Darwinism seemed for the moment to substantiate materialism; instead, it greatly enlarged the biological horizon in favor of modifications of the theory of evolution to account for gaps in the process and to prepare the way for an adequate philosophy, with a conception of "creative evolution."

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§ 33. HERBERT SPENCER

Life.—Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) was born in Derby, England, and remained in England for his education and life-work. He received his early training from his father, who was a teacher; from an uncle; and from early interests and occupations, in civil engineering, journalism, and the special sciences. Promising as a student in mathematics and mechanics, he declined to go to college; and did not even in his later years acquaint himself with the great philosophical teachings of the past. The study of Lyell's *Geology* led him, in 1839, to his theory of development, which he expressed in essentially social terms in his *Social Statics*; he was also influenced by the views of C. F. Wolff and von Baer, whose researches showed that all organic development involves a law of change from homogeneity to heterogeneity. In an essay on *The*

Development Hypothesis, 1852, Spencer compared evolution and creation; and in successive works, until 1887, formulated his system of synthetic philosophy. His *Autobiography* was issued a year after his death.

Personality plays a conspicuous part in Spencer's doctrine. Spencer showed his native independence by refusing to attend college or to read books expounding views with which he was not in accord. This non-conformist temper, which held him aloof all his life and was so pronounced that he did not even profit by criticisms passed on his system, is often cited as the explanation of the essentially provincial attitude characteristic of his works, their dogmatic tone, and the author's unwillingness to modify a position once adopted. On the positive side this uprightness or self-reliance expressed itself in Spencer's strong moral motive, which led him to anticipate his ethical doctrine as the culmination of all his labors. Negatively, his work was limited to the extension or verification of his formula of evolution; hence he failed to develop his system to make it constructively "synthetic." With the recognition for which he waited many years, came a relentless criticism which disclosed many serious defects in his system. While he showed great skill in assimilating and co-ordinating data from widespread sources in exemplification of evolution as the universal idea, his system lacked the close articulation of thinkers who drew upon the deliverances of the history of thought. Persuaded by his early inquiries that species had been evolved, and that there must be a formula which will express evolution as a law, Spencer devoted himself to instances of his formula in each of his special fields; and regarded philosophy as essentially a co-ordination of such results as he had gathered. Hence his system belongs in a measure apart from the continuities and prevailing conceptions of modern philosophy.

First Principles.—Judged by the classic instances of metaphysical analysis, Spencer's method is least effective where philosophy should be most productive: in the inquiry on which he bases his later works. Assuming that a First Cause is inevitable, infinite, independent, he accepts

Mansel's definition of the Absolute without critical investigation. Thus he adopts scientific ideas as "ultimate," namely, for the representation of realities which "cannot be comprehended." Under this head belong matter (known only by reference to force), space, time, motion, rest, and the existence of mental life.¹ Spencer also accepts the conclusion current in his day that ultimate religious ideas are "merely symbols of the actual," not cognitions of reality itself. He readily adopts Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, without noting the difficulties inherent in that doctrine; and consequently takes for granted that reality remains beyond conception in final terms. On this basis he establishes the conception for which he has been most sharply assailed, his well-known idea of the Unknowable, which is his term for whatever may be absolute, first or ultimate in the order of the universe, including the idea of God. Spencer's starting-point here seems to him to be that of common sense, which leads us to infer the existence of a reality, of *some* reality lying behind phenomena. Science shows that this reality can neither be what we objectively think it to be nor what it seems to be subjectively. Yet, utterly inscrutable as this reality is, we must, says Spencer, adopt its existence as a Power (whether personal or not), and regard Power as the basis of our intelligence and the ground of the universe. Indeed, it is also a matter of duty to regard Power, the Unknowable, as the Reality through which all things exist.

Spencer does not however mean that because unknowable this Power is detached, as if our relative knowledge referred solely to our own subjective states, to the mere conditions of existence. Having postulated its existence as unconditioned or absolute, as if for the moment the Unknowable were indeed "utterly inscrutable," Spencer devotes the major part of his *First Principles* to developing the positive content of the Unknowable, as if it were profoundly *known*, the explicit source of all empirically observed conditions and the direct basis of our cognitions

¹ *First Principles*, Part I.

in all branches of knowledge. According to this his "transfigured realism," the Unknowable is a Power to which various attributes can be assigned. It possesses manifestations, with knowable likenesses and differences, and a resulting segregation which comes within the compass of our experience. Thus Part II of Spencer's treatise is devoted to the Knowable, with the assumption that we are "persistently conscious" of the Power with which we have previously become acquainted as the Unknowable. Although this Power is, in the terms borrowed from Sir William Hamilton, the "Unconditioned," space, time, matter, and motion as known from past experiences of force are built into our knowledge through conditioned effects of this unconditioned Cause.

Accordingly, Spencer appeals to the facts of impressions and ideas as ordinarily characterized by English empiricism, and defines reality as "*persistence* in consciousness," unconditional or conditional.² Persistence of force having been accepted as the cardinal fact of the objective world, the energy behind all evolution, we are concerned with effects wrought by this force in the phenomena known as our experience. We know the unknowable as transcending relations, but we also know it through its relationships; we may proceed to develop the implications of relations of sequence and relations of co-existence. Indeed, we definitely know that the persistence of force is the central underlying law. Originally derived from experience by contacts with nature, our beliefs concerning matter, space, time, motion, the powers of the external world in general, were implanted in us by the evolutionary process; hence forms of thought are produced with and within the organism as parts of our mental structure. In the maturity of our thought, we are able to justify this empirical knowledge, notably by testing it in terms of the inconceivability of the opposite, the criterion which Spencer applies to his conception of the persistence of force. Spencer does not leave his readers with relative knowledge in the sense of ignorance, but with the explicit recognition of the evolu-

² *Op. cit.*, Pt. II, Chap. III.

tionary or empirical conditions under which it was acquired. The persistence of force is admittedly the persistence of the Cause which transcends our knowledge; but Spencer is concerned with what follows from the fact of force rather than with the resolution of his paradoxes. Consequently, with the proposition that there is an invariable connection between the consequent mode of the Unknowable and its antecedent mode, he turns to an analysis of the persistence of relations among forces, the uniformity of law, the correlation of mental and physical forces, the directions of motion, the law of the continuous redistribution of matter and motion, namely, evolution: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."³ Evolution involves (1) the concentration or integration of elements, a process which is seen not only in the development of our solar system out of the primitive nebular state, the absorption of materials into the structure of a plant, but also in the assembling of individuals into groups in human society; (2) differentiation, as exemplified by the richness of our mental life; and (3) determination, or the appearance of differences emerging from the formerly homogeneous mass, coupled with an advance from confusion to order, from the simple to the complex. The clue to this threefold process is biological. But it is also found in sociology, the advance through life and mind to man as a developed social being by stages of increasing complexity.

Psychology.—Nervous evolution is said to vary partly as the quantity of motion generated in the organism, partly as the complexity of this motion. Spencer regards the feeling-life as the concomitant of the physical, with special reference to continuity and persistence. Impressions and ideas are not separate existences: existence means persistence amidst certain relations.⁴ Knowing implies some-

³ *Ibid.*, Pt. II, Chap. XVII.

⁴ *Principles of Psychology*, 2nd ed., 1870, Vol. I, p. 146.

thing acted upon and something acting upon it, for example, in the nervous shock which is probably the ultimate unit of consciousness, feelings being composed of rapidly recurring mental shocks. In the parallelism of physical heterogeneity and psychical heterogeneity, unlike feelings are due to unlike modes of integration of this unity of motion. Since matter, motion, and mind are symbols of unknowables, we cannot pass beyond this duality of subject and object, mind and matter: mind as "substance" is as inscrutable as matter.

The components of mind are feelings and relations between feelings, a relational feeling is undecomposable. Sensation is a peripherally initiated feeling, emotion is centrally initiated feeling. Feelings are classed as vivid or primary, faint or secondary. The law of composition is that vivid feelings tend to cohere with all preceding faint feelings similar to them. Ideas result from such unions: knowing is the name of the act of segregation. Mind is constituted "when each sensation is assimilated to the faint forms of antecedent like sensations."⁵ The evolution of mind is through ascending stages of composition, as primarily a progressing integration. Sensation itself is an integrated series of nervous shocks or units of feeling, and the development proceeds by an increasing heterogeneity of these integrated aggregates of feeling. Feelings are revivable in so far as they are relational, and relations are more revivable than feelings: revivability varies as associability varies. With the establishment of correspondences between relations in the organism and relations in the environment, intelligence appears. The development of mind as a whole is the progress of such correspondences in space, time, speciality, generality, complexity. Every act of intelligence is essentially an adjustment of inner to outer relations.

Psychical life is distinguished from physical by the fact that it consists of successive changes only, whereas in physical life there are also simultaneous changes. The law of succession of psychical changes is the law of their cor-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

respondence. The highest forms of psychical life arise out of the lowest, little by little, and cannot be definitely separated from them. Every instinctive action is an adjustment of inner relations to outer; actions called rational by long-continued repetition become instinctive; rational action grows out of instinctive when such action becomes too complex to be automatic.⁶ Cohesion of psychical states is in proportion to the frequency with which these states have followed one another in experience: hence the "forms of thought" are explained. Our ideas of space and time are due to consolidated, indissoluble, instinctive mental relations. While sensations cannot be decomposed, perceptions, as secondary, are decomposable; so too the evolution of will can be traced, also memory, and reason, the relational element of mind being the intellectual element throughout. Thinking consists of combinations of impressions and ideas by means of incessant internal changes.⁷ Consciousness is an orderly succession of the changes which constitute its raw material, organized through its development. Emphasis falls on the *unity of composition* throughout all the phenomena of intelligence. The universal process is the assimilation of impressions, amidst a continuous integration and differentiation.

Ethics.—The analysis of external phenomena by themselves yields the data of physics, the investigation of internal phenomena in relation to external phenomena in the organism yields physiology; while life, studied as continuous adaptation of internal physiological relations to external relations implies biology. The important consideration is the maintenance of inner relations as products of evolution by which the organism is sustained in its adaptations. The original mass out of which organic forms appeared was homogeneous protoplasm; differentiations of external forces produced morphological and physiological differentiations; species arose through interaction between the organism and the external world; variations, occurring in the organism through external changes, are preserved

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 458.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 292.

by natural selection if adapted to conditions. The evolution of conduct of all living creatures being understood by its adaptations, this conduct is traceable from the physical into the biological, thence into the psychological and social aspects, thus into its ethical phase.

Spencer announced in the preface to the *Data of Ethics*, with which he began the moral doctrine later completed in his *Principles of Ethics*, that this doctrine was his main interest in developing his system of philosophy. He limits himself however to what some ethical philosophers would call the preliminary inquiry into conduct involving successful adjustments. He defines good or bad acts as those which subserve or hinder life in terms of pleasure and pain. Conduct is said to become moral as the activities become less militant, more industrial, co-operative, with the appearance of altruistic desires. Since man's conduct is good if its total effects are pleasure, the ultimate test of perfection would be conduciveness to happiness. In the moral life the balance of internal actions in the face of external forces tending to overthrow it approaches most nearly to completion. The individual cannot however advance beyond society: only through complete equilibrium between the co-ordinated activities could the most highly organized life in a complete society be attained. The social organism is higher in rank than its units. Through the proportioning of benefits received to services rendered the universal basis of co-operation is attained. But because egoism is prior to altruism, it must take precedence over it; the pursuit of individual happiness is essential to the attainment of the greatest general happiness. Yet Spencer assigns a high rank to altruism, he finds that self-sacrifice is as surely primordial as self-preservation; hence he anticipates the growth of altruism through social evolution. Originally weak, altruism becomes stronger, and eventually justice appears, from sympathy as its root. Eventually, egoistic satisfactions depend on justice, with the establishment of conditions for maintaining it.

Spencer's evolutionary hedonism seems to him to supersede earlier forms of hedonism and utilitarianism, because

he bases it on an analysis of biology and the other special sciences, which he has already formulated in terms of evolution. Critics have raised the question whether he proves that evolution tends to the greatest happiness, or shows that the historical process affords a ground for attributing a supreme value to the individual. Spencer undertakes to explain higher by lower conduct, internal conduct by external behavior; and mental life by pleasure biologically interpreted. Pain is identified with evil, and pleasure is uncritically accepted as the test of goodness. One's conclusions on these matters will affect any judgment passed on other applications of Spencer's theory. Granted the transition from the individual to the social, and the appeal to the principle of the survival of the fittest among social groups, the way is open for carrying on conduct which does not in any great degree interfere with the moral conduct of other groups. Rights are due to equal freedom, progress involves the relinquishing of functions; very much depends on keeping social, especially political functions, within certain limits so that individuals shall have full opportunity to develop. This view is in accord with Spencer's *Education*, in which he grants special freedom to the child to develop spontaneously. In his *Principles of Sociology*, Spencer formulates his doctrine of the development of the characteristics of the race by manifold illustrations drawn from the primitive races. The analogy between society and the organism, in which the individuals correspond to physiological units, is the unifying principle of description, although here as elsewhere the individual is supreme.

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§ 34. OTHER TYPES OF EVOLUTIONISM AND ETHICS

Lewes.—Influenced in the direction of positivism, by Comte and Darwin, G. H. Lewes (1817–1878), advanced beyond his derogatory treatment of philosophy in his well-known *Biographical History of Philosophy* to a more constructive view in *Problems of Life and Mind*. With a clear idea of the relation of consciousness to the organism, Lewes was among the first to put stress on the social factor in the development of mind, namely, the “social medium” which is added to the physical. Lewes accepts the view that as all knowledge is relative, philosophy is a logic of the highest scientific concepts; such terms as “general mind,” “individual mind” are symbols; our knowledge develops in terms of “feeling” plus symbols, sensibility being inherent in the nervous substance of the organism.

Huxley.—T. H. Huxley (1825–1895), to whom the term “agnosticism” is attributed, reverts to Hume, on the assumption that Hume’s great service was an “irrefragable demonstration” of the limits of human inquiry. In his appeal to experience as the “great school-master,” with the counsel that truth is that knowledge which can be experimentally tested, Huxley admits that causality or universality cannot be proved by any amount of experience. We are safeguarded from materialism by the probability that, besides matter and force in the universe, there is mind or consciousness. Matter is for Huxley a “symbol” only, while consciousness is a collateral effect of certain physical causes, witnessing phenomena but not participating in them as a cause. While physical science associates objective existence with a material world, mental facts imply another sort of existence, and Huxley inclines toward Berkeley’s idealism. But at other times idealism seems to him as absurd as materialism, since we know

neither spirit nor matter save as symbols. The resource is an attitude of restraint on Huxley's part, with a sincerity, directness, and acuteness as a critic which made him a great power in the controversies over Darwinism. He was best known in a later period for his famous Romanes lecture, *Evolution and Ethics*, 1893, in which, frankly acknowledging the struggle and lack of moral purpose in nature, he rejects the "gladiatorial theory of existence," while suggesting that ethical progress depends on passing beyond the historical process and combating the forces of natural evolution.

G. J. Romanes (1848-1894) took a leading part in the discussions over evolution, with reference to theism, animal intelligence, and mental evolution in man. W. K. Clifford (1845-1879) adopted panpsychism, on the ground that evolution involves the integration of simple units of crude feeling, or "mind-stuff."¹ Feeling, as the type of reality, implies in its higher phases "cosmic emotion" yielding a religion of humanity or social consciousness; also a social epistemology by virtue of our recognition of similar mental content in the minds of our fellowmen, another man's consciousness being an "eject," and conscience the judgment of the "tribal self."

Leslie Stephen (1832-1904), author of the *History of English Thought in the 18th Century*, 1876, formulated in his *Science of Ethics*, 1882, an evolutionary ethical doctrine resembling Spencer's, but with emphasis on social vitality rather than pleasure, with more attention given to the inner life, and a trend toward idealism. In his *Methods of Ethics*, 1874, Henry Sidgwick (1838-1899) adopted Mill's utilitarianism in part, but found it impossible to demonstrate on empirical grounds the inseparable connection between utilitarian duty and the greatest happiness of the individual conforming to such duty. Sidgwick therefore modifies utilitarianism in favor of intuitive principles, and finds that justice is the basis for the distribution of the means of happiness. Sidgwick made an important contribution to ethical thought in his *History*

¹ *Seeing and Thinking*, 1879; *Lectures and Essays*, 1879.

of *Ethics*, 5th ed., 1902. H. Rashdall undertook a further modification of utilitarianism in *The Theory of Good and Evil*, 1907. It is now admitted that it is the *idea* of pleasure, before the desired action is accomplished, which is influential; that pleasure is *a* good rather than *the* good; hence the need for a scale of values, for an "ideal" utilitarianism. With the conclusion that there is nothing in this idealism inconsistent with the fullest admission that morality has been gradually evolved, interest in ethics passes over into further studies in the evolution of morals, and moral progress.²

§ 35. NATURALISM AND NEO-KANTIANISM IN GERMANY

The reaction from Hegel's idealism in favor of the doctrines of Strauss, Feuerbach, Karl Marx, was succeeded by a scientific naturalism in further development of the more recent generalizations. We have noted the fact that the generalizations of the mechanical theory of Galileo and Newton held sway for a very considerable period. In the age of Descartes and Spinoza interest had centered about the idea of substance. With Leibniz the idea of force became more prominent, although the conception of the persistence of substance also continued as a leading interest. Lavoisier at length succeeded in demonstrating the long cherished idea of the persistence of matter through all changes. Priestley, Saussure, and others formulated laws involved in material changes; and organic life could then be more definitely conceived as belonging within the one system of material processes. Later, came the far more important discovery of the principle of the conservation of energy by Robert Mayer, in 1842, a generalization of great moment for physics and philosophy.

Other important contributions were made by Johannes Müller (1801-1858), professor of physiology in Berlin; H.

² Cf. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, 1889; Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1906. Evolutionary hedonism is analyzed by Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, 1908; Thilly, *Introduction to Ethics*, 1900.

Helmholtz (1821–1895), professor of physiology in Königsberg and other universities (1852–1894), professor of medicine in Würzburg; and Du Bois Raymond (1816–1896), who succeeded Müller as professor of physiology.¹ The theory of the transformation of heat into motion suggested an investigation of all forces with reference to their mutual convertibility, and with the extension of the concept of mechanism to include all vital processes the old conflict between atomism and dynamism was again brought to the fore. The problems of the origin of life, of the purposive order of nature seemed soluble. But the problems which pertained to the ultimate nature of matter (atoms), force (action at a distance), the origin of motion, the possible genesis of consciousness from the known conditions of mental life remained unsolved. The general result was naturalism. Meanwhile, ardent discussions ensued concerning the relationship of brain and soul.²

Materialism.—Prominent in the materialistic controversy of the period were Karl Vogt (1817–1895); H. Czolbe (1819–1873); J. Moleschott (1822–1893), a Dutch professor of physiology; and L. Büchner (1824–1899). Moleschott was author of the famous saying *Ohne Phosphor kein Gedanke* (no phosphorus, no thought), a saying which, like the teaching of Cabanis that the brain “secretes thought,” suggests materialism at its lowest level. Gall claimed to have localized the alleged “faculties” of the soul in definite regions of the brain, and had substituted “phrenology” for psychology. Still more famous than Moleschott’s dictum was Büchner’s *Kraft und Stoff* (Force and Matter), 1855, which passed through sixteen editions in Germany and was profoundly influential. Aside from its materialism, which seemed conclusive, this book also put stress on relativity, with the implication that the ultimate riddles of life are not to be solved.³ Apparently, materialism had won a greater triumph than during the

¹ Lange, *His. of Materialism*, Vol. III; Siebert, *Gesch. der neueren deutschen Phil.*, p. 292, foll.

² Cf. Lange, *ibid.*, Vol. III, Sec. III.

³ See Lange, *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 271; Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 346, foll.

culmination of the Enlightenment in France. But, once more, the prime result was cautious naturalism, guarding against the assumption of anything supersensuous, and frankly admitting that there were unsolved problems.

Haeckel.—With the shifting of interest to the problems of evolution, after the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, materialism took another form. The leader of this movement in Germany was Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), professor of zoology at Jena after 1865.⁴ Haeckel's best known popular work, *Die Welträtsel*, 1899,⁵ had a remarkable vogue, partly because Haeckel as a biologist apparently spoke with much more authority than Spencer. Haeckel transformed the Darwinian theory of development into a system of nature-philosophy; he generalized the conception of evolution in terms of a monism of matter and force as two aspects of one substance, and with respect to the emergence of life from physico-chemical conditions. His view of nature is a kind of animism in evolutionary form, with intimations of a spiritual view of the universe which aroused great interest in some quarters, but was regarded as inconsistent and very vulnerable by others. The laws of substance and of universal evolution seemed to have solved all the great riddles of existence. The hypothesis of spontaneous generation with special reference to slime-creatures living in the greatest depths of the sea seemed to account for the origin of life. Granted the constancy of matter and force, this world-scheme seemed complete. Life had apparently emerged from protoplasm, which was followed by psychoplasm and neuroplasm, on the assumption that life is physico-chemical energy, and consciousness a product of psychic gradations and the brain. The higher values find no place in this easily won monism save so far as Nature takes the place of God in a new "natural religion."⁶ But the result was renewed interest in the prob-

⁴ *Generelle Morphologie*, 1866; *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 1868; *Anthropogenie*, 1874; translations of the two latter works: *The History of Creation*, 1883; *The Evolution of Man*, 1879, and *The Pedigree of Man*, 1880.

⁵ *The Riddle of the Universe*, tr. by McCabe, 1902.

⁶ Cf. Siebert's discussion, *op. cit.*, p. 317, foll.

lems of force or energy and life, with increased caution concerning the higher values.

Ostwald.—Wilhelm Ostwald (b. 1853), professor of physical chemistry at Leipzig, substituted a dynamic or energetic theory for materialism.⁷ The properties of matter were now described as special forms of energy, life itself being a combination of physico-chemical energies; and psychic energy another form, nervous energy being an intermediate form. Energy, as the universal substance, implies conservation, the law of constancy. Not only is space occupied by volume-energy, mass being capacity for motor energy, and weight a certain kind of local energy; the chemical qualities are varieties of energy due to the transformation of substances. Energy is either work and all that arises from it or is converted into work. It is the most comprehensive scientific concept, compasses both substantiality and causality. As chemical, energy is utilized in all the active processes of life. Underneath matter and body are energies in a composite state of equilibrium. Consciousness too is energy, as shown by the analysis of attention, memory, will, and the unity of consciousness with its correlation of experiences in inner coherence. The problem of the relation of unconscious to conscious energy is left unsolved.⁸

Mach.—Ernst Mach (1838–1916), professor of physics at Prague, later professor of philosophy at Vienna, sought a standpoint which would include physics and psychology, since all science should be a whole.⁹ Interested when only fifteen in Kant's *Prolegomena*, later in Spinoza, Herbart and Fechner, Mach was influenced by a study of the physiology of the senses, with special reference to space-perception, then with the problem of the accommodation of psychical processes to the given, and the question of quantitative arrangements as simpler and more compre-

⁷ *Die Überwindung des wissenschaftlichen Materialismus*, 1895; *Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie*, 1902 (*Natural Philosophy*, 1910).

⁸ Cf. Hüffding, *Mod. Philosophers*, p. 128; Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

⁹ *Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung*, 1883 (*The Science of Mechanics*, 1893).

hensive than qualitative. Such concepts of force, mass, atom, serve as convenient means of recalling economically arranged experiences. So too ideas of causal relation and continuity have logical significance in the general economy of thought, as indeed ideas of analogy between corresponding fields make possible the uniform treatment of dissimilar facts. Thus the mechanical theory of nature involves the analogy between moving masses in space and qualitative changes in things. But, as analogy is not identity, it does not follow that all physical processes are merely mechanical; materialism does not follow, since qualitative experience is not accounted for by quantitative relations, psychical phenomena are not explained by physical.¹⁰ Experience, however, may be regarded as the same reality from two points of view, the physical and the psychical. It then becomes a question of elements, in themselves neither physical nor mental, but differing in their dependence or in their systems. It does not follow that the world is describable as a mere aggregate of experiences; for Mach attributes "functional relations" to the elements which control the types described by physics and psychology, although he does not show how, by developing the economy of thought, or methodology of these convenient concepts, a constructive view is to be attained.

Methodological Positivism.—Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894), professor of physics at Bonn, famous for the experimental demonstration of the identity of electricity and light, adopted time, space, and mass as his symbols in setting forth his physics. We observe masses in motion, not force or atoms: invisible masses may underlie those that are visible. Energy may be partly the effect of a motion, partly a cause. Only by conjecturing the invisible can we complete our world-view. Hertz strongly emphasized the symbolic character of our concepts. G. Kirchhoff (1824–1887) and M. Verworn (1863–1921) represent the same tendency of thought. R. Avenarius (1843–1896), leader of an empirico-critical school of thought, began with a study of Spinoza which led him to a doctrine of identity

¹⁰ Cf. Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

and the reduction of all philosophical ideas to the minimum. Hence arises the conception of the empirically given, with reference to the smallest possible application of force, namely, a "pure experience." This conception was developed by Avenarius in his *Kritik der reinen Erfahrung*, 1888, with reference to an empirical world-view and the natural history of problems. Pure experience is to be attained by penetrating beneath all human problems, with their subjective intermixtures, to the originally given. The objective series, with the implied changes in the central nervous system, is the independent vital series; the subjective is dependent. These terms are however essentially matters of convenience in the quest for the third or fundamental principle, as "pure experience" is approximated. The term "pure experience" naturally suggests Plato's pure Idea, although Avenarius did not have opportunity to develop his doctrine in the direction of valuation as a higher type of pure experience common to all who have apprehended the eternal values.

Lange.—Among others who adopted a methodology which enabled them to indicate the trend of thought in the direction of positivism or naturalism may be mentioned Albert Lange (1828–1875) whose *History of Materialism*, 1866, brought to a focus manifold scientific concepts in terms of post-Kantian thought. Lange finds that materialism has a firm basis in the sum-total of phenomena given us by sense-experience. Yet he ends with the standpoint of the ideal: even the picture of the world which our senses give us is subject to our own interpretation in ideal terms.¹¹ Materialism is valuable as a counterpoise. But, having served as a corrective of our visions, it leaves us with phenomena only; there is all the more reason to supplement it by what is highest and noblest in the human spirit. The spiritual life determines man's inmost character. Investigation and imagination may still go hand in hand. Materialism offers opportunity for ever fresh discoveries, amidst recognition of the ideals of art, religion, philosophy. Although Lange adopted the *Critique of Pure Reason* as decisive with re-

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, last Chap.

spect to the determination of objects by our consciousness, he regarded the categories as applicable to the field of the natural sciences only. The newer psychology supplies a basis for understanding the mind's constitution, hence naturalism takes the place of the *a priori* explanation of the categories. Here Lange agrees with Mach, Avenarius, and others who espouse methodological positivism; and by supplementing his naturalism with a scheme of values he anticipated a point of view which has prevailed since Lotze's time. Lange, who was professor at Zurich (1870–1872) and at Marburg (1872–1875), numbered among his followers H. Cohen, leader of the Marburg School, and H. Vaihinger (b. 1852), who took the lead in the philological study of Kant.¹²

The Marburg School.—Cohen (1842–1918), professor of philosophy in Marburg, undertook to establish Kant's *a priori* doctrine anew in the light of Lange's conclusions.¹³ Sensibility is the source of all knowledge. Because of the discovery that space and time are *a priori*, materialism is impossible. Pure intuition unites sensibility with the understanding. On the basis of a logic of pure knowledge, Cohen founded an ethics of pure will and an aesthetics of pure feeling.¹⁴ P. Natorp (1854–1924), Cohen's pupil, also professor at Marburg, developed essentially the same view in works on the logical foundations of the exact sciences, social pedagogy, and religion within the limits of humanity. He described the basis of knowledge, will, and aesthetic imagination in terms of feeling, which accompanies all forms of consciousness from lowest to highest, and is the source of the religious life. Ethics completes the unfinished task of science by an ideal of reason which unites individuals in the community. Education combines with cultural aspiration and the religious consciousness in the achievement of this idealistic or ethically organized

¹² Vaihinger's *Philosophie des Als Ob*, 1911 (*The Philosophy of "As If,"* 1924) is akin to pragmatism.

¹³ *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, 1871; cf. Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁴ *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, 1902; *Ethik des reinen Willens*, 1904; *Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls*, 1912.

social whole. Kant's three critiques find places under natural science, ethics, and art in the doctrines of Cohen and Natorp.

The social ideal of the Marburg school finds expression in the works of R. Stammler (b. 1856), Staudinger, Woltmann, Bernstein and Vörländer, who have given special attention to social ethics in relation to their Kantianism. Vaihinger's point of view is in comparison decidedly sceptical; our knowledge is limited to the sphere of subjective appearance, it ends in the antinomies, critical scepticism being the result of Kant's theory of knowledge.

Liebmann.—The return to Kant as a special movement is associated with the appeal of Otto Liebmann (1840–1912), professor of philosophy in Strassburg, at Jena after 1882, author of the cry, "Back to Kant" (*es muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden!*). Reacting against the Hegelian method, as well as revolting against materialism, Liebmann raised this cry in his *Kant und die Epigonen*, 1865. Liebmann adopted the fundamental truths of the critical philosophy: the proof that space, time, and the categories are functions of the intellect; that subject and object are necessary correlates. Kant's chief error was a remnant of dogmatism, namely, the doctrine of things-in-themselves. Critics maintained that in the symbols, X and Y, employed by Liebmann in his later work the things-in-themselves reappeared.¹⁵ The movement represented by Liebmann included Weisse, Zeller, Fortlage, Haym, and K. Fischer.

The group of scholars devoted to the philological study of Kant included B. Erdmann, K. Kehrbach, R. Reicke, E. Adickes. In the controversy over the question whether the individual ego or a transcendental consciousness is implied in the *a priori*, the transcendental position was maintained by Cohen and others of the Marburg school, also by Lasswitz, E. König, and Koppelman. The so-called immanent philosophy was adopted by Schuppe, Rehmke, and Schubert-Soldern. The theological Neo-Kantians include A. Ritschl, W. Hermann, J. Kaftan, H.

¹⁵ *Über den objektiven Anblick*, 1869.

Schultz, K. Köstlin, A. Dorner, and R. Lipsius. Ritschl (1822-1889) is the most prominent in this group of thinkers devoted to the philosophy of religion.¹⁶ Eugen Dühring, beginning with natural science as the science of reality or the given, gave special attention to the theory of knowledge, in his *Natürliche Dialektik*, 1865, and other works. The problem of philosophy in metaphysics, ethics, and the philosophy of history is the development of the highest form of consciousness of the world and of life in general: our knowledge is not, as Kant maintained, limited to phenomena, but includes knowledge of the essence of the world, which Dühring interprets in optimistic terms.¹⁷

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§ 36. NEW IDEALISM IN GERMANY. LOTZE

Kant's analysis of knowledge seemed to leave no opportunity for speculative reconstruction. Since objects in the external world are independent, detached, they are inaccessible; knowledge is limited to the linkage of phenomena. Phenomenalism was not indeed accepted by the post-Kantian idealists. But criticism of the doctrines of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer threw idealism into temporary discredit. Yet positivism, materialism, and naturalism failed to satisfy. Is there a new metaphysical method which is able to utilize the special sciences as intermediaries between experience and a world-view?¹ Fechner contended that an extension beyond the field of experience

¹⁶ Cf. Siebert, *op. cit.*, p. 214, foll.

¹⁷ For Volkelt and other Neo-Kantians, cf. Siebert, *ibid.*, p. 185, foll.

¹ Cf. O. Külpe, *The Philosophy of the Present in Germany*, trans., 1913.

is possible if we carefully employ our generalizations, extensions, enlargements as already used in the empirical field. This methodology became for Fechner a "generalization by induction and analysis, and the rational combination of the common elements gathered from different sides." Hartmann also adopted this approach by what he called the inductive scientific method. So did Wundt and Erhardt. The function of metaphysics is to carry forward the work of the special sciences, anticipate results, settle disputed issues, unite diverging sciences, and attain a complete world-view. Intimate knowledge of psychology as a natural science is the special prerequisite. Thus idealism may adopt the view of the material world which mathematico-empirical science ascribes to it, and a content of consciousness including all simple conscious beings. Lotze's idealism became very prominent in the period before us. Again, idealism took the persuasive form given it by Eucken.

Lotze.—Conspicuous among philosophers in the second half of the nineteenth century is Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), who studied physics, medicine, and philosophy at Leipzig, was professor of philosophy at Göttingen and Berlin; and who as teacher and writer came forward at a time when the conditions were remarkably favorable for assimilating the teachings of Spinoza and Leibniz, and post-Kantian idealism in the light of the dominant natural sciences. With a clear and persuasive style, he wrote both for thinkers and for those who sought practical values, his works were soon translated into English, and he became widely influential. In his medical writings Lotze assigned physiology to its proper place in the mechanical science of nature. In his *Medizinische Psychologie*, 1852, Lotze considered the relation between the spiritual and material principles, and fostered physiological investigation of the broadest type. His more elaborate discussion, *Mikrokosmos*, 1856–1864, covers the whole field from physiology and the history of culture to cosmology and the philosophy of religion. This work is popular in character, and Lotze does not hesitate to introduce the idea of the soul, its hopes

and values, as the term is used in practical life. In his *Metaphysik*, 1841, *Drei Bücher der Logik*, 1874, and his later *Metaphysik*, 1879, Lotze discusses first principles in more technical form.

Method.—Lotze stands in vigorous opposition to Hegelian idealism, which seemed to him to have reduced the world to a “solemn shadow-land” of logical notions, with the result that individual minds count for nothing in history.² In contrast with the attempt to lay bare the contents of the physical and moral worlds, as if every particular could be assigned to its place according to a dialectical scheme, Lotze reverted to the contents of ordinary consciousness, to the given facts of sense-experience, frankly acknowledging that thought is secondary, formal, limited; that it represents *ideally* the world of objects. Granted that the material of thought is purely subjective, it does not follow that thought is untrue; instead, thought will be assigned to its proper function.

The primary difficulty in previous systems was due to the assumption that thought actually attains Being, is ontological or metaphysical; whereas it *represents* the Being toward which it strives. Thought does not constitute existence. It is but one of several elements, along with feeling, faith, will, pleasure and pain, emotion, and all higher experiences in which we acquire or possess content while unable to transcend this given or derived content of experience to determine its ultimate source. Having then limited thought to the ideal sphere, we are prepared to begin philosophical analysis with immediate feeling, which discloses both worth and worthlessness, both love and hate; and it becomes clear that the Good is a higher category than the True.

Metaphysics.—Thus profiting by the critical philosophy, and avoiding the pretensions of absolute idealism, as if Thought were identical with Being and could unfold its essence, Lotze begins with the cosmos as he finds it. The two main interests brought into view by his less ambitious scheme of thought are the mechanism of nature and the

² Cf. H. Jones, *The Philosophy of Lotze*, p. 10.

psychical mechanism amidst which man is discovered, with the spiritual values which man assigns to the universe. Naturally, the question suggests itself, What place do we occupy in this "wonderful machine of Nature"?³ When we try to answer this question, we realize that everywhere is ceaseless motion, an all-embracing tide amidst which living things emerge and disappear; everywhere is law, order, mechanism; a purely mechanical conception of life and vital force seems to follow. It is not then "Being that *is*, but Things that *are* . . . not Becoming that becomes: but the particular becoming thing."⁴ Yet these given things cannot be a mere multiplicity of independent elements; but all elements, in reciprocal action, must be regarded as parts of a single real Being, which Lotze symbolizes by "M," the truly existent substance, the indispensable presupposition of all intelligibility in finite things.⁵ By "M" Lotze means a formal conception of this all-comprehensive Being, whose unity resolves itself into single things relative to our faculties of presentation and observation. The many are cognizable because of the offices which M imposes on them, while ever including them in its unity. There is a real becoming or succession of events among the many, a connection of things which surpasses thought in its effort to assign conditions, causes, activities; for thought is limited to the eternally subsisting relations amidst the content of the knowable: it is unable to grasp real existence.⁶ The utmost that can be said about beginnings is that real things "stand in relations," in the internal reciprocal relations which things "unremittingly exchange." Meanwhile the unity of M is the eternally present condition of this great interchange. Because the world, constituted in a particular way, once for all, is, and we are in it, the thought or reason which lives in us is able to distinguish different cases of the universal. Hence for Lotze there is strong reason for saying, "It is not the

³ *Microcosmus*, trans., Vol. I, p. 23.

⁴ *Metaphysics*, 1879, trans., 1887, Vol. I, p. 112.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 165; *Microcosmus*, Vol. II, p. 659.

⁶ *Metaphysics*, Vol. I, p. 179.

business of metaphysics to make reality but to recognize it; to investigate the inward order of what is given, not to deduce the given from what is not given.”⁷

We must then guard against the mistake of taking abstractions to be constructive and independent elements by which to build up the real. Thought is limited to the functions which beings and things are executing. Of M itself we chiefly know that it fulfils the function of being the Unity which renders all that the world contains precisely what we find it to be. In his *Microcosmus* Lotze considers the One more concretely as the full and complete concept of God, with reference to the demands of the heart and conscience, as well as the demands of special knowledge.⁸ Human selfhood consists in an immediate self-existence constituting the basis of the contrast between ego and non-ego, self-consciousness being the elucidation of this self-existence, perfect personality being in God only. In the last analysis it is not mechanism that is dominant, but individuals appertain to the mechanism in which the supreme articulates itself. Hence the true reality that is and ought to be is “not matter and is still less Idea, but is the living personal Spirit of God and the world of personal spirits which He has created. They only are the place in which Good and the good things exist; to them alone does there appear an extended material world, by the forms and movements of which the thought of the cosmic whole makes itself intelligible to every finite mind.”⁹

Psychology.—Mind is in first appearance the “smaller mechanism” within nature’s great machine. Yet psychical life in contrast with nature involves the freedom of internal self-determination.¹⁰ That is, the resolutions of the will involve freedom; while the whole course of ideas, emotions, and efforts is subject to connections according to laws.¹¹ Our mental life also involves the incomparability

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 659, foll.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 728.

¹⁰ *Microcosmus*, Vol. I, p. 144.

¹¹ *Metaphysics*, Vol. II, p. 166.

of all inner processes—sensations, ideas, emotions, desires—with spatial motion, figure, position, energy. “We shall never succeed in deducing the feeling from the nature of its physical excitant; we can only connect the two synthetically. . . . It is utterly fruitless to attempt to show how a physical nervous process gradually transforms itself . . . into sensation or any other mental occurrence.” At best we know only *what* psychical events and *what* physical stimuli are universally connected in the order of nature. For each group there is its own special ground of explanation. Our inner experience offers us the fact of a *unity of consciousness*; an undivided unity holds together the variety of the inner life. This unity does not imply a single primitive faculty; but ideation, feeling, will. Hence Lotze dwells on the main outlines of internal connections, the modes of energy, the power to combine the manifold, the reciprocal action between body and soul or the “substantial permanent subject of the phenomena of our inner life . . . endowed with an eternal and imperishable duration.”¹²

Lotze sees no reason for waiting to mention the soul. This would be a wilful departure from that which is given in experience. “A mere sensation without a subject is nowhere to be met with as a fact. It is impossible to speak of a bare movement without thinking of the mass whose movement it is.”¹³ As perception exists in us, as our state, involving comparison of ideas and presupposing the absolutely indivisible unity of that which compares them; so our whole inner world of thoughts is built up. Individual members or elements held together and arranged by the relating activity of this single pervading principle, implying the unity of consciousness. Lotze here refers, not to one hard indissoluble atom, but to the unity of the soul, the power of producing and experiencing effects, also the identity of the subject of the inner experience. The soul is, in fine, precisely what it shows itself to be, a unity whose life consists in definite ideas, feelings, efforts; and,

¹² *Microcosmus*, Vol. I, p. 389.

¹³ *Metaphysics*, Vol. II, p. 169.

to an extent, the soul is an independent centre of actions and reactions. Lotze does not assume the premundane existence of the soul, but the idealistic conviction of continuance through participation in the realm of purposes in the rational connections of the eternal Idea. What he especially wishes to guard against is the notion that the soul is a collateral effect of physical forces. He is contented with the proposition that the Absolute is indivisibly present wherever productivity occurs, that it embodies itself in us, gives to every organism its fitting soul.¹⁴ For Lotze argues that interaction between the Absolute and all elements of the world is eternal and incessant, that the causal mechanism of nature is the will of the universal soul, manifests one infinite shaping impulse, so that nature, the condition for the realization of the Good, harmonizes with man, the microcosm.¹⁵ The clue to unity is therefore to be found within the soul. In the human mind the idea of a valid and binding truth, the sense of universal right, of a universal standard by which all reality must be tried, the capacity of becoming conscious of the Infinite—these are the distinguishing features. Given this internal clue to unity, we do not conceive the relations of things in terms of space or spatial movement, but with reference to the totality of reciprocal actions according to the meanings of things as constituents of the world's content, and as standing in need of one another.¹⁶ So in the individual soul, *meaning or purpose* is the profoundest clue: the soul is true substance and unity in its own assertion of itself as such, in its increasing purposiveness.¹⁷ It is never the external relationship which yields the true connectedness of things. There are always gaps from such a point of view, for example, in the relation of mind and body. Matter remains an "appearance for our perception" arising from the reciprocal effects of existing things. The description of sensation is limited to the external sense-impulse

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

¹⁵ *Microcosmus*, Vol. I, 395.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 625.

¹⁷ *Metaphysics*, Vol. II, p. 185.

and the physical state preceding the sensation, as the occasion of the production of the sensation, for example, the known sensation of red or blue, which is incomparable with either the external stimulus or the nervous processes. Sensation as such is therefore an internal phenomenon of the soul. More depends on the connection of our memories, intentions, expectations, and interests than on the mere sensation. It is the uniting interest of our ideas, rather than the association, which gives ideas their power. So too the ensuing activity wherewith we respond to a motor-image is of greater moment than the image. The same emphasis on the higher phases of mental life runs through Lotze's psychology, which is grounded at all points on his metaphysics. Lotze's view of the soul is indeed essentially metaphysical: the soul is not a resultant of physical forces or bodily behavior; distinctions depending on space are not preserved as such in the soul; nor is the soul to be assigned to a definite region on the assumption that it acts through the brain by contact only.¹⁸

Historical Position.—Lotze has shown the intimate relationship between thought and will, faith, feeling, and other elements of the inner life without the confusions of a faith-philosophy or the arbitrary assumptions of a Schopenhauer. He is loyal to the "soul" in the popular sense of the term, while also emphasizing the unity of self-consciousness as the strong point in post-Kantian idealism. Having waged a polemic against the doctrine of thought usually attributed to Hegel, he develops the categories of both nature and the inner life to a point where, assuming an "M" as world-ground, he arrives at some of Hegel's conclusions in other terms. Thus, while keeping close to the facts on which the mechanical view of the cosmos is founded, he finds that no mathematico-mechanical conception of nature is adequate.¹⁹ He particularly objects to any view which, first assuming "measure and number," forthwith subordinates the meaning of the world to the type of cosmos thus presupposed. Beginning aright, we

¹⁸ For objections to this view, see *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 287.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

should start with meaning or purpose, then consider in what sense mechanical principles fulfil an end in "the living and active meaning of the world." In other words, ethics comes before metaphysics, the Good before the True. Here, Lotze's doctrine agrees with the idealism of various thinkers in England and America who have assigned the first place to the kingdom of ends or purposes in which *moral selves* in relation to a Supreme Self constitute a higher order of reality than nature.

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§ 37. FECHNER. WUNDT. EUCKEN

Fechner.—G. T. Fechner (1801-1887) professor of physics at Leipzig, is especially known as the founder of psycho-physics, a science of the relationship of body and mind involving the measurement of psychical magnitudes.¹ A certain amount of stimulus is required to produce any sensation (the law of the threshold). The intensity of the sensation increases by slower stages than the steps by which the exciting cause increases. Instead of increasing in direct proportion to the strength of the stimulus, it increases by diminishing increments which Fechner formulated in terms of "Weber's law," in recognition of his teacher, E. H. Weber. The two sides of existence described by Spinoza with regard to the exact

¹ *Elemente der Psychophysik*, 1860.

correspondence between them was thus expressed in mathematical terms, and the way was prepared for more precise experimentation by the quantitative method. Fechner applied his psychology to aesthetics, in his *Aesthetik*, 1876.

Having established his scientific standpoint by beginning with a study of the relation between mind and body, in which the most exact method was exemplified, Fechner founded his system of metaphysics on the results of the special sciences. Developing his thought by induction and analogy, he avoided *a priori* construction. This meant an extension of the same principles universally which were embodied in his psychological doctrine. The result was a monistic view of the world, including the idea of God, in terms of a psycho-physical system whose graduated stages encompass the universe as a whole. The divine spirit, whose body is nature, is said to be the supreme unity connecting all activities. Both plants and animals have souls. Man is intermediate in the panpsychical scale between plants and animals on the one hand, and the universal spirit on the other. The parallelism is universal, as in Spinoza's system. The planetary mind, in this view, is a speculative conception formulated to correspond to the rich complexity of a world, a planet being a huge ganglionic cell or world-brain. The same reasoning leads to the idea of God as the universal total consciousness.

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Paulsen.—Persuasive as an interpreter of Kant,² of extensive influence as professor of philosophy in Berlin, Friedrich Paulsen (1846–1908) held a panpsychism similar to Fechner's, with emphasis on the will and on practical values. His *Introduction to Philosophy* has been popular

² *Immanuel Kant*, tr. by Creighton and Lefevre, 1902.

as a text-book.³ In his *System of Ethics* Paulsen pleaded for an energizing practical doctrine, enforced by a suggestive summary of Greek and Christian ethics.⁴

Wundt.—Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), professor of physiology at Heidelberg, professor of philosophy at Zurich, and after 1875 at Leipzig, where he came into great prominence, organized the first psychological laboratory in any university, in 1879. Wundt was the teacher of many who established psychological laboratories in other lands. Through his pupils in America, for example, physiological psychology became widely known, and experimental psychology came generally into vogue, with its precise methods of observation and the use of instruments, in contrast with the methods of introspective psychology.⁵ Wundt treated all branches of philosophy however, and we are here concerned chiefly with his work as a whole.

Approach to Philosophy.—Starting with medical studies and physiological problems, Wundt turned to psychology in pursuit of his early studies in space-perception, reaction-time and physiological experiments; and, later, from psychology in general to logic, ethics, and metaphysics. His works cover the whole field of philosophy. His *Physiological Psychology*, 1874, is his masterpiece in experimental psychology, with its emphasis on methods, description, analysis, experiment, and the physiological grounds of psychology. His *Logic* is notable for the rich material derived from the special sciences. In his *Ethics* Wundt also establishes his doctrine on a broad scientific basis notably with reference to social psychology. His *System of Philosophy* and *Introduction to Philosophy* bring his philosophy to completion.

Metaphysics.—Contrary to tradition, Wundt places metaphysics at the end of the philosophical enterprise. It includes the philosophy of nature and of spirit; while under epistemology belongs the history of knowledge, as well as

³ Tr. by Thilly, 1895.

⁴ Tr. by Thilly, 1899.

⁵ Beginning in 1881, Wundt and his followers made known their views on experimental psychology and the theory of knowledge in *Philosophische Studien*.

logic. Hence the central problems are those of Being and Knowing; ethics, concerned with man as willing, occupies a special field; and psychology is distinguished as one of the particular sciences. Yet Wundt finds psychology of importance for philosophy, because of the direct relation with the theory of knowledge, with physiology, and the problems of relationship between the mental and the material. He does not adhere strictly to psycho-physical parallelism, since this is essentially a provisional point of view. While the individual elements of consciousness have their correlates, the connection of the elements of consciousness is another problem; nor have psychical values a physiological correlate. Although the physical energy of the world is constant, there appears to be an increase on the mental side due to psychical qualities and new values, howbeit the assumption of the conservation of psychical energy is important for the study of all mental states. Wundt describes the soul as activity rather than substance. The continuity of soul-life involves "creative synthesis" in sense-perception, in the qualitatively new fact; apperception, which Wundt emphasizes where some psychologists assign the first place to attention; and will, as central to psychical life, as the most composite and special form of conscious life, although will is not an element.

Theory of Knowledge.—In his epistemology Wundt calls attention to the fact that we naturally begin with the study of naïve realism, or the real validity of ideas, since knowledge does not at first involve the distinction between knowledge and its objects, and there must be good reason for passing beyond the reality of the immediately given. This primitive realism becomes critical with the analysis of the constant and the variable in the pursuit of validity despite all change; the analysis of perception, understanding, and reason. Rational knowledge transcends experience thorough quest for unconditional coherence, unity, totality, a system of all relations of dependence. Empiricism and scepticism fall short by keeping speculation within specified limits. But empirical knowledge can be continued and

amplified by a real transcendence, the passage from Knowing to Being. Wundt completes his scheme by an analysis of cosmological and psychological ideas which lead to ontological ideas, the concept of coherent elements as a totality of willing and striving. Here emphasis once more falls on the will, with the idea of an infinite corporate will (God).

The question raised by some of Wundt's critics is whether Wundt, with his system of will-units, has discovered the most probable solution of the cosmic problem, in contrast with other views of qualitative transcendence. The completion of empirical science by appeal to metaphysical and religious conceptions, in an essentially objective attitude, has failed to satisfy critics who seek profounder insight into subjective factors, who find the manifoldness of psychical processes still unexplained.

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Windelband.—W. Windelband (1848-1915), is especially known outside of Germany for his *History of Philosophy*, 1892,^o a work of first importance because of the conceptual treatment of the chief philosophical issues. Windelband also wrote separate works on ancient and modern philosophy. He regarded philosophy as the critical science of the universal values. This point of view is developed in his later work, *Introduction to Philosophy*, 1914, in which the theoretical problems are distinguished from the axio-

^o Tr. by Tufts, 1893, 2nd ed., 1901.

logical (questions of value, including ethics, aesthetics, and religion).⁷ The school of thought founded by Windelband is known as the "Southwest German School," because of his connection with the universities of Freiburg, Strassburg and Heidelberg. The Kantian basis is conspicuous in his doctrine, although he was influenced by Kuno Fischer and Lotze, and by his sceptical reaction against Hegelianism. Adopting the view that truth is a satisfaction of the fundamental demands of the thinking self, Windelband finds our knowledge unsatisfactory. The unsettled problems of daily life leave us with an interest in scientific problems, which eventually lead to philosophy; and philosophy in time brings us to the problems of valuation. Values yield unrealized if not unrealizable demands, the norms which guide us are not fulfilled. Reality and the standards of value never wholly coincide, the "ought" remains other than the "is." Hence the fact of valuation implies a dualism which is not overcome. Optimists and pessimists seek to advance beyond this dualism, but the doctrines of Leibniz and Schopenhauer fall short; the nearest approach to a synthesis of optimism and pessimism is achieved by Hartmann. The world of values and the world of realities are not indeed foreign to each other, but they are different: the final problem is insoluble, it is the "sacred mystery" which marks the limits of our nature and our knowledge.⁸

H. Münsterberg (1863-1916), a pupil of psychology under Wundt, in Leipzig, became prominent as professor of psychology at Harvard University; but retained his affiliations with philosophy in Germany, and formulated a voluntaristic idealism of the Fichtean type, with reference to the world of values.⁹ H. Rickert (b. 1863) who succeeded Windelband at Heidelberg, in 1916, emphasized "immanent meaning" as a basis of union of actuality and

⁷ Tr. by McCabe, 1921.

⁸ *Introd. to Phil.*, trans., p. 358.

⁹ *Die Willenshandlung*, 1888; *Beiträge zur experim. Psychologie*, 1889, foll.; *Psychology and Life*, 1899; *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, 1900; *Science and Idealism*, 1906; *The Eternal Values*, 1908, trans., 1909.

value. W. Dilthey (1833–1912), Lotze's successor at Berlin, 1882, was prominent as critic, historian, and biographer.¹⁰ Emphasizing the particular values of the mental sciences, with reference to norms and purposes, he also developed a philosophy of history in terms of its successive stages; and distinguished world-views under three heads: naturalism, subjective idealism, objective idealism.¹¹

Eucken.—Rudolph Eucken (1846–1926), a pupil of Trendelenburg, professor of philosophy at Basel, and at Jena, after 1874, was popular as a writer in Germany, and his works were extensively known through translation in England and America. Eucken gave special attention to the spiritual life and the philosophy of religion. The religious life, in his description, often exists under conditions which are obscure and uncertain. Yet the living spirit or spiritual life stands at the centre of the universe, is the most central and positive reality which we know. Indeed, a spiritual life, transcending all human life, is the ultimate basis of all reality. Hence this central truth is to be put over against agnosticism, positivism, empiricism, materialism, or any other doctrine which limits our knowledge to the disclosures of the bodily senses and inferences therefrom. More primary than matter, this life is independent, is not derived from any natural basis, is not a product of evolution. Indeed, change and evolution are to be disregarded in the endeavor to grasp this life, its essence and laws. Man's relation to the spiritual life is his immediate, vital consideration, namely, the life of the spirit regarded as working within him. Hence Eucken, in successive volumes, studies the development of modern thought with reference to the whole of the spiritual life, the total coherence of values, in contrast with our fleeting and disparate experiences. History records a movement of the spiritual life in the direction of this disclosure,

¹⁰ *Leben Schleiermachers*, 1870; *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels*, 1905; *Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters*, 1887; *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung*, 1905.

¹¹ *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, 1883; *Weltanschauung, Philosophie und Religion*, 1911.

which Eucken interprets in a Fichtean manner, by appeal from the facts of consciousness to the spiritual inwardness of life, with special reference to deeds, victories, a faith looking beyond the merely personal life to the true, the beautiful, and the good.

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§ 38. ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN GERMANY. NIETZSCHE

Nietzsche.—Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) occupies a conspicuous position among those who have awakened the public by radical utterances without adding to constructive thought. A prey to neurotic egotism, profoundly stirred by conflicts between his enthusiasms and his hatreds, he aroused those who were passing through a reaction against the old weaknesses and meannesses, but were not sure what type of strength to offer as a substitute. As a historian of culture he depicted an age when goodness and strength were allied, the weaker peoples in subjection; the epoch when Christianity, by praising affliction and poverty, overcame freedom, pride, and individuality; and the modern period, with its servitude to weak standards and its laudation of sacrifice and suffering. Nietzsche himself passed through stages indicated by his various works, beginning with *The Birth of Tragedy*, 1872, written while he was a friend of Charles Wagner, with its portrayal of the

conflict between the principles of Dionysius and Apollo, and in other mental stages expressed in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 1882; *Beyond Good and Evil*, 1886, and *The Will to Power*, 1888.

Taking his clue in part from Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will to power, Nietzsche praised all instincts which foster hunting, fighting, ruling; with the dangers, violence, and vigor involved in war. A new freedom is to bring man's passion, pride, and aristocracy once again to the fore, in a recurring cycle of masterful morality, beyond conventional good and evil, in the "superman" as the ideal type. This "transvaluation of values" in favor of the superman is to be achieved by conquering not only democracy, the mediocrity of contemporary weaknesses; but by an individual criticism which is merciless in the ridicule of what passes as virtue and exposes the shortcomings of one's nation. Hence Nietzsche's doctrine, substantiated by some of his followers on biological grounds by appeal to brute strength and the struggle for survival, and by others through militaristic assertion of supremacy, became in some quarters the standard for an all-conquering materialism. Others have distinguished this version of Nietzsche's doctrine from true Darwinism, and have indicated the poetic values of Nietzsche's works. Although these values may be thin disguises for a "restlessly intolerant and muscular individualism which despises its own sufferings, an idealism without any world of truth, a religion without a faith, a martyrdom without prospect of a paradise," Nietzsche's doctrine also "discounts its own emotional illusions" and is indirectly a stimulus to constructive thought.¹

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¹ Cf. Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism*, p. 68.

§ 39. PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE SINCE 1850

The period of interest in social issues, with high hopes of social reformation for which Saint-Simon and his school had stood, was succeeded by a period of disturbances due to the Revolution of 1848 and the war of 1871. The result for thinkers who were philosophically inclined was interest in the arts, letters, and sciences, rather than in social regeneration. Positivism as a trend of thought or spirit survived the political upheavals, to find expression anew in the works of literary men and critics. The spiritual type of thought which owed much to De Biran also survived. Meanwhile, influences due to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* received recognition in the movement known as neo-criticism. The development of the special sciences was another factor in the period of thought immediately before us, a time when for reasons already indicated interest in metaphysics was at its minimum.

The revival of interest in metaphysics begins with Etienne Vacherot (1809-1897), who succeeded Cousin as professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne. Vacherot was in part a follower of Cousin and the positivists, but also combined naturalism with interest in metaphysics in an intermediate field between the sciences and idealism. Adopting a dualism of the real and the ideal, he was doubtful in regard to the perfection of the world, the triumph of ideals.¹ Under the Empire, Vacherot was deprived of his professorship and imprisoned, on account of his liberal principles.

Taine.—H. Taine (1828-1893), literary and art critic, was in philosophy a pupil of Vacherot; and also adopted doctrines from Condillac, the ideologists, and the English empiricists. As a critic of the vague type of spiritual doctrine advocated by Cousin and the eclectic school, Taine agreed in a measure with Comte's positivism, but recognized values in metaphysics. Taine's *Philosophy of Art*, 1865, puts stress on psychological factors, and shows the relation between the art of a period and the environment

¹ *La Métaphysique et la Science*, 3 vols., 1858.

in which it appears. In 1864, Taine became professor of the history of art and aesthetics in the Ecole des Beaux-Arts. In his psychological work, *De l'Intelligence*, 1870, which is written in the spirit of the English school, Taine treats human intelligence as a mechanism, with especial reference to the evolution of knowledge in the struggle for existence of the psychical elements, notably with regard to sense-perception as product of this conflict. Sense-perception (as *hallucination vraie*) is associated with the mechanism of movement, that is, with action. Taine assigns to psychology a very important function among the sciences, as the basis of the philosophy of history and metaphysics. By appealing to morbid situations in explanation of conscious life, Taine set the example in psychology which was followed by such writers as Charcot, Ribot, Binet, and Pierre Janet. Thus French psychology acquired a peculiar stamp, in contrast with the typical interests of English and German psychology.² In his metaphysical interests Taine sought a mediating position between English empiricism and the critical philosophy of Kant: we have objective knowledge of things, hence assured knowledge of cosmic reality.

Renan.—Taine's great contemporary, E. Renan (1823–1892), was trained for the priesthood, but gave up this career at twenty because of his interest in modern biblical criticism, the teachings of science, and his revolt against the dogmatism of the Church. Although for the most part a positivist, Renan retained religion to the end of his life and added the category of the ideal or beautiful; while rejecting supernaturalism and revelation. Renan founded his teachings on interpretations of history in which he put religion in the positive sense over against religions and theologies. In 1861, Renan became professor of Hebrew

² Charcot (1825–1893), a leader in the Paris School of psychologists; Ribot (1839–1916) *La Psychologie anglaise contemporaine*, 1870; *La Psychologie des Sentiments* (*Psychology of the Emotions*), 1896, etc.; Binet (1857–1911) *Les Altérations de la Personnalité*, 1892, etc.; Pierre Janet (b. 1859), professor at the Collège de France, *L'Automatisme psychologique*, 1889, and other works on abnormal psychology.

in the Collège de France. He is especially known for his great work on *Les Origines du Christianisme*, a part of which, *The Life of Jesus*, 1863, is famous as a critical yet somewhat romantic study of Jesus. Renan undertook to reconcile Catholicism with liberal thought, by reacting against superstition and assimilating the values of religious sentiment. As critical, sceptical, but essentially humanistic, he is typical of the manifold interests of his time.

Cournot.—The teaching of Cournot (1801–1877) is intermediate between positivism and neo-criticism.³ He adopted the spiritual principles, eclecticism, and psychology of Cousin, and shared Comte's interest in sociological problems; but also made a critical study of the foundations of our knowledge by analysis of the sciences, and of the principles on which they are founded. Since there is no science of things lying beyond phenomena for which absolute certitude can be claimed, *a priori* deductions are to be avoided. A positive doctrine of knowledge is possible with respect to three cardinal ideas: order, chance, probability. Order, as founded in the universe, affords opportunity for induction, although induction yields probability only, not certainty. Contingency or chance is a factor in all evolution, all history; it is a positive factor, for which room is to be reserved in all our attempts at the correlation of phenomena, including all results due to the concurrence of independent series of causes, the irregularities and exceptions in the cosmic order. Cournot also wrote on economics and mathematics, and made greater use of the history of philosophy than was characteristic of the positivists.

Renouvier.—Charles Renouvier (1815–1903) was one of the chief thinkers of the century in France. At the École Polytechnique in Paris he was greatly interested in the mathematical sciences; and later was a follower of Saint-Simon, interested also in the socialism of Fourier, Proudhon, and other leaders of the period. Influenced by Comte's teaching in favor of political science, he turned to phi-

³ *Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances*, 1851; *Traité de l'Enchaînement des Idées fondamentales*, 1861, etc.

losophy in general and took up the study of Kant. His chief work belongs to his later or Kantian period, in which he developed a form of the critical philosophy known as *néo-criticisme*. Renouvier's *Essais de Critique générale*, the first volume of which appeared in 1854, marked an epoch in the history of French thought during the nineteenth century. In co-operation with Pillon, Renouvier founded *L'Année philosophique*, in 1867; and in 1872 established the famous *Critique philosophique*, first as a weekly, then as a monthly. Renouvier's *Essais* covered the whole field of logic, psychology, the philosophy of the sciences, and the philosophy of history. His chief treatise on ethics, *La Science de la Morale*, appeared in 1869. Other philosophical works and later volumes of the *Essais* followed until *Le Personnalisme*, 1903; also several posthumous works. His long and vigorous life was devoted to the production of these periodicals and books in an independent career, not connected in any way with institutions or with academic instruction. Not until the power of eclecticism waned in the universities did his type of thought win recognition.

Neo-criticism.—Although Renouvier accepted the positivist doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, he regarded himself as a direct successor of Kant. But Renouvier also translated Hume, whose phenomenalism influenced the development of his thought. In any event the idea of substance is to be rejected, the immediate object of knowledge being the particular phenomenon, which Renouvier regards as prior to any discrimination between the inner world and the outer. The given phenomenon is at once representing and represented, these two aspects involve the least unit of experience, namely, the experience of something and as something experienced. Renouvier accepts these aspects as essential to experience as given, without undertaking to trace each to a world, thereupon trying to reconcile opposites in Hegelian fashion. To attribute these opposites to a "substance" would be to adopt pantheism and fatalism. Renouvier not only rejected any doctrine which thus implies an all-inclusive ground, but also continuity in all its

forms, logical and moral. Choosing between contradictions, in the case of the Kantian antinomies, he decided in favor of the finite on the ground that the given world is finite, space and time are finite. The world had a beginning, there is an ascending series with a first term. Moreover, there is contingency and freedom. Renouvier agrees with Hume that causality cannot be demonstrated, that new beginnings may come all along the way of life. His acceptance of freedom and discontinuity implies a voluntaristic epistemology, the conclusion that philosophy cannot be constructive, that every system is conditioned by personal factors which influence the standpoint selected. That view is to be adopted which seems logically and ethically right. As there is no comprehensive principle or historical law, each phase of development is introduced by a new origination.

The Method of Relations.—A new system of categories follows: relation, number, extent, duration, quality, becoming, causality, finality, and personality. The law of relation is the most general, the first and fundamental category, the ground-work of knowledge. Any proposition concerning representation would involve this category. Relation involves the idea of objectivity (the aspect of representation as the “represented,” in contrast with the “representing”). The latter aspect implies in turn “consciousness,” thus personality, which as the central category figures in all our beliefs, as essentially “personal constructions.” Hence it is that all knowledge involves an affirmation of will; intellect, feeling, and will combine to produce our theories and certitudes. Thus there is the will to create belief, the “*moi-volonté*” implied in the free act of will, the “*première vérité*” or free personal act of faith which underlies all our conceptions.⁴ The “method of relations” is also the clue to such knowledge of phenomena as we possess. Since all knowledge is limited to phenomena, we know things as objects of concepts only. The result for

⁴ Cf. W. James, *The Will to Believe*, in which Renouvier’s emphasis on both will and chance, freedom and the personal equation is persuasively adopted.

Renouvier is that interest centres in action, morals. Conscience is unassailable. Strong emphasis on duty follows, an affirmative ethical doctrine in general, despite the keen criticism which Renouvier follows in the examination of all types of doctrine. The importance assigned to personality, in terms of will, with the recognition given to individuality, leads Renouvier to adopt a type of monadism.⁵ The universe is envisaged as a system of finite beings in a type of thought which reminds us of recent English and American personal idealism. Renouvier's type of phenomenalism is distinguished from the agnosticism of Huxley and others by a synthesis of the aspects and implications of experience, and from constructive idealism by its cautious use of the category of relation.

To Renouvier's influence is due the neo-critical school, including Pillon, Prat, Séailles, Darlu, Hamelin,⁶ Liard, and Brochard. In *La Science positive et la Métaphysique*, 1879, Liard (1846-1917) undertook to combine the doctrines of Vacherot, Renouvier and Kant. Brochard gave special attention to the problems of error, responsibility, and the universality of ethical ideas. The influence of Renouvier is also seen in Gourd's *Le Phénomène*, 1888, and Boirac's *L'Idée du Phénomène*, 1894.

Ravaisson.—The so-called spiritual philosophy of the first half of the nineteenth century in France found a new adherent in Félix Ravaisson-Mollien (1815-1900), who began in 1840 to bring forward De Biran's doctrine in opposition to the eclecticism then current. Ravaisson also contributed important studies of habit, the metaphysics of Aristotle, and the philosophy of France in the nineteenth century.⁷ The last named study was an inspiring summons to all free spirits in favor of a satisfying idealism. This *Report* was also a keen criticism of both eclecticism and positivism. Ravaisson revived not only the philosophical doctrines of Aristotle, but those of Leibniz, and

⁵ *La nouvelle monadologie*, 1899.

⁶ *Essai sur les Eléments principaux de la Représentation*, 1907.

⁷ *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, 1867.

Schelling, with special reference to Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition. He divided philosophy into three types: empirical, the philosophy of the understanding (Stoicism, Kant); and the systems of metaphysics, based on intellectual intuition, implying that spiritual reality is anterior to material reality. Ravaisson, who wrote but little, was chiefly influential in the university, where his pupils included Lachelier, Boutroux, and Bergson. He was a learned man of wide experience, an archeologist, a connoisseur in the fine arts, and curator of the Department of Antiquities in the Louvre. He predicted the time when a spiritualistic realism or spiritual positivism will prevail, with special emphasis on consciousness as the clue to all types of experience.⁸

Lachelier.—Jules Lachelier (1832–1918) was influential as a teacher rather than a writer, in the École Normale Supérieure (1864–1875). He was a pupil of Ravaisson, but also a profound student of Kant. Rejecting Kant's doctrine that space, time, and the categories have only relative value, he maintained that by reflection our thought brings us to knowledge of the essence of our selfhood, hence to knowledge of absolute being. Following Leibniz, he regarded sense-knowledge as an obscure form of rational knowledge. Space and time are deducible from the essence of our thought. Ideas come before sensations, laws before facts, in the light of their significance. The empirical world of science is a construction of our thought, as the substantive reality involving the essential principles. In his work, *The Foundation of Induction*, 1871, Lachelier discusses final causes and adopts a teleological principle as the basis of induction. In his later work, he endeavored to overcome the dualism of mechanism and final causes by interpreting mechanism as a teleological activity of spirit.⁹ Here, the stress is put on the absolute spontaneity of spirit as the basis of our life and experience. Thought as thus interpreted is not abstract but includes sensibility and

⁸ Ravaisson was associated while in Munich, attending Schelling's lectures, with Charles Secrétan (1815–1895), the Swiss philosopher, whose *Philosophie de la Liberté* appeared in 1848, 1849.

⁹ *Psychologie et Métaphysique*, 1885, new ed., 1924.

culminates in self-conscious reflection, a creation of all the moments of our past and present life in a unifying act; it passes from being in general, to the particular or concrete and thence to its most active or real stage, in which the supremacy of spirit, the reality of freedom is established in its fulness. This doctrine includes a conception of morality and religion implying dependence on God in terms of universal thought.

Boutroux.—These conceptions of freedom and spontaneity received further formulation by Émile Boutroux (1845–1922), who raised the question whether the laws of nature are absolutely necessary.¹⁰ Boutroux's conclusion was that an absolutely rigorous necessity is inconceivable, hence scientific laws are not what has been claimed for them. Phenomena as known permit of contingency, our consciousness discloses the presence of freedom: the alleged perfect regularity, uniformity, necessity of things is an appearance. Accordingly, Boutroux, reverting to Leibniz, argued for the principle of indiscernibles: the ever-changing spontaneity of things surpasses our most precise formulations. There are three types of contingency and determination: logico-mathematical, categorical, and the empirical-inductive uniformities. In the empirical sequence of events in nature there is no necessity, but at best only prediction. The facts of nature are therefore subject to metaphysical interpretation in favor of the free creative life of the spirit. Boutroux's doctrine is a synthesis of the teachings of Ravaisson and Lachelier. In a supplementary volume Boutroux further defended his theses.¹¹ The influence of his criticism of the sciences is seen in the doctrines of Hannequin, Payot, and Milhaud; and, more recently, in the work of Duhem and Henri Poincaré.¹² Boutroux is also known for his works on the history of philosophy.

¹⁰ *De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature*, 1874, trans. 1916 (*On the Contingency of the Laws of Nature*).

¹¹ *Sur l'Idée de Loi naturelle*, 1892, 1893.

¹² *La Science et l'Hypothèse* (*Science and Hypothesis*), 1902; *La Valeur de la Science* (*The Value of Science*), 1905; *Science et Méthode* (*Science and Method*), 1909.

Fouillée.—Idealism received formulation in the doctrines of Alfred Fouillée (1838–1912) in which there is an effort to harmonize idealism with the more assured results of the sciences. Fouillée, who began with studies in Greek philosophy in an effort to find the common basis of idealism and naturalism, substituted a concise philosophical synthesis for the eclecticism which had previously prevailed, in terms of a clue found chiefly in Plato.

In his *Psychologie des idées-forces*, 1893, Fouillée describes thought as not merely a representation but as a kind of reproduction with a force working for its own realization. In the successive stages of development of inner processes, from impulse or appetite, pleasure and pain, choice, and the growth of interests, to the expression of will, emphasis falls on the conative expression of thought. Idea and action are inseparable. All ideas involve a tendency to set power free in the direction of the given interest. What is of practical interest remains in the memory as an incentive to further action; volitional activity also plays the chief part in perception, and our ideas and feelings thus regarded constitute both the conditions of internal change and the factors of mental evolution. Uniting the feeling, activity, will, with thought thus described, Fouillée adopts the term *idée-force* as the basis of both psychology and ethics. Consciousness of self in this activity-process includes consciousness of others, and this social awareness implies the solidarity which, in ethical terms, finds expression in altruistic feeling. This monism of *idées-forces* also possesses metaphysical significance, by reference to the tendencies of personal life toward union with universal life. Hence sociological analogies yield the clue to metaphysical principles, the idea of a universal community, with God as the innermost ground of all social aspiration. The result is not idealism, not an attempt to envisage the final synthesis of an ideal community; but a hypothetical conception which is subject to the modifications of later comparisons of metaphysical systems.

Guyau.—Jean Marie Guyau (1854–1888), Fouillée's brilliant pupil, whose career was very short, devoted him-

self to the problems of aesthetics, ethics, and the philosophy of religion. In his criticism of English ethics, *La Morale anglaise contemporaine*, 1879, Guyau notes that morality is said to originate in prudent calculation, the association of ideas, natural selection, adaptation to vital relations, or through a primitive egoistic need of self-preservation. In contrast with this incomplete description, Guyau attributes morality to a broader impulse which can eventuate in social co-operation and devotion to a more comprehensive life. Accordingly, in his *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction*, 1885, he pleads for the fulness of life in the "greatest possible community," in which duty is to be an overflow, *générosité* the highest virtue. Aesthetic and religious elements combine with the ethical in this view of the comprehensive life. The coming religion, as depicted in *L'Irreligion de l'avenir*, 1887, will be a higher stage of the religion and civilization now known, when dogmas have gone, and life has become more complete through the liberation of the ethical elements and an ideal sociology. Guyau was typical of a tendency of thought in France, after 1870, which combined a strong love of life with keen critical ability, a broad intellectual vision implying constructive insight, and acute awareness of human limitations.¹³

Applied Philosophy.—In line with interest in social problems, which was noteworthy in the doctrine of Fouillée, is the work of a number of sociologists who carried out the interests in this direction fostered by Comte. The chief works of this stamp are: *Sociétés animales*, 1876, by Espinas; *De la Division du Travail social*, 1893, and *Les Règles de la Méthode sociologique*, 1894, by Durkheim; *La Cité moderne*, 1894, by Izoulet; and the works of Tarde, who preceded Bergson at the Collège de France, *Criminalité comparée*, 1898, and *Les Lois de l'Imitation*, 1890. Interest in philosophy in France has been greatly stimulated by the periodicals, including the widely known *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, established in 1870 by Xavier Léon, and *Revue philosophique de la France et de*

¹³ See Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, Chap. XII.

l'Etranger, founded by Ribot in 1876. Among the more recent works on the newer idealism or spiritualism is to be noted Blondel's *L'Action, Essai d'une Critique de la Vie et d'une Science de la Pratique*, 1893, in which the "Philosophy of Action" takes the place of the term pragmatism as used in America, in another connection. The term "action" here stands for the primary fact in human life, in contrast with the traditional emphasis on thought. Action, essentially unique and irreducible, already involves a living synthesis, and is richer in values than any intellectual description is able to make clear. Blondel's terminology at this point closely resembles that of Bergson, save that his doctrine takes the form of a philosophy of religion in a conception of God as at once transcendent and immanent, a twofold relationship in which man shares.¹⁴ In the doctrines of Ollé-Laprune this type of thought becomes a philosophy of belief, with strong emphasis on the primacy of the practical reason.¹⁵ The writings of the Modernists or Neo-Catholics also disclose this emphasis on practical significance as the test of religious belief.¹⁶

§ 40. BERGSON'S INTUITIONISM

The emphasis on freedom, spontaneity, the life of action which surpasses intellectual analysis, finds eloquent recognition in the philosophy of Bergson, whose philosophy attained great vogue in France, also in England and America, by means of translations, notably, *Creative Evolution*, which had a remarkable sale. Because of the clarity and brilliancy of his style, the popularity of his lectures, and the persuasiveness of his personality, Bergson is indeed

¹⁴ See Gunn, *Modern French Philosophy*, p. 87.

¹⁵ *Le Prix de la Vie*, 1885; *La Raison et le Rationalisme*, 1906.

¹⁶ Cf. Gunn, *op. cit.*, p. 89. Gunn analyzes the doctrines of the leading thinkers since 1851 with reference to science, freedom, progress, ethics, religion, as the chief interests of the period, which extends into the twentieth century.

one of the best known and most stimulating of recent philosophers. His books abound in compact utterances and suggestive insights which open up great vistas to constructive thought. His philosophy is intelligible to a multitude of readers, and bespeaks a tendency of the age to which great numbers of people respond. He is akin to the pragmatists and anti-rationalists, yet stands in a sense apart, inviting thinkers of various schools to follow, intimating that still more engaging prospects await those who are true to their insights.

Life.—Henri Bergson was born at Paris, in 1859, was a professor in provincial and Parisian lycées, at the École Normale (1898–1900), and at the Collège de France (1900–1921). His works consider such problems as time and space, memory, freedom, the nature of intellect and intuition, the origins and values of evolution, the introduction to metaphysics. He is best known for his doctrine of intuition, with its implication that creative evolution might have taken a different turn had man retained intimate touch with forces due to the *élan vital*, the original impulse of life.

Doctrine of Memory.—In his *Matière et Mémoire*, 1896, Bergson adopts a midway position between idealism and realism, in an analysis of the relationship between body and mind, by describing matter as an aggregate of images and by regarding memory, rather than perception, as the clue. The body is a centre of action, the brain an organ for motor reaction, not a creator of images or consciousness. Memory is inseparable from perception, imports the past into the present intuition, gives perception its subjective character, is independent of matter, is the ground of belief in spiritual reality. The past survives both in motor mechanisms and in independent recollections, the consciousness of a whole past of efforts stored up in the present. Memory as usually understood by psychologists is *habit interpreted by memory* rather than memory itself.¹ Our largest memory includes all our past. Ordinarily pure memory is manifested in the “colored and living image

¹ *Matter and Memory*, trans., p. 95.

which reveals it," when, for example, we detach ourselves from the present to recover a recollection.² Associationism fell into error by substituting a discontinuous multiplicity of elements for this "continuity of becoming" or "fluid moving reality" in which each unique moment of the past survives, latent and unconscious. In pure perception subject and object coincide. Spirit, already memory in perception, declares itself more and more as a "prolonging of the past into the present, a *progress*, a true evolution."³ Thus Bergson substitutes a temporal for a spatial distinction, maintains that memory is spiritual. Matter and sensation differ in degree, sensation and memory in kind, memory realizes continuity through the inner stream; psychical life contains much more than the body, which is an instrument of the soul.

Duration.—In his earlier work, *Essai sur les Données immédiates de la Conscience*,⁴ 1889, Bergson had already argued that the further we penetrate into the depths of consciousness the less right we have to regard psychical states as if set side by side, as numerical. "Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states."⁵ Bergson objects that we introduce our ideas of space into our "feeling of pure succession; we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them . . . no longer in one another, but alongside one another . . . we express duration in terms of extensity." But pure duration is wholly qualitative, it is the "melting of states of consciousness into one another," in contrast with this juxtaposition of lifeless states to which the understanding has accustomed us. Bergson holds that we have immediate knowledge of free spontaneity. He describes the free act as the act of the whole soul, for example, in sympathy, or in states in which the whole personality gives

² *Ibid.*, p. 170.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁴ Translated as *Time and Free Will*, 1910.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, trans., p. 100.

rise to a decision: the soul is not then determined, but self-determined, infallible when it affirms its immediate experiences, feeling itself free and saying so.⁶ The clue is discoverable in the concrete reality or dynamic progress which consciousness perceives, the relation of inner causality being purely dynamic. Freedom, "the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs," is indefinable just because we are free.⁷

Intuition.—Since the mind is memory, freedom, all consciousness is a "conservation and accumulation of the past in the present," as well as an anticipation of the future. There is an overflowing of the organism which makes mental life much more than cerebral life. Mind is not then essentially thought, but is more truly *intuition*, as the disclosure of this rich immediacy.⁸ Consequently, there follows Bergson's characteristic criticism of all doctrines taking their clue from thought. Thought betrays a tendency to import spatial concepts and dwell on merely practical considerations. The psychical stream which affords the clue to spiritual reality in his earlier works is vividly re-interpreted by Bergson in biological terms.⁹ Life is described as "a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided." The growth of character in ourselves is an illustration. Choosing and rejecting, we are carried forward by an inner impetus; automatisms are generated which presently impede us; the essence of life divides into two general directions; and our greater difficulty begins with the separating off of intellect or intelligence, whereas we might have developed in the other, the intuitive direction. Intelligence offers one solution only of the problem of life, it is entirely formal, is concerned with the discontinuous, the immobile, decomposes, is "characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life."¹⁰

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 165, 183.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁸ *Mind-Energy*, trans., 1920, p. 8.

⁹ *Creative Evolution*, trans., p. 99.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

Reiterating his criticism of thought or intellect in various terms, Bergson finds that, as thought is dominated by spatial concepts, deformed by its objects, by the mechanism of language, it tends to parcel out, divide, abstract; our intelligence interferes, introduces images and ideas which are inadequate, also concepts which are related externally. By attributing connections to things which are essentially external, our intelligence has been in bondage to an idea of the immutable, ever since the Eleatics sought to describe Being, since Plato tried to interpret the universe by pure concepts. There is need for a rediscovery of the immediate unity or inner continuity which Bergson has already taken as his guide in the study of duration in contrast with space. By "intuition," as the revelation of this immediacy, Bergson means both perception and experience, superior, pure, distinterested. Intuition implies synthesis, unity, spontaneous grasp or appreciation; in contrast with analysis, and multiplicity. It gives appreciation of the continuous stream of experience which has lived, with its inner transformations following one another in an uninterrupted course. To penetrate into this spontaneity as a moving whole would be to realize that, moving in time, not in space, it is essentially qualitative. The psychical stream is not homogeneous, as if we could compare its states in terms of mere strength, adding item to item, as psycho-physics tries to make out. Our inner states flow into one another in *la durée qualifiée* (psychical time) as opposed to *le temps matérialisé* of the special sciences (symbolized by spatial extension). Furthermore, intuition is a disclosure of new differences brought by the immediately given.

In his analysis of the primary difficulty, Bergson appeals to the instinct from which intuition sprang. Instinct, essentially organic, is nearer to life, is a direct continuation of the original impetus of life, due to the activity of life itself in its progress toward consciousness, which is already latent in instinct. Intellect, diverging later, is "the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the

manufacture.”¹¹ External and mechanical, trying to devise as many viewpoints as possible, intellect is in opposition to instinct, which it can never re-absorb. In so far as it is innate, it is knowledge of form, while instinct is knowledge of content or matter. A disinterested instinct would be our great resource, but we have diverged too far in our intellectual life to recover such an instinct. “There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them.”¹²

Conception of Evolution.—What is the resource? We must rid ourselves of the practicality which has been identified with intellect, free ourselves from this externalizing and mechanical procedure. By an act of will we must break with our scientific habits, seek things in their immediacy and fulness by putting ourselves *within* them, appreciating them as a whole, as living things. Bergson develops this view by an acute analysis of types of evolutionary theory. Transformism being in some sense acceptable, an evolution *somewhere* being presupposed, life is to be envisaged as like a current passing from germ to germ, or as progress on which each organism rides during its existence. Here a purely mechanical view of the process falls far short. The mobile current in which new properties appear and unfold is an activity in which there is nothing lifeless, nothing is absolute rest, but is a process in which life continually struggles with matter. It is impossible to account for life as reducible to physical and chemical processes, as if life's organisms were manufactured products. To try to account for all things mechanically is to assume that “*all is given*,” time being deprived of its efficacy in a “universal mathematic.”¹³ The objection to the teleological view of evolution is that it implies mere realization of what was laid down in the cosmic plan, with nothing unforeseen, no room for novelty or invention. Time would then be useless, and everything would be once

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 37, 39.

for all *given*. Nature discloses neither purely internal finality nor wholly distinct individuality. Mechanism and finality may indeed be present in our conduct, but as aspects only; we must throw off these "encasings" which confine our thought. We should once more see reality as "a ceaseless upspringing of something new," noting that when the whole self acts the unforeseen enters in (with our freedom). The harmony which we so readily project into things lies behind rather than before. In contrast with our ideas of a pre-existing model, life progresses, *endures*. "The road has been created *pari passu* with the act of travelling over it." Intellect does not compass the original vital impetus which has led to such marvellous results. This impetus is more than biological, the original impetus involves a spiritual aspiration, a common tendency of a higher type which radical finalism cannot adequately describe. Our consciousness must detach itself from the already-made and attach itself to the *being-made*, the becoming or creative evolution of which we are participants. In so far as we envisage this becoming with reference to God, he too is to be conceived as having nothing of the already made; but as unceasing life, action, freedom. This is a vision with the spirit, with a "faculty of seeing which is immanent in the faculty of acting."¹⁴

Historical Position.—Bergson's philosophy is a form of temporalism: it does justice to time (as "duration"), hence to the cosmic process or process of Becoming, with reminders of the perpetual flux which Heracleitus long ago put over against Being, as the static idea of reality. It brings to completion the type of spiritual thought in France which stands for freedom, spontaneity, creativity. Bergson's doctrine of intuition is an eloquent reminder of the fact that, in our modern, highly categorized world, we have overdone classifications and formal conceptions to the neglect of sympathetic insight into the living whole of reality. Intuition is also significant as a possibility to which man might have given greater recognition at the outset of various lines of development, whereas intuition

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 237, 248, 250.

for philosophers of the Platonizing type is a culmination rather than a beginning. What appears to be lacking is a metaphysical ground for the *élan vital*, or original impulse of life; an eternal basis for the temporal process of the world, also a doctrine of values, ethical and aesthetic, also a religious application of the conception of creative evolution. When the last word is spoken in favor of biological intuitionism, intellect or reason apparently regains the ascendancy, as still capable of "thinking life" despite Bergson's critique of intellectualism as essentially external. Bergson's doctrine is not a synthesis of idealisms in French philosophy; but as a type of temporalism it suggests comparison with other temporalisms, with the realism of space-time recently advocated by Alexander in England, and the conception of empirical temporalism of William James in America.

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§ 41. PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY. CROCE

Reverting to the period of discussion of Cartesianism in Italy, we note that while Sigismond Gerdil (1718-1802) was in part a follower of Descartes, Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744), professor of rhetoric at the University of Naples, had been opposing Cartesianism as unhistorical.

A forerunner of Herder and Hegel in his historical method, Vico started with the fact that what the mind knows is its own activity. Man, or human nature, is the criterion of experience and history. In the universal course of civilization history passes through successive stages of development distinguishable in such terms as the divine (theocracy), the heroic (aristocracy), and the human (democracy and monarchy). There is also a threefold development in later history, in customs, laws, languages, and character. The divine providence, immanent in the development of the nations, involves an ideal eternal history.¹

Antonio Genovesi (1712–1769) unified ideas borrowed from Leibniz and Locke; emphasized the activity and self-consciousness of the individual; also the study of practical values, languages, politics, ethics.² Melchiorre Gioja (1767–1829) and Giandomenico Romagnosi (1761–1835) were also empirical philosophers, but with inclinations towards the sensationalism of Condillac. Pasquale Galluppi (1770–1846) formulated the critical philosophy with more stress on immediate self-consciousness and the synthetic relations (*rapporti*) of identity and difference, as *a priori* products of the mind's activity.

Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797–1855), pioneer of idealism in Italy, distinguished between the matter and form of knowledge. The form is one, self-identical, innate, apprehensible by intuition or an inner perception of being as transcendently ideal (*l'essere ideale*). Pure concepts (substance, cause, unity, necessity) are due to analysis of this general idea of Being; mixed concepts (space, time, motion, body, spirit) arise through the application of this idea to sense-experience. The idea of Being is a principle of knowledge, it is not ontological, not identical with God, who is both real and ideal. Rosmini's doctrine is modified in favor of the identity of all principles in God in his later work, *Teosofia* (Theosophy), 1859. Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852) rejects Rosmini's psychologism in favor of

¹ Cf. Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy*, trans., 1921, p. 304.

² See Falckenberg, *His. of Mod. Phil.*, p. 548, foll.

the ontology of a primitive intuition, the content of which is divine creation (Being creates existences). Hence the Absolute is the ground of the series of thought and the series of reality.³

The attempt of Rosmini and Gioberti to harmonize reason and Catholicism was opposed by Giuseppi Ferrari (1811–1876), and Ausonio Franchi (C. Bonavino) (1821–1895).⁴ Positivism was introduced by Roberto Ardigò (1828–1918) who, after being a priest, became professor of philosophy at Padua, in 1881. In his chief work, *La Psicologia come Scienza positiva*, 1871, Ardigò undertook to establish psychology as an independent science of experience. Andrea Anguilli (1837–1890) belonged to the same school. Positivism was critically considered by Pietro Siciliani, in his work, *On the Revival of Positivism in Italy*, 1871. The Hegelian philosophy was introduced by Augusto Vera (1813–1885), who translated and expounded Hegel. Bertrando Spaventa (1817–1883) adapted Hegelianism to the Italian tradition in *La Filosofia di Gioberti*, 1863.

Benedetto Croce.—The revival of Vico's conception of philosophy and history, and its correlation with post-Kantian idealism is chiefly due to Benedetto Croce, who was born in the province of Aquila, of a Neapolitan family, in 1866. Croce was enabled by ample means to devote himself to historical and literary studies, which led him gradually to philosophy. In his earlier studies he was influenced by Italian literary scholars, notably De Sanetis (1817–1883) and Carducci (1835–1907), also by Herbart and other German philosophers. Among his twenty-eight volumes on literature and philosophy, the four works devoted to the Philosophy of the Spirit, and his books on Vico and Hegel occupy the chief place. After the publication of the Philosophy of the Spirit, Croce was hailed as the master of the new generation in Italy.⁵ Through translations he became extensively known in other countries.

³ Cf. Turner, *His. of Phil.*, p. 633; Falckenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 551.

⁴ For Catholic philosophers of the nineteenth century, see Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 637, foll.

⁵ Cf. Piccoli, *Benedetto Croce*.

Croce is especially famous for his theory of art, known as the "expressionist theory," which identifies beauty with expression, in the form given this doctrine by Croce's concept of intuition.

Science.—According to Croce, philosophy is the Science of Spirit. It is concerned with concrete spirit (mind) as the only reality in the ultimate sense of the term, the universal principle implied in any form of reality which we may apprehend. The testimony of consciousness furnishes the method of philosophy. The human spirit in the fulness of its determinations is the object. All reality being immanent in consciousness, the central interest is to discover the logic of this all-inclusive immanence, which involves reality as a system. Analysis of this all-inclusive activity, as immediate, with its order and relationship of types, its union of dependence and interdependence, discloses four fundamental forms, to which correspond four philosophical sciences: Aesthetics, Logic, Economics, Ethics. Knowledge assumes two forms: *intuitive* (aesthetic) and *conceptual* (logic). Since all knowing has action in view, consciousness implies the theoretical and practical in inseparable relation. As knowing includes intuition and conceptual thinking as theoretical activities, so the practical activity includes the economic and ethical. In other terms, there are four pure concepts: beauty, truth, usefulness, goodness. There is no world of nature transcending mind, or any supernatural realm inaccessible to thought. Croce also rejects any alleged passive mental element ("feeling") as a supposed third form of mental life in addition to knowing and acting. Since nothing exists outside mind, there are no data to be examined on the hypothesis of an external something; all form is given by mind as activity, intuition is knowledge of the individual or particular, the concept is knowledge of the universal.

Starting-point.—Croce's philosophy presupposes Kant's analysis of sense-experience, with the rejection of things-in-themselves; and Hegel's doctrine of the concrete concept and dialectical method (with modifications). Croce begins with inner experience and its certainties. Experience is

infinitely rich, and calls for the philosophical sciences in interpretation of its great wealth. Experience is significant both as given, with its implied types, its grades, and values; also as a movement or life, interpreting the given. Present and actual, the clue to the future meaning of experience is discoverable by delving more and more deeply into its present actuality. Experience is mental, but more truly spiritual; and as such it is a whole or unity whose implications are to be made explicit by realizing that all the distinctions that may be discovered are still within its own field. Experience as self-determining and self-creating discloses its relationships and contrasts: we may understand them without trying to transcend the immediacies of our analysis, since these are already possessions of the Spirit which we would know. Here then before us are the forms and contents, grounded in Spirit, whose values we are to classify. Yet although the wealth of the Spirit is before us, it is important to formulate the sciences in a certain order or relation.

Intuition.—Beginning with the form of knowing which Croce calls the theoretical activity, and first considering the sub-grade of cognition which contributes the material of thought, our task is to differentiate Croce's doctrine of intuition from conceptions of intuition held by other philosophers. The science corresponding to intuition is Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic. The term "aesthetic" is used in a specific sense not to be confused with theories of beauty or the arts formulated by thinkers of various schools. There are points of resemblance to Kant's analysis of the forms and matter of our sensibility; but Kant develops his theory of the beautiful as another discipline, in *The Critique of Judgment*, whereas for Croce the same analysis yields both a doctrine of knowledge in its first form and a theory of the arts.

To understand the term intuition as a form of knowledge, it is not necessary to consider how sense-objects are presented, how passive mentality gives place to active mentality, how sensation leads to perception, and perception to thought; for sensation already is active and cognitive

(not formless or passive), although it is not yet reflective.⁶ We have intuition without space and time.⁷ In Croce's characterization, space and time are far from simple; they are intellectual constructions of great complexity, in contrast with intuition as free from all intellectualism. Intuition is distinguished by the fact that it is inferior, and involves the natural datum as *expression*, namely, the given content which has not yet been intellectualized. Our analysis of knowledge therefore starts with representation as already in process, with imagination contributing its varied imagery. Intuition as a form of knowledge is this primary grade which includes imagination. It is original and autonomous, not empirical or intellectualistic. This activity is aesthetic activity regarded as yielding the subject-matter of the logical form of knowledge. The intuitive or aesthetic form is conceivable without the conceptual or logical form; but logic as a type of knowledge cannot be conceived without intuition.

Aesthetics, the science of the first grade of knowledge, is not only the basis for logic and for language, but also for art. The intuition which gives the content for this science is the ingenuous form of the spirit, or first operation of the human mind. Intuition is not a culmination of the knowledge of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, as in Plato. It does not involve the blending of subject and object in which all rational relations are transcended, as in types of mysticism and Neo-Platonism. It is not a biological product developing out of instinct, in contrast with our intellectual evolution. Nor is it Schelling's intellectual intuition, as the special experience which Kant denied to all future metaphysics. Again, it is not Schopenhauer's immediate experience of Will as a point of departure for fundamental knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Finally, it is not intuition in any popular sense of the term.

Intuitive activity is explicitly to be understood as possessing intuitions in so far as it expresses them.⁸ Intuition

⁶ *Logic*, trans., p. 3.

⁷ *Aesthetic*, trans., p. 7.

⁸ *Aesthetic*, p. 13.

also includes form (as constant), in contrast with the matter or content which distinguishes intuition into types. Apprehending the living reality of experience, I make it my own or give it form in a richly implicit synthesis capable of elaboration. Aesthetic activity, thus distinct in its nature as the grade of reality on which other activities depend, is imagination in a creative sense. It is the artistic activity which yields individual images, and is expressive, productive. The idea or concept lives by virtue of this intuitive activity. So does art as immediate, purely mental. The mind envisages by expressing. Intuition already is expression. The internal image, yielding words, language, content, form, in a perpetual creation which makes logic possible, is also in another characterization art in such a way that every one is an artist in creativity and form; since art includes not only the activity which we popularly associate with genius but pure intuitions which we all possess.

The intuition and expression together, of the painter, for example, are pictorial; while those of a poet are verbal. The painter paints, not with his hand, but with his brain, as Michael Angelo said. Croce calls Beethoven's Ninth Symphony "his own intuition, and his own intuition the Ninth Symphony."⁹

Art is not immediacy of "feeling," or mere inner appreciation, leading to external representation in "works of art" described as if intuition were not expression. This view is as foreign to Croce as the interpretation put upon him that there is no such thing as an external work of art, on the assumption that art is a mere matter of internal "meaning." "Art is the expression of impressions, not the expression of expression." Croce finds a work of art indivisible. He distinguishes the expression (intuition) from the activity of externalization by means of technique. "We cannot will or not will our aesthetic vision: we can however will or not will to externalize it . . . to preserve and communicate to others the externalization produced."¹⁰

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

Ordinarily, we discriminate between impression and experience. Hence we describe various stages of the process: impression, the spiritual synthesis of impressions, feelings of pleasure or pain commingling with the process of transforming impressions, the part played by the creative imagination, the objectifying of the artist's vision or translation of the aesthetic data into actual works of art, such as a painting. Granted the products—poems, paintings, works of sculpture, musical compositions—we raise questions familiar to students of theories of the fine arts: What is beauty? What is the relation of a work of art judged as beautiful to inner apprehension, to standards of taste, to reality? The poet or painter seizes the intuition as subjective, and then expresses the internal image in fuller degree, and we think of the work of art as the expression of beauty. Beauty then becomes the criterion almost as a thing to be handled or taken apart objectively. In that sense one must be an artist to produce beauty, and only the artist is genuinely able to criticize.

This is to neglect Croce's truth that intuition, including the wealth of its imagery, already *is* expression in a sense which makes us all artists and subordinates "works of art" as products of business shared by poets, painters, and other producers. For Croce, intuition as expression actually *is* those moments before mentioned, as if intuition were the culminating stage only. Beauty, intuitively apprehended, *is* expression, *expression is beauty* for us all: ugliness is non-expression. What we call "impression," when referring to the portrayal of moonlight on the water in a painting, for example, is already expression in our internal image, as truly as the musical theme which we perceive or the words of a lyrical sigh which constitute for us a "poem." "A work of art and a philosophical work, an act of thought or of will, cannot be taken up in the hand or pointed out with the finger: it can be affirmed only in a practical and approximate sense that this book is poetry, and that philosophy."¹¹

Logic.—Granted sensation at its lowest limit, the intui-

¹¹ *Logic*, p. 81.

tion which is not yet intellectual but is more than perception, in an "undifferentiated unity of the real and of the simple image of the possible," we turn from aesthetic, as the logic of poetry and art to logic, which is concerned with the "pure concept" existent in its verbal expression, elaborating reality as a universal. Intuition yields individuality, multiplicity; the concept implies the universality of individuality, the unity of multiplicity. The concept springs from representation as implicit, antecedent, elementary. Thus is disclosed, for example, quality, beauty, final cause. A given object, such as a house, a cat, or a process like free motion, involving nothing precise and universal, would involve "fictional concepts" only. These Croce calls "pseudo-concepts." These precede, presuppose pure concepts as a counterfeit presupposes knowledge of something to imitate. The house, cat, and free motion presuppose quantity, quality, existence. These are produced by the practical spirit, which is non-cognitive. Pure concepts possess expressivity, universality, concreteness, character.¹² The pure concept has value because it is, is thought itself, its own norm, is a constitutive element of reality.

In Croce's view, any value has reality, for example, in art (which needs no other beauty than art itself), in morality (which has no other goodness than action itself directed to the universal). The "distinct concept" involves unity in distinction and distinction in unity, for example, practical activity as distinct from the theoretical. An "opposite concept" involves ugliness, for example, as the opposite of beauty, falsehood as the opposite of truth, uselessness as the opposite of utility. Opposites are concepts because reality means opposition, includes opposed forms. For example, beauty is such because it has within it ugliness, the true is such because it has within it the false. Thought includes affirmation and negation. Its law is unity and distinction.

Croce does not attempt to deduce the categories, for

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

logic cannot be substituted for the other philosophical sciences as conceptions of the nature of reality.¹³ Logic can only define the categories and formulate judgments, “*only on that aspect of Reality which is logical thought.*”¹⁴ All other categories are no longer logical but real.

Idealism.—The two pure theoretic forms are those already indicated, the intuition and the concept.¹⁵ There are two modes of the practical elaboration of knowledge, the empirical concept and the abstract. Philosophy is the pure concept in its essential character and deepest tendency, namely, as idealism. By contrast with idealism, determinism, for example, negates the end and affirms the cause: the cause which it posits as its principle is the *idea* of cause. Again, materialism negates thought and affirms matter: this is the *idea* of matter. Naturalism negates spirit and affirms nature, namely, nature as *idea*. Looking back to ancient philosophy, this emphasis on “*idea*” is everywhere exemplified. Thales’ first principle, for example, is “no longer any given empirical water, but metaphysical and ideal water.” So for Pythagoras “numbers” become cosmic principles and ideas. As philosophical thought proceeds, it is a question of *sufficient* in contrast with *insufficient* idealism, implied, for example, in the idea of “water,” matter, nature, Jehovah (personal divinity), and other insufficient conceptions. The objective is a *system of concepts*, namely, thought in its relation of unity and distinction with all other concepts. Distinct concepts constitute a unity, order, symmetry. An organic unity of distinctions and a correlation of parts is necessary even though there is asymmetry in the world: the asymmetrical *belongs* with the universe. The shallow critic ridicules the idea of symmetry in the Hegelian system, he may laugh at dyads and triads, at sacred numbers in religion and philosophical numbers in philosophy. Let him laugh who wills, says Croce, but

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

he does not laugh well. The criterion of symmetry does not become a prejudice: symmetry is formulated because found in the cosmos.

Croce notes that astronomers are praised because of calculations which are supported by the criterion of proportion and symmetry. Thus the hypothesis is formed that a star, unseen at the time, but which the telescope will eventually discover, must be at a certain place in the sky. So a philosopher might deduce that there must be in the spirit a form which is as yet unobserved, or a form to be eliminated because it spoils the symmetry: why should the spirit be less rhythmical and symmetrical than the starry sky?

Philosophy.—System in philosophy is not indeed something superadded: in philosophy none of the parts exists without the whole, and the whole does not exist without the parts.¹⁶ For Croce then metaphysics is not a "general" philosophy in contrast with a *particular* philosophical science, for the general philosophy is the philosophical sciences. In the development of philosophy as system, discoveries have actually been made: the concept of Socrates and the dialectic of Hegel, for instance, are actual discoveries in Logic; Kant's discovery of freedom is a discovery in Ethics; the concept of intuition is a discovery of Aesthetic. Philosophy develops the pure concept as the science of first principles, including history, which we *produce* by making judgments. Thought is a dialectical process made explicit by Logic as a science: we all universalize when we think. So too we are all participants in history, as it springs from present life, as an activity rather than an object, a doing which involves thinking.

History and the Sciences.—History is the individual judgment, the intuitive and logical elements both being indispensable. History cannot be constructed by pure reason: the vision of the thing done is necessary and is the sole *source* of history, for example, an authentic narrative concerning the fact as *lived* and as it vibrates in the spirit of him who participated in it. Hence the need

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

for discovering this genuine resonance of fact, by its liberation from perturbing elements. Thus too the need of the historical element in philosophy. So philosophy depends on the natural sciences as empirical concepts: philosophy destroys naturalistic philosophy but not the natural sciences.¹⁷ The empirical sciences cannot be reduced to the mathematical: there are empirical limits of the natural sciences.

In relation to the sciences, it is important to understand error as a moment of the dialectic synthesis. The true as a concept is separable from the false as its opposite. Errors do not exist as truths, but may perfectly well exist as errors (as products of the practical spirit). An error is not irrational as an *act*. The babbler, for instance, emitting sounds instead of thoughts, may win applause and honor denied to the serious thinker: "*un sot trouve toujours un plus sot pour l'admirer.*" Thus a deed may be economically rational which we do not regard as moral. A dauber may produce an object demanded in the market by people who "wish to have at home pictures of any sort." So too Croce is ready to admit that in the immanence of values evil may serve as the stimulus and corrective of the good. Error, as Vico had shown, is the *improper combination of ideas*. Bad history is bad philosophy. One who creates excellent philosophy might create bad history (and so bad) philosophy the moment after. Croce accepts the dialectic view (the unity of opposites), but denies its validity for the distinctions of the concept, the unity of which is organized as a unity of distinctions in the theory of degrees of reality.¹⁸

The Practical.—Knowledge serves life and life serves knowledge; action implies will, will implies thought; and the theoretical activity involves the practical. But in thus moving from theory to practice Croce insists that by the philosophy of the practical he does not mean a practical philosophy.¹⁹ He does not mean a collection of rules for the attainment of the useful and the good, but a purely

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

¹⁸ For summary of his logic, see *Logic*, p. 604.

¹⁹ *Philosophy of the Practical*, trans., p. 52.

formal doctrine, the content of which is the infinite wealth of the individual determinations of the will, an intrinsic content which accompanies every act of the spirit. Volition and activity are not to be separated. The relation between spirit and nature is not a relation between two entities, but merely between two different modes of elaborating one spiritual reality. What we call "matter," movement, material modification, is already included in the volitional spiritual act. The Spirit has drawn and draws at every moment cosmos from chaos; it has achieved the passage from animal life to human life, has created and creates modes of life ever more lofty: its work is not finished and never will be finished.²⁰

The will reveals two distinct forms of activity, the economic and the ethical. The economic activity is that which wills and realizes what relates to the conditions of fact in which the individual finds himself: the will of the individual, of a particular end. The ethical is the activity that wills and realizes what relates to those conditions in some way which transcends them; it is the will of the universal, of the rational end. The economically good is the useful; its concrete form is economic history, the history of the spirit of man as it realizes itself in the individual action or volition.

Criticism of Hegel.—In defence of Hegel, Croce says: "Hegel cancels neither evil nor the ugly, nor the false, nor the vain: nothing could be more alien to his conception of reality, so dramatic, and in a sense so tragic. What he sets himself to do is to understand the function of evil and error; and to understand it as evil and as error is not to deny it as such. . . . Fact, reality, is always rational and ideal. . . . But . . . by fact is meant what is really fact; by reality what is truly reality. The illogical, the unpleasing, the ugly, the base, the capricious is not fact" (in the sense in which the term is here used).²¹

Croce is referring to events which have been taken up into interpretative thought and regarded in the light of

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

²¹ *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, trans., 1915, p. 59.

their significance. Thus he characterizes individuality as the "vehicle of universality, the process of its becoming effective." Verifying the estimate put by Hegel on passion, he observes that nothing can be achieved unless it becomes a passion, nothing great can be accomplished without it: passion is activity directed toward particular interests and ends. Thus great men take "what is real and substantial in the wants of their time and people, and make of them their own individual passion, their own peculiar interest; they are the 'men of affairs,' of the world-spirit." Thus Hegel possessed a conception of life which was so philosophical that conservatism, revolution, and restoration, each in turn, found its justification in his philosophy. Out of Hegel's "mediation of opposites" came the exaltation of history. In Hegel's system, history is the very reality of the Idea, Spirit is nothing outside its historical development: facts, germane to the Idea, belong to the organic whole. Hence the system is "harmonious with and sympathetic towards concreteness, passion, fancy, and history," although Hegel's system was condemned as the opposite of what it means to be.

Croce endeavors to overcome the misconceptions attendant upon the system by substituting the logic of *implication* for that of "classification."²² To classify the spheres of economic, scientific, and moral activity, would be to leave them almost externally distinct. The constructive clue is found in the conception of degrees of Spirit, an idea which permeates all Hegel's works, as it did those of Vico. "Vico too conceived philosophy, not as a cabinet with separate pigeon-holes, but as '*eternal ideal history*, upon which particular histories appear in time.'"

According to the theory of degrees, every concept is both distinct from and united to the concept superior to it in degree. Thus art and philosophy are two distinct and co-ordinate species of a genus, the relation being one of union and distinction together. Spirit, passing from art to philosophy, negates art and at the same time maintains

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

it as the expressive form of philosophy; for philosophy exists by means of words, images, metaphors, forms of speech, symbols, all these (the artistic side of philosophy) being so real and indispensable that philosophy could not otherwise exist. In the dialectic advance from degree to degree, the true and the good, for example, are brought into relation as distinct, but distinctions are not the same as opposites.

The true, for instance, is not in the same relation to the false (its opposite), as it is to the good (in distinction from it). Nor is the beautiful in the same relation to the ugly as it is to philosophical truth. Truth without goodness is not a falsity to be annulled by a third term. The dialectic should not then proceed in the same manner when advancing through its successive degrees toward higher truth and superior goodness, as when mediating opposites, considering error and falsity. Degrees, considered in their distinction (as the concept of the Spirit in its determinations), are not the same as the dialectic synthesis of opposites. To avoid the misconceptions would therefore be sharply to distinguish between *affirmations which are true* and those that are false, by noting that error as error remains in a darkness "which the light of truth has not yet illumined." Lacking Croce's clear-cut discrimination, critics of Hegel have apparently attributed to the phenomenology of error the appearance of an ideal history of truth.²³ Croce does not however take account of Hegel's own distinction between what is *essential* and what is mere appearance (*Existenz*: before any significant element has been discovered). Nor does he note that under the term "immediacy" Hegel groups the superfluities, anomalies, contradictions, and errors *as such*, prior to the philosophical meanings which are to be discerned and carried forward into the system of truths.

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²³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

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Gentile.—Croce's chief disciple is Giovanni Gentile (b. 1875), who has given special attention to the dialectic of being and thought, the absolute immanence of thought as Pure Act or concrete thinking.²⁴ From this point of view idealism reconciles all distinctions, affirms the finite as well as the infinite. By adopting the standpoint of the unity of experience, Gentile overcomes the difficulty in Croce's system due to the acceptance of a fourfold multiplicity, namely, distinctions which are as real as the unity itself. Hence Gentile sets aside Croce's grades and moments of experience, and tends to return to Hegel in respects in which Croce had departed from Hegel. Philosophy is the final form in which the disciplines, such as art and religion, are taken up and reconciled. The mind generates its own objects, and self-consciousness is the type of all reality. The philosopher, thus understood, is the maker of reality. "Nothing is, but thinking makes it so, in the act of its own self-formation." Gentile does not then retain Croce's distinction between intuition and concepts as the initial presupposition. Yet in emphasizing mind as "pure act" Gentile apparently reverts to subjective idealism, neglecting the advantages of the Hegelian system.²⁵

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²⁴ *L'atto del pensare come atto puro*, 1912, tr. by H. Wildon Carr (*The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, 1922).

²⁵ Cf. C. E. M. Joad, *Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, pp. 56, 59, 64.

§ 42. IDEALISM IN ENGLAND. GREEN

German idealism was introduced into England by Coleridge, Carlyle, and other literary leaders; and in technical terms by J. H. Stirling (1820–1909), whose *Secret of Hegel*, 1865, stimulated inquiry. John Caird (1820–1898) applied Hegelian principles in his *Philosophy of Religion*, 1880. Edward Caird (1835–1908) made a monumental contribution to scholarship in his *Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant*, 1877. Caird was influential as a teacher of the history of the idealistic movement, also through other important critical works.¹ William Wallace (1844–1897) prepared the way for the understanding of Hegel by his explanatory works and translations, and as a teacher. His *Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy*, 1873, is an analysis of the critical philosophy and the development of post-Kantian idealism with respect to its problems and difficulties. Wallace persistently calls attention to philosophy as a progress of thought from love of wisdom to possession of wisdom; and as a system in which the Idea is triumphant over the fragmentary, chaotic and irregular appearances of the world. Wallace translated the *Logic* of the *Encyclopedia*, also the *Philosophy of Spirit*.² In a series of introductory essays, he delimited the field of psychology as essential to philosophy, in intimate relation with ethics; also in the light of critical doctrines, past and present, which bear on the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) adversely criticized Hegel's monism in his *Hegelianism and Personality*, 1887; but gradually modified his critique and his own doctrine, as indicated in his later works.³ A. C. Fraser (1819–1914),

¹ *Hegel*, 1883; *Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*, 1885; *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889; *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 1904.

² *The Logic of Hegel*, 1874, 2nd ed., 1892; *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, 1894.

³ *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, 1897; *The Idea of God in the Light of Modern Philosophy*, 1917.

who succeeded Sir Willim Hamilton in Edinburgh, awakened interest in Berkeley's idealism by his edition of Berkeley's works, 1874.⁴ Fraser's own position in British philosophy is significant as a development from the realism of the Scottish school to the appreciation of Berkeley's "spiritual realism."⁵ Berkeley is represented as true to the facts of experience, namely, that self-conscious activity exists on our part, and that perceived appearances disclose what we take to be the world. But the *mere* phenomena of our unreflective impressions become the significant or interpreted phenomena in Berkeley's transition to an intelligible world-view. Berkeley neither doubts the reality of the material world nor the value of physical science: he advances from the subordinate causality of perceived appearances, unsubstantial and powerless in themselves, to a conception of the permanent principle, the perfect reason and will of God.

We have already considered various types of thought prevalent in England during the middle of the nineteenth century: utilitarianism, positivism, naturalism founded on evolution and on psychology, the relativism which was due to Hamilton and Mansel, and the trend of thought indicated by the contributions of the poets and literary leaders. To these influences were added the doctrines of writers who, like James Martineau, incorporated Kantian and neo-Kantian principles into their philosophy. After the explanatory and critical works of Edward Caird and William Wallace, came in time various systematic works on idealism, notably those of Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet.

Thomas Hill Green.—Very great influence as a teacher is attributable to Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882), born in Birkin, Yorkshire, educated at Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford; and tutor, lecturer, and professor at Balliol. Green's influence as a writer began with his *Introduction to Hume*, in the new edition of Hume's works, 1874. This introductory study was for the most part an elaborate criticism of Hume's *Treatise*, in which the inconsistencies

⁴ New ed., 1901; *Selections from Berkeley*, 1874, 6th ed., 1910.

⁵ *Berkeley and Spiritual Realism*, 1908.

and other defects of Hume's argument are relentlessly exposed. Green gave special attention to the analysis of Hume's doctrine of space and time.

Metaphysics.—Green's profound study of first principles introduces his ethical philosophy, in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 1883, one of the most important contributions but in some respects the most difficult work on ethics in English. In order to establish ethical principles on a firm basis Green first develops the idea of a spiritual principle in knowledge and nature. He derives his idealism from Kant and post-Kantian idealists in his quest for a more secure foundation for ethics than that of Hume's empiricism, Mill's utilitarianism or any evolutionary doctrine.

The injunction to obey moral laws would be unmeaning if man were merely a product of nature, his knowledge also due to nature in the sense in which knowledge is explained by the empiricists. On the other hand, to adopt Kant's view that the understanding makes nature, namely, in the process of re-thinking the presentations of sense-experience, with the result that we are left with knowledge of phenomena only, and to stop with the Kantian dualism of things and selves, would be to leave unsolved the problem of the relations which determine both man and nature. Reality, defined as a single and unalterable order of relations, has meaning for both man and nature. Man's knowledge of nature herewith implies an eternal system of related elements, beyond any mere process or experience of change. The uniform order of nature and our knowledge imply a common spiritual principle.⁶ The existence of nature implies a knowing subject. Real relations exist only for a thinking consciousness, an active self-conscious principle which is not tied down to the relations which it establishes between phenomena. Granted the eternal spiritual principle, neither in time nor space, ever one with itself, essential to the existence of all phenomena, it is a question of the relation of this principle to man as intelligence, and of the secondary principles which follow. For the eternal consciousness, the relations of fact at-

⁶ *Prolegomena*, Bk. I, Sec. 33.

tained by our knowledge already exist in their system. These relations include the many beings or selves in an order of existence apart from which they would have no meaning. In the finite self as a centre of experience the eternal consciousness is reproduced, both as intelligence and as freedom. This principle in man is not a cause in the sense in which one phenomenon is ordinarily said to cause another. Freedom in that sense would involve determination from without, whereas man by virtue of his character is a free cause.⁷ Given the spiritual existence of man in an order of being above merely temporal sequences, the way is prepared for analysis of the will, its freedom, its relations to instinct, desire, motives, and its expression through conduct.⁸

Ethics.—Wants become motives for a subject, the moral motive supervenes upon the natural series and is determined by the subject from within. Since we are free in motive if at all, it is a question of the origin of our strongest motive; the combinations of motives effected by the agent as expressive of character are not what they would have been as mere circumstances. Will has made character what it is through experiences in which man has been an object to himself, and by means of an idea of his own good upon which he has made his circumstances converge.⁹ The self as thus conceived is concrete; its content is the particular feelings, desires, thoughts, which constitute the inner life. Thus the self, although timeless, has had a history. There is no choice without a motive, but the moral act is free because the motive lies in the man: a “strong character” signifies concentration of powers essential to the fulfilment of certain purposes. One self or spirit “desires in all a man’s experiences of desire, understands in all operations of his intelligence, wills in all his acts of willing.”¹⁰ Man comes to know himself as the self-identical individual who has thus shaped his moral career; he is

⁷ *Ibid.*, Sec. 74.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, Bk. II.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Sec. 99.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Sec. 117.

responsible, capable of progress, able to realize a moral ideal.

In his discussion of the moral ideal and moral progress, Green analyzes types of ethical theory involving pleasure or utility as a standard, and defines the good as that which satisfies the desire of the moral agent.¹¹ But the powers by which man initiates virtuous habits and actions, realizes an end which gives satisfaction, and attains his true good, are due to the one spiritual principle which reproduces itself in the human soul. An ideal of *personal* worth is the ultimate standard. Self-realization is the ideal; but the self is one of many in a social whole attaining a common good, the outcome of which is perfection in this social community.

Green discloses the content of this richly suggestive idea of the good by comparing Greek and Christian conceptions, and assimilating the classical virtues in terms of the higher ideal of modern times, which implies a more complete realization of the capacities of the human spirit, of the "devoted will" which in principle implies the perfect life. Book IV of the *Prolegomena* is concerned with practical means of applying this doctrine to the guidance of conduct. The first clue is found in the conclusion that the one unconditional good is the good will, the will being the vital bond among men in the pursuit of the good as perfection. It is important to put a true estimate on conscientiousness, to see how practical convictions are quickened by the attraction of heart and will toward the ideal; and to push through moral perplexities with the realization that there is no real conflict of duties.¹² We do not as yet know what human perfection would be, but in advancing from an existing state to a better we may profit by the clues which utilitarianism affords, reinterpreting conventional morality, comparing current theories as possible sources of guidance. The will toward perfection is already in itself a realization of the good, special aptitude is a factor, so is circumstance; and in instances of doubt

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Bk. III, Sec. 171.

¹² *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, Sec. 324.

conduct may be guided by measured reflection on perfection as the ideal. Self-sacrifice holds an appropriate place in this idea. Intrinsic goodness is superior at many points to extrinsic, but the expressions of the good issuing in human betterment are essential to the purification of the inner life. Green urges his ideal with religious persuasive- the same time always connecting it with the eternal principle, makes it an incentive to immediate practice, while at a principle which lies at the basis of his metaphysics, his theory of knowledge, and idea of God.

Historical Position.—The great merit of Green's argument is that he seeks a constructive basis sufficient to account for both (1) the existence of nature and of our knowledge of nature; and (2) the existence of self-conscious beings, with the values and profound implications of moral and spiritual experience. He does not seek the unity of selves and things by positing the demands of faith, feeling, or intuition, as in certain types of post-Kantian idealism. Nor does he begin with the Absolute, thereupon proceeding to an analysis of the worlds of nature and the self. Experience as given is, for Green, frankly such a process of change as we all take it to be; but we are also *conscious* of change, and Green seeks an intelligible explanation of this and other aspects of our selfhood, of our total relatedness. He does not leave the discussion in the sphere of self-consciousness, as if man were limited to inferences based on a theory of knowledge, but discloses the universal rational Ground as essentially objective, as a principle which reproduces itself in man, partially and gradually, but with the possibility that man shall rise to knowledge of the eternal. Thus his idealism has horizon or scope, yielding an insight into the eternal consciousness for the sake of which the relations of the universe exist. Man's moral experience takes place in this the richly endowed universe of the eternal verities in which he functions as a spiritual being. The antithesis between the Kantian worlds is overcome by penetrating to the underlying reality. Green does not assume that the cognitive relation is the only clue to this unity. His ap-

peal to a spiritual reality which reproduces itself in our total selfhood (intellect and will, freedom and practical activity) is common to constructive idealists. The objections to his idealism are those of critics who confine themselves to a single issue, for example, Green's concept of relatedness as the clue to his first principle.

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§ 43. THE METAPHYSICS OF F. H. BRADLEY

Influenced by Green, who was his teacher, also by Kant, Hegel, and Lotze, F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) was unlike Green in type, and stimulated critical rather than constructive inquiry. Prevented by ill-health from taking part in academic teaching, as research fellow of Merton College, Oxford, he devoted his life to the measured development of his philosophy, issuing his books at infrequent intervals, and occasionally contributing articles to *Mind*. In his *Ethical Studies*, Bradley analyzed current concepts and doctrines by appeal to a highly organized standard of self-realization, in terms of a harmonious and comprehensive whole. He scrutinized the idea of "my station and its duties" with special reference to the theory of duty for duty's sake, a doctrine which is formal and self-contradictory.¹ *The Principles of Logic* is a criticism of the psychological and empirical methods in favor of the idealistic position that the subject of the judgment is

¹ *Op. cit.*, Chap. IV; cf. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, pp. 203, 274, 346.

reality, not the mere idea; and that acts of judgment imply a system of thought.

Metaphysics.—Bradley's greatest work, *Appearance and Reality*, 1893, is a searching critique of first principles, the most influential treatise on metaphysics in recent years, and perhaps the chief work on philosophy in English. In Book I, Bradley relentlessly criticizes the chief conceptions implied in a system of first principles—primary and secondary qualities, relation and quality, space and time, motion, change, causation, activity, things, the self. In each case Bradley finds that the discussion implies mere "appearance," where "reality" might be expected; he finds a lack of intelligibility, contradictions. All these principles or considerations share the faults of our thought, as "relational," hence they fall short of truth. The identity of a "thing," for example, depends on the view we take of it. There is no science of cognition, the self has so many meanings, and means them so ambiguously that it is forever wavering. Thus, all things finite prove baffling.² Whatever alleged element of reality we consider, taken as it stands, proves to be inconsistent with itself, and thus far true and unreal; but metaphysics demands what is free from contradiction, namely, principles which stand absolutely by themselves, so that whatever appears shall somehow be one. Yet all existence must belong to reality; reality, set apart from appearance, would be nothing; hence these inseparables must be joined: the problem is to find how appearances can perchance belong to reality.³

In his second Book, Bradley brings back some of the appearances he has condemned in the first by inquiring anew into independence and plurality, by appeal to a whole "in which distinctions can be made, but in which divisions do not exist"; and especially by reference to the immediacies of experience.⁴ Thought, as Bradley used the term in the first part of his inquiry, was admittedly abstract, disappointing; but with the term "experience" he

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 74, 76, 101.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 146.

introduces feeling, and finds that reality is "indissolubly one with sentience." If our experience, where relational, is untrue, there is indeed an absolute "which holds all possible content in an individual experience where no contradiction can exist." The real problem is to know how appearance and evil, or finite things in general, are compatible with the Absolute. Bradley passes in sceptical review the difficulties besetting error and evil, time and space, the self as "this" and "mine," nature, body and soul, goodness, and the system of degrees of truth and reality which is said to culminate in the Absolute. The result is the Absolute *and* its appearances, with ultimate doubts concerning the whole investigation. For finite thought no point of view yields the truth we seek. Yet, for the Absolute, appearances somehow remain. What is ultimately real is qualified by plurality; but, as owning this diversity, Reality is one. We seem under compulsion to transcend experience, to know Reality in this its system, owning appearances which need to be envisaged in a higher way than thought discloses; but the attempt to transcend experience would be senseless, sentiency holds the clue, yet in a unity of feeling which we sadly mar when we try to describe it, as if we could retain it as object without destroying what is most precious in the psychical whole. The whole Reality was present in our first immediate experience, the self was a construction based on this immediacy, it sought to transcend experience but was itself transcended; and the utmost we seem able to say is that our experience would if completed yield this the immediate whole, or Absolute, which holds even the lowest of the degrees of truth and reality.

Estimate.—This result has seemed to some of Bradley's readers the uttermost scepticism in English thought, to others a highly quickening incentive to constructive idealism; and to some of Bradley's critics his doctrine seems to be a mysticism akin to Spinoza's intuition of reality under the aspect of eternity. Bradley gives too little attention to special and empirical reality to win the realistic or empirical reader. His work is intended for all who

would "become aware of and doubt all presuppositions," who realize that "metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct," but are nevertheless impelled to make the venture. Bradley considered objections and difficulties in his *Essays on Truth and Reality*, in which he is less negative. He also discloses later insights into the Absolute as the completion of our aesthetic, moral, and cognitive experiences. By separately analyzing each of the more important principles, in *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley made the metaphysical enterprise far more difficult for any thinker who fails to take these principles in their connection: he is not sceptical concerning the totality of appearances as constituting Reality. In the end, "nothing is lost to the Absolute, and all appearances have reality"; "the Absolute is its appearances."⁵ In reaching this conclusion Bradley, if in any sense mystical, is very far from relaxing his hold for a moment. He appeals to the Whole, the coherent system whose integrity is such that no language adequately articulates the two-fold truth that the whole world of appearances exhibits a progress from lower to higher, culminating in the Spirit ("a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased"); whereas the Absolute "has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number."⁶ The Real then is "qualified by all plurality." It includes our experience, our feeling or immediacy, as well as our thought and will: Reality is one experience; and in our first immediate experience the whole Reality is present. Bradley's final thought is therefore a richly suggestive conception which takes up and preserves in a surpassing degree the internal distinctions which cannot be adequately treated by themselves.⁷

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⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 486, 495.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 498.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 520, foll., 533.

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§ 44. BOSANQUET AND OTHER IDEALISTS

The Principle of Individuality.—Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923) compassed essentially the same field as Bradley, in the neo-Hegelian spirit, but with constructive emphasis on the relationships of immediacy in its reconciliation with logic, and with much more consideration given to the idea of the individual, which he discusses at length in several important works.¹ Bosanquet also contributed a *History of Aesthetic*, 1892; and translated Lotze's *Logic* and *Metaphysic*, in co-operation with other scholars.

Bosanquet gives prominence to the "collective will," which had been discussed by Green, and develops this essentially social idea of the concrete individual in his social and political philosophy. Although the true individual is self-existent, self-dependent and complete, it is not finite individuality which furnishes the clue for developing this insight into a system; it is the organic unity which finds expression in the family, the state, art, religion, in the whole content of culture which looks toward the Absolute for completion. Bosanquet had already indicated his constructive clue in his *Logic*, 1888, in which he describes the judgment as *one act* all along, in the endeavor of the self to think reality as a whole, as already implying the truth about reality, the primary basis of logic being its relation to reality. The escape from relativity is to be found by pushing through relations to the goal, since "all relativity rests on an absolute datum . . . all relation is within some whole."² Although all explanation is *within* the universe, and all contents relative except the Absolute, we

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912; *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 1913, etc.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 146, 256.

already know that individuality rests on differences of categories at hand, that identity and difference are inseparable aspects of all that exists, and that reality as Ground of Being includes the negativities which so extensively beset us in the totality of its system.³ Knowledge and Being are inseparable, therefore, reality is one system; and what we profoundly *mean* all along is that one system to which all judgment refers. Every fact, every sense-perception *proves something* concerning the reality of the system to which it belongs; each element of the universal, rightly understood, involves the others in their full determinateness.⁴ The form of knowledge being an active and constructive principle, it becomes a question of the real purpose which is the dominant essence of the universal, and so logic leads to teleology and a metaphysic of values.

Ward.—Another approach to the problems of post-Kantian philosophy is developed by James Ward (1843–1925), an idealist of Lotze's type, whose famous article on psychology marked an epoch in the advance beyond tradition by a fresh analysis of association.⁵ Ward expounds psychology as the science of individual experience, in which experience no longer automatically combines its data, but is described as a continuum rendered intelligible to a subject by the discovery of distinctions and connections through selective attention and other factors which distinguish subjective activity from the field of consciousness in general. In his *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 1899, Ward develops the theory of science as a whole in an exhaustive critique, which shows both the shortcomings of the most precise conceptions of science and the failure of any purely naturalistic point of view. The result is a series of constructive considerations tending toward a spiritual view of the universe and a plurality of finite centers of experience.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 146, 235, 264, 299, 307.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 171, foll.

⁵ In *Ency. Brit.*, 9th ed., 1886; enlarged in *Psychological Principles*, 1918.

The One and the Many.—In *The Realm of Ends*, 1911, Ward formulates this new monadism in a defence of values and theism akin to Berkeley's spiritual realism, but with more reference to the interaction of spirits in an environment of ever enriching experience. Naturalism leaves us with a mechanical world which affords no explanation of mind, no clue to the meaning of existence. The passing of materialistic monism and scientific realism brings us anew to a consideration of spiritualistic monism, with its realm of ends. But the ancient problem of the One and the Many also recurs. Accordingly, Ward examines various conceptions of unity—acosmism, mysticism, the World-soul of Platonism, the Absolute Object, the Absolute Subject, Absolute self-consciousness—and finds no type of unity acceptable which ends in abstractions or in absolute transcendence of the Many. The recoil from absolutism once more brings pluralism into the foreground, where the monadology of Leibniz is still the type. But pluralism, without the presupposition of a rigid underlying monism, seems to involve contingency in the world. Yet, granted the "interaction of a plurality of individuals, intent on self-betterment as well as self-conservation, there should be a general tendency to diminish the mere contingency of the world and to replace it by a definite progression."⁶ Hence Ward next turns to an analysis of evolution as epigenesis (which entails new properties which its component factors did not previously possess) and equilibration, with the conclusion that synthesis creates new values, not new entities, the good that is achieved tending to be conserved and to advance to worthier forms.

Social Pluralism.—The type is found in social organization, in which there is no absolute opposition between structure and function, but interdependence of higher and lower. The question then arises, In what sense is society a unity? Scrutiny of the various views which prevailed since Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, leads Ward to the conclusion that there need be no lapse into the subjectivism of our mere self-consciousness; since human experience

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

from the outset involves both subject and object, both self and other, with differentiation proceeding amidst inter-connection, society being a "living reality," though complex and over-individual.⁷ The objective mind which belongs to society is at once immanent in and dominant over its several members, who thereby attain to self-consciousness and think and act as rational persons. Here Ward's conclusions coincide with Bosanquet's, through reliance on the fundamental logic of human nature defined as rational. We cannot as yet specify the details of life which would satisfy an intelligent being. Reason is progressively making man master of his fate. Realization of the rational ideal will bring humanity to a point where society will be "animated by a single wise and righteous will," with every citizen working harmoniously with every other, each doing the wisest and best of which he is capable. This is not the ideal of a King, but that of a perfect commonwealth in which the divine will becomes a reality only when the ideal toward which the whole creation moves is actually attained: the objective mind in the breast of each man being the sovereign and standard.

Ward finds a pluralism running through the Hegelian system, in which the World-spirit and its instruments are compared to an architect using natural forces; the completed plan proves to be the architect, and the World-spirit the living organization in which individuals as ends gradually evolve. The result of the doctrine of manifold development however is that the potential and the actual differ only in form, as if in the kingdom of the Spirit the outcome of the development were the same as the beginning. No less disappointing is any view founded on history which neglects the possibility of a higher achievement than that of our own nation, or any doctrine which neglects the plurality of worlds. So too the argument for a Supreme Unity as the upper limit is as faulty as that of the plea for the lower limit of pluralism: neither the unity of a society nor that of a Person is absolute. The conception of a higher spiritual order making possible the conserva-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

tion of values, seems imperative from a pluralistic point of view. Modern pluralism is at least sure of the existence of the universe as "the totality of monads really interacting."⁸

Theism.—Approaching the study of theism with the hope that it will complete pluralism, not abolish it, Ward considers at length the idea of creation, with the tendency of theism toward singularism; the cosmology of theism; freedom; freedom and foreknowledge, with the difficulties presented by the problem of evil, moral evil and theories of the future life, and the validity of the moral argument for the future life as a matter of faith, not of knowledge. A more fundamental standpoint than that of the Many is required, to furnish their ontological unity for their common world and ensure a teleological unity for their varied ends: the One which is the ultimate source of their being and the ultimate end of their ends.⁹ But Ward guards against any attempt completely to envisage the One. Instead, he interprets God from our own limited standpoint, as possessing intelligence and will, hence as personal; in any event God cannot be regarded as absolute in such wise as to deprive ourselves of personality or initiative. We cannot tell how God created the world. But, safeguarding the Many as real, we must say that creation implies limitation; the greater the world, the greater the freedom and capacity of God's creatures. The realm of ends is that of self-determining, free agents; amidst contingency in part, stability in part, and progress in part. The principle of continuity is to be retained, with the "upward striving which is the essence of life." Meanwhile, the present world, with the progress possible on its plane, will never meet our highest needs. Yet amidst the beautiful and sublime which we have thus far attained, the eternal values appear. Ward ends the discussion with the explicit reminder that he has approached the end of ends with the Many always in view, in contrast with the alternative bias which begins with and insists upon the One.¹⁰

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 442.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 452.

McTaggart.—Prominent among those who have devoted years of research to the Hegelian system, with a view to overcoming the ambiguities and the defects of the dialectical method, is J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925), who has given special consideration to the view that the Absolute is a spiritual community.¹¹ McTaggart's works involve a searching analysis of personality in the doctrines of Hegel, Lotze, Bosanquet, and others; with a critique of the conception of society as an organism, and of Hegelianism in relation to Christianity. Idealism is first concerned to prove that reality is not exclusively matter, then to show that reality is exclusively spirit, and finally to determine what is the fundamental nature of spirit. The argument of the *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology* culminates in the conclusion that the Absolute can only be perfectly manifested in a state of consciousness meeting three conditions: (1) it must have a balance between the individual for whom all reality exists and the reality which is for it, neither being subordinate, the harmony being ultimate; (2) it must be able to establish a unity between self and not-self such that the latter loses all appearance of contingency and alienation; and (3) in the Absolute the separate and unique nature of each individual must be found in its connection with other individuals.¹² McTaggart's analysis shows that neither knowledge nor volition complies with these conditions: it is love, the highest reality in the universe, which fulfils all the conditions. Love is of persons and God; it implies a unity of persons which is more than a personal unity, includes all truth and all goodness, will and knowledge, in a system which preserves their values.

The movement in favor of personal idealism in England includes various influences ranging from the poetry of Tennyson to modifications of Hegelianism and other types of post-Kantian idealism. W. R. Sorley represents a

¹¹ *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, 1896; *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, 1901; *Some Dogmas of Religion*, 1906; *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, 1910; *The Nature of Existence*, 1921.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 285.

type of ethical idealism.¹³ *Personal Idealism*, 1902, is the co-operative product of a group of Oxford thinkers, who incline toward voluntarism, Berkeley's theism, pragmatism, or an idealism of Eucken's type. Theistic idealism has found expression in a type which admits limitations or finiteness on the part of God. Personal idealism is also significant in relation to Bradley's absolutism, which has been adopted in a measure, but modified by A. E. Taylor and Harold Joachim; while Seth (Pringle-Pattison) has modified Hegelian absolutism in greater recognition of finite selves, as already indicated. Personal idealism as a philosophical doctrine readily passes over into theism as recognized in current theology, and personal idealism in America is intimately related with the movement in England.

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§ 45. PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA

Early Schools.—Five types or schools of thought have been distinguished in the early period of interest in philosophical subjects in the United States.¹ Out of these partly religious, partly political, scientific and philosophical trends of thought came the systematic interests of the later period. The first school included Puritanism and anti-Puritanism, notably the doctrines of Calvinism, with its deity dwelling outside the framework of the universe, its conception of God's arbitrary and inscrutable will, foreordination, creation out of nothing, and its derogatory view of human personality. The idealism of the second school began with Samuel Johnson (1696–1772), who vis-

¹³ *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, 1918.

¹ I. W. Riley, *American Philosophy: The Early Schools*.

ited Berkeley during the sojourn of the latter in Rhode Island; and included Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), the theologian, who has been highly praised for his metaphysical ability. Johnson issued a brief *Introduction to Philosophy*, in 1731, based on Locke's divisions of philosophy as rational, natural, and moral. Berkeley's idealism seemed to him the true support of religious faith, and in his later writings and teachings Johnson assimilated this idealism, also views from Malebranche, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and other philosophers of their time. Edwards passed through three periods of thought: as mystic, with his remarkable sense of the immediateness of the divine presence; as idealist, in his agreement with Plato's conception of God as the idea of the good; and as pantheist, in his approximation to Spinoza's doctrine of the one substance, manifested in the universe.² Riley concludes that while Edwards was a precocious idealist and profound mystic, he was not a consistent philosopher, but adopted a traditional doctrine of the Logos to substantiate his theology in contrast with his philosophy.³ Noah Porter (1811-1892), president of Yale College, 1871-1886, has given an account of the followers of Edwards and the development of philosophy subsequent to Edwards' time.⁴

The third school includes the period of interest in deism, as an outgrowth of the rationalism of the last quarter of the seventeenth century, but as an independent movement in the eighteenth century, notably in the leading colleges of the United States and in the period of Benjamin Franklin's philosophical interests in Philadelphia.⁵ Materialism was the prevailing doctrine in the fourth school, including the views of Hartley and Priestley, and their French followers; the teachings of Colden (1688-1776), earliest and foremost among American materialists, Buchanan (1785-1812), Cooper (1759-1840), and Rush (1745-1813), the leading medical materialist of the eighteenth century.

² Cf. Riley, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁴ Appendix to translation of Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, 1873, p. 442, foll.

⁵ Cf. Riley, *ibid.*, Bk. III.

The fifth or realistic school began with the definitions of natural realism and expositions of the general doctrines of Reid; and continued with the realistic traditions at Princeton, in opposition to agnosticism, materialism, and idealism.⁶ Witherspoon (1723-1794), a Scotchman by birth, was the first realist of prominence. He was succeeded by other leaders of theological persuasion, including Beasley (1777-1845), a member of the Philosophical Society of Philadelphia and provost of the University of Pennsylvania; and Ogilvie (1760-1820), one of the minor Scottish philosophers, whose *Essay on the Nature, Extent and Limits of Human Knowledge*, restated the common-sense principles with emphasis on practical values. The greater period of interest in the Scottish philosophy began with the coming of James McCosh (1811-1894), a pupil of Sir William Hamilton, professor of logic and metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast, who became president of Princeton in 1869. McCosh, acute as critic of Kant and Hamilton, Mill and Spencer, expounded his own view in various works on the Scottish school and realistic studies of the human mind.⁷ The natural points of contact with intuitionism were such that in America, with the prevalence of the practical and realistic temper of mind, the dislike for the refinements of speculation, the demand for positive assurances underlying religious faith, realism seemed to be the distinctively American philosophy.⁸

Liberalism.—No less typical however was the practical wisdom of Franklin, the free-thinking and liberalism of the latter part of the eighteenth century and the beginnings of the nineteenth, notably in the teachings of W. E. Channing (1780-1842), whose writings exercised very great influence during several generations. Channing was a devout believer in an essentially spiritual philosophy,

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 475, 480.

⁷ *The Intuitions of the Mind*, 1860; *An Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy*, 1866; *The Laws of Discursive Thought*, 1870; *Christianity and Positivism*, 1871; *The Scottish Philosophy*, 1875; *Realistic Philosophy Defended*, 1887; *First and Fundamental Truths*, 1889.

⁸ Cf. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, p. 39.

with special regard for the independence and authority of reason and conscience. He was the forerunner of a group of religious liberals, essayists, and literary leaders, including Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), W. H. Channing, Margaret Fuller, James Freeman Clarke, and Theodore Parker (1810-1860). Frothingham has traced the doctrines of New England transcendentalism to their sources in England and Germany.⁹ Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection*¹⁰ was an influential work in this period, also the teachings of Carlyle, the literary and especially the romantic expressions of post-Kantian idealism. In a later period the writings of James Martineau came into prominence, among English liberals whose works were influential in America.¹¹ Emerson's work as an idealistic leader corresponds in a measure with that of Carlyle. Poet, seer, mystical in the higher sense of the term, Emerson combined belief in the individual (originality, self-reliance, intuition, inner guidance) with an idea of God as Over-soul or Universal Mind manifested in all history. One of the greatest essayists of any age, his methods of thought and literary composition were those of the romanticists, implying the conviction that all our moods will somehow disclose their unity, our detached thoughts their system, our visions of truth an idealism which surpasses that of discursive reasoning. Theodore Parker gave classic expression to the liberalism of the period, in works of far-reaching influence.¹²

Evolutionism.—Interest in Spencer's philosophy found expression in the writings of Hickock (1798-1888), author of works on rational psychology, moral science, *Creator and Creation*, 1872; and John Fiske (1842-1901), the historian, who lectured on positivism in 1869, and expounded the philosophy of evolution in more popular form.¹³

⁹ O. B. Frothingham, *Transcendentalism in New England*, 1876.

¹⁰ American ed., by James Marsh, 1829.

¹¹ Cf. *A Study of Religion*, 1888, *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, 1890.

¹² *Discourse on the Transient and Permanent in Christianity*, 1841; *Discourse on Matters Pertaining to Religion*, 1842.

¹³ *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, 1874; *The Unseen World*, 1876;

Fiske's smaller works, published between 1884 and 1899, made the doctrine of evolution highly intelligible and very persuasive, and fostered union of belief with theism; hence they led the way for religious thinkers who sought to correlate Christian doctrines with the philosophy of development. The writings of Joseph Le Conte were also influential in uniting religion with evolutionism.¹⁴

Types of Technical Philosophy.—Interest in the technical study of German idealism was fostered by W. T. Harris (1835–1909), editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, and author of works on Hegel's idealism.¹⁵ Harris' leadership corresponds to that of Stirling and Wallace in England, and his periodical gave expression to the movement from the older Scottish philosophy to idealism in the American universities. Harris translated portions of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik*, and interpreted the central principles of Hegel's philosophy. The Kantian philosophy was expounded and interpreted by John Watson, author of numerous works on Schelling, hedonistic theories, positivism, Christianity in relation to idealism, and the philosophy of religion.¹⁶ Other leaders in teaching and expounding types of philosophy and psychology, notably in the universities, included Francis Bowen, Harvard University; G. T. Ladd, Yale, author of a long series of works; B. P. Bowne, Boston University; John Dewey, Chicago, Columbia;¹⁷ J. M. Baldwin, Princeton;¹⁸ and G. Stanley

Darwinism and Other Essays, 1879; *The Destiny of Man*, 1884; *The Idea of God*, 1885; *Through Nature to God*, 1899; *Life Everlasting*, 1901.

¹⁴ *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*, 1888, 1897; Le Conte was a geologist, a disciple of Agassiz (1807–1873), great as a teacher of zoölogy, who adopted the teachings of Cuvier in terms of Schelling's philosophy of nature: Agassiz raised objections to the doctrine of evolution.

¹⁵ *Hegel's First Principle*, 1869; *Hegel's Doctrine of Reflection*, 1881; *Philosophy in Outline*, 1884; *Hegel's Logic*, 1890.

¹⁶ *Kant and his English Critics*, 1881; *The Philosophy of Kant Explained*, 1908.

¹⁷ *Psychology*, 1886; *Outlines of Ethics*, 1891; and a series of works on instrumentalism and the philosophy of experience.

¹⁸ *Handbook of Psychology*, 1890–1891; *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, 1901–1905; etc.

Hall, prominent as president of Clark University, in psychology and education, and as leader in research in various philosophical fields. Leadership in ethics has been notable in the teaching and writings of G. H. Palmer, Harvard University, whose ethical idealism incorporates Kantian ethics with special reference to the organic conception of goodness.¹⁹

Personal Idealism.—Post-Kantian idealism was brought into prominence by Josiah Royce, Harvard University, after 1879, whose idealism, partly Hegelian in type, tended toward panlogism or pantheism, in its earlier form. This type of idealism was opposed by G. H. Howison (1834–1916), of the University of California, a leader in pleading for the integrity of moral freedom and responsibility.²⁰ Hence Howison objected to the monism of thinkers, like Royce, who seemed unable to defend the ethical principles implied in the integrity of the moral individual, whose idealism failed to give adequate recognition to *persons* as real beings. What is required is recognition of selves in their noumenal being, ultimate, self-determining, coexisting in a moral order or the eternal City of God. This pluralistic or personal idealism, in contrast with the idea of an Infinite or all-inclusive Self, is further developed in Howison's later work, *The Limits of Evolution*, 1901, in which Howison calls attention to some of the central problems which remain unsolved. Howison also raised objection to the monism of Spencer and Haeckel, to naturalisms of various types, and to Hegelianism. The resulting opposition between the doctrine of nature and the demands of our moral consciousness is to be overcome by a social logic in what Howison calls a universal social recognition.²¹

Three characteristic tendencies have been noted in personal idealism.²² This idealism tends, through desire to

¹⁹ *The Field of Ethics*, 1901; *The Nature of Goodness*, 1903; *The Problem of Freedom*, 1911; *Altruism, its Nature and Varieties*, 1919.

²⁰ See his contribution to the public discussion of 1895, in Royce's work, *The Conception of God*, 1897.

²¹ Cf. *The Limits of Evolution*, revised ed., 1904.

²² R. B. Perry, Weber's *History of Philosophy*, revised ed., 1925, p. 551.

save the individual and his moral attributes, to emphasize will and practical consequences, at the expense of the theoretical reason: Howison resisted this tendency, which finds expression in the movement among British idealists towards voluntarism and pragmatism.²³ The second tendency of this idealism is toward emphasis on *society*, in contrast with the relativism and sceptical consequences of unqualified individualism. The third characteristic is found in the tendency to emphasize the substantive reality of persons, regarded in the light of self-consciousness in which they are said to be directly known. The last of these tendencies finds expression in the philosophy of B. P. Bowne (1847-1910), who was professor of philosophy in Boston University during a considerable period, after his studies under Lotze, with whom he agrees in emphasizing the spiritual activity of the self.²⁴ Our "living experience of intelligence itself," the "active self-experience" which involves a revelation of causality, substance, unity-in-manness, identity amidst change, is the basis of this philosophy. Bowne's "transcendental empiricism" as thus outlined leads to his spiritualistic metaphysics, implying a Supreme Person and a world of finite persons in mutual relationship with nature, as their world of communication and expression. This doctrine has been adopted by a number of idealists who have substituted the term "personalism" for spiritualism, the central thesis being that *only persons are real*, that society is an interaction of persons dependent on God.²⁵ Mind, defined in terms of this idealism, is "an individual that universalizes."²⁶ The laws of nature, the relations and interactions of things and persons are dependent on the will and purpose of the Supreme Person

²³ See *Personal Idealism*, 1902, in which idealists, voluntarists, and pragmatists find a common ground in pluralism.

²⁴ *Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, 1874; *Studies in Theism*, 1879; *Metaphysics*, 1882, 2nd ed., 1898; *Introduction to Psychological Theory*, 1886; *Philosophy of Theism*, 1887; *Principles of Ethics*, 1892; *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 1897; *Personalism*, 1908; *Kant and Spencer*, 1912.

²⁵ See E. S. Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy* (bibliography), 1925.

²⁶ Brightman, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

or Mind. Finite selves, although dependent on the divine purpose for their being, are self-conscious and relatively self-determining; hence they are not identical with the consciousness of the Supreme Person. God possesses a genuine "other"; the universe of persons is a society such that the principles emphasized by pluralists are maintained, and there is no merging of all selves into one, as in absolutism. Personalism also claims to offer an account of the facts and values of experience essential to the interpretation of life as a whole: it is particularly fruitful because it gives a cosmic status to the ideal values, and regards personality as "more than a terrestrial incident."²⁷ In the United States, also, absolute idealism has tended toward recognition of finite selves, without passing over to personal idealism as a movement. W. E. Hocking, of Harvard University, for example, approaches the idealistic argument from the point of view of the meaning of religion for the finite person, the place of social experience and social realism.²⁸

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§ 46. ROYCE'S IDEALISM

Earlier Doctrine.—Chief among American idealists in his day, great as a teacher, and possessing exceptional power in portraying the historical sequences of modern philosophy as vital moments of thought for all who think systematically and profoundly, Josiah Royce (1855–1916), professor of the history of philosophy in Harvard Uni-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 246, 247.

²⁸ *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, 1912.

versity, defended post-Kantian idealism by progressively assigning content to the Absolute in his successive volumes. Royce gave special attention at first to the problem of the larger self construed as implying an all-knowing Thought which completes our fragmentary knowledge. Never fully aware of the content or meaning of my present self, I must in deeper truth be far more of a self than I now know myself to be; otherwise I am not even as much of a self as I now take myself to be. I must indeed be "organically related to a true and complete reflective Person" whom my finite consciously logically implies.¹ In his *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Royce had already approached the question of the inclusive whole which holds our judgments and their intended objects in a system, from the viewpoint of the possibility of error.² Granted error, judgments are true or false only in reference to a higher inclusive Thought presupposed by them. Reality is described as a unity of Infinite Thought which, knowing all truth, includes knowledge of our imperfect facts and of the conflicts of our wills. Here, Royce's thought is formal, the finite self is meagre, God is chiefly a postulate; and evil, with other finite differences, is too readily absorbed.

In *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, a work which is unexcelled in vivid exposition, thought is enlarged by the concrete content which experience and recent sciences give it; while the distinction between the "world of description" and the "world of appreciation" conveniently classifies types of knowledge. The Infinite now becomes the Logos or organic Self of the world of appreciation whose truth encompasses at a glance the world of higher categories, with the purposes which give unity to finite selfhood, the true world being the system of thoughts of the Logos.³ Royce now accepts Schopenhauer's World-Will, with Hegel's Self-conscious Thought, in one all-embracing activity. We are part of the world of appreciation, in so far as we are clearly conscious of our own choices: the

¹ *Studies of Good and Evil*, pp. 145, 162.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 393.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 415.

Logos is our own fulfilment, our own selves in unity, suffering and conquering with us. In *The Conception of God*, this doctrine is defined as theism; God, as Omniscient Being, possessing a world of immediate data of consciousness, fulfils, in an all-completing experience, ideas, experiences, purposes, which as possessed by us are still fragmentary.

Types of Being.—In *The World and the Individual*,⁴ this idealism is put in its completed form in relation to four concepts of Being. (1) Realism, by asserting the independence of Being, as somehow external to the knower, neglects consciousness and its internal meanings, asserts hopeless contradictions which it declines to consider. (2) Mysticism identifies Being as immediate with the knower, so that all definite contents are excluded and only the simple Absolute remains.⁵ (3) Critical rationalism identifies Reality with validity, the Being of the world with certain ideas; but discloses no “view of the Real as the finally determinate that permits no other.”⁶ Realism passes into this view, which dates back to Plato and Kant, and includes Mill’s doctrine. (4) The fourth historical conception is synthetic, constructive: Reality completely embodies, in individual form and final fulfilment, the internal meaning of finite ideas.⁷

Much depends therefore upon understanding the term Idea in relation to Reality.⁸ An idea is not a mere image or representation, it involves a consciousness of how you propose to act, is a partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose (with the significance of an act of will), is representative of a fact beyond itself (derived, external meaning); the purpose of the idea is its *internal meaning*, and it is true or false according to the meaning selected. The external meaning is continuous with the internal and is involved in the latter. *To be* means to express or embody “the complete internal meaning of an

⁴ Gifford Lectures, Vol. I, 1900; Vol. II, 1901.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 144, 180.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 204, 299.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 339, foll.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1, foll.

absolute system of ideas," in which all our ideas tend to complete themselves, the real world being our whole will embodied: the Absolute is what we really mean.

Critique of Realism.—The refutation of realism is essential to the argument. According to realism, to be real means to be *independent* of an idea or experience, through which the real being is felt, thought, or known. Everything turns on the ontological predicate. Objects are independent of any knowing that is external to themselves: the true meaning of our ideas for realism is, to be wholly external.⁹ But Royce points out that the internal meaning stubbornly remains. Realism emphasizes both the independence and the permanence of its reals. But these reals prove to be abstractions, for example, the atoms and monads. Can realism become self-consistent? It becomes a problem of the One *vs.* the Many.

There are at least *two* genuinely independent real beings in the realistic world. There must then be: (1) an object, (2) a knower, (3) real ideas. *The idea is independent too*: this is the "forgotten thesis of realism." To be real, an idea must refer to a real independent object: such real reference would be on the realistic hypothesis impossible. There is no object independent of the knowledge which relates to it. To be related, idea and object must have common characters: this would mean that the absolute dualism of realism is overcome. Royce's conclusion is that, the realists, having asserted the contradictions on which their doctrine depends, leave these difficulties unexamined: realism depends upon not knowing what it does.¹⁰

The Constructive View.—Turning to a further analysis of internal meanings, in terms of the fourth or constructive conception of Being, Royce notes that our internal meanings are fragments, involving dissatisfaction, a longing for ideal construction; our external experiences, regarded as confirming or confuting ideas, also imply meanings beyond ideas. Neither internal nor external meanings are

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 186; for empirical realism, see *op. cit.*, p. 365.

adequate alone to embody individuality: an individual is unique, everything save its individuality can be defined.¹¹ Individual beings are essentially metaphysical, involve presuppositions which are not empirically verifiable: the Other that we seek would determine our ideas to their final truth, the linkage of internal and external meanings is the deepest fact about the universe. The clue to the unity of meanings lies in the unique fulfilment of Purpose. Purpose includes the empirical element, the immediacy implied in every fact: only individual experience is real; but in the varieties of individual expression there is unity of the whole, with one universal type of ideal meaning in all the realms of life.

On one hand is the realm of individuals morally free. On the other, one final Knower knows all that we are in one inclusive act in the insight of a single self-consciousness. The significance of the world and of individual life lies then in the conscious fulfilment of meaning: significant meaning has brought the world to pass. Will in God and man logically determines the consciousness of individuality. Our various individual purposes are such as the Absolute will would fulfil: God, in knowing our purposes, knows their fulfilment (not as separate purposes independently arising).

In a discussion of recent mathematical doctrines, Royce considers the difficulties raised by Bradley's conceptions of appearance and reality, and defines the Absolute as a self-representative system.¹² The constituent individuals are not absorbed or transmuted in the whole, but the whole as One Self is an Individual of Individuals; will, thought, experience are preserved, and reach determinateness of expression.¹³ Royce's idealism is made more complete in the second volume by further recognition of the linkage of facts, the temporal in relation to the eternal, and the relationships of the Many and the One.

Summary.—“Hereby each of these characters is deduced

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

¹² *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, Supplementary Essay.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 569, 588.

from our general concept of Being, as that concept is illustrated by our experience. *One* is the Absolute, because in mere multiplicity there would be no finality of insight. *Many* is the Absolute, because in the interrelationships of contrasted expressions of a single Will lies the only opportunity for the embodiment of the wholeness of life, and for the possession of Self-consciousness by the Absolute. For the mystic long ago showed that simple Oneness meant Nothingness. *Individuals* are all the various expressions of the Absolute, in so far as they are *Many*; just because, where the *One* is individual, every aspect and element of its self-expression is unique. *Free*, in its own degree, is every individual will amongst all the wills that the world-life expresses, because every such will, as unique, is in some respect underivable from all the others. *Temporal*, is the world order, because, so far as we can know, time is the universal form of the expression of Will. *Eternal*, is this same world order, because, past, present and future time equally belong to the Real, and their Being implies, by definition, that they are present, in their wholeness, to the final insight. And Time, surveyed in its wholeness, is Eternity.”¹⁴

This conception of the *Many* in relation to the *One* is developed in other aspects in *The Problem of Christianity*, and in distinctively ethical terms in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, in which the formal moral doctrine is re-defined in terms of loyalty to loyalty, through which one is advised to choose that cause or movement which will most greatly increase loyalty in the world. Other volumes are devoted to the relation of this idealism to the conception of immortality, the sources of religious insight, and to the idea of “the beloved community.” Thus Royce’s original teaching was enriched in the direction of moral content and practical values, in contrast with the theory of knowledge. The historical background of Royce’s doctrine was made more clear in the posthumous volume, *Lectures on Modern Idealism*. Royce’s later years were especially devoted to comparative studies in the relation-

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 336.

ships of logic and mathematics, with special reference to the new doctrine of the infinite; and the forms, categories, and types of order. Here a constructive basis was afforded for the principles common to rationalism (assimilating realism) and idealism (enriched by current criticisms).

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§ 47. ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM. JAMES. PRAGMATISM

The reaction against intellectualism in Germany, England, and the United States has been due in part to the rejection of speculative idealism, notably the absolute idealism of Hegel, in part to the development of voluntarism in metaphysics since the protest of Schopenhauer and the influence of voluntarism in psychology, also in part to increasing interest in the practical values of philosophy. The vogue of Bergson's *Creative Evolution*, with its critique of intellectualism and its doctrine of intuition, is an additional sign. The rapid increase of scientific knowledge has made the constructive enterprise more difficult. Scientific formulations are often taken to be tentative, as signs or short-hand accounts of realities and relativities surpassing present knowledge. Relativity, as essentially objective, has come to occupy a place once assigned to absolutes of various types. Reason, which in the age of Descartes, seemed able to generate principles out of its own

nature, has come to be regarded as an instrument; thus the instrumentalism of Dewey and his followers has come into vogue, and pragmatism as a method of testing conceptions has made its modest contributions. If these protests have been negative rather than productive, rationalism has been enriched, for example, by the suggestive polemic of William James in his analysis of absolutism, his objection to the idea of an All-knower postulated to account for knowledge. The tendency has been to substitute a biological or pragmatic conception of knowledge for idealistic epistemologies of all types, by persistently asking, What is knowledge *known as*, what do our conceptions actually signify? If the hypothesis of an All-knower fails to withstand the test, the resource is to regard knowledge in the light of its various origins and values. If a monism of substance, in terms of a Self, an Absolute, a determinism, pre-established harmony, or World-will is not demanded by the facts, the resource is to adopt a pluralism or radical empiricism which meets the needs of our facts. The protests of the pragmatists fall in line with the realistic reaction, to be considered below, namely, in the effort to refute any idealism which seems to settle the metaphysical problem by insisting on a certain type of epistemology.

William James: Characteristics.—William James (1842–1910) had an extensive and profound influence in America, with an increasing recognition in England and other countries, during the last twenty-five years of his life. As a teacher at Harvard University, he was exceptionally human, tolerant, keenly appreciative of individuality; suggestively informal, persistently calling attention to issues neglected by the system-makers: always disclosing side-lights of promise, a great lover of fair-play. As an empiricist, he represented the English tradition, with special fondness for Locke and for Mill's *Logic*. His early training brought him in touch with the philosophy of Renouvier, in France; and James adopted essentially the same view of contingency and freedom, and was especially emphatic in his arguments against determinism. After graduating from Harvard Medical School, James lectured on Spencer's

evolutionism and psychology, in a course in philosophy classed under Natural History. Later, he developed his own type of psychology, as teacher and writer; and also gave courses in cosmology, the psychology of religion, metaphysics, and pragmatism.

Psychology.—Great as a descriptive psychologist, James' *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, is still the chief work on psychology in English: the starting-point for both exposition and criticism, the basis of lesser types of psychology which build on certain of its principles by ignoring the rest. James described the mind we actually know and can verify by appeal to experience; in contrast with any psychology, which, seeking consistency at the cost of fidelity to mental life in all its phases, neglects certain aspects of the inner life. His description of the stream of thought is classic, also his account of the types of awareness of self. He gave special recognition to attention, in an acute analysis which relates attention to thought in one direction, and to will in the other. In his discussion of habit and emotion, James seemed to be purely physiological, as though contradicting what he had said in other parts of his two volumes; but his aim was to be true to experience as given. For him, the real mind is the mind which has been developed by *use*, in which will plays a significant part, and which discloses its types of activity or interest, one of which is intellectual. James did not hesitate to introduce practical inferences into psychology as a "science," whatever the critics might say concerning his inconsistencies.¹ His letters give a graphic picture of James as friend, lover of truth, critic, teacher.²

Turning to the field of religion, in his epoch-making work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, James sympathetically described types of religious experience possessing significant values. He investigated not only the origins of such experience as shown in various documents

¹ When charged with having "injured the cause of psycho-physics in America," he replied, "I hope I have."

² *The Letters of William James*, ed. by his son, Henry James, 2 vols., 1920.

and descriptions, including those of the saint and the mystic, the once-born and the twice-born types, the rationalistic and the less-rationalistic; he indicated a wider approach to the religious field by reference to Myers' conception of the subliminal or larger self, and possible empirical contacts with a higher order of being. James appealed especially to values as goals of experience to be estimated in their own right, whatever judgments might be passed on vicissitudes and conditions along the way. Religious experience possesses value in contrast not only with institutions and formalisms of every sort, but because it shows the scope and power of the life of feeling, emotion, sentiment, in contrast with the account which rationalism gives of the human mind. James does not show how this rich inner life, with its feelings of unity and of energizing relationship to a higher order of being, is to be unified with our knowledge of the universe. But here again his province is description, the disclosure of horizons which inspire ideals and yield new incentives.

Temporalism.—In *The Will to Believe*, James had already shown his impartiality in putting himself within another's point of view, in keen appreciation of any "live hypothesis" which may be genuinely needed to express a strong sentiment or conviction. By pleading for a real moral freedom bordering on absolute chance, opportunities to contribute individual values of true significance, to accomplish something worth while in a universe which surely needs us, he exposed the shortcomings of optimism, determinism, or any other doctrine which assumes an all-inclusive plan. The result was a suggestive argument for theism, for a real God to work with, who is limited, achieving, responsive, akin to our finitude, as opposed to the absolutes and infinites of the past. The implication is that our thought is encumbered by manifold conceptions not called for by experience. If James is sceptical, it is with the enthusiasm of one who realizes that only the future history of thought can tell us how the multiplicity of values shall receive true recognition. It may well be that various systems will be required to express and inter-

pret diverse types of life and thought. His objection to a "block universe" of any sort, either the absolutism of Hegel or the pre-established harmony of Leibniz, was in favor of a temporalism of the type of Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. The advantage of such a conception is that it leaves many possibilities open; hence it encourages a freedom of thought and action, a spontaneity or responsiveness, originality, genius, or individuality wholly discounted in a universe which is eternally complete and timeless. A fixed world-plan would be gratuitous. An omniscient, omnipotent God is also superfluous. But the assumption of a temporal process, a pure experience making toward some far-off goal which no one distinctly sees, a radical experience which is willing to take things as they are in the universe for the sake of doing our part to make them better, not only spurs us on to action but quickens thought at its best. Thus in ethics James was a meliorist, as ardently opposed to mere optimism as to any sort of pessimism, frankly admitting that we "live in partial systems," our responsible concern being with "our private destiny, after all."

Pragmatism.—This interest in actual experience, its practical bearings, and wealth of types and values, led James to bring to notice a doctrine of Charles Pierce (1839–1914), the American logician, who introduced the term "pragmatism."³ By pragmatism James meant a method of putting conceptions to the concrete test by appeal to the things, objects, or ideas to which we specifically refer. Pragmatism is not a philosophy, but is preparatory to philosophy. It is, in brief, a means of "settling disputes that might otherwise be interminable."⁴ Thus one might, on either theoretical or practical grounds, or both, reject doctrines which were never demanded by anything real. The result would be an enormous gain. Thus one might discard very many conceptions of deity and the

³ James, "How to Make our Ideas Clear," in *The Popular Science Monthly*, Jan. 1878. Pierce's papers on logic have been collected in a posthumous volume, *Chance, Love and Logic*, 1923.

⁴ *Pragmatism*, p. 45; see, also, *The Meaning of Truth*.

universe, notably ideas concerning the world-plan which, like the doctrine of pre-established harmony, assume that *all is given*, and therefore leave no ground for real achievements. Tried by the pragmatic test, one would reject assumptions concerning static goodness and perfection, determinisms of all types, and all Absolutes which preclude the reality of individuals. The test in each case would be: What is this thing known as? What precisely do you mean when you say God is three Persons in One? How do you propose to act, in view of your notion that everything in the universe is foreordained?

Having cleared the ground of useless conceptions, and come very close to the facts of life as actually presented, one would be ready to begin anew, keeping as persistently in touch with given experience as James himself sought to do in his descriptive psychology and in such a work as *A Pluralistic Universe*. Since a man's vision or over-belief is the great fact about him, there is every reason to give it free expression. Moreover, as a man's philosophy is the expression of his intimate character, and there are many types, it is well to develop these temperamental ideas to the full, noting the several types and considering whither the several doctrines lead in mutual relationship.

James exemplified his method by adding to the discussion of pragmatism various ventures in the field of metaphysics. Empiricism meant for him "the habit of explaining wholes by parts, rationalism . . . the habit of explaining parts by wholes."⁵ Rationalists tend to adopt the point of view of the whole without sufficiently considering the disconnectedness or pluralisms of experience. Possibly the flux of sensible experience itself contains a rationality that has been overlooked.⁶ Hence the resource would be an intelligent return to experience.⁶ James led the way by reacting against any world-view which leaves formal absolutism on our hands. Fidelity to experience in all its phases, however conflicting its tendencies, however diverse its typical expressions, seemed to him far more

⁵ *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 7.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 80.

important than logical consistency in behalf of a well-rounded system.⁷ The unsatisfactory philosophies of the past are traceable to conventional views of the human mind, notably the intellectualisms. Hence it becomes clear that a fundamental difficulty lies in our psychology. James' psychology, with its suggestive voluntarism, was a corrective of the old-time assumption that the mind is chiefly intellect. His pragmatism was especially directed against *a priori* philosophies.

The Results of Pragmatism.—Unable himself to formulate any satisfactory world-view, James invigorated others by his criticisms, his regard for individuality, his respect for novelties and for beginnings which thus far have no discoverable cause. He also won recognition for thinkers who, like Renouvier and Bergson, suggest possibilities that have not been fully tested. Although James habitually referred to F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey as if these thinkers were the chief exponents of pragmatism, he it was who quickened pragmatism into the movement which waned with his death, in 1910. The movement exhibited a vigorous life for a time, disclosing manifold variations and producing a considerable literature. Taking its clue from James, this movement was in the main anti-intellectual; opposed to any sort of static universe, to absolutism of any type, or any monism or singularism which assumed either one Substance or one Self, in the light of a theory of knowledge. Pragmatism also stood for naturalism, for "pure experience" of the type which, discounting consciousness, finds a clue in the behavior of the organism. Here too James had taken the lead by describing consciousness in terms of biology, also by raising the question whether consciousness even exists, namely, as an entity.⁸ Behaviorism as a movement in psychology is indebted to James at this point, also the "new realism" of American writers who have sought a description of objects as present in the world of space and time apart from the cognitive relation.

⁷ Cf. *Essays in Radical Empiricism*.

⁸ See, especially, the article, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?" in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Sept. 1, 1904.

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Other Types of Pragmatism.—Naturally, no two pragmatists have agreed, for each has essayed the philosophical enterprise anew, after James had made matters more difficult. In terms of "humanism," pragmatism becomes a new appeal to knowledge of human nature, its claims and values, as essentially a method, not a philosophy.⁹ John Dewey formulates his method in terms of "instrumentalism," which implies experimental uses assignable to the intellect, in logic, in education, the general conduct of life, the re-formulation of philosophy, and the possibility that America may sometime contribute other types of philosophy.¹⁰ Knowledge is here shown to be secondary, as a functional activity within experience. Emphasis falls on social philosophy and progress, with the hope that, through progressive formulations, the ends or purposes of existence will become more clear. Thus Dewey's works fall to a large extent outside pragmatism, in behalf of the educational movement and a philosophy of experience which recognizes relativism to the full.¹¹

A. W. Moore has given a popular exposition of the method in his *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, 1910. Writers of pragmatic types have found difficulty in making

⁹ See F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*, 1903; *Studies in Humanism*, 1907, 2nd ed. 1912. Schiller, who frequently contributes to *Mind*, belongs with the personal idealists in England.

¹⁰ See, especially, *Studies in Logical Theory*, 1903; *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, 1920; *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922.

¹¹ See *Democracy and Education*, 1916; *Experience and Nature*, 1925.

philosophical headway without passing over into the fields of materialism, realism, or personal idealism. Pragmatism as a motive is noticeable among writers of various types who have reacted against rationalism, or have tried to avoid constructive idealism. The difficulties increase for those who, having subordinated reason beyond hope, have circulated in spheres of thought even more restricted than that of subjective idealism.

A. O. Lovejoy analyzes Dewey's pragmatism as implying *either* idealism or dualism (both psycho-physical and epistemological), *not* a realistic or monistic doctrine of knowledge.¹² Examining pragmatism from the point of view of knowledge of the past, Lovejoy finds the pragmatist unwilling to class retrospection as true knowledge, unwilling to accept indirect verification. A consistent pragmatism endeavors to be "a philosophy of man as agent, and as reflective agent, in a physical and social environment." But the pragmatists have confounded their temporal categories, have failed to put the knowledge-situation in its temporal context; "have declared that truth must be an '*experienced* relation,' without asking the essential questions: experienced *when* and by whom?"¹³

Historical Position.—Pragmatism does not of course cease with the adverse judgments which have been passed upon it. It is at least as old as the humanism of the Sophists and the searching questions raised by Socrates when conversing with pretenders. It has varied with the types of philosophers; found recognition wherever empiricism has prevailed, notably in the philosophy of Locke and his successors, and in the "practical reason" of Immanuel Kant whenever Kant's ethical doctrine has been put to the test. Thus Fichte tried out this doctrine in one way, Hegel in another. Pragmatism especially follows from the stress which James puts on the activity and unity of consciousness, in the "stream of thought," with

¹² *Essays in Critical Realism*, Drake and other authors, Chap. II. In the *Journal of Philosophy*, 1908, Lovejoy indicates thirteen varieties of pragmatism.

¹³ *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 80.

the attention he gives to selective interest and biological considerations. Granted his description of the "feeling of tendency," amidst the substantive and transitive parts of this stream, one has every reason to follow the deliverances of experience to see whither they lead. For a thinker of his type, James' description will lead in the direction of the categories of interest and practice.¹⁴ A voluntaristic theory of knowledge will readily follow, with its distinction between knowledge *by acquaintance* and knowledge *about*. Hence the trend will be toward radical empiricism, with special attention given to the types of philosophers, with the resulting types of doctrine. Thus the pragmatic method may actually lead to a philosophy of the type which James would approve. But another type of thought would result from another attitude, and the pragmatic method would seem less significant to a thinker of the stamp of Josiah Royce, who was concerned with the "comparative morphology of concepts," trying out the several contestants to see what they would imply, as did Hegel when investigating the typical forms of consciousness in his *Phenomenology*.

Probably the chief result of pragmatic criticism of the philosophical systems is a certain alertness with respect to temperament or the "personal equation," which James has so persistently emphasized that for the moment a given system seems to be merely the philosopher's personality raised to the cosmic power. Thus it might be said that the optimism of Leibniz is Leibniz's love of harmony writ large, and projected into the universe in terms of "pre-established harmony." Again, Kant's dry scholastic temper is seen in the elaborate formalism of his *Critique*; the strong intellectualistic bias of Hegel is manifested in his elaborate rationalism; the voluntaristic bias of Schopenhauer is no less apparent.

One might however over-emphasize this consideration. The lesson of history is that one should discriminate between the real Plato or Aristotle, for example, and the several Platos and Aristotles of the ages of criticism. The

¹⁴ Cf. Weber-Perry, *His. of Phil.*, revised ed., p. 578.

real philosopher in each case was a great genius who belongs to the ages, whose definiteness of type made possible a great system. Possibly Leibniz disclosed a truer picture of the universe than Schopenhauer. Possibly the real Hegel is as unlike the alleged Hegels of the critics as the real Aristotle in contrast with the Aristotles of the Middle Ages. In the long run, the rationalists may be securer guides than thinkers in whom the will predominates. In any case, the student of the history of thought seeks to become aware of and to make allowances for all personal equations, as indeed in the special sciences there is a persistent effort to eliminate every subjective tendency. Fortunate indeed for the cause of truth is the sequence which gives us first Kant, for example, then Green, to be followed by Bradley, and forthwith by Bosanquet and Ward. Meanwhile, the lover of philosophy persistently seeks those principles which are essential to truth as a coherent system. The actual history of philosophy is a pragmatic test of the great systems.

In the end, the pragmatic and dialectical methods are not far apart. The progress of thought is not by direct lines but by zigzags, as one doctrine leads to its antithesis in an ensuing criticism, out of which emerges fresh effort. Certain antitheses have persisted from ancient times, notably the contrasts between Being and Becoming, the One and the Many. Thus the antithetical relation of Eleaticism and Heracliteanism continues in the polemic between absolutism and temporalism of recent decades. But history also discloses an effort to articulate the greater truths which have survived controversy in terms of the Idea (Plato). The greatness of philosophy is chiefly due to the thinkers who have most nearly succeeded in propounding a system. Its dialectic is largely due to those who, like Zeno, Hume, Bradley, and James, have raised penetrating objections. The problem for subsequent history is to assimilate the constructive principles by making allowances for the accidental, purely provincial or temperamental.

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§ 48. THE REALISTIC REACTION

Various types of realism appear in the modern period. Realism implies, in brief, the existence of external things in the given world of space, time, causality, the cosmic process being independent of presentations in our experience. A certain house, with its rooms, its contents, would be "out there" if no observer were present to perceive it. Thus in Locke's analysis of experience the primary qualities of things are said to inhere in the substratum of existents whether perceived or not. In Kant's doctrine, independent existence is assigned to things-in-themselves, even though these existents are unknown. For Herbart, the relations by which we commonly describe objects become contingent points of view, incidental to his Reals. For the Scottish school, the starting-point is the conviction common to mankind that an external world exists, that immediate certainty with its axioms is the basis of our knowledge. Accordingly, an object with its spatial relations is to be described as what it appears to be, with the implication that in knowing objects we go forth as it were to meet them without in any sense transforming things perceived or events noted. Realism in naïve or natural form seems to meet the situation until we undertake to explain error and illusion, and to account for the mechanism of sense-perception.

Recent realism has endeavored to become complete by refuting idealism, and attributing both primary and secondary qualities to things, together with all spatio-temporal relations requisite for a thoroughgoing description

and explanation of the mathematical, physico-chemical and other relations of things. It has usually postponed the effort to envisage the universe of minds and values in favor of a preliminary study of the relations of given objects, one of which is the cognitive relation. Realism as a reaction against idealism is a protest against the assumption that to be and to be known are one and the same. Idealism is charged, in brief, with "basing a false conclusion on a true proposition. The true proposition is, 'It is impossible to discover anything that is not known,' because it becomes known by the mere process of being discovered. From this proposition it follows that it is impossible to discover with certainty what characteristics things possess when they are not known. The idealist then proceeds falsely to conclude, 'Things have no characteristics when they are not known; therefore the characteristic of being known is that which constitutes their existence: therefore things only exist when they are known.'"¹ The one valid conclusion based on the foregoing proposition is a truism, namely, All things are known. Again, idealists err by identifying perceived objects with ideas; whereas, for realism, the objects of an act of thought should be distinguished from the mental act: mind has the power of knowing things other than itself.

The New Realism.—The new trend toward realism, which began in England with G. E. Moore's critique of idealism, took the form of an analysis of the assumption, "to be is to be perceived."² Idealism assumes that whatever is, is experienced; and is something mental. As an *argument* this is said to be faulty because the aspect of a thing which is inseparable from sentient experience is not what makes it real. Consciousness and the object of consciousness cannot be assumed to be identical, for example, the sensation of "red," and the *red thing* given in the field of perceived things. We have as good reason for supposing that material things exist as for believing we have sensations.

¹ Summary by Joad, *Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, p. 9.

² *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XII, 1903; included in *Philosophical Studies*, 1922.

For the "new realism" both in England and America things remain red or green, for instance, whether perceived or not; things imply energies, spatio-temporal relations, events, quantitative and other categories apart from the relatively negligible process of being known. The first essential is to avoid any confusion between the sense-datum and our awareness of it: the act which makes us aware of an object as red is not itself redness. Granted the objectivity which abandons the method of self-knowledge for that of general observation, what is mine may become yours (my friend, for example); minds belong to intersecting rather than to exclusive systems, and when I have told you what is in my mind then you know my mind directly: mind is open to mind through language.³ Thus is made possible a coalescence of content and convergence of action in a common object; there is nothing *in* my sensation that you cannot know, and nothing *about* it that you cannot know. When things are known they *are* ideas of the mind, they enter directly into mind. Ideas are only things in a certain relation, things in respect of being known are ideas.

American Neo-Realism.—Six of the American neo-realists stated their position in a co-operative volume, the chief propositions of which are these: "(1) the entities (objects, facts, etc.) under study in logic, mathematics, and the physical sciences are not mental in any proper or usual meaning of the word 'mental.' (2) The being and nature of these entities are in no sense conditioned by their being known. (3) The degree of unity, consistency, or connection subsisting among entities is a matter to be empirically ascertained. (4) In the present stage of our knowledge there is a presumption in favor of pluralism. (5) An entity subsisting in certain relations to other entities enters into new relations without necessarily negating or altering its already subsisting relations. (6) No self-consistent or satisfactory logic . . . so far invented countenances the 'organic' theory of knowledge or the 'internal' view of

³ Summary by an American realist, R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, 1912, p. 271.

relations. (7) Those who assert this (anti-realistic) view, use in their exposition a logic which is inconsistent with their doctrine."⁴ The primary condition of consciousness is one of acceptance of cerebral implicates or conscious contents at their face value and as bases for action: the brain event is the knower, what it implies is the known.⁵ An atomic theory of consciousness follows: consciousness wherever localized at all is not in the skull but *out there*, precisely wherever it seems to be.⁶ Granted these conclusions, the classic problems of knowledge disappear (as if solved) in a novel terminology, amid propositions which suggest materialism.

Russell.—Bertrand Russell, to whom the American realists are especially indebted, is acute and cautious; his doctrines have undergone changes which have removed them from all types of realism which come within the scope of brief summaries. Prominent in the field of mathematical logic, in which he is a leading and brilliant expert,⁷ Russell, after the World War, took up social and international problems, in an ardent controversy over the state of affairs in England, Russia, and China. The new doctrine of the infinite is introduced into his epistemological discussions, which are further complicated by the fact of the successive formulations of his theory of knowledge. The result is a doctrine which undertakes to avoid some kind of idealism while retreating farther from the external world.

In an earlier view Russell separated between (1) knowledge of acquaintance which yields (a) sense-data, (b) knowing minds, (c) universals; and (2) knowledge by description, which yields knowledge of physical objects.⁸ In his intermediate view, the centre of Russell's interest shifts from physical objects to sense-data, which are not

⁴ *The New Realism*, by Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin, Spaulding, 1912, p. 472.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 287, 295 (Montague).

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 351, 353 (Holt).

⁷ *Principles of Mathematics*, 1903; *Principia Mathematica* (with A. N. Whitehead), 1910, 1913.

⁸ *The Problems of Philosophy*, 1912; see Joad's summary, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

entities but "sensible objects" of which we are directly aware in sensation. A sensible object is not a thing, such as a table, but a patch of color, for example, momentarily seen, or the particular hardness noted when we press the table.⁹ The thing called "table" is a logical construction from the various sense-data noted in different connections. Russell now emphasizes the multiplicity of points of view from which sensible objects may be acquired; external reality is independent of these perspectives. A "private" world is a view from the standpoint of the sense-organs, the viewpoint of the given perceiver. A physical "thing" is an object given in one perspective, correlated with other objects in a system of perspectives. In the third exposition of our knowledge, the distinction between sensations and sense-data fades away, and "neutral particulars" (more primitive, neither mental nor material) come to the fore.¹⁰ These, taken in different contexts, give the subject-matter of psychology and physics; they are not affected by the circumstance of being known, are not known by a mind at all; there are no illusions of sense, but only those of our inferences. Since universals disappear, the constructive enterprise is limited to mere particulars. Russell retains the physical world amidst a complex of perspectives implying a common space as a logical construction of all private spaces.¹¹

An acute critic, venturing to interpret Russell, suggests that for Russell philosophy seems to be "concerned only with those logical relationships that belong to all possible worlds."¹² Hence a given concept is "defined in a way that shows only a remote connection with . . . familiar human meanings." Consequently, "Russell's own results are quite reckless in their disregard of what things are

⁹ *Our Knowledge of the External World (Scientific Method in Philosophy, American title)*, 1914.

¹⁰ *The Analysis of Mind*, 1921.

¹¹ The idea of "perspectives" is borrowed from Leibniz, who had the advantage of conceiving the great variety of points of view of his monads in terms of a constructive idea of the cosmos, prior to the present-day disparagement of human reason.

¹² Rogers, *English and American Phil. Since 1800*, p. 429, foll.

experienced as. . . The data out of which the external world is to be constructed are, not permanent objects, but those irreducible and momentary qualia into which, when he looks at an object, an observer's experience can be analyzed." Hence follows Russell's "doubtful thesis that the original objects of sense-perception are qualia, and not things."¹³ Another critic finds Russell's treatment of the physical aspect of sensations thoroughly inconsistent, and his treatment of perception highly confused: perception becomes ultimately atomic.¹⁴ Joad finds that Russell uses the methods of traditional philosophy to discredit those methods.¹⁵

Critical Realism.—The realistic situation is clarified by a group of seven American critical realists, in a co-operative study.¹⁶ This doctrine combines the view that the data of sense-perception are physical existents with the view that these data are psychological existents. The psychological starting-point alone proves to be as erroneous as the objective or physical, taken by itself. We are justified on practical grounds in accepting the instinctive belief in the existence of the physical world. Although all reasonable discourse makes realistic assumptions, biology, psychology, and logic require and justify realism as an assumption. We cannot indeed deduce any proof that the world exists; but, granted the world, the characteristics and relations of our data become "marvellously intelligible": in terms of character-complexes (essences, logical entities) following one another in the stream of consciousness we are able to develop our realistic view.

The situation, in brief, involves: (1) the outer object, (2) the conscious organism, and (3) the datum of perception, the character-complex (including traits which do not belong to the actual character of the object itself). The neo-realists overlook these character-complexes or essences

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 433, 439.

¹⁴ J. E. Turner, *A Theory of Direct Realism*, 1925, p. 121.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹⁶ *Essays in Critical Realism*, by Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellars, Strong, 1920.

which appear in perception, essences which are not my mental states, although mental states always exist when the sense-data appear. Granted messages coming from outer objects, for example, sounds referred to a given direction, we give attention at once to the objects, not to the mental states directly caused by these messages.

Rogers shows that the positive requirements of the thesis of Neo-Realism do not allow it to define error intelligibly or to find a place for it in the universe.¹⁷ Santayana offers three proofs of realism, showing that as all reasonable discourse makes realistic assumptions, these proofs are necessarily circular.¹⁸ To prove anything else, one must assume realism: biology, psychology, logic, require and fortify this assumption. Discussing knowledge and its categories, Sellars summarizes critical realism as affirming knowledge to be "a function of the knower rather than a peculiar, real relation between the knower and the known."¹⁹ "The time of knowledge is that of the act and not of the object." Strong shows that data are not the real things themselves, not psychological in their nature, not existences.²⁰ Data must then be distinguished from sensations "by the use of which they are given." The sensations are in time and perhaps space. But the data are not. Sensations alone are existences. Data are logical entities or essences. The datum of memory is also an essence. It is "present-as-absent." It is in space "here," in time "now," in mind as "given." Knowledge implies that we somehow virtually behold absent things, behold past and future, behold objects as existing separately from ourselves. Hence logical or essential identity becomes the "keystone of a correct theory of knowledge." A significant feature of this critical realism is that, qualities, being psychologically accepted as precisely what they appear to be, relations are irreducibly distinct from them; "relation is a truth *about*

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 224, 228, 230.

qualities. It could not *be* unless there were qualities to be related.”²¹

Joad finds that the analysis of perception offered by the critical realists precludes the possibility of any real knowledge of reality; the fact that perception takes place is attributed to the influence exerted by an alleged object on the brain, “an influence which causes the brain to project or imagine the characteristics of the object as its data”; and the theory “adopts a criterion of truth and error which though formally consistent can never be applied.”²² The resource seems to be to revert to naïve realism, since the plain man is right without knowing it.²³ The mind is in immediate contact and relation with the external material world, perception is in principle veridical. Turner finds himself driven to this position because, for one thing, critical realism leads to a dilemma, and denies the existential unity of sense-perceived content with physical reality.²⁴ Naïve realism proves however to be merely a starting-point. The constructive clue is found by understanding Hegel’s idealism, which Turner rehabilitates by meeting typical objections to it.²⁵ The term “Idea” is not for Hegel psychological: it “always denotes *objective* reality; although at the same time this objective reality must be apprehensible, *in its reality*, by the human mind, since it would otherwise be a mere unknowable thing-in-itself.” Turner distinguished three essential characteristics of the Hegelian Idea: “objective reality or existence, universal structure, and completeness; the term denotes, in short, the systematic existent whole of reality; and philosophy then becomes the investigation of this reality . . . the actual universe.”²⁶

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

²³ Turner, *op. cit.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Chap. XX.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

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§ 49. ALEXANDER'S REALISM

Alexander.—Whatever may be said about the shortcomings of any of these types of realism, realism is given its most complete reformulation and technically persuasive exposition in S. Alexander's profound work, *Space, Time and Deity*, 1920, a work which in point of view resembles the doctrines of the American realists and assimilates Russell's viewpoint of "perspectives," but also in a measure fulfils critical realism by systematically developing a fundamental conception or "essence."

The Cognitive Relation.—Alexander offers at the outset a theory of knowledge involving a psychology of will-acts which might be adopted by several types of realism, namely, by means of a distinction between (1) the act of mind or awareness, and (2) the object of which it is aware: perception is a process or act of contemplation in which the mind "enjoys" or *lives through* this activity in "com-presence" with the object.¹ I am, in brief, my mind and am conscious of the object; my mental acts constitute a continuum, continuous at each moment. The object also belongs in a continuum, in the context of the given world where objects are limited by and cohere with other objects. The awareness of the thing whereby I describe it is the synthesis of its appearances on different occasions. The object is a distinct existence, apart from the mind which contemplates it; it is thus "independent."

Alexander frankly admits that the term "object" is a question-begging word, the object being confessedly "selected for contemplation." But the main interest here is

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 11, foll.

to attribute the content of perception so far as possible to the thing perceived, the acts of perception being described as instances of awareness with reference to an experienced direction, for example, in the case of an auditory sensation referred to a piece of apparatus in front of the building which I just now occupy. Thus a congeries of sounds or a group of colored objects in various relations contribute the content of given perceptions in the instances in question. "My experience declares the distinct existence of the object as something non-mental . . . experience declares mind and things to be fellow-members of one world, though of unequal rank."² *Sensum*, percept, image, and thought are to be discriminated. As the object varies, so does the corresponding enjoyment or experience, however minutely. Contemplation of objects yields one phase of knowledge. The "enjoyment" is another phase. "I enjoy my sensing as an effect of the *sensum*, which is its object. . . . I enjoy myself as the effect of an object which acts on my senses. . . . We enjoy ourselves as permanent amid our changes."³ On the basis of the "assurance" given that external objects exist, sympathetic imagination supplies what is lacking, and a general world-view follows, based on the assumption of a union of spatio-temporal elements. Space and time, *given* for contemplation, "cannot be regarded as dependent on mind, though they may be concerned with the constitution of mind as well as of external things."

Space-Time.—Alexander's contribution to philosophy consists in a systematic analysis of the conception of space-time, adopted as the central conception in his world-view, including a scheme of values and an idea of deity. Space and time, ordinarily taken separately, are here taken to be interdependent, space in its very nature being temporal, and time spatial.⁴ Time and Space are the simplest characters of the world: there must needs be some continuum

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44, foll. The exposition is in Alexander's own words, quotation marks being omitted.

other than Time which can secure and sustain the togetherness of past and present. This other form of being is Space. Time is an object given to us empirically. Space cannot be except through indissoluble connection with Time: Time is discovered to supply the element in Space without which Space would be a blank; without Space there would be no connection in Time; without Time there would be no parts to connect. There is no instant of time without a position in space, and no point of space without an instant of time: a point *occurs* at an instant, an instant *occupies* a point. Point-instants or *pure events* in Space-Time or Time-Space in a one-many correspondence, Time being repeated in Space, Space repeated in Time: this is the elementary relation, at the bottom of our experience of empirical substances.

Order, arising out of the temporal character of positions in space, is fundamental; Space has three dimensions because Time is successive, irreversible, and uniform in one direction. Growth in Time, or the history of the Universe as a whole, is a continuous redistribution of instants of Time among points of Space. There is no empty space or empty time: Space is full of Time and Time is full of Space, each being a complete or perfect continuum. So too there is no immovable space: the universe *is* motion in its simplest terms. Space-Time being an infinite continuum of pure events, the universe in its completest terms is a growing universe and is through and through historical; its phases express its real life. Space is the assemblage of events which occur at the same moment of time, namely, a legitimate selection from the whole of Space-Time. The point-instant which is taken as the centre of reference is a perspective of Space-Time taken from that point of reference. At any moment of a man's history his body is a perspective at that instant of his whole life. Total Space-Time is the synthesis of all partial space-times or perspectives of Space-Time. Points of space which are simultaneous in one perspective may be successive in another.⁵

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

Events.—Mental or psychical time is the time in which the mind experiences itself as living, the time which it enjoys; while mental space is the space in which the mind experiences itself as living or which it enjoys.⁶ Mental time is a piece of the Time in which physical events occur. If mind is spatial, like matter, Space is as much in affinity with mind as it is with matter, and the fear of materialism is groundless. The space which we enjoy as occupied by our minds may also be contemplated as occupied by a physical thing. We also enjoy a time filled with mental events. My mind is somewhere within my body *in the same place* as the nervous system. The union of mind and body constitutes the one person. Personality is the persistent set of organized habits of action, thought, and feeling by which I am to be judged, by which I stand or fall. The body is a percept in which various *sensa* or sensed elements and corresponding ideational elements are revealed. The bodily person is the beginning and type of all forms of the self. The body is experienced as an instrument of the mind. Certain processes occurring in specific parts of the cortex are vital for a particular sort of mental event. The direction of a mental process is that of its specific anatomical or physiological path.

The pastness of an object is a datum of experience, directly apprehended, the object being compresent with me *as past*.⁷ The past object is appropriated as mine, as occurring in *my* past. The memory is as much a physical object as the percept. Memory itself is the only knowledge we have that there ever was something perceived.

The Categories.—Empirical things or existents are groupings of point-instants as bare events. Thus complexes of motions are differentiated within one all-encompassing system of motion. With certain of these groupings are correlated what we call qualities, such as materiality, life, color, consciousness. The pervasive characters of existents are the categories of experience, and may also be called the *a priori* or non-empirical characters, although

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 93, foll.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

this is a distinction within the characters of experienced things. The primary qualities are variations of the prerogative characters of things, the secondary are correlated with complexities in the primary qualities. Life is correlated with physical and chemical movements, which are themselves reducible to more elementary movements. Mind in turn is correlated with vital movements of a certain sort. The categories, as the groundwork of all empirical reality, are common to mind and to non-mental things, namely, as fundamental properties of Space-Time. The mind which is Kant's source of the categories has nothing whatever to do with the matter: mind is only a name for minds which are empirical things, like other empirical things, all being complexes of Space-Time stuff.⁸ Hegel's conception of an evolution of logical categories is mistaken, since there is only an evolution of categories which occupy space-times.

The continuity of Space-Time is something primordial and given in experience. Relations, as the spatio-temporal connections of things, are also in the end spatio-temporal complexes. Causality is the relation of continuity between one substance and another, the continuous passage of one motion or set of motions into a different one. The major categories are: existence, universality, relation, order.⁹ Next come substance, quantity, number, and similar categories constituting the second group; while motion forms the last or third group. Groups of characters belonging to empirical existents follow. Quality and change are omitted as categories, since these are empirical generalizations of various specific qualities of things; whereas quantity as such is a real determination of existents. Change is not pervasive, for there may be persistence without it. Within Space-Time as the matrix of things, everything has being and is a substance, every event has a cause, everything is related to something else by way of quantity or causality or difference or otherwise. Since things out-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

side are already causal, they are so apprehended by the mind.

Mental Processes.—Mind is experienced by us as a set of connected processes which have the character of being mental or the character of consciousness.¹⁰ Within this organization of processes also belong those vague and indistinct processes on the extreme margin of consciousness which are sometimes described as subconscious, such as the tone of the organic sensations when we are occupied with external events. But we experience also our bodies; experience leads us to connect our mental processes with our body, and in particular with our central nervous system. We are forced to go beyond the mere correlation of the mental with these neural processes and to identify them as not two but one: that which is experienced from the inside or enjoyed is a conscious process, is, as experienced from the outside, a neural one. It is to be accepted as an empirical fact that a neural process of a certain level of development possesses the quality of consciousness. A mental process is *also* a vital one of a certain order, *also* neural but not merely neural. The locality of the mental process is what chiefly makes it mental: without the specific physiological or vital constellation there is no mind. There is not necessarily a psychosis corresponding to each neurosis. But all psychoses are neuroses. Mental process may be expressible completely in physiological terms, but it is not merely physiological but *also* mental.

Mental process is something new, a fresh creation framed by nature out of certain physiological conditions. Mind is not however a mere epiphenomenon, since this theory would be false to empirical facts. Nor is parallelism as a theory acceptable; the theory of psycho-physical parallelism was devised to give expression to the alleged complete disparity of the merely physiological and the mental. Mind and brain may be said to interact if the phrase is properly interpreted: no brain process shall be understood to cause its corresponding mental process, no mental process

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 4.

to cause its corresponding brain process. Discontinuity of consciousness is possible, because a neural process may be replaced by a lower process not attended by consciousness: there may be unity of mind though the component processes are not connected at the conscious level. Other minds are apprehended, not by analogy, but by intercourse with them; knowledge of ourselves and that of other minds grows up together.¹¹

As empirical things in general come into existence because Space-Time of its own nature breaks up into finites, so mind appears, as the highest order of finite empirical existents.¹² A mind is the substantial continuum of certain processes which have the conscious quality. Cognition of objects is a case of the compresence of two finites when one of these finites is a mind: the act of mind is the cognition, the object is the cognitum, and the cognitive relation is the compresence between them. There is no mental act but is correlative to its non-mental object.

Values.—Truth, goodness, and beauty are tertiary qualities, not qualities of reality in the same sense as color, form or life: reality is not true or false; it is reality.¹³ Objects are illusory or unreal only in relation to the mind which believes them. Things are good only so far as we extract their goodness by using them to our purposes. Truth belongs to real propositions only in their relation to mind. Values imply the amalgamation of the object with the human appreciation of it. Beauty is felt; and good is the satisfaction of persons. Appreciations arise within the community of minds: there is no truth, goodness, or beauty in reality by itself: there is only reality. Reality cannot be either coherent or incoherent, but there is coherence in knowledge, amongst our perspectives. Values arise through the combination of mind with its objects. Truth is not tested by appeal to reality in the sense of correspondence: propositions made about the internal structure of reality are compared, and the group

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

which that structure allows to retain are truths.¹⁴ The rejection of error is performed at the guidance of reality through the clash of minds. True knowledge owes its truth to the collective mind, but its reality to the proposition which is judged.

God.—Primarily, God is defined as the object of the religious emotion or of worship correlative to that emotion (what we worship, that is God).¹⁵ Metaphysically, God is defined as the being, if any, which possesses the divine quality. Deity is the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing forth: deity is, like all other empirical qualities, a birth of Time and exists in time. Some quality in the purview of material things which lies ahead of material qualities has produced deity. We cannot tell what is the nature of our deity, but we can be certain that it is not mind, not spirit, but something different from it in kind. Yet God is *also* spirit, as well as living and material and spatio-temporal: spirit, personality, mind—all these human or mental characters belong to God, not to his deity but to his body. We indeed become aware of God through spirit. But God is not an all-inclusive mind: he is the whole world as possessing the quality of deity.¹⁶ Religion is an outgoing sentiment toward the whole universe in its process toward the quality of deity.¹⁷

Estimate.—The conception of the universe as constituted of a primordial stuff known as Space-Time enables one to envisage the modern world, with the changes that have intervened since Hobbes described reality as "body," and other philosophers construed it by appeal to extended substance and absolute space. Leibniz prepared the way for present conceptions by substituting "force" for matter, with his emphasis on the relativities of "perspectives" in

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

¹⁶ Alexander rejects pantheism, on the ground that individuality would be lost.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 402. Deity, for Alexander, is not then a value; nor an unmoved mover drawing the universe toward: deity is a product of the universe.

an all-inclusive system of monads. The developments of modern chemistry and physics first reduced material substances to molecules and atoms, then divided atoms into protons and electrons in a continuum of radiant energy, which is possibly electrical in character. Alexander intimates that Space-Time may be ultimately electrical; in any event space, once regarded as empty or as absolute, is in spatio-temporal terms everywhere occupied, motion is all-pervasive, events universally occur.

This conclusion accords with the newer doctrines of space and time, with the widely current view that there are not two sorts of relations, one which constitutes space and another which constitutes time; there is one relation differently analyzed by the observer into a spatial part and a temporal part. "Suppose," says Russell, "you travel from London to Edinburgh in eight hours; common sense would say that your departure from London and your arrival at Edinburgh were separated by two sorts of intervals, 400 miles in space and eight hours in time. It turns out however that this division into kinds of intervals would be differently made by an observer moving rapidly relatively to the earth, and does not represent any physical fact. . . . If all motion is relative, the distance between two places at different times depends upon the body to which the motion is referred. . . . Relatively to the fixed stars, you have travelled, not merely 400 miles, but all the distance covered by the earth in its orbit during eight hours. . . . Both space and time must be taken to be between *events*, but neither is between two events alone; each is relative to some standard string of events which can be interpreted as the motion of a body of reference. This is still within the physical world and does not involve a percipient. The only intrinsic quantitative relation between events is their spatio-temporal interval."¹⁸

So too Whitehead substitutes the conception of *events* for the Newtonian theory of absolute space and time. The mere reference to an event may be put in familiar language: "yesterday a man was run over on the Chelsea

¹⁸ Introd. to *Space, Time, Motion*, by Vasiliev, trans., xvii, xxii.

Embankment.”¹⁹ But such an event is a complex in which definite mutual relations between component events may be discerned with respect to their relative positions in nature, described as a “structure of events.” In the accounts given of the concrete facts of nature, we should distinguish between (1) different types of objects, (2) different types of situation, (3) different types of location, and (4) the difference between location and situation. Our knowledge of nature is in brief an experience of passage or activity with respect to events as both spatial and temporal; “space and time are each partial expressions of one fundamental relation between events which is neither spatial nor temporal.”²⁰ What we call an “object,” for example, the Chelsea Embankment, is an ingredient in the character of the event; and the theory of objects implies comparison of events. The perceptual object is the outcome of the habit of experience; it is not the product of the association of intellectual ideas, but the product of the association of sense-objects in the same situation. The unit-factor which we perceive in nature is that “something is going on then-there.”²¹ Granted (1) the bare fact, the undifferentiated terminus of sense-awareness, (2) the factors which enter into our sense-awareness (which yields something which is not thought), we may (3) proceed to consider the factors in their function as the termini of thought.

Thus Whitehead explicitly differentiates the event, to avoid any confusion between events and our apprehension of them. An event, in brief, is the “grasping into unity of a pattern of aspects. . . . It is in this endurance of pattern that time differentiates itself from space. The pattern is spatially *now*; and this temporal determination constitutes its relation to each partial event. . . . The importance of space as against time, and of time as against space, has developed with the development of enduring organisms.”²² Thus internal relatedness is intelligible in

¹⁹ A. N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, 1920, p. 165.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 185.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

²² *Science and the Modern World*, p. 174,

terms of the event, spatio-temporal relations being no longer "external." The idea of the "organism" takes the place of "matter."²³ Granted the "event" as the starting-point in our description of nature, the cognitive situation becomes more explicit in terms of "sensa" and different "acts of sensing."²⁴ Knowledge being essentially a mediating process between mind and objects, both mind and nature are left as they were before, when the new realism has done its work. Mind is free to interpret the objects cognized in terms of predicates which are well understood in their proper connection. Thus in terms of "critical realism" consciousness retains its structure: the self is attentive (at one pole of the field of consciousness) to discriminations, meanings, constructive conceptions; and at the other is absorbed in the act of knowing objects in the environing world.²⁵

Criticism.—While Alexander's realism clarifies the whole field of naturalism, and makes vivid the relativism of recent science, it leaves rationalism in possession of the field. For the last word uttered by this new realism concerning the knowledge-process is that mental states take the "direction" pursued by the neural organism: the implications of consciousness are not developed, the meanings of the "self" are not co-ordinated, and no world-ground is offered as the basis of qualities, notably those attributable to mind and to deity. If, as one critic suggests, qualities discoverable in the universe are different in kind after all, what Alexander offers is a world of one sort developing into a world of a very different sort from that of Space-Time as the sole reality.²⁶ The difficulty of the situation is shown, for example, in Alexander's discrimination between the kinds of knowing, contemplative knowledge and enjoying, to which Alexander later adds the qualification of "assurance" eked out by sympathetic imagination.²⁷ Knowledge in its *proper* sense proves to be "cases where

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

²⁴ Cf. C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought*, 1923, p. 384.

²⁵ Cf. R. W. Sellars, *Journal of Philosophy*, April 28, 1927.

²⁶ Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

²⁷ *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 37.

one of the compresent elements is an 'act of awareness.' This however is to attach the peculiar differentia of knowledge to the internal structure of the knowing act, where it indeed seems naturally to belong."²⁸ So too another critic, trying to picture the universe with deity emerging as the next higher empirical quality, and all finite existences as generated from Space-Time by "emergence," concludes that to deny this is materialism is to equivocate.²⁹ How can a mind, for example, "be said to act *as such*, if it be merely the awareness of a neural process? The neural process is physico-chemical, and therefore the real agent is physical." Again, errors and illusions are still unexplained, if minds are "*merely* physical complications." On the assumption that Space-Time is absolute, what right have we to speak of one set of qualities as "higher" than others? Leighton thinks it better to dispense with the terms deity and God altogether, in such a world-view. Meanwhile, he is unable to see that "the whole world of human and spiritual culture can be regarded as merely an emergence from, or complication of, so thin and poor a motion-stuff as Space-Time."³⁰

§ 50. CONCLUSION

The New Rationalism.—The realistic reaction has clarified the cognitive situation by its critique of idealism. Its point of view is thoroughly objective, on the assumption that things in the external world are independent of the fact that they are known. It holds to the hypothesis that quality can be explained by quantitative arrangements, even though the introduction of quality as a category should seem more widely explanatory. It clings as resolutely to naturalism, stopping short of a reconstruction of principles and values which naturalism can scarcely consider without becoming transformed into another doctrine.

²⁸ Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

²⁹ J. A. Leighton, *The Field of Philosophy*, p. 299.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 300.

Meanwhile, rationalism as a synthesis of principles essential to a complete philosophy of the universe, is better equipped to begin where the various types of realism come to a pause. The critical realists, for example, found difficulty in agreeing sufficiently for purposes of their co-operative volume; for each had his way of advancing to a more complete view. Thus Strong advocates a type of panpsychism which invites comparison with the doctrines of Paulsen, McDougall, and Ward. So, too, Santayana expounds the "life of reason" in which his poetic materialism is all the while surpassing itself, as if nature destined him for idealism.¹ Recent philosophy may be said to approximate a rationalism which shall co-ordinate in one system the principles which have borne the test of time.

Thus Spaulding contends that the types of philosophy are reducible to two, and that these tend toward a system which he outlines by analyzing the leading conceptions of those types. Hence Spaulding, free from the realistic preconceptions which narrow the vision, endeavors to be true to the self, with its rights and privileges, as well as faithful to "things" in space and time. The knowing situation is, in brief, "of such a character that the knowing process neither causally affects, modifies, or creates that which is known, nor demands an underlying entity to mediate the relationship between knowing and its object."² There are on the one hand existents (particularized temporally and perhaps spatially), and what Spaulding calls "subsistents" or entities that are neither physical nor mental, including universals and ideals, for example, justice, numbers. Analysis is from this point of view valid: the thing analyzed is not created, altered, or modified by the analysis; and the wholes are to be accepted as entities that are "discovered." Logic being "an empirical science, one accepts various types of relations, of classes, of series, and of functions."³ The result for this "new rationalism," of-

¹ *The Life of Reason*, 1905; *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, 1927.

² E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism*, 1918, p. 11.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

ferred as the "basic system, philosophical realism," is a "pluralism of many entities, of many kinds, in many different relations, at many different loci," as the only ontology which stands the test of empirical investigation, such an ontology being also a cosmology.⁴ In this philosophy there is place for both the existence and the subsistence of values, for example, just acts and justice. Values are regarded as "real parts of the *objective* world, external to and independent of not only their being perceived, and appreciated, but also independent of the bodily organism. Justice, beauty, and truth do not themselves change, but "remain eternal, quite outside time and space," in a realm of values "not subject to the stresses and strains of this slowly evolving earth."⁵

Types of Order.—By admitting the subsistence of entities, essences, or some other type of principle required by realism, in order to press forward to completion; and by substituting the new logic of the forms and types of order, in place of the old logic of classification, thinkers of realistic persuasion have met constructive idealism on common ground. This is in a measure the ground of Plato's idealism (also a realism). The forms, categories, and types of order are those discovered by the thinker in the field of his special investigations. Thus Plato, by aid of definitions, "gets at the essence, at the 'Idea,' at the type, which special instances exemplify, and [definition] depends on taking the universal as such, and upon bringing it to our knowledge with clearness."⁶ Hence Plato's methodology follows from what the definition of concepts has disclosed, the result being that the universals or Ideas form a system.

"(1) The realm of the Universals or 'Ideas' is essentially a System, whose unity and order are of the first importance for the philosopher. (2) Inference is possible because truths have momentous objective relations, definable precisely in so far as the process of inference is de-

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

⁶ Royce, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Vol. I, p. 70.

finable. (3) The 'Order and Connection' of our rational processes, when we follow the right method, is a sort of copy of an order and connection which the individual thinker finds, but does not make . . . [That is, the thinker *finds*] a new realm—a realm of types, of forms, of relations. . . . Without objects conceived as unique individuals, we can have no Classes. Without classes we can . . . define no Relations, without relations we can have no Order. But to be reasonable is to conceive of order-systems, real or ideal."⁷

Granted the objectivity of relations for which realism pleads, it is a question of developing the various types of order, as many as may be needed to be true to the universe as a whole. It seems immaterial whether the resulting doctrine be called rationalism or idealism. In either case the implication is that complete knowledge of the universe would show it to be rational. Until our knowledge shall be complete, philosophers will distinguish between their still unfinished systems and the order of reality in its system which calls for both the world of description and the world of appreciation. The idealist maintains that whatever objects and principles may yet be brought within the scope of our knowledge will be such that it can be correlated with the consciousness of self.⁸ "It is not maintained that there is no reality which is not thought by us, but only that the reality which we know is thought reality."⁹ Our concepts embody the distinguishable aspects of the real world in a progressive unification. It is not assumed that our thought or consciousness constitutes or modifies the world.

Modern philosophy, as an enterprise to be pursued by a group of thinkers, each a specialist in his own field, is therefore for the most part a comparative study of concepts, the wealth of whose meaning increases with our knowledge. Whitehead and Russell, for example, are representatives of modern mathematicians concerned with the

⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 71, 107; italics omitted, in part.

⁸ J. Watson, *Christianity and Idealism*, 1897, p. 137.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

comparative study of concepts in their field, each with a devotion to "Number" reminding us of Pythagoras and Plato, each thereby intimating that there is a realm of Ideas.¹⁰ Others admit us into the universe of discourse of temporalism, with suggestive comparisons of various types of thought which remind us of the doctrines of Fouillée, Bergson, James, Dewey, as well as Alexander's Space-Time philosophy.¹¹

Again, within a more restricted field, it becomes a question of such a point of view as C. Lloyd Morgan's doctrine of evolution as the pyramidal supervening of new emergent qualities in progressively ascending grades; with life emerging from matter and mind from life, in the long enrichment of the world through the advent of new qualities at successive levels.¹² The theory of evolution has become more technically precise, with recent contributions; for instance, the four factors of the fundamental law of life, noted by Osborn: the inorganic environment, the developing organism (protoplasm and body-chromatin), the germ of hereditary chromatin, and the life-environment.¹³ Granted (1) the law of continuity; (2) the law of rectigradation, under which many important new characters appear definitely and take an adaptive direction from the start; and (3) the law of acceleration and retardation in racial and individual development, by which each character has its own velocity or rate of development,¹⁴ it is then a problem to account for variations in sudden leaps, not by an "original impetus of life" (Bergson).¹⁵

Religious Conceptions.—Turning to another field, we find that the comparative study of religions, the philosophy of religion, and the psychology of religion are enriching our knowledge, each with its special literature. Thus a

¹⁰ Cf. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, 1926; Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 1919.

¹¹ See Leighton, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXI.

¹² *Emergent Evolution*, 1923.

¹³ H. F. Osborn, *The Origin and Evolution of Life*, p. 21.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 251, 252.

¹⁵ Cf. J. E. Boodin, 1925, *Cosmic Evolution*, p. 27.

new literature began with James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*. The trend is toward recognition of types of religion, types of religious experience, with a philosophy of religion either separating itself from metaphysics or tentatively suggesting a spiritual world-view.

Typical of the view which avoids metaphysics as far as possible is Höffding's significant work, *The Philosophy of Religion*, with its careful delimitation of the field left to religion (since Kant's time), now that religion cannot be said to "comprehend" existence but rather to *conserve values*.¹⁶ Granted such delimitation, it becomes a question of the concepts which most nearly meet our religious need in envisaging what Höffding calls the "law-abiding inter-connection which holds the world together from within."¹⁷ Can we any longer say that the basis of law is a First Cause localized in space? No, the terms "above" and "below" are now purely symbolical: spiritual things are no longer conceived in spatial terms. Shall we adhere to the dualism of (1) life as historical development and (2) eternal life as already present, with (3) a tension of relation between them? No, this is the "worst of dualisms": work and development should have immediate or present value. If we regard God and the world as two different beings, the result will be a never-ending series, not a principle which makes the construction possible. We cannot deduce the manifold from unity, the world from God, imperfection from perfection, the mutable from the immutable: neither creation nor emanation suffices. God as the absolute unchangeable ground of continuous change is unthinkable. So too religious ideas drawn from analogy fail.¹⁸ Figurative ideas of God as "King," "Lord," "Father," fall short; even personality as an analogy fails at the essential point, since it is drawn from the idea of the finite ego (a single member of the great world-order). Ideas of force, life, substance, failing us, we hesitate between figurative and literal conceptions. But whatever

¹⁶ Tr. by B. E. Meyer, 1906.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

the shortcomings of our religious ideas, *religious experience remains*, with its presuppositions of life, truth, beauty, goodness, namely, as an experience of the relation between value and reality. Here indeed there is a stable and continuous direction of mind, in which, for Höffding, the stress falls on ethical ideas, with opportunity for spiritual culture *in this world*, amidst a decisive faith in present values, discovered and produced in the world of experience.¹⁹

Each disciple of philosophy will therefore supplement his progressively changing views of the modern world, as he adjusts his thought to the latest deliverances of science,²⁰ by adding the values which constitute his ethics and religion, his philosophy of art and history, in relation to his First Philosophy. If religion on its practical side is the faith which develops character, "cleansing the inward parts," on its doctrinal side it "requires a metaphysical backing; for its authority is endangered by the intensity of the emotions which it generates."²¹ Although religious experience cannot be said to contribute to metaphysics or yield "any direct evidence of a personal God in any sense transcendent or creative," it is compatible with a view of the universe which is through and through interdependent. Thus, in Whitehead's terms, "The body pollutes the mind, the mind pollutes the body. Physical energy sublimates itself into zeal; conversely, zeal stimulates the body. The biological ends pass into ideals . . . and the formation of standards affects the biological facts. The individual is formative of the society, the society is formative of the individual. Particular evils infect the whole world, particular goods point the way of escape."²² For Whitehead logical coherence, adequacy, and exemplification are the tests of accuracy leading the way to the "realm of ideal entities"; while God, "including in himself a synthesis of the total universe . . . is the measure of the aesthetic con-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 323, 381.

²⁰ For example, the quantum theory, with the investigation of discontinuity in contrast with traditional views of continuity; see Oliver Lodge, *Science of Today*, 1927.

²¹ Cf. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 5, foll.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

sistency of the world." Here, as with Höffding, the attainment of value in the temporal world is first. But, unlike Höffding and Alexander, Whitehead grants us a vision of God as the completed ideal harmony, as the ground antecedent to transition, the divine goodness determining every possibility of value. The ideal world of conceptual harmonization and the idea of God here coincide in one system which transcends the temporal world: God becomes *an actual being*, an actual fact in the nature of truth as "that function in the world by reason of which our purposes are directed." Since God is the binding element in the world, we are granted a positive metaphysic; the consciousness which is individual in us being universal in God, the love which is partial in us is all-embracing in God, who, when the last word is uttered is not the world, but the valuation of the world."²³ Meanwhile, as the comparison of religious concepts is but one of the several special enterprises in the philosophical field, modern philosophy resolves itself for the time being into more acute analysis of its types and problems, with an increased output of works on the Introduction to Philosophy.²⁴

The External World.—Meanwhile, if we have accepted the modern psychological description of knowledge for the most part, in place of Kant's elaborate apriorism, we may simplify the knowledge-situation with respect to the external world by adopting Mill's excellent phraseology. Mill showed that when referring to a given thing, we have in mind, not some *one* sensation, but a great number and variety of sensations in their linkage, so that the presence of one suggests the rest.²⁵ One refers, for instance, to the Chelsea Embankment as a "permanent possibility of sensation," whenever one may visit London, follow a certain

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

²⁴ Cf. G. W. Cunningham, *Problems of Philosophy*; J. A. Leighton, *The Field of Philosophy*; G. T. W. Patrick, *Introduction to Philosophy*; E. S. Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy*; W. Windelband, *Introduction to Philosophy*, trans.; M. W. Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*; W. H. Sheldon, *The Strife of Systems and Productive Duality*.

²⁵ J. S. Mill, *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 238.

sequence of space-time events leading thither, and indicating the embankment in its proper place, announce (with the pragmatists) 'This is the thing I mean.' From repeated experiences of the same types of objects, we reflectively acquire our belief in the permanent possibilities of sensation, the possibilities being much more real for us than this or that actual sensation, visual or tactual.

The external world is for us, from moment to moment, what Mill calls the "permanent background" to any one or more of the sensations, to any of the "events" which Whitehead and Russell describe. Pressing our thought of this background as far as we are conceptually able in modern terms, we reject the idea of a permanent "substance" as substance was regarded in the eighteenth century; we refer to a piece of matter as a group of events belonging, for example, to an electron at one place in space-time, motion being "a string of events connected with each other according to the laws of motion."²⁶ Contenting ourselves with an object as experienced by means of the organism, we note that our idea of the "permanent background" assumes certain differences which distinguish it from a particular sensation. The groundwork of sensation is readily forgotten. "We can withdraw ourselves from any of our (external) sensations, or we can be withdrawn from them by some other agency. But though the sensations cease, the possibilities remain in existence; they are independent of our will, our presence, and everything which belongs to us. We find, too, that they belong as much to other human or sentient beings as to ourselves. We find other people grounding their expectations and conduct upon the same permanent possibilities on which we ground ours. . . . The world of possible sensations succeeding one another according to laws is as much in other beings as it is in me; it has therefore an existence outside me; it is an external world."²⁷

The Moral Universal.—Thus too I pass from the simplest moral experience, determined by potential relationship to

²⁶ Cf. Russell, *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Jan., 1927, p. 24.

²⁷ Mill, *ibid.*, p. 241.

the moral law, and attain a conception of what we may call the *permanent possibility of moral experience*. That morals change is a truism. The morality of a people deeming slavery "right" gives place to a morality which judges slavery to be "wrong," with higher values assigned to human personality. Meanwhile, the moral law endures, the law, namely, that there shall be law. The moral law is not an entity, like a table. It is neither abstract nor static: it is concrete, dynamic. Ethical philosophers seldom venture to formulate it as if it implied duty for duty's sake, or loyalty to loyalty as such; instead, they show that it has meaning in relation to *deeds*, for example, in favor of the rights of man in a given nation, at a given stage of development. It is made effective by quickening the individual to see that the right depends partly upon him. As lawgiver, the self discloses the law which is above me by also showing me that it is my duty to obey it amidst the conditions which life bestows upon me: without the individual the moral universal would not become concrete. Meanwhile, ideas with reference to *what is right for me to do* vary as greatly as the Copernican astronomy in contrast with the Ptolemaic, or the modern conception of the organism in contrast with the "*homme machine*" of the French Enlightenment. As a world-view is always possible amidst the changing conceptions of science, so moral conduct is not only possible but imperative amidst changing conventions. I make the moral law my own by acquiring a concept of it, as (with Croce) I write history by entering into sequences of events creatively to discern their connected significance. It is a question then of developing the implications of the moral universal in its own field, with its own type of order; then a problem of comparison between the fields of ethics, metaphysics, the philosophy of religion, and other disciplines, each with its typical conceptions.

The Spiritual Order.—Is there a spiritual order, as a permanent possibility of spiritual or religious experience? Is there a higher order which is the "place" of the eternal values? Shall we say that the City of God is a reality?

These questions take us beyond the range of decisive philosophy into the sphere of over-beliefs. Our history at least permits us to say that the self is the locus of values.²⁸ All through modern philosophy we find thinkers who, changing from the traditional point of view of bondage to "things" in comparison with which minds are half-spent products, look from within outward. Thus, for Descartes, "thinking substance" is real in the light of the implications of self-consciousness, which has a world of its own. Spinoza's philosophy culminates in his higher type of knowledge, his intellectual love of God which lifts him above limitations to the viewpoint of eternity. Leibniz envisages the life of the self-conscious monad from within, in the light of individual perspectives such that space and time are ideal. Berkeley's spiritual realism is fundamental to and wider in scope than his idealistic theory of knowledge seems to imply. Kant profoundly emphasizes the unity of the ego, with the postulates of practical reason supplementing his world of pure reason. Fichte starts and remains with the ego, formulating his doctrine of the ego and the moral order. Schelling, Hegel, Lotze, and Eucken contribute their variations of post-Kantian idealism. In France, the essentially vague "spiritualism" of the earlier period of nineteenth century thought gives place to various expressions of idealism or personalism in the later period. In England, Green pleads for a spiritual principle underlying nature and man; and other philosophers for a cosmos of persons, a realm of ends, a society of individuals, or a new monadism, with reminders of Leibniz, Lotze, and of Hegel's idealism. The same types of thought appear in America.

The general implication of this trend of thought through the modern centuries may be said to be the assumption that *the identity of the self as will and intellect is not a product of matter*, does not cease to exist with the interruptions of consciousness. The self is the ground of permanent possibilities of experience—in relation to nature, in moral thought and conduct, in the field of religion, the

²⁸ Cf. Leighton, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXVII.

sphere of values. It persists through changes of state and various functions. It is not only the locus of values but the permanent possibility of intuitions, as intuition has been described from Plato to Croce and Bergson. It includes "character" as the increasingly permanent possibility of moral conduct of certain types. Finally, it is essentially "social" in the sense in which this term has been used by Green, Ward, McTaggart, Royce, and other thinkers, including social psychologists, who have widened the scope of all our thinking concerning the self. It is no longer "lost" or "absorbed" into an all-knowing "Absolute." It persists as a real individual regarded from the standpoint of some kind of pluralism.

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